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ABSTRACT
Two puzzles dominate the study of organizational learning and counterinsurgency. First,
militaries often struggle to develop effective strategies to address the problem of
counterinsurgency. Second, their strategic performance seldom improves over successive
counterinsurgency campaigns. This study offers a theoretical explanation for these
dominant patterns of learning dysfunction. It argues that a set of closely held,
professional beliefs - the military operational code - and bureaucratic preferences distort
the organizations' initial response, subsequent adaptation and interwar retention. The
military operational code leads militaries to misunderstand counterinsurgency in a
systematic and debilitating fashion; bureaucratic interests lead them to reject the most
effective strategies once they have been uncovered. When militaries manage to break
with this dysfunctional pattern, it because their professional judgment is constrained; high
civilian participation and/or resource scarcity force often force militaries to adopt
political strategies that are less congenial but more effective in restoring state authority.
This study tests the theory against six empirical cases: Indochina, the Indochina-Algeria
interlude, Algeria, British Palestine, Malaya, and Thailand. These cases strongly suggest
that the dysfunctional learning patterns are the product of broadly shared, professional
beliefs and bureaucratic interests rather than the common, alternative explanations based
on experience, culture or normative and material constraints.
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Puzzles and Punch Lines
The Puzzles
Why do militaries struggle to develop effective counterinsurgency strategies?
Why doesn't their performance improve across successive counterinsurgency campaigns?
The first puzzle involves a conspicuous failure to adapt in wartime; the second an
inability to retain hard won lessons in peacetime. Taken together, these two puzzles are
at the heart of past and present debates on counterinsurgency. Across time and national
traditions, the most skilled and professional armies of their day have often labored and
lost against insurgent forces that were demonstrably inferior in weaponry, training and
sophistication. Even in those instances where they have defeated their insurgent
opponents, military establishments have been wont to "forget" the very strategies that
brought them success. Why?
Militaires have faltered in all three stages of adaptation: their initial response to
counterinsurgency, intrawar adaptation, and interwar learning and retention. Most
respond to insurgency by mounting conventional military operations against their guerilla
opponents - a faithful application of the historically established "worst practices" of
counterinsurgency.' Nor have they proven more adept at overcoming these initial
missteps. Instead, intrawar adaptation to counterinsurgency has been slow, costly,
distorted, incomplete and impermanent. In spite of considerable investments of
resources, effort and time, militaries have often failed to make appreciable headway
towards their stated objective: the restoration of a durable, low cost political order. Even
I owe Barry Posen this turn of phrase.
when militaries have derived valid insights from their experience, they have generally
failed to retain, let alone build upon them. Instead, militaries have celebrated the end of
such campaigns by purging many of these lessons. Far from improving their
performance across conflicts, professional militaries appear doomed to relive the same
tortured progression of inappropriate response, delayed strategic search, errant choice and
postwar purge.
Many scholars and practitoners have noted these regularities but few have offered
convincing general explanations. 2 In some quarters, learning failure has been dismissed
as an illustration of the general adaptive weakness of all military organizations; all
militaries are inept learners; their scale, hierarchy, homogeneity, insularity and lassitude
of these organizations impair learning in all contexts. Others have argued that the
problem is the novelty of the task. Modern armies are highly specialized organizations
trained to wage conventional war, and hence maladroit response and slow adaptation to a
new task should not be surprising. Still others have singled out the role of flawed priors;
militaries fail to adapt to counterinsurgency because they apply the wrong ideas to this
variety of conflict.
While plausible, these explanations, on closer examination, remain incomplete
and unsatisfying. Intrawar and interwar adaptive performance in conventional, interstate
war does vary. While it is true that certain militaries have struggled to innovate within
the conventional realm, the regularity of learning failure in counterinsurgency is striking.
2 Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (New York: Praeger, 1966); Frank Kitson, Low
Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency &Peacekeeping (New Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 1992); Roger
Trinquier, La guerre moderne (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1961); Thomas R. Mockaitis, British
Counterinsurgency, 1919-1960 (London: Macmillan, 1990); Thomas R. Mockaitis, British
Counterinsurgency in the post-imperial era (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995); Ian F.W.
Beckett, Modem Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerillas and their Opponents since 1750
(London: Routledge, 2001); Hew Strachan (ed.), Big Wars and Small Wars: The British army and the
lessons of war in the twentieth century (Routledge, 2006).
Nor is it true that counterinsurgency is novel in any historical sense. Far from being new
or rare, insurgency, even in its recognizably modern form, has been prominent problem
facing military establishments since at least the late eighteenth century.3 War, in all its
forms, is a rare event, but insurgency is no more uncommon than conventional war; it is
less a "bolt from the blue" than a periodic and foreseeable natural disaster - the
proverbial thirty or fifty year hurricane. The observation that priors distort learning is
valid but maddeningly incomplete. Where do these priors come from? Why do they
persist in the face of contradictory evidence? Why are militaries unable to recognize and
overcome these flawed priors?
The Argument
I argue that the stereotype of military organizations as insensitive to the task
environment of counterinsurgency is false. Far from being inert, militaries do change in
response to counterinsurgency. The central question is not whether militaries learn; it is
what they learn, what they retain, and why. I argue that a combination of professional
beliefs and bureaucratic preferences distort organizational learning, making much of what
armies learn from their counterinsurgency experience irrelevant or counterproductive.
Their strategies and investments consume finite resources and time but do not bring the
state any closer to its political objective - the restoration of a political order that can
survive the removal of large numbers of military forces.
3 This is a conservative estimate of the novelty of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The British
campaigns in the American Revolution and the Napoleonic campaigns in the Vend6e, Spain, and Calabria
are clearly recognizable examples of modern counterinsurgency. The case could be made that rebellion is
as old as organized government, making the problem as old as man. That said, the differences in levels of
political mobilization do make a rough distinction between modern and pre-modern cases meaningful.
Militaries misunderstand counterinsurgency, seeing in the violent political
struggle the familiar outlines of interstate war. Once they have framed counterinsurgency
in these terms, they embark on a frustrating journey from conventional response to
political war. When, after much wasted effort, they come to understand what is
necessary to win, they develop a strong distaste for the answer. The organizational
changes that maximize the chances of success impinge on the autonomy, resources and
prestige of the military institution. While militaries may be willing to put up with
unpalatable changes under wartime pressure, the end of the campaign signals the
beginning of a vigorous organizational backlash. Learning failure in counterinsurgency
is a two step, with misunderstanding followed by revulsion.
The Dominant Pattern: Models 1, 2, and 3
Military learning in counterinsurgency follows a predictable and dysfunctional
pattern. First, militaries tend to devote more energy to the refinement of existing
solutions than to the search for effective strategy; in most cases, the exploitation of
familiar routines becomes a substitute for strategic exploration.4 Second, when militaries
do engage in strategic search, their prior beliefs and preferences distort that search. Their
strategic choices fall into one of three categories. The most common response to
insurgency is to wage a "small war" against the rebels (Model 1), an approach that
produces gratifying tactical military successes but campaign stalemate. Most militaries
respond to this paradox of micro-success and macro-stalemate by exploitation - the
refinement of existing military routines and the investment of greater manpower and
4 James G. March, "Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning," Organization Science, Vol.
2, No. I (February 1991).
capital. When exploitation fails to unlock stalemate, they shift from an attack on the
rebels to an attempt to control the population (Model 2). This new and explicitly political
war demands new weapons and new targets; militaries develop psychological and
economic weapons and to control the behavior of several audiences - the local
population, their own forces, the domestic population, and the enemy. The great appeal
of this new formula is its compatibility with the familiar paradigm of battle. Militaries
can incorporate political considerations without overthrowing their core problem solving
paradigm. If politics is simply war by other means, then militaries can use new political
weapons to batter or bribe new targets into submission. Too often, the application of
Model 2 leads to a costly, new plateau. Military forces may control local politics through
the application of incentives, but they are unable to step away without the structure
collapsing.
Model 3 recasts counterinsurgency as a problem of violent negotiation. Though
Model 3 strategies may share routines with Models 1 and 2, its underlying assumptions,
logic and goals of Model 3 are dramatically different. Models 1 and 2 assume that the
counterinsurgency forces can dictate outcomes through the exercise of coercive force
against rebels and the population. By contrast, Model 3 assumes that the
counterinsurgency forces have limited agency and that the population is an actor rather
than a target. According to this reasoning, counterinsurgency forces can impose coercive
control, but cannot construct a lasting political order without the consent of the governed.
The shift in emphasis from coercive control to consensual authority thrusts the military
into the unfamiliar and distasteful realm of two-way politics. For most militaries,
negotiating while fighting smacks of weakness and the intrinsic ambiguity of negotiation
only exacerbates the problem of measuring campaign performance.
While Model 3 offers militaries the greatest chance of lasting success, it is the
least frequently chosen and the most rapidly jettisoned. To reach it, they must overcome
two distinct unlearning hurdles; they must recognize the limits of "small war" against the
rebels (Model 1), and then the limits of one-way politics in restoring low cost, state
authority (Model 2). To make the leap from a Model 1 starting point to a Model 3
strategy requires two epiphanies and two rounds of political re-education. When
militaries adopt Model 3 strategies, they do so grudgingly; these foreign strategies are
frequently discarded as soon as more palatable alternatives are again possible.
When they adopt Model 3 strategies, it has less to do with professional judgment
than with material or organizational constraints on military choice. Extreme resource
scarcity can rule out the preferred small war and political war strategies, leaving military
leaders few alternatives to violent bargaining or negotiation. In other cases, extensive
civilian participation in counterinsurgency strategy can force alternative interpretations of
campaign performance and hasten the move from Models 1 and 2 to Model 3.
Progress from Models 1 to 2 to 3 is ephemeral. The further militaries move from
the core constructs of counterinsurgency as battle, the greater the pressure to revert to
Model 1 when circumstances permit. Even in the course of a single counterinsurgency
campaign, the provision of additional resources or autonomy can lead military decision
makers to abandon Model 2 and Model 3 strategies in favor of the more familiar Model 1
construct.
Beliefs, Preferences and Task Pressure
What produces this particular pattern of dysfunctional learning? Two sets of
pressures, one cognitive and the other bureaucratic, distort the timing, order and extent of
search. The core beliefs or dominant logic5 of the military profession - the military
operational code (MOC) 6 - influences choice in predictable and largely
counterproductive ways. This bundle of causal and normative beliefs is the foundation of
effective performance in conventional war. At its core is a problem solving model based
on coercion and battle - the one-way, application of force to compel submission. The
military operational code also provides a set of simple, valid, and highly reliable
indicators of task performance. The MOC has proven so effective over time that
militaries assume it is a general guide to action in all cases of mass violence.
The MOC distorts organizational learning in three ways. First, it invites
inappropriate initial response. The symptoms of insurgency - mass violence, armed
opponents, and small battles - superficially resemble those of conventional war; under
these conditions, most militaries succumb to the illusion of familiarity and apply a
conventional solution. Rather than consider the best strategy to restore state authority,
leaders assume that the military defeat of their armed opponents will allow them to
dictate the desired political outcome. In short, the MOC makes the decision to apply
Model 1 solutions a patterned response rather than a considered choice.
5 C.K. Prahalad, Richard Bettis, "The Dominant Logic: A new linkage between diversity and performance,"
Strategic Management Journal, 1986, Volume 7, pp. 485-501.
6 Nathan Leites coined the term "operational code" in his study of Bolshevik reasoning, The Operational
Code of the Politburo: A Systematic Analysis of the Political Strategy of Communism and the Rules by
which it Operates (New York: The RAND Corporation, 1951).
The MOC also delays the recognition of strategic failure. Since the MOC
includes not only a standard prescription but also a set of performance indicators, it
focuses the leadership's attention on the results of the military operations. Since the
counterinsurgency forces are generally far stronger and better equipped than the rebels,
almost all military engagements will end in counterinsurgency victories. The string of
"small victories" masks the underlying lack of progress towards the desired political
objective. Even when the gap between local successes and campaign results becomes
clear, the first response will be to exploit existing solutions - to refine existing routines
and escalate the scale and intensity of the military effort. In this sense, the MOC sets up
a "learning trap" in which positive military performance delays the search for more
effective and more political strategies.
Even when stalemate becomes clear and exploitation options have been
exhausted, the MOC distorts the order and extent of search. Forced to acknowledge the
political dimension of counterinsurgency, militaries tend to choose strategies that are
compatible with the coercive model of the MOC. Model 2 strategies enable militaries to
incorporate economic and political considerations without discarding the coercive
framework of the MOC. Once militaries have adopted Model 2, they see no reason to
explore the more alien and disruptive political strategies of Model 3.
While professional beliefs play the leading role in explaining intrawar learning
failure, the bureaucratic preferences of the military also exert an important influence.
Militaries are bureaucratic organizations that seek to maximize their autonomy,
resources, and prestige. As such, they resist the adoption and retention of strategies that
undermine these equities. Models 2 and 3 both threaten these interests. Both restrict the
autonomy of the military, forcing military leaders to subordinate conventional operations
to political considerations. While Models 2 and 3 may increase the flow off resources,
the military is seldom able to channel those resources into its preferred investments (e.g.
capital modernization). What is more, military immersion in politics puts the institution's
prestige at increased risk. Strategies that rest on political control or political stratagems
are seldom short or decisive; they are generally long term, high risk and low return
investments. Model 2 and 3 strategies also thrust soldiers into less prestigious roles as
social workers, policemen, or worst of all politicians. Finally, both models increase the
risk of "dirty war" incidents that damage the prestige of the institution. Once militaries
recognize that the most effective counterinsurgency strategies come at a steep
institutional cost, they will avoid them if at all possible. Wartime pressure may
temporarily suppress these parochial considerations; militaries may grudgingly accept
solutions in wartime that would be unacceptable in peacetime. In the intrawar period, the
military's intrinsic distaste for Models 2 and 3 is expressed in the pace and order or
search. In the interwar period, this distaste takes the form of an active purge of Model 2
and 3 strategies and capabilities.
Task pressure acts as the switching mechanism between the two sets of pressures
- one cognitive and the other bureaucratic. When task pressure is high and insurgency
threatens the survival of the state, as in many cases of domestic counterinsurgency,
cognitive bias is paramount and motivated bias relatively insignificant. When task
pressure is moderate, as in most cases of expeditionary counterinsurgency, cognitive bias
plays the leading role but parochial interests may influence the pace, order, and extent of
search. In the interwar period, when task pressure is low or entirely absent,7 parochial
interests dominate military reactions to counterinsurgency.
Variation in Learning Performance
While these beliefs and interests produce a dominant pattern, they are not
dispositive. Militaries do deviate from this pattern, though primarily as a result of
binding constraint rather than choice. All things being equal, the professional beliefs of
military encourage a slow and halting march from Model 1 to Model 2 and perhaps, in
the closing act, to Model 3. In cases of extreme resource scarcity, however, militaries
may be forced to explore explicitly political and even consensual political solutions much
earlier than they otherwise would. Active civilian participation in the framing, execution
and evaluation of counterinsurgency strategy may accelerate search and steer it away
from the pitfalls of Models 1 and 2.
The Interwar Purge
When militaries adopt Model 2 and Model 3 strategies in wartime, they seldom
retain them in peacetime. Professional beliefs and bureaucratic preferences make both
models prime candidates for postwar rejection. The causal beliefs implicit in Model 3 are
diametrically opposed to the MOC. To retain Models 3 a single military organization
would have to maintain two, antithetical sets of cognitive reflexes - a MOC emphasizing
coercion and one way compellance, and an alternative code emphasizing consent and
7 While there is no immediate task pressure in peacetime, militaries are, in theory, influenced by the
expectations of future war. As the history of interwar counterinsurgency shows, preferences typically
trump rational expectations; when the threat of future war is low, militaries are more likely to prepare for
the scenarios that they would prefer to fight rather than those they are most likely to confront.
negotiation. The problem is not simply that counterinsurgency is a different task; it is
that it requires the same organization to distinguish between different types of mass
violence and respond in dramatically different fashion depending on that classification.
The default answer to the dilemma of dual reflexes is to jettison counterinsurgency
reflexes in favor of the simplicity and familiarity of the MOC.
What is more, the disappearance of task pressure propels bureaucratic
considerations to the fore and militaries eliminate strategies that are antithetical to their
parochial interests. Routines are more likely to be retained than strategies, and these
routines are judged on their contributions to conventional war rather than their utility in
counterinsurgency. While the interwar purge amounts to functional self-mutilation,
militaries do it in order to avoid future counterinsurgency campaigns. Tragically, they
cannot choose their next wars, and the protective purge simply guarantees that they will
enter the next counterinsurgency campaign at the ground floor.
This argument upends much of the conventional wisdom on organizational
learning in counterinsurgency. These learning disabilities are not the products of flawed
organizational design or the peculiar national histories of specific militaries - they are the
product of a set of professional beliefs and interests that distort functional adaptation.
The problem is not the novelty of counterinsurgency but its deceptive familiarity, an
illusion that encourages militaries to expend time and resources in a fruitless pursuit of
military decision. The search for effective counterinsurgency strategies is the military's
struggle to understand politics: its significance, its laws of cause and effect, and its
relationship to the familiar instruments of force. Here the military's conceptual starting
point exerts a powerful influence, leading it first to ignore, then to misunderstand, and
finally to reject the relationship between politics and conflict termination. The clash
between two views of politics - one predicated on coercion and control and the other on
consent and authority - often determines the success or failure of the counterinsurgency
campaign.
Similarly, this argument challenges a number of strongly held notions about the
role of resources, civilian intervention and task pressure. Contrary to the protestations of
most military commanders, the chief obstacle to adaptation is not excessive civilian
intervention; it is civilian abdication and military hegemony in counterinsurgency
strategy. In the material dimension, the problem is seldom the shortage of troops but
rather the numbing effect of their superabundance. And the interwar period is not, as
some scholars have suggested, a sanctuary for the development of improved strategy or
doctrine.8 In the case of counterinsurgency at least, the disappearance of task pressure is
the prelude to a deliberate purge of the strategies political leaders will need most in
subsequent campaigns.
What the Study is and What it is Not
This is not a study of campaign outcomes. Simply put, states can win without
learning, and learn without winning.9 At least three things separate organizational
learning from outcomes: circumstances, strategic interaction, and chance. A range of
circumstantial variables - the social and political environment, the existence of powerful
external sponsors, the availability of internal or external sanctuaries, and the like - make
8 Stephen Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1991), pp. 253.
9 1 owe Roger Petersen this turn of phrase.
certain counterinsurgency problems more difficult than others.'l Second, the insurgents
and population play important roles in the outcome of these struggles. While this study
focuses almost exclusively on the actions of the counterinsurgency force, this is a
conscious methodological choice; campaign outcomes depend on the interaction of the
counterinsurgent and insurgent strategies. Third, as Clausewitz noted, war is the realm of
chance. These three factors - circumstances, interaction, and chance -make a distinction
between learning performance and outcomes imperative.
Instead, this is a study of organizational adaptation to a specific task set. The
question is how well military organizations play the hands they are dealt and why. The
political objective in all counterinsurgency is the restoration of a political order durable
enough to survive the removal of major military forces. Solutions that bring the military
closer to this goal are functional; those that consume resources and time without doing so
are dysfunctional. Solutions that restore state control only through the perpetual exercise
of very high levels of force are unsustainable and failures in the long run. The measure
of learning performance is the rate and extent of convergence on the highest payoff
counterinsurgency model - Model 3.
This is also a study of the role of ideas and material factors in shaping
organizational behavior. While certain strongly held beliefs and preferences explain the
general pattern of organizational behavior in counterinsurgency, material constraints can
alter this pattern. Though organization science remains divided on the influence of
resources on innovation, in counterinsurgency resource scarcity appears to improve
10 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing,
2005), pp. 26-27; Ibid. Thompson, pp. 16-20.
learning performance. Ironically, militaries are at their best when they lack the resources
to do themselves and their cause great harm.
While individual and organizational learning are closely related, this study
focuses on the behavior of large organizations rather than individual leaders. The
development of effective counterinsurgency strategies is far more than a thought
experiment - it is a test of the ability of leaders to impose effective solutions on their
organizations. In almost every counterinsurgency campaign we can identify a handful of
leaders who pierced the illusion of familiarity and identified optimal strategies early on.
But vision without influence is tragedy, and the history of counterinsurgency is littered
with powerful leaders who have failed to impose sound but heretical ideas on reluctant
organizations.
Structure of the Dissertation
This study is divided into three parts. Part I presents the theory and a series of
alternative explanations for the puzzles. Part II examines the theory using three French
cases. The object of this section is to test the internal validity of the theory within a
single national tradition. Part III tests the theory against a series of shadow cases. These
cases help establish the explanatory range of the theory.
Alternative explanations
The literature on counterinsurgency suggests a number of competing explanations
for the puzzles of intrawar and interwar learning failure. While there is no shortage of
plausible explanations, they are largely underdeveloped and untested. We are left with
three broad categories of explanation and a series of loosely defined propositions. None
is implausible or entirely invalid; each casts some light on the puzzles without
illuminating them in full. The first category explains learning failure in terms of the
availability and processing of experience. The second emphasizes the influence of ideas
on organizational learning. The third category attributes learning failure to material and
normative constraints. This section outlines the arguments and observable implications
of each category. Then we compare these propositions with the historical case set and
identify the strengths and weaknesses of each argument. All this sets the stage for the
controlled comparison of the theory proposed here with the leading alternative
explanations.
Experience
A number of authors have sought to explain learning failure in terms of
experience. In these arguments, the availability of counterinsurgency experience or the
organizational processing of that experience drive the military into inappropriate response
and ineffective search.
The simplest form of the argument is that learning performance in
counterinsurgency is a function of the stock of counterinsurgency experience. Militaires
with extensive counterinsurgency experience should outperform those new to the task,
and performance should improve over the course of successive campaigns. All things
being equal, recent experience is more useful than distant or second hand experience.
Even if we allow for some decay in proficiency over time, we should expect long run
military progress in counterinsurgency to be smooth and cumulative."
This relatively common sense explanation does not survive close scrutiny. First,
there is very little to support the claim that counterinsurgency is novel. Internal war
appears just as common as interstate war; over the past half century, the leading Western
militaries have been far more likely to engage in counterinsurgency than traditional,
interstate war. More important, there is no clear evidence that past and even recent
exposure to counterinsurgency improves subsequent learning performance. Militaries
with extensive counterinsurgency experience appear as likely as novices to fall into the
dominant intrawar pattern: conventional military response, delayed search, errant choice.
The inability of militaries to capitalize on very recent experience suggests that the
novelty of counterinsurgency to any given generation of military leaders is largely
artificial - the result of postwar doctrinal purges rather than simple decay.
The "last war" variant of this argument suggests that military posture is a function
of the most recent wartime experience. When the second war closely resembles the first,
they should perform well; when the war is quite different, performance, at least in the
initial phases may suffer. If this is true, we should expect higher learning performance in
the wake of counterinsurgency campaigns and lower performance in the wake of
1 Natural decay in proficiency can be traced to two sources: personnel turnover and the difficulty of
organizational recall. As personnel leave the organization, the number of individuals with personal
experience in counterinsurgency decreases. The collective experience of the organization is also encoded
and stored in the form of doctrine and standard operating procedures. Even after the last individual with
personal experience in counterinsurgency has left the organization, the stored experience can, in theory, be
recalled. It is reasonable to expect some lag in the recall of stored memories, but the shelf life of the stored
lessons should be significantly higher than the personal experiences of the members. Based on these
observations, and assuming unbiased encoding of lessons, we should expect a slow steady decay of direct
experience based on turnover followed by a plateau as the organization comes to rely solely on stored
lessons.
conventional wars. Even when militaries face no immediate postwar threat, we should
expect them to tailor their interwar doctrine to the experience of the last war.
The historical record suggests no such pattern. Militaires emerging from
counterinsurgency campaigns appear just as likely to respond to subsequent
counterinsurgency problems with conventional war solutions. The British response to a
humiliating defeat in Palestine in 1947 was to apply the much same methods in the early
phases of Malaya.12 After the Vietnam war, the U.S. military did not prepare for a new
counterinsurgency campaign; instead, it jettisoned many of the lessons of Vietnam and
focused its attention on a possible, future, conventional war in Europe.13 While the "last
war" hypothesis provides clear predictions for interwar behavior and initial response, it is
mute on the question of intrawar adaptive failure. The observed behavior of most
militaries in the wake of counterinsurgency campaigns directly contradicts the "last war"
claim. Instead of tailoring their doctrines to the last campaign, militaries tend to emerge
from counterinsurgency with a renewed emphasis on conventional interstate war. This
behavior suggest quite a different pattern: militaries tend to prepare for "preferred war"
rather than the "last war" or the "most likely" war.
Other scholars attribute learning failure in counterinsurgency to the military's low
propensity to learn. The purported weaknesses of military organizations are legion:
hierarchy, insularity, conservatism, and uniformity. If the generic propensity to learn is
the primary issue, then we should expect adaptive performance across task sets to be
12 Anthony Short, In Pursuit of Mountain Rats: The Communist Insurrection in Malaya (Singapore:
Cultured Lotus, 2000), pp. 116-117; John Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency from Palestine to
Northern Ireland (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 43-49.
13 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The American Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1986), pp. 268-274; John D. Waghelstein, "What's wrong in Iraq: Ruminations of a Pachyderm,"
Military Review (January/February 2006).
uniformly low. Militaries should be equally ineffective learners in conventional war and
counterinsurgency. Similarly, we should expect militaries that are exceptionally effective
in adapting to conventional war challenges to exhibit equal performance in
counterinsurgency settings.
Neither of these propositions is empirically supported. Learning failure in
counterinsurgency appears both more regular and more intractable, and armies that have
succeeded in conventional learning have often failed in counterinsurgency. The French,
Prussian and German armies that set the standard for conventional military innovation in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries seldom developed effective solutions to the
counterinsurgency challenges of the same period. 14 If military organizations are
generally insensitive to their task environments, and particularly to new tasks, then we
should not expect them to respond aggressively to counterinsurgency stimuli. This too is
at odds with observed military behavior in counterinsurgency. Militaries are generally
avid if ineffective learners in counterinsurgency settings; they expend enormous amounts
of time, energy and resources on improving their mobility, firepower, and intelligence
capabilities. That these improvements bring them no closer to their political objective is
a separate issue, less an issue of receptivity than of errant choice. On balance, militaries
appear to be active but consistently dysfunctional learners in counterinsurgency.
A fourth variant of the experience argument focuses on information flows within
the organization. Organizational learning is portrayed as a largely mechanical problem,
in which the challenge is to identify lessons learned at the local level, repackage this
14 The Napoleonic armies struggled to suppress a major uprising in the Vendde and later failed in their
counter-insurgency campaigns in Spain and Calabria. The German high command struggled to develop
effective and economical solutions to thefranc-tireurs in the Franco-Prussian war and both World Wars.
While they possessed enormous resources and were ruthless in their application of collective responsibility,
their strategies never established stable economical solutions to the problems of authority.
wisdom, and then disseminate it to the rest of the organization. Organizations that are
open to inquiry and capable of processing local lessons quickly will be more effective
learners. Though a number of authors have made these arguments in the conventional
realm, 15 John Nagl is the leading proponent in the recent literature on counterinsurgency.
In his comparative study of British and American organizational learning in Malaya and
Vietnam, Nagl operationalizes his concept of the "learning organization" by posing five
questions:
1) Does the army promote suggestions from the field?
2) Are subordinates encouraged to question superiors and policies?
3) Does the organization regularly question its basic assumptions?
4) Are high-ranking officers routinely in close contact with those on the ground and open to their
suggestions?
5) Are standard operating procedures (SOPs) generated locally and informally or imposed from the
center? 16
Nagl argues that armies that answer yes to these five questions are better equipped to
adapt to the challenge of counterinsurgency. Nagl's conclusion that the optimal learning
organization is open and decentralized is consistent with a number of studies of tactical
and operational innovation in conventional military conflicts; when the problem is how to
overcome hedgerows in Normandy, static trench lines on the Western front, or how to
coordinate air support, the organization that was open and decentralized often
outperformed more rigid and centralized counterparts. Nagl transposes these ideas onto
the problem of strategic innovation in counterinsurgency, arguing that the attributes that
'5 Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Change in German Tactical Doctrine during the
First World War (Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institue, 1981); Michael D. Doubler, Closing with the
Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994).
16 John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), pp. 10.
make an organization successful in tactical or operational innovation in conventional war
will bring success on a higher level of analysis and in a different task environment. 17
If Nagl and others are correct that learning in counterinsurgency is primarily an
issue of general receptivity and information processing, then there are several observable
implications. First, we should see stable performance by specific militaries across task
sets. Presumably a military that is flat, decentralized and encourages input from below
should outperform more hidebound organizations in conventional war and
counterinsurgency. This should hold true for strategic choice as much as tactical
innovation. Second, if variation in these five dimensions explains observed, cross-
national variation in learning performance, we should expect to see significant variation
in these independent variables in historical cases.
Closer examination of American, British, French and German counterinsurgency
performance undermines both these assertions. Michael Doubler makes a convincing
case that the U.S. army in WWII was, by Nagl's tests, an outstanding learning
organization, harnessing local innovation to overcome a series of tactical and operational
challenges on the Western front.18 Nagl argues that this same American military had
ceased to be a "learning institution" by Vietnam. In a foreword to his revised edition of
his study, Nagl now characterizes the U.S. army in Iraq as an effective, learning
organization. For an argument that seeks to anchor the learning attributes of particular
militaries in their foundation experiences, this instability in the coding of organizations
17 It is worth noting that Stephen Rosen disagrees with Nagl on this point. Rosen draws a distinction
between loose organizations optimally structured for minor innovation and the centralized, hierarchical
organizations capable of engineering major wartime innovation (Source: Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the
Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 38-39.
1s Michael D. Doubler, Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe (Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 1994), pp. 266-273.
suggests two alternative interpretations. Either American learning performance varied by
task set or cross-national variation in learning performance may have less to do with the
deep historical foundations than Nagl suggests.
The historical record draws into question the level of variation in Nagl's
independent variable or the dependent variable of learning performance. If we make a
conscious distinction between campaign performance - who won counterinsurgency
campaigns - and learning performance - how they played the hands they were dealt - we
see a shared pattern of learning dysfunction rather than dramatic cross-national variation.
British "success," particularly in Malaya, may have had more to do with the degree of
difficulty of particular insurgencies'l9 and their willingness to concede rather than contest
political control.20 Controlling for these circumstantial differences, the British, French
and American armies were more effective in refining existing routines and processes than
at identifying appropriate strategic responses to counterinsurgency. Where Nagl's
hypotheses would lead us to expect large variation rooted in national and organizational
culture and history, we see shared professional dysfunction.
The most glaring weaknesses of the information flows argument are its
assumptions that learning is automatic and that innovation on the routine and strategic
levels are essentially the same. Whereas wartime experience is notoriously ambiguous,
overwhelming emphasis on the machinery of adaptation suggests that lessons are ready
for the taking if organizations only increase their receptivity. In practice, learning,
particularly strategic learning, is an act of interpretation and choice; the speed and ease of
change count for little if that change brings the organization no closer to its stated goal.
19 Robert O. Tilman, "The Non-lessons of the Malayan Emergency," Asian Survey, Vol. 6, No. 8 (August
1966), pp. 407-419.
20 Ibid., Newsinger, pp. 1-2.
Implicit in the information processing argument is the idea that tactical and strategic
innovation are essentially the same; organizational attributes that improve tactical
innovation or process refinement also improve strategic search. As this study will show,
process refinement and strategic search are not simply distinct; they compete for the
finite attention and resources of the organization. The search for new counterinsurgency
strategies is not simply a scaled up version of the technical challenge of mastering jungle
patrolling, and excessive emphasis on the less risky path of process refinement can delay
the search for more effective strategy.
Ideas: Cultural Explanations of Learning Failure
Other observers point to national or organizational culture as the primary
explanation of learning failure in counterinsurgency. According to this argument,
culture, generally defined as a set of shared beliefs and preferences, will cause particular
groups to respond differently to the same wartime stimulus.21 Whether these shared traits
are national or organizational in origin, most authors argue that they have their roots in
the formative experiences of the group and are highly resistant to change 22 - what might
be called a "first war" syndrome.
If culture explains learning performance, then we should expect to see substantial
variation in initial response, intrawar adaptation, and interwar retention. Particular
national traditions or organizations should consistently outperform others in terms of
21 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy What Government Bureaucracies Do and Why They Do It (New York:
Basic Books, 1989), pp. 93.
22 Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1957), pp. 38.
initial response, intrawar adaptation and interwar retention. In addition, such variation
should be a clearly linked to the historical anchors that culture proponents identify.
Cultural arguments suffer from several general weaknesses. First, culture
arguments are notoriously underspecified. Culture is often so broad a variable that it can
be used to justify almost any observed outcome. The absence of compelling causal
mechanisms leaves the category of argument open to ad hoc assignment of causality.
Second, the level of analysis is often unclear. In some cases it is national culture that
purportedly dictates outcomes; 2 3 in others a particular organizational culture is the driver.
How national and organizational cultures interact, and which is the more significant in
explaining behavior remains maddeningly opaque. Third, many cultural arguments fail
the test of time. Cultural traits used to explain outcomes in one historical period often
produce the opposite outcomes in subsequent periods. 24 John Nagl's explains sub par
American performance in Vietnam in terms of the American way of war; a longstanding
emphasis on total war and a culture resistant to skeptical inquiry made the U.S army a
less effective learning institution. In the wake of his experiences in Iraq, Nagl argues that
this same American military has been far more effective in adapting to its current
counterinsurgency challenge. 25 The same enduring national character and organizational
history appear to have produced the opposite outcomes.
23 Rod Thornton, "Historical Origins of the British Army's Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Terrorist
Techniques," Conference Paper, Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), pp. 3-5.24 This problem extends well beyond the issue areas of counterinsurgency and the military. Culture
arguments have often been used to explain cross-national differences in economic performance.
Explanations of low economic performance in Confucian cultures in the 1940s and 1950s identified
specific traits such as familial organization and a high propensity as obstacles to development. A half
century later, those same traits are cited as explanations for meteoric economic growth seen in those same
communities over the last three decades.
25 John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. ix.
These methodological issues aside, the cultural argument, with its emphasis on
national and organizational traits, does not correspond to the observed pattern of
behavior. It is true that groups vary in their response to the same stimulus of
counterinsurgency, but not along national and organizational lines. Military reactions to
counterinsurgency are remarkably similar. In spite of significant differences in national
and organizational histories, militaries appear to respond to counterinsurgency in the
same way. This is a major problem for most cultural arguments; if variation in early
history and therefore culture explains outcomes, then why do a range of militaries exhibit
largely the same behavior in the response to counterinsurgency stimuli? It is not that
variation is entirely absent; instead it appears that the variation is professional rather than
national or organizational in origin. Across a range of national traditions, civilian
politicians appear to approach the problem of counterinsurgency differently than their
military counterparts.
The argument presented in this study shares some of the characteristics of the
cultural arguments. It places significant emphasis on the role of ideas in shaping
behavior. Where it breaks with the cultural arguments is in the origins of those beliefs
and their locus. The military operational code is functional in origin and its persistence is
the result of its observed and lasting utility in conventional war. And militaries share this
implicit set of core beliefs in spite of significant variation in national and organizational
history. This study also breaks with the cultural school in terms of specificity. It argues
that dysfunctional patterns of behavior have more to do with the interaction of
professional beliefs and counterinsurgency stimuli than with broader cultural identities or
group histories.
Constraints: Resources and Scruples
The final category of explanation focuses on the role of constraints. According to
these arguments, effective counterinsurgency strategies do exist but militaries are unable
to employ them.
Resources: More Boots on the Ground
One popular notion is that success in counterinsurgency is primarily a function of
resources and specifically manpower. Whatever the strategy, the counterinsurgent force
must deploy some minimum number of troops in order to defeat rebellion and restore
order. This conviction is usually stated in the form of minimum force ratios: the number
of security forces per guerilla,26 the number of forces relative to the size of the
population, 27 or the number of forces for a given geographical area.
James Quinlivan has provided the leading, contemporary version of this
argument. He argues that past historical cases suggest a threshold of 20 security force
personnel for every 1,000 inhabitants. 28 Above that threshold, counterinsurgency forces
may be able to restore order; below the threshold, they have almost no chance of
26 The prescribed force ratio of friendly forces to guerillas varies considerably by author. Colonels
Valeriano and Bohannan argue that effective operations demand 40-50 troops for every guerilla, while
Edgar O'Ballance argues that the threshold is 10: 1. Larry Cable has cited a number of sources from the
Malaya and Vietnam eras that propose force: force ratios between 10 and 12 to I (Sources: Colonel
Napoleon D. Valeriano, Lieutenant Colonel Charles T.R. Bohannan, Counterguerilla Operations: The
Philippine Experience (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 22; Edgar O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War: 1944-
1949 (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 216; Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths: The Development of
American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War (New York: New York University Press,
1986), pp. 81-82).
27 James T. Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," Parameters, Winter 1995; James
Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger,
Anga R. Timilsina, America's Role in Nation-Building (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2003); John J.
McGrath, Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat
Studies Institute Press, 2006).
28 James Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," Parameters, Winter 1995, pp. 61.
succeeding: "No one has discovered successful stabilization strategies that avoid large
troop commitments while trying to bring order to large populations." 29
If, as Quinlivan suggests, a minimum force to population ratio of 20:1,000 is a
"necessary but not sufficient" 30 condition for stabilization success, then we should expect
to see several patterns in the historical data. First, there should be a generally positive
statistical relationship between force ratios and campaign success. Second, cases where
force ratios exceed the 20:1,000 threshold should be strongly associated with success.
Third, there should be no examples of low force ratio success.
Though these ideas have broadly accepted in defense policy circles, the empirical
and theoretical support for Quinlivan's proposition is remarkably weak. Once we move
beyond Quinlivan's initial case set of six, the purported relationship between force ratios
and campaign performance disappears: there are a number of high force ratio failures
(Vietnam, Algeria, Chechnya, Cyprus) and low ratio successes (El Salvador, Oman).
Using any reasonable coding conventions, 3 1 the data do not support a strong, statistical
relationship between force ratios and campaign success. 32 If there is no strong, statistical
29 James T. Quinlivan, "Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations," RAND, 2003.
30 Ibid, Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," pp. 61.
31 In the chart, the ratio of all security forces (local and foreign) to population corresponds to Q or the blue
column. The ratio of foreign troops to population is QF as represented by the red column. Though
Quinlivan makes clear that he is referring to Q (total local and foreign security forces), other authors have
invoked his 20:1,000 benchmark while counting only foreign troops (James Dobbins, John G. McGinn,
Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, Anga Timilsina, America's
Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Moice: RAND Corporation, 2003), MR-1753).
32 It turns out that there are a number of serious coding problems that make testing of the Quinlivan
proposition more challenging than it might at first appear. The inclusion or exclusion of various elements
of the security forces (e.g. local self-defense forces) causes the ratios to swing dramatically, dramatically
reducing the utility of standardized benchmarks. Similarly, the measurement of the denominator
(population) raises important questions (e.g. is the relevant population the total or simply the ethnic or
political base associated with the rebellion?). Finally, Quinlivan makes no attempt to define a standard of
success. Taken together, these coding problems weaken his narrow claims to validity even within his
reduced case set of six. For a more detailed discussion of this problem, see Colin Jackson, "An Arithmetic
of Force? The Use and Abuse of Force Ratios in Counter-insurgency."
correlation between force ratios and success, then it is difficult to argue that a lack of
material resources explains failure in counterinsurgency.
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When we shift from a focus on the relationship between force ratios and campaign
outcomes to the impact of resources on learning, the positive relationship becomes even
more suspect. Implicit in the Quinlivan proposition is the idea that strategic choice and
resource allocation are casually independent. This study argues that resource availability
often drives strategic choice. Provided unlimited manpower and resources, militaries will
pursue their preferred strategies and will respond to performance shortfalls through
material escalation. The cases examined here, and a number of cases outside the study,
suggest that resource scarcity stimulates early and far ranging search. Abundance, by
contrast, delays search and indulges damaging first preferences.
Scruples: The Balance of Terror
According to some authors, the key to successful counterinsurgency is to exert
more coercive force over the population than the insurgents. When modern sensibilities
intervene, Western powers are unable to do the unseemly things necessary to achieve
their objective of crushing resistance. In a recent essay, Edward Luttwak explained the
dilemma in these terms:
Occupiers can thus be successful without need of any counterinsurgency methods or tactics if they
are willing to out-terrorize the insurgents, so that fear of their reprisals outweighs either the desire to
help the insurgents, if any, or their own threats. 33
As Gil Merom has noted, liberal, democratic polities are often incapable of or unwilling
to compete in this arena. While governments and militaries may be willing to do what is
necessary in the short run, increased military performance comes at the cost of
diminished domestic support. Eventually, domestic and international outcry so increase
the costs of the campaign that it becomes unsustainable. 34 Merom goes on to argue that
high levels of violence are not only effective but also efficient: "Higher levels of violence
can cut down on the investment and loss of manpower and material, both through the
destruction involved and the fear generated." 35 While he acknowledges that brutality
may encourage resistance, Merom contends that these costs are frequently overstated:
"Beyond a certain threshold of coercion, the emboldening effect of brutality may very
well be offset by the fear it creates. Oppressed communities may become too fearful to
let their feelings of humiliation, insult and vengeance guide their behavior." 36
33 Edward Luttwak, "Modern War: Counter-Insurgency as Malpractice," Politique dtrangkre, No. 4
(Winter), 2006, pp. 10.
34 Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria,
Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp.
15.
35 Ibid., Merom, pp. 43.
36 Ibid., Merom, pp. 45.
If Merom and Luttwak are correct and the primary obstacle to adaptation in
counterinsurgency is the denial of the viable option of state terror, then we should expect
to see two things in the historical case set. First, states and militaries that do employ
terror should perform better, at least in the local arena. Whatever the domestic or
international outcry, such militaries should come closer to a lasting and low cost solution
to rebellion. Second, as Merom argues, democracies should be less effective in
counterinsurgency because their citizens deny them the use of the most effective
strategies.
The critical assumption in these arguments is the efficacy of state violence in
counterinsurgency. If we confine ourselves to campaigns of extermination, then Merom
is correct. Whether in the classical period, or in the twentieth century campaigns in
Turkey, Tibet, or Saddam's Iraq, a state that is willing to destroy a significant fraction of
the population and resettle the area with its own supporters may well succeed in breaking
resistance. Short of such wars of annihilation, however, collective responsibility
strategies and the blunt use of force have seldom been effective in establishing stable,
low cost state authority. 37 Brutal occupation may succeed in imposing state order at the
point of a gun, but when the gun is removed resistance is likely to re-emerge. Far from
being the "efficient and economical solution that Merom portrays, high coercion
campaigns that stop short of genocide are recipes for high cost, long run stalemate. The
brutal, large scale and protracted German occupations of Greece and Yugoslavia did not
37 This is very similar to the distinction between air power strategies predicated on the destruction of men
and materiel and those based on the threat of future destruction. There is no question that the wholesale
destruction of the population, armed forces and industrial underpinnings may eventually extinguish a state.
What is far more problematic is the notion that some more limited form of destruction will lead to the target
to concede. The threat of destruction proves far less compelling than the fact. For a more detailed
treatment of this dilemma, see Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 55-79.
extinguish resistance behavior. Similarly, Russian brutality in Afghanistan and Chechnya
has not restored state authority that can survive the removal of very large numbers of
troops. These extreme cases, in which neither resource nor scruples constrain the
counterinsurgency forces, cast into doubt the core assumption of the efficacy and
economy of state terror.
Instead, it appears that there are two stable equilibrium strategies in
counterinsurgency. The first is the strategy of annihilation. Though the material and
audience costs may be very high, and success may involve a decades long course of
"treatment," a state that is willing to destroy the enemy population and replace it with
loyalists can construct stable, low cost authority over the long run. On the other end of
the spectrum, counterinsurgency forces can design an order around the minimal consent
of the governed. This Model 3 strategy is generally less costly to build and maintain, and
the domestic and international audience costs are considerably lower. The middle course,
characterized by state terror that falls short of demographic annihilation, is a recipe for
failure.
Sui Generis: The Denial of General Patterns
Faced with the complexity of internal war and the weak explanatory power of
theories based on experience, ideas, and constraints, other authors have taken refuge in
the sui generis argument. According to this argument, each case of counterinsurgency is
essentially unique, and any internally valid explanations of outcomes cannot be safely
exported to other cases. Interstate war, which pits two functionally similar actors against
one another in a trial of strength, is considerably simpler than internal war. In internal
war, the opposing armed forces must compete with a number of functionally distinct
actors with widely divergent goals and capabilities: multiple armed groups, organized
political factions, and the population. The structural complexity of internal war makes
the problem of generalization considerably more challenging than in interstate war.
While internal war is often far more complex and variable than interstate war, this
denial of general patterns appears overdrawn. The sui generis objection could be applied
to virtually any category of complex social activity - from civil war to revolution.38 If
internal wars were unique, then we would expect to see tremendous variation in the
behavior of the antagonists and the efficacy of their strategies. Instead, what is striking
about counterinsurgency is the obvious and stable patterns of behavior across historical
cases. While each case has its particular features, the forces bearing on the
counterinsurgency authorities, the population and the insurgents are remarkably
consistent. To seize on the particular features of each case and deny recognizable
patterns would be to forgo an opportunity to make progress towards a more complete
understanding of a recurrent and important phenomenon.
Nor is the sui generis approach costless. As in any single case study, narrow
focus increases the risk of spurious inference. The author can attribute causal weight to a
particular feature in the case, but cannot establish with any certainty whether that feature
explains the observed outcome. The comparison of different cases is an indirect way of
38 Here Raymond Aron's quip seems appropriate: "Historical understanding consists of perceiving
differences among similar phenomena and similarities among different ones." (Source: Raymond Aron,
"Evidence and Inference in History," in David Lerner (ed.), Evidence and Inference (Glencoe: 1959). pp.
27).
discriminating between internally valid and invalid explanations for particular, historical
outcomes.39
In the counterinsurgency literature, the most common expression of the sui
generis critique is the "great man" argument. In every counterinsurgency campaign,
success or failure in learning depends on the skill and vision of the senior leaders. When
states are fortunate enough to have the leadership of a General Templer, 40 they succeed;
when genius is absent and they must make due with a General Westmorland, they are
more likely to fail. Since chance plays a prominent role in the appointment of such
leaders, learning performance in counterinsurgency is something of a random lottery:
who you get determines how you do.
If the presence of genius in senior leadership is a leading explanation of
organizational learning performance in counterinsurgency, then several things should be
true. First, changes in leadership should produce major changes in interpretation. Since
counterinsurgency campaigns tend to be protracted, each case offers an opportunity to
test the effects of leadership replacement on senior leadership and organizational
behavior. Second, senior leaders should be able to impose their interpretations on their
organizations.
In practice, neither assertion is strongly supported. While leadership changes
provide an opportunity for changes in strategy, they often reveal the relative similarity or
homogeneity of the population from which leaders are chosen. Most candidates for
39 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inquiry in Qualitative
Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 209-211.
40 General Templer was the military and civilian governor in British Malaya during the peak years of the
Malayan insurgency. Many credit Templer with reviving the collapsing British campaign in Malaya and
setting the stage for eventual victory several years later. For a more detailed discussion of Templer's
contribution, see Chapter 7.
senior leadership are products of professional education, socialization, selection and self-
selection; not surprisingly, they are more likely to confirm existing organizational beliefs
than overturn them. While maverick leaders do exist, they are rarer than a truly random
sample would suggest.
What is more, the influence of even the most senior military leaders depends on
the content of their proposed reforms. When senior leaders propose changes that are
consistent with the beliefs and preferences of the military organization, then change can
be rapid and sweeping. When changes require major conceptual shifts or jeopardize the
institutional interests of the military, the power of the visionary leader may be limited and
reversible. Bureaucratic inertia is not a constant; it varies with the relationship between
the proposed changes and the prior beliefs and preferences of the organization.
Summary
Militaries fail to learn from counterinsurgency because they misunderstand it.
They misunderstand it not in a trivial or accidental way but in a crippling, systematic and
predictable one. Closely held professional beliefs so distort military reactions to
rebellion that they follow a clear pattern: inappropriate response, delayed search, errant
choice. This dysfunctional pattern is not particular to any national tradition. All
professional militaries, irrespective of their past experience, appear to labor under the
same conceptual disadvantages.
As militaries engaged in counterinsurgency come to understand what is necessary
to succeed, they come to despise the solution set. The organizational changes that
maximize the chances of task success impinge on the authority, resources and prestige of
the military institution. While militaries may be willing to put up with unpalatable
changes under wartime pressure, the end of the campaign often sets off a vigorous
organizational backlash. Distasteful arrangements, no matter how effective they proved
in the preceding conflict, are jettisoned as the military returns to its preferred task
orientation. Peacetime, far from being a sanctuary for the measured refinement and
development of counterinsurgency doctrine, becomes the rendering house of proven
counterinsurgency strategies.
Task pressure acts as the switching mechanism between these two sets of
influences. When war threatens the survival of the state and its instruments, the pressure
to overcome the opponent overwhelms the influence of parochial concerns is minimal.
Militaries engaged in total counterinsurgency may struggle to understand the conflict, but
they seldom subordinate problem solving to institutional self-protection. When
counterinsurgency does not threaten the state, cognitive and motivated biases are both
present. The former distorts response, evaluation and search; the latter delays and
distorts the search for alternative strategies. In times of peace, the disappearance of task
pressure makes parochial interests dominant.
Chapter 2
Militaries, Organizational Change, and Counterinsurgency
This study of organizational adaptation in counterinsurgency is motivated by two
empirical puzzles. First, why do militaries have such difficulty improving task
performance over the course of counterinsurgency campaigns? The history of
counterinsurgency reveals a striking pattern of flawed initial response, biased adaptation,
and delayed search for more effective strategies. Second, why do militaries have such
difficulty improving their performance across successive counterinsurgency campaigns?
Even when militaries manage to develop important new routines and strategies over the
course of a single counterinsurgency campaign, they tend to abandon these lessons in
relatively short order. Having discarded these lessons, militaries are likely to start
subsequent counterinsurgency campaigns with the same inappropriate strategies.
Central Questions
In contrast to much of the recent scholarship on learning in counterinsurgency,4 1
this study focuses on the content of organizational learning rather than the formal
structures or process of learning. It contends that almost all militaries undergo substantial
organizational change over the course of counterinsurgency campaigns, but that this
experience is ambiguous and subject to organizational interpretation. The real questions
are what militaries learn from their exposure to counterinsurgency, what they do not
learn, and why. We are particularly interested in whether the lessons militaries derive
41 John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to East Soup with a
Knife (Westport: Praeger, 2002); Robert Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror:
Military Culture and Irregular Warfare (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2008); Major General
Robert H. Scales, "The Second Learning Revolution," Military Review (January-February 2006), pp. 37-44.
from these experiences improve task performance. In other words, do the changes in
military strategy within and across counterinsurgency campaigns make the re-
establishment of stable, self-standing political order in the affected regions more likely?
The Dominant Pattern: Intrawar Pitfalls and Interwar Purges
The history of modem counterinsurgency reveals striking regularities in the
pattern of military responses to this category of problem. The lessons that professional
militaries derive from these campaigns are quite similar across national traditions and
across time. The themes that emerge suggest that the problems militaries encounter in
these conflicts are professional rather than national in origin.
During counterinsurgency campaigns, professional militaries are most successful
in exploiting existing strategies and routines. They refine existing tools and concepts,
and these efforts translate into improved efficiency at the level of the organizational
routine. Professional militaries engaged in counterinsurgency generally become far more
proficient in counter-guerilla warfare; their efforts to seek out and destroy insurgents
follow a distinct learning curve. Where old tool sets are inadequate, militaries often
develop new tools and routines designed to fill these gaps. Militaries often develop new
capabilities in the areas of civic action, psychological operations, and human intelligence
- all capabilities whose significance in conventional war is quite limited.
Where militaries struggle and often fail at the level of campaign strategy: the
effort to combine existing and new routines to produce the desired political outcomes.
The surface similarity of counterinsurgency to conventional war produces an illusion of
familiarity. This illusion in turn leads militaries to apply conventional military strategies.
Faced with small groups of armed opponents, militaries will seek to re-establish order by
destroying these groups in battle. Overly optimistic interpretation of performance
feedback from these military operations reinforces attachment to the conventional
military response to insurgency. When militaries belatedly realize that conventional
strategies produce stalemate at the campaign level, they attempt to modify existing
strategies rather than overthrow them. The military moves from the simple application of
force to the application of a mix of force and positive material and ideational incentives.
While this shift is more effective than a purely military response, these modified
strategies seldom provide a lasting answer to the underlying problems of political
instability and high levels of social violence. The energies consumed in the modification
of the military model to incorporate non-military tools
When counterinsurgency campaigns end, militaries retain certain lessons and
purge others. This selective retention favors tools and capabilities that are consistent with
the organization's dominant logic and bureaucratic interests. When militaries recognize
what the adoption of the counterinsurgency solution set means in bureaucratic terms, they
reject it. Militaries are least likely to retain the core strategic lessons of
counterinsurgency - those that relate the exercise of force to the restoration of state
authority. Instead of weighing strategies on the basis of their proven utility in addressing
the problems of counterinsurgency, militaries judge them on the basis of compatibility
with existing beliefs and institutional interests. Consequently, professional militaries are
likely to enter subsequent counterinsurgency campaigns with the same suboptimal and
often counter-productive strategies that proved unsuccessful in earlier campaigns.
What explains learning dysfunction in Counterinsurgency?
This study provides an explanation in two parts. First, the causal and normative
beliefs models that professional militaries bring to counterinsurgency exert a profound
influence on their initial responses and subsequent adaptation. Those beliefs, which I
refer to as their operational code, account for much of the bias and delay in the typical
adaptive response. Professional militaries will tend to pursue offensive operations in the
expectation that the military defeat of its armed opponents will lead to a cessation of
hostilities. Their battlefield successes tend to reinforce their commitment to this strategy
and delay the search for more effective strategies. Even as the inadequacy of
conventional military approaches becomes apparent, the implicit causal and normative
beliefs of the professional military distort the search for new strategies. Instead of
recasting the conflict as a political problem, militaries try to modify their existing mental
models to incorporate new political elements.
Second, organizational incentives play a supporting role in explaining biased
intrawar adaptation and a dominant role in explaining selective interwar retention.
Militaries resist the adoption and retention of the counterinsurgency "best practices" set
because it undermines the organizations' fundamental interests in survival, autonomy,
resources, and prestige. A strategic solution set that depends on unilateral military
restraint and increased risk to organization members is unlikely to appeal to military
leaders. Similarly, organizational arrangements that give civilians veto power over the
operational use of military force challenge the military's claim to a separate sphere of
expertise and control. 42 Furthermore, effective counterinsurgency strategies may
represent long term drains on the resources and prestige of the military organization. In
wartime, such compromises may be grudgingly accepted, though only after more
palatable approaches have been exhausted. Once wartime pressure is gone, the military
organization will jettison those lessons that threaten both its core ideas and interests.
The relative influence of ideas and organizational interests varies with the level of
task pressure. When the survival of the army or the state is at stake, the parochial
interests of the military organization will tend to recede as task success and
organizational survival become synonymous. In peacetime, when task pressure is entirely
absent, bureaucratic interests will tend to dominate organizational behavior. When task
pressure is moderate, as in the case of most expeditionary counterinsurgency campaigns,
the military must balance task pressures and bureaucratic pressures. Routines and
strategies which improve task performance and are consistent with core beliefs and
organizational interests will receive more attention and resources.43 Where routines and
strategies involve clear tradeoffs between task performance and ideas or interests,
militaries are likely to exhaust all other avenues before they embrace them. When the
stakes are limited and task pressure is low, task performance is important but not all
important.
While the military operational code and organizational interests explain many of
the difficulties militaries encounter in intrawar and interwar adaptation, they are not
dispositive. What militaries manage to learn in counterinsurgency depends on the
42 Samuel A. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); Helmut von Moltke as cited in Daniel A. Hughes (ed.),
Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), pp. 35-36.
43 Peter A. Hall, "The Politics of Keynesian Ideas" in Peter A. Hall (ed.), The Political Power of Economic
Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 361-391.
influence of a handful of independent variables. It is the interaction of these variables
with the twin pressures of ideas and beliefs that explains the outcome of organizational
learning in counterinsurgency.
Misunderstanding Counterinsurgency - The Military Operational Code
Bounded rationality, Cognitive simplification, and the Operational Code
Organizations and individuals have powerful incentives to simplify their
interaction with the environment. Decision makers generally lack the time, resources,
and cognitive capability to examine and weigh all of the information relevant to a given
choice. As a result, they employ shortcuts to guide their search for appropriate
responses. 44 These simplifications are generally positive - they enable the organization
to reduce the cost and time necessary to interpret feedback and respond to changes. A
relatively stable, information structure of the environment makes it possible for the
organization to employ a selective rather than exhaustive approach to problem solving;
instead of examining every detail of the landscape, the organization can afford to look at
a handful of proven indicators to select an appropriate response.45
Cognitive simplification takes place on two levels: routines and operational codes.
Organizational routines are standard responses to specific problems that the organization
44 Herbert Simon, "A behavioral model of rational choice," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 69,
No. 1 (February 1955), pp. 99- 118; James G. March, Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1958), pp. 136-172 . For a more general discussion of the role of heuristics or shortcuts see
Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1985), pp. 50-57; Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu
and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 24-32; Ziva Kunda,
Social Cognition: Making Sense of People (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999), pp. 36-40.
45 Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd, ABC Research Group, Simple Heuristics that make us Smart (Oxford
University Press, 1999), pp. 13.
has faced in the past.46 As the environment changes, whether in competitive or
technological terms, specific routines may be refined or discarded. While these routines
are important to understanding any snapshot of an organization's behavior, they are
expression by a more general set of shared causal and normative beliefs - the
organization's operational code. 47 The operational code plays three important roles.
First, the code helps the organization prioritize activities and evaluate performance
feedback; members of a given organization or profession will share a rough
understanding of what is central to their business and what is peripheral. Second, the
operational code includes a basic causal logic or mental model for routine functions.
This causal logic provides rough rules of cause and effect in standard situations, and a
handful of core measures of performance or effectiveness. This causal logic is distinct
from the routines or standard operating procedures (SOPs) it employs. The operational
code is the broader logical framework that drives the choice and retention of specific
routines or SOPs. 4 8 Third, the operational code may contain important normative beliefs;
it may specify what members of an organization should and should not do in the practice
of their trade. Together, these beliefs define the limits of the profession's area of interest.
Though the operational code does not dictate all actions or all organizational routines, it
46 Richard R. Nelson, Sidney G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 14-19; ibid., March, Simon, Organizations, pp. 140.
47 Nathan Leites coined the term "operational code" in his study of Bolshevik reasoning, The Operational
Code of the Politburo: A Systematic Analysis of the Political Strategy of Communism and the Rules by
which it Operates (New York: The RAND Corporation, 1951). Alexander George refined Leites'
approach, specifying the content and influence of Communist ideology on Soviet behavior (Alexander
George, "The 'Operational Code:' A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-
Making," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 1969)). The use of the term operational
code is also broadly similar to work by Richard Bettis C.K. Prahlad on what they call "the dominant logic"
of organizations (C.K. Prahalad, Richard Bettis, "The Dominant Logic: A new linkage between diversity
and performance, Strategic Management Journal, 1986, Volume 7, pp. 485-501.
48 Ibid., George, pp. 191, 196-197.
shapes the actions and policies of organizations in predictable ways. 49 This is particularly
true when the organization in engaged in a search for solutions to novel problems. The
code's logic narrows the set of routines or solutions that appeal to an organization
confronted with a specific problem. Solutions that do not conform to the operational
code are less likely to be examined, adopted or retained.50
The operational code is functional in origin, and the locus of the code will depend
on the range of organizations that share a given function. In some cases, an operational
code may be specific to a single organization. In other industries or issue areas, similar
functions may lead to the development of broadly similar or even shared organizational
or professional codes.
This operational code is specific to an organization or profession but general to its
members. The basic elements are instilled in professional training and reinforced by
experience and social interaction with other members of the profession. It is the strong
shared nature of this professional logic that enables professionals (e.g. German and
American medical doctors) to communicate and cooperate even when separated by
national, linguistic, or historical barriers. The differences in logic across professions
explains the predictable differences in the members' approaches to problems that lie
outside of their area of expertise; members of the medical profession will approach
problem solving in a way that is distinct from that taken by lawyers or soldiers. 51
49 Ibid., George, pp. 191, 196.
50 This is also closely related to Thomas Kuhn's notion of paradigms and paradigm shifts (Source: Thomas
A. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996)).
5 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1976), pp. 286.
The utility of these simplifications depends on the fit between these
simplifications and the problems the organization encounters. 52 If organizations apply
the appropriate routine or decision rule, then the organization is likely to solve the
problem and reduce the time and cost of response. If the chosen routine does not match
the problem, then the test becomes one of flexibility rather than fit: can the organization
detect the mismatch and develop a more appropriate response? The answer to this
question depends less on the structure of specific routines than on the operational code
that underpins them.
In short, constraints and the structure of the environment make it both necessary
and feasible to take shortcuts in problem solving. While these shortcuts are generally
positive, they open the door to interpretive failure.
The Military Operational Code
Professional militaries share an operational code, and this code has exerted a
powerful influence over time and across varied strategic settings on the more observable
elements of doctrine and strategy. The unifying theme in this operational code is
coercion. Military leaders are, as Laswell and later Huntington noted, "managers of
violence;" their core function is the use of force to compel the submission of their
enemies. What is most important to the managers of violence is battle. Carl von
52 Laura Martignon, Ulrich Hoffrage, "Why does one-reason Decision Making Work?" in ibid., Gigerenzer,
pp. 129-136; Kenneth R. Hammond, Human Judgment and Social Policy: Irreducible Uncertainty,
Inevitable Error, Unavoidable Injustice (Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 9, 103-105.
Clausewitz, the most important exponent of the modem operational code, summarized
the military art in this way:53
"Fighting is the central military act; all other activities merely support it.... Engagements
mean fighting. The object of fighting is the destruction of defeat of the enemy. The enemy
in the individual engagement is simply the opposing fighting force." 54
Strategy, according to Clausewitz, "is the use of an engagement for the purpose of the
war."55 The way to achieve victory is to mass force and destroy the enemy's armed force
in decisive battle. 56 The immediate measure of effectiveness is the destruction of the
enemy or the capture of his capital. 57 Should the attacker fail to destroy his enemy or
compel his submission, the natural response is to increase the level of force applied to the
problem.58
The assumptions that underpin this mental model are important. First, the model
is predicated on a simple and stable information structure in which the enemy army is the
focus and all other objects in the battle space are secondary. Second, it assumes that
problem solving depends on the one-way application of force to compel submission. It
assumes that the physical destruction of the enemy's armed forces will lead enemy
leaders to capitulate. Third, the model minimizes the role of the local population. The
central issue is the clash of armies and civilians are treated as insignificant and largely
passive bystanders.
53 The Clausewitz depicted here is the Clausewitz of the military profession and not the Clausewitz of
social science. Whereas many scholars associate Clausewitz with the notion of the subordination of war to
politics, most military professionals have been suspicious of this argument; Clausewitz's insistence on this
point fundamentally challenges the officer corps' monopoly on wartime decision making. For a discussion
of this split interpretation, Michael Howard, "The Influence of Clausewitz," in Carl von Clausewitz, On
War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 31-32.
54 Ibid., Clausewitz, pp. 227.
55 Ibid., Clausewitz, pp. 177.
56 Ibid., Clausewitz, pp. 227.
57 Ibid., Clausewitz, pp. 227.
58 Ibid., Clausewitz, pp. 77.
The operational code also includes important norms governing the conduct of
civilized war. Civilized wars are formal rituals in which statesmen inaugurate conflict,
generals decide it through battle, and the defeated acknowledge the outcome in formal
surrender. 59 These wars must involve a strict separation of combatants and non-
combatants. The willingness of the military to exercise restraint towards civilians is
contingent on the behavior of the enemy and the population; if the enemy or the
population blurs the distinction between soldiers and civilians, the military reserves the
right to treat the enemy population as combatants. In general, the operational code
suggests that adherence to these norms is contingent and reciprocal.
Origins of the Military Operational Code
Military organizations are products of their standard environment, and the
peculiarities of that environment have influenced both their reliance on the operational
code and its particular content. The specific pressures of the combat environment - high
uncertainty, time pressure, background noise, strategic uncertainty, and high
consequences of failure - lead military organizations to adopt decision making strategies
that favor reliability and speed over accuracy or environmental fit.
The military organization's primary solution to the problems of the combat
environment is routinization. A combination of simple routines and decision rules helps
the organization overcome obstacles to the execution of its own plans - friction - and the
pervasive uncertainty of the battlefield - the fog of war. Routines and rules help
commanders ensure that tasks are reliably performed by subordinate units, and provide a
basis for action in the face of uncertainty. Military training and internal selection systems
59 Helmut von Moltke as cited in ibid. Hughes, pp. 44-47.
reflect the importance placed on routines and rules. The object of training is
indoctrination - the transmission of known solutions and accepted rules or principles.
Job performance at most levels is a function of the military leader's ability to execute
routines and apply basic rules under the stress of real or simulated combat.
The effectiveness of this system and the wisdom of the tradeoffs it entails depend
on the level of variability in the environment. When tasks are familiar, adaptation is
straightforward. So long as the signals are familiar, and the meanings of those signals
remain the same, militaries are likely to learn rapidly and effectively.6 0 Under these
conditions, the organization's reaction is broadly consistent with the ideal model and
performance feedback makes rapid changes in routines and even strategy possible. 61
When the task is clearly novel, the need to adapt is inescapable. If the task clearly falls
outside of the framework of the operational code, then the military organization will
begin the search for new solutions early. While early search cannot guarantee success, it
makes inappropriate patterned response much less likely. The military organization is
most likely to stumble when the task appears familiar but is not. Familiar cues will elicit
60 Jesper Scrensen has made the point that organizations with strong cultural cohesiveness outperform less
cohesive organizations provided that the environment is relatively stable; under these permissive
conditions, broad internal agreement on routines and rules brings improved coordination, improved
agreement on goals and increased employee effort. In the face of discontinuous change, however, this
capability becomes a disability. The same organizations find it hard to recognize the need for change. First
order learning impedes and substitutes for second order or strategic learning. Cultural homogeneity
reduces internal variety and with it the likelihood that alternative viewpoints are available. Finally,
culturally coherent organizations typically lack alternative subcultures (Source: Jesper B. Sorensen, "The
Strength of Corporate Culture and the Reliability of Firm Performance," Administrative Science Quarterly,
Vol. 47 (2002), pp. 70-91).
61 When changes remain within the scope of the operational code, even major technical or tactical surprises
or setbacks can be recognized and overcome. As Rosen has noted in his study of wartime innovation, the
degree of difficulty rises sharply when change invalidates existing measures of effectiveness. Under these
circumstances, militaries lack the means to judge their own performance and the soundness of alternative
strategies (Source: Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 114).
patterned responses, and those responses may reinforce the organization's commitment to
a mistaken course of action.
The Military Operational Code, Doctrine and Strategy
The military operational code is the product of accumulated experience and
selective pressure. The beliefs derived from this experience have been tested across a
range of cases and express the underlying and enduring regularities of interstate war.
Most important, they have proved remarkably insensitive to major changes in the
technology of war. This is why these "principles of war" provide an equally compelling
explanatory framework for the campaigns of Alexander and the mechanized wars of the
20th century.
This historically stable set of causal beliefs is expressed in doctrine - a given
military's concept of how wars should be fought in a given historical moment in time.
While the operational code is stable and largely unchanging, doctrine is intrinsically
variable; it is a function of this operational code, geographical circumstances, likely
adversaries and the state of contemporary technology.62 As technology changes, so too
may a state's doctrine. States in the same technological moment but different
geographical settings will adopt different doctrines. In short, the military operational
code is remarkably stable across time and geography.
While doctrine is one state's prewar theory of how wars should be fought,63
strategy is the state's answer to a specific, present challenge. Strategy is the state's plan
to accomplish a set of specified ends against a real opponent. In some instances, doctrine
62 Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 14.63 Ibid., Posen, pp. 7, 13.
and strategy may be closely related. If the state is particularly astute in guessing the
nature of future war or its likely opponent, strategy, at least in the early stages of a war,
may be a straightforward projection of the doctrinal theory of war onto a real problem. In
other cases, the imagined war of doctrine may be only distantly related to the present
challenge. In other cases, doctrinal theories may not correspond to the realities of
contemporary technology and a live opponent. In these cases, strategy will be a function
of the operational code and the circumstances of the immediate challenge: a plan
composed of one part deep causal belief and one part expedient. 64
In short, the operational code is a function of the information structure of
interstate war. Doctrine is a function of the operational code, technology, geographical
circumstance and expected opponents. Strategy is a function of the doctrine and a real
and present opponent. When doctrine fails to provide effective answers to a real
challenge, strategy will be a function of the operational code and expedients.
The operational code does not dictate individual choice. Instead it describes the
median performance of the military organization. Every military will produce individuals
who resist the illusion of familiarity and develop Model 2 or Model 3 alternatives. What
the military operational code does explain is the distribution of those individuals within
the larger pool. Model 1 advocates are likely to be the dominant group, followed by a
much smaller group of Model 2 innovators. Model 3 advocates are by far the smallest
group. This distribution is likely be be even more skewed in the senior ranks, where
selection and self-selection have removed heterodox individuals. This means that those
64 This is very close to Helmut von Moltke's conception of strategy: "Strategy is a system of expedients. It
is more than a discipline, it is the transfer of knowledge to practical life, the continued development of the
original leading thought in accordance with constantly changing circumstances. It is the art of acting under
the pressure of the most difficult conditions." (Source: Helmut von Moltke as cited in Hughes, Moltke on
the Art of War, pp. 47.
in high command are likely to lean in the direction of Model 1. What is more, each
change in senior command is far more likely to produce a Model 1 advocate than a Model
3 visionary.
Standard Military Environments and Military Routinization
Military organizations depend on routines and decision rules because they provide
an effective answer to the perennial challenges of combat - uncertainty and friction.
Routines and decision rules enable leaders to act quickly and decisively in the absence of
complete information. Military leaders will tend to favor reliability under combat
conditions over the fit or precision of a given response. In part this rests on the
assumption that swift action will clarify the situation;65 an organization that can correctly
interpret performance feedback can recognize and overcome initial missteps. On a more
basic level, it reflects an assumption that delay is more dangerous than hasty action. The
optimal general solution to the decision environment of combat is one that emphasizes
speed and reliability over evaluation and fit.
Information Structure and the Utility of Environmental Cues
Cognitive simplification works when the short cuts employed fit the task
environment. As Herbert Simon66 and others67 have noted, every environment has a
specific information structure and adaptation will depend heavily on that structure. The
65 Militaries have long considered the hasty attack an effective way to capture information about the
enemy's strength and disposition (Source: Adolf von Schell, Battle Leadership: Some Personal
Experiences of a Junior Officer of the German Army with Observations on Battle Tactics and the
Psychological Reactions of Troops in Campaign (Quantico: The Marine Corps Association, 1988), pp. 71-
72). For a contemporary example of this reasoning, see Major-General Raymond T. Odierno, "Division
Operations across the Spectrum - Combat to SOSO in Iraq" Field Artillery (March-June 2004), pp. 9-1 1.
66 Herbert Simon, "Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment," Psychological Review, Vol. 63,
No. 2, 1956, pp. 130.
67 Ibid., Gigerenzer, Todd, pp. 13.
way in which information is distributed in the environment, the degree of randomness
versus structure, and the types of signals or cues that are present define that information
structure. The regularity and stability of the information structure are what make the use
of routines and heuristics possible and productive.
In any environment, some cues or signals are more useful than others. Some cues
are consistently valid guides to action, while others are less useful. A businessman faced
with a choice between two investments will rely on a cue such as estimated profitability68
that has proven an effective guide in the past. This past validity of the profit signal
enables the businessman to dispense with an exhaustive evaluation of the remaining
information about the two projects. This property, which Gigerenzer and Todd have
labeled "ecological validity," can be operationalized as the number of correct predictions
an actor will make using this cue or rule divided by the total number of predictions. 69 In
this case, the businessman may have found that investments with a higher net present
value resulted in better business outcomes in nine out of ten cases: an ecological validity
of 0.9. The validity is "ecological" in the sense that it is specific to an environment. The
validity of the same measure used in a different environment might be quite different.
Some cues may be ecologically valid but be of little use in discriminating between
competing courses of action or competing interpretations of performance. To use another
business example, a company that has been approached by multiple potential buyers may
receive a number of bids whose total dollar values are quite similar. While the seller may
be exclusively concerned with the dollar proceeds of the sale, the particular sample of
68 This raises the issue of which measure of profitability (e.g. net present value vs. internal rate of return) is
most valid, but the general point is that any measure of profit may be a more reliable guide to action than a
host of alternative signals.
69 Ibid., Gigernezer, pp. 85.
bids or the dynamics of the bidding process may leave the seller with no clear way to
distinguish between competing bids. Dollar value may have been a highly valid measure
in the past, but still contribute relatively little to the decision at hand. This is what
Gigerenzer and Todd call the discrimination rate: the frequency with which a signal or
rule can help the decision maker distinguish between choices.7 0 A signal or decision rule
may be highly valid, but relatively rare in the environment. Alternatively, the cue values
may be so similar that the decision maker cannot base his decision on them.
These two characteristics - ecological validity and discrimination rate - enable us
to describe the functional utility of any cue or signal to the decision maker. As
Gigerenzer and Todd point out, the intuition is relatively simple: "The larger the
ecological validity of a cue, the better the inferences. The larger the discrimination rate,
the more often a cue can be used to make an inference." 71
Experience in a given environment enables the decision maker to sort valid cues
from noise. More important, this experience enables the decision maker to draw
appropriate inferences from a small subset of valid cues. 7 Even in a relatively noisy or
cluttered information environment, the existence of historically stable, ecologically valid
cues makes the use of routines and simple decision rules a viable alternative to more
exhaustive analysis. 73
70 The formal definition of discrimination rate is more elaborate and less intuitive than that of ecological
validity. For the mathematical formula, see Gigerenzer, Todd, pp. 85.
71 Ibid., 85.
72 J6rg Rieskamp, Ulrich Hoffrage, "When Do People Use Simple Heuristics and How Can We Tell?" in
ibid., Gigerenzer, Todd, pp. 166.
73 Ibid., Gigerenzer, Todd, pp. 22; John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New
Dimension of Political Analysis (Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 58, 66-70.
The Information Structure of Conventional War
The information structure of conventional war is both simple and historically
stable. The military professional can use the known properties of wartime environments
to simplify and accelerate the decision making process. The structure and stability of
those environments explain the military's high level of commitment to routinization in
general and conventional war routines in particular.
In conventional war, humans in a given territory can be divided into three groups:
friendly military forces, the population, and enemy forces.
Roles in Conventional War
-1 0 +1
Friendly Forces Local Population Enemy Forces
(Neutral)
In most instances, the categorization of individuals is straightforward. Uniforms
and other conventions help identify combatants, and all other individuals are assumed to
be members of the non-combatant population. 74 The primary focus of attention for each
force is its armed opponent. While the civilian population may be treated as a secondary
74 This is an obvious oversimplification. Norms and causal rules on the categorization and treatment of
non-combatants have varied across cases and across time. Nevertheless, we use this as a simplifying
assumption to examine the contrast between the relative simplicity of categorization in conventional war
and its far greater complexity in insurgencies.
target under certain circumstances, 75 civilians are generally assumed to be of secondary
importance. In any case, they are assumed to be largely passive, more a part of the
physical environment than true actors in the armed struggle.
In this environment, the commander faces at least three perennial problems. First,
in a battle with a thinking opponent and mass armies, even perfect ex ante knowledge
does not give him an ability to predict outcomes.76 In practice, his ex ante knowledge of
initial conditions - the location of his enemy, his strength and intentions - is generally
quite limited. This condition of pervasive uncertainty is what Clausewitz referred to as
the "fog of war." The second challenge is friction. Clausewitz noted that translating even
simple plans into action was immensely hard on the battlefield. The scale of modern
military organizations, the stresses of combat, and the role of chance all served to slow
and divert the energies of the commander. In addition to fog and friction, the commander
faces the severe consequences of failure. The wrong choice, or the right choice made too
late, may lead to the destruction of his unit or his own death.
As the commander weighs decisions and evaluates the success or failure of his
operations, he can fall back on a handful of core indicators. These cues - enemy losses,
friendly losses, and territory gained - together give the commander highly valid measures
of the success or failure of an operation. Operations in which the commander kills or
captures far larger numbers of his opponents than he loses are clear victories. 77
Operations which result in the capture of key terrain or rapid advances are likewise
75 Militaries target civilians when such action undermines the opponent's military effort. Sherman's March
to the Sea and the strategic bombing campaigns of WWII are examples of armies targeting civilians in
order to break the productive capacity of the enemy.
76 This is the Laplacian fallacy - the idea that complete ex ante information would eliminate prospective
uncertainty. For further details, see Gigerenzer, Todd, pp. 8-9.
77 To use Gigerenzer and Todd's terminology, loss or exchange ratios have high ecological validity and
high discrimination rates.
victories. Operations in which friendly losses are very high, or in which terrain is lost are
defeats.
As the commander weighs subsequent resource allocation or organizational
changes, these same cues guide his choices. Tactics that produce heavy enemy losses or
large territorial gains will be retained, refined, and expanded. Those which score lower
on the same measures will receive less attention and fewer resources. Focusing on these
cues allows the commander to ignore the far larger set of distracting signals and focus
only on those cues that are useful and reliable guides to action.78 It is this structural
simplicity, hidden beneath the surface chaos of battle, that makes effective command
possible.
The information structure of conventional war has proven remarkably stable over
much of recorded military history. Loss ratios and territorial gains are as valid in the 21 st
century as they were in classical combat. It is true that technological changes, and the
doctrinal and tactical shifts that have flowed from them, have changed the content of
specific routines. Close order infantry drill has no place in modern warfare, having been
replaced by new routines that better fit the context of modern war. What has remained
intact is the underlying information structure - the parameters of the problem, the most
important cues, and the inferences that can be drawn from them. While a 19th century
general might be shocked by the technology of 2 1st century combat, he would find it far
easier to interpret the outcomes of conventional battle. It is this stability that gives rise to
the belief in enduring principles of war, and gives the work of authors such as Clausewitz
remarkable relevance centuries after the tools of their age have been eclipsed.
78 Ibid, Steinbruner, pp. 73-74.
The specific attributes and relative stability of the information structure of
conventional combat have two important consequences. First, military organizations
have come to rely more heavily on routinization than most organizations. So long as the
underlying structure of combat has remained simple and stable, routines and simple
decision rules have been effective answers to the problems of uncertainty and friction.
Second, the specific attributes of this environment have shaped the specific decision rules
and mental models that govern military behavior. The tradeoffs and rules of thumb that
inform military decision making are direct products of the information structure of
combat.
Historical Roots of Military Routinization
This common understanding of the importance of routinization in military
operations has deep historical roots. In his early 19th century treatise On War, Carl von
Clausewitz argued that friction and uncertainty made the use of simple routines
unavoidable. Routines reduce friction and make command of large numbers of
individuals and units feasible:
"Routine, apart from its sheer inevitability, also contains one positive advantage. Constant
practice leads to brisk, precise, and reliable leadership, reducing natural friction and easing
the work of the machine. In short, routine will be more frequent and more indispensable the
lower the level of action." 79
Clausewitz also noted the advantage of using routines to overcome the problem of
pervasive uncertainty:
"The frequent application of routine in war will also appear essential and inevitable when we
consider how often action is based on pure conjecture or takes place in complete ignorance,
either because the enemy prevents us from knowing all the circumstances that might effect
our dispositions, or because there is not enough time. Even if we did know all the
79 Ibid., Clausewitz, pp. 153.
circumstances, their implications and complexities would not permit us to take the necessary
steps to deal with them. Therefore our measures must always be determined by a limited
number of possibilities. We have to remember the countless minor factors implicit in every
case. The only possible way of dealing with them is to treat each case as implying all the
others, and base our dispositions on the general and the probable."s8
What Clausewitz suggests is that some level of reliance on routines is
inescapable. 8 1 The complexity of war with a thinking opponent is such that even perfect
information cannot provide a reliable guide for action. Instead, the commander must rely
on simplified routines and decision rules to act under uncertainty.
While Clausewitz recognized the merits of routines in the execution of a
commander's intent, he was acutely aware of the dangers of routinized behavior in the
realm of higher strategy. 82 He argued that senior commanders must resist the temptation
to substitute simple models and principles for careful consideration of larger strategic
problems. 83 The danger, as he saw it, was that these leaders would come to regard
general principles as "absolute, binding frameworks of actions (systems)." Clausewitz
argued that the narrow education and socialization of the professional officer corps made
the drift toward reflexive action rather than strategic evaluation an ever present danger. 84
In short, Clausewitz identified the fundamental tension between the benefits of routinized
tactics and the dangers of routinized strategy.
80 Ibid, pp. 153.
8' Max Weber made similar observations about the rise of modern bureaucratic forms. For a detailed
treatment of these themes, see Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York:
Free Press, 1947), pp. 363-386.
82 Ibid., pp. 153.
83 This explains Clausewitz's insistence that the most important and far reaching act of judgment is to
determine the "nature of the war." Clausewitz is arguing that hasty patterned response could lead to the
application of the wrong strategy.
84 Ibid., pp. 154.
Modern Routines and Models
Military reliance on routines and mental models continues into the modern era.
While the content of these routines has changed dramatically from the Napoleonic era to
the present, the ubiquity and significance of routines and higher order decision rules as
building blocks for organizational action under fire has not.
The British Army of the Second World War embraced the use of "battle drills" 85
as a means of ensuring rapid and effective execution by junior leaders and soldiers.
Major General Alexander, one of the chief proponents of the British army's embrace of
battle drill, summarized his commitment to the approach in the following terms:
In the introduction [to the "1st Corps Tactical Notes" pamphlet] Alexander likened battle to a
"supreme sport" that required previously worked-out team plays. "Surely," he argued, "a
soldier on the battlefield, beset by fear and doubt, is far more in need of a guide to action
than any games player at Lord's or Wimbledon." Suggesting that it was preferable "to know
instinctively some orthodox line of conduct than ... be paralyzed by... uncertainty of what to
do," he recommended drawing up "lines of conduct - simple guides for simple soldiers" so
that men faced with battlefield problems would have answers to them.86
For Alexander, as for Clausewitz, routines were an effective means for overcoming
friction and uncertainty in mass armies. 87
Contemporary American war fighting depends on the use of routinization at all
levels. Like the British in the Second World War, the U.S. Army employs simple recipes
or battle drills to cover reactions to common small unit tactical problems. These drills,
and the host of routines collectively labeled "tactics, techniques and procedures" (TTPs),
are the building blocks of military action at battalion level and below.
85 Jay Luvaas, "Clausewitz, Fuller and Liddell Hart," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 9, Issue 2&3 (June
1986), pp. 197-212.
86 John A. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High
Command (New York: Praeger, 1991), pp. 109.
87 The British enthusiasm for battle drill had mixed results. While many insisted that it improved the
performance of inexperienced leaders, it also contributed to predictability of British tactics in the face of
German opposition. In addition, the Canadian high command appears to have suffered from an upward
drift in the habits of routinization.
At the more general level, the U.S. Army has long used decision rules to govern
its approach to planning and targeting. One such decision rule, the Military Decision
Making Process (MDMP) lies at the core of the contemporary military planning process.
According to the current Army doctrine, the MDMP provides a universally valid
approach to structured problem solving:
The military decision making process is a planning model that establishes procedures for
analyzing a mission, developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of action against criteria
of success and each other, selecting the optimum course of action, and producing a plan or
order. The MDMP applies across the spectrum of conflict and range of military operations.
Commanders with an assigned staff use the MDMP to organize their planning activities,
share a common understanding of the mission and commander's intent, and develop effective
plans and orders.88
As the figure below shows, the MDMP is an algorithm; the military planner moves
through a series of seven steps and 117 substeps, using available information to guide the
commander's decision making process. While the MDMP is used by higher level staffs
rather than soldiers and junior officers, the motivating rationale behind this routinization
is similar to that of the tactical battle drill. Simple, shared models improve and accelerate
decision making in the combat environment, giving friendly forces an advantage over the
enemy. 89
88 U.S. Army Field Manual 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, January 2005, pp. 3-1.
89 This belief reveals a related assumption that combat is about beating the enemy to the punch. John
Boyd's theory of the OODA loop (Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action) is a more refined example of
this idea - the notion that success in combat depends on getting inside the enemy's decision cycle.
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90
Recent debates about the effectiveness of the MDMP provide supporting evidence of the
military's attraction to simplified decision rules. Most critics have attacked the MDMP
90 This figure is drawn from U.S. Army Field Manual 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, January2005, pp. 3-1.
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model on the grounds that it slows down the orders process and diverts attention in
unintended ways. The answer, for most critics, is to simplify the algorithm in order to
accelerate decision making.
One recent push has been to use recognition-primed models in which the
commander's past experience guides the development of military plans and actions.91
That experience enables the commander to recognize patterns and develop plans that fit
the category of problem. The important point is that the debate over MDMP has focused
the speed of patterned response not fit; the relative value of one model over another has
been seen a function of its contribution to speed and reliability of decision. 92
The U.S. military has developed algorithms to routinize the application of
firepower against enemy targets. The Army's D3A targeting algorithm 93 is illustrated in
the figure below. As in the case of the MDMP, the decision model leads decision makers
through a cycle of discrete steps. Decision makers analyze decision requirements and
generate target lists (decide), locate specific targets (detect), attack those targets (deliver),
and evaluate the effects (assess). This cycle runs continuously as the unit seeks to
destroy the enemy targets in its sector.
91 Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 15-30.92 Christopher Compton, "The Task Force FSO in a Model for Full Spectrum Planning," Field Artillery
(January-February 2006).
93 The services' targeting rules vary in their particulars, but their basic form and purpose are very similar.
The U.S. military's push for joint integration of military operations has resulted in a Joint Targeting
Process. For an example of the application of D3A, see Colonel Thomas S. Vandal, Captain William L.
Gettig, "D3A in an Urban Environment: 1st Cavalry Counterstrike Operations in Iraq," Field Artillery
Magazine (September-October 2005), pp. 10-13.
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94
As in the case of the MDMP, the routinization of targeting is intentional. By simplifying
and standardizing the process of attacking targets, the military organization increases the
speed and reliability of its actions.
What is generally missing from debates about military decision models is the
discussion of the tradeoffs that underpin routinization. The first, identified by Clausewitz
and most of the authors of modern military doctrine, is the danger of the routinization of
higher strategy. While routines help junior leaders overcome tactical problems of the
battlefield, they may come to supplant careful strategic evaluation at the senior level.
Routines and decision rules may take on a life of their own, enabling the organization to
act without regard to the appropriateness of those actions in a given environment. The
94 This figure is drawn from U.S. Army Field Manual 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, January
2005, pp. H-2.
habits of routinization developed by junior officers seldom fade with promotion, and
many senior leaders are as ready to resort to patterned response as their juniors.95 The
danger is that reflexive and patterned response may not match the specified problem.
A related danger is the problem of tunnel vision. As noted earlier, the use of
routines narrows the attention of the organization. Decision makers focus their attention
on performance indicators that have worked in the past, and may miss or dismiss
unfamiliar signals.9 6 Third, reliance on routines and decision models makes militaries
more likely to engage in exploitation than exploration. By employing routines, militaries
generate performance feedback that generally stimulates process improvement rather than
innovation. Since exploitation and exploration compete for the same organizational
resources and attention, a strong bias in favor of exploitation will tend to crowd out
exploration, especially in periods of organizational stress and time pressure.9 7
The wisdom of heavy reliance on routines depends on the variability of the
environment. Where that environment is relatively stable, routinization may confer
tremendous advantages. While we tend to think about warfare as intrinsically unstable,
the chaos of battle and the march of technology belie a certain underlying stability in the
structure of conventional combat. An early 2 1st century reading of Clausewitz reveals
obvious changes at the level of routines (e.g problems of mountain warfare, 19th century
supply trains), but remarkable stability in terms of the general theoretical constructs. In
spite of major advances in the information technology and armaments, militaries in the
95 Ibid., Clausewitz, On War, pp. 154.96 Max Bazerman, Dolly Chugh, "Decisions without blinders," Harvard Business Review, January 2006;
ibid., Steinbrunner, pp. 74.
97 James G. March, "Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning," Organization Science,
Volume 2, Number 1, February 1991, pp. 72-73.
early 2 1st century struggle with the same basic problems of friction and uncertainty and
adopt similar approaches to overcome them.
Reliance on routines is likely to be counterproductive only when change exceeds
the range of the organization's decision models. 98 Under these circumstances, the
benefits of routinization are more than offset by the risks of inappropriate response and
interpretive failure. Organizations that depend heavily on routines and decision models
are less likely to notice and overcome major environmental shifts when they come. Most
perilous are the cases in which the situation appears very similar to past problems but is
in important respects different. The presence of familiar cues may convince the
organization that it understands its performance when in point of fact it does not.
The Military Operational Code and Counterinsurgency
Militaries struggle to develop effective solutions to counterinsurgency not
because it is novel but because it appears so similar to problems they fully understand.
Inappropriate response, misinterpretation of the performance results, and significant
delays in the search for more effective approaches combine to derail military adaptation
to the core problems of counterinsurgency.
In many respects counterinsurgency superficially resembles conventional war. In
insurgencies, civil order has broken down, and there are armed opponents who prevent
the restoration of order. In the presence of familiar cues - widespread violence and
armed opponents - the military will tend to apply the mental models, measures of
effectiveness and specific routines of conventional war. That familiar cues may have
different meanings in the context of counterinsurgencies is seldom examined. Militaries
98 Ibid., Steinbrunner, pp. 58
tend to apply their mental models and act on the results. 99 If the task were entirely novel,
and these familiar cues were absent, the temptation to apply existing mental models
would be far lower. In this case, the illusion of familiarity is most significant obstacle to
learning.
Military domination of counterinsurgencies strategy makes systematic
misunderstanding of the task more likely and more intractable. While there are a number
of valid reasons that civilian leaders call on the military to lead the counterinsurgency
campaign, this abdication of executive control removes an important check on
inappropriate, patterned response. Military models and come to dominate the
formulation of strategy and the interpretation of state performance, and this makes it
more difficult to avoid or overcome learning traps.
The Information Structure of Counterinsurgency
Military organizations enter counterinsurgency with mental models optimized for
the conduct of conventional war. These models assume a simple categorization of
combatants and non-combatants and a straightforward, one way application of force as
the primary path to victory. The presence of familiar cues - armed opponents, civil
disorder, and the breakdown of civil authority - suggests that counterinsurgency is a
smaller and less intense version of conventional war. Consequently, military leaders will
tend to apply inappropriate models, draw incorrect inferences from familiar signals, and
ignore more valid but less familiar indicators of campaign progress.
99 Militaries might be more likely to succeed if they were entirely unfamiliar with the problem. Military
successes in activities such as disaster relief, military aid to civil programs (the Civilian Conservation
Corps and the Manhattan project) suggest an ability to overcome new problems once they are recognized as
genuinely novel.
The surface similarities between counterinsurgency and conventional war belie
important structural differences. Counterinsurgency is intrinsically more complex,
involving larger numbers of actors and important differences in the role and significance
of the population.
Roger Petersen's model of insurgency provides a useful backdrop on which to
examine these effects in depth. 100 According to Petersen, the local population falls along
a spectrum ranging from armed support for the insurgents (+3) to armed collaboration
with government forces (-3) (see diagram below). To bolster the resistance, insurgent
movements must retain those members who are supporting the insurgency in various
capacities (+1, +2, +3), attract new adherents from the neutral or pro-government
elements of the population (0, -1, -2, -3), and prevent defections to the government cause.
The government forces face the opposite challenge: they must physically eliminate the
armed insurgents (+3) and their supporters (+2) or force them to abandon the insurgent
cause and move into support of the government. Equally important, the government must
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100 Roger Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), pp. 8-10.
101 Petersen's study examines local variation in resistance while holding Soviet counterinsurgency strategy
constant; he is interested in the mechanisms that lead certain communities to join the resistance and
A military organization accustomed to dividing the battle space into three
categories - friendly (-1), enemy (+ 1) and neutral (0) - and focusing its efforts on armed
opponents will tend to miss the significance of these structural differences in the early
stages of the conflict. Military leaders will focus on armed opponents (+3), ignore
important enemy infrastructure and support networks (+1, +2), and lump the population
into one broad category (-2, -1, 0, +1, +2). This instinctive reaction will be amplified by
the structure and focus of existing military intelligence organizations. These
organizations, whose role in conventional combat is to establish and monitor the enemy
order of battle, will be unaccustomed to making fine grained distinctions between
population categories. Early mistakes in framing the counterinsurgency problem
contribute to the application of inappropriate military routines.
maintain their support in the face of hopeless odds. Here we are concerned with the opposite problem: how
does variation in the government's counterinsurgency strategy activate mechanisms that increase or
decrease local resistance?
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Misunderstanding of the counterinsurgency problem limits the organization's
ability to interpret performance feedback correctly. Here again, surface similarity creates
the illusion of understanding. Some of the most important cues in conventional war -
particularly loss ratios - are present, while others are notably absent - territorial gains or
rates of advance. 10 2 The natural tendency for military leaders is to lock on to the trusted
indicators that are present, and assume that familiar cues retain their original meanings.
If in the past battle performance hinged on the number of enemy killed and captured, and
the battle space lacks any meaningful spatial dimension, then a focus on attrition is the
logical solution.103
102 Counterinsurgency does have a spatial dimension, but the familiar references of the conventional
battlefield - rates of advance and seizure of key terrain - are largely absent. Control of terrain proves to be
maddeningly impermanent. This in turn upsets a familiar cause and effect belief: the idea that territorial
gains are cumulative.
103 Ibid., Rosen pp. 114-115 on WWI British models.
In reality, both the meaning and utility of the cues are quite different in
counterinsurgency. Whereas the ecological validity and discrimination rates of loss ratios
are very high in conventional war, both are much lower in counterinsurgency. The
number of enemy killed in an engagement is only distantly related to success in political
stabilization, and operations in which large numbers of insurgents are killed at the cost of
high collateral damage may have a negative net influence on campaign performance. In
other words, enemy killed or captured may no longer be a highly effective predictor of
task performance at the campaign level. Similarly, comparisons of loss ratios are less
useful in gauging the relative success of different operations. Many operations will tend
to produce similar results - a handful of enemy killed or captured, a handful of weapons
and money confiscated. These measures alone do not generally give the military leader
much insight into the relative contribution of similar operations. These changes highlight
one of the major sources of military confusion in counterinsurgency - the need to re-
evaluate the meaning and utility of familiar cues.
Just as the value of familiar cues drops, the importance of what was once
considered noise increases. In conventional war, the attitudes of the local population are
inconsequential. Wars are decided by competing armies, not opinion polls or elections,
and the military commander can safely assume that this attitude data adds little to the
decision process. By contrast, popular attitudes are a primary driver of the strength of
insurgencies. The willingness of the population to assist the insurgents or the
government depends on their perception of security and the legitimacy of the warring
parties. Similarly, the penalties associated with killing civilians (the false positive in
target classification) are dramatically higher. In conventional war, civilian casualty or
property damage may be regrettable but seldom influences the outcome of the contest on
any level. In counterinsurgency, the killing of civilians may have a decisive effect on the
effectiveness of strategy on the local and national level. 104 What was once signal - loss
ratios - is now noise; what was once noise - local attitudes - is now signal.
The military leader accustomed to conventional war may be unsettled by these
shifts in the utility of environmental cues. Much of what he "knows" - routines, decision
rules, and measures of effectiveness - is only distantly related to the new problem, and
prompt action against his armed opponents may not clarify the situation. In the best case,
the commander recognizes the declining utility of old models, rules, and metrics and
searches for new and more appropriate ways of addressing the problem. In many cases,
attention to old models and rules instead produces a false sense of certainty, control, and
progress. This will delay the search for new and more appropriate rules and strategies.
In the worst case, the commander clings to the old models and rules under the assumption
that and escalation in their scale and intensity can resolve the problem.
The Gap between Military and Civilian Opinion
The military perception of counter-insurgency is unique to the profession. Other
parties, particularly diplomats and politicians, apply different professional models to the
same task. Where the soldier reflexively focuses on the armed opponent and his
destruction, the diplomat sees a violent political problem best resolved by suasion. While
the military professional and the politician may agree on the importance of restoring
order and the indispensability of force, they will differ widely in their interpretation of
104 Jon Lindsay has noted that the fundamental distinction between conventional war and counterinsurgency
is that the penalties for false positives are far higher in counterinsurgency.
how force should be applied. Where soldiers rely on the one way application of force to
pacify their opponents, politicians typically see a two way exchange between the
intervening force and the local population and elites as a means of securing popular
consent. This clash of models, one predicated on battle and the other on bargaining,
explains both the military propensity to inflame the problem and the natural friction
between civilians and the military in counterinsurgency.
John Masters, a British officer serving in the Northwest frontier province in the
late 1930s, summarized the chasm separating military and political professional opinion
in counterinsurgency:
For a year the regiment had been training for this particular game - "a Frontier show" - trying to
weld the rules of successful warfare with the rules laid down by the government for Frontier
campaigning. The two conflicted violently, and we, girding for war, heard ourselves being advised
by contrapuntal voices. The first voice, that of military experience in all the wars of recorded
history, was hard, unequivocal, and merciless. The second voice, that of the civil government, was
oleaginous, ambiguous - and merciless. The chant went like this, and I sang it gloomily to myself
to a psalm tune:
Get therefustest with the mostest men.
Do not get there at all until we have referred the matter to the Governor-General-in-Council, which
will take months.
Shoot first, shoot fastest, shoot last, and shoot to kill.
Do not shoot unless you have been shot at, and then try not to hurt anyone, there's a good chap!
Mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy, then never leave him a moment to gather himself again,
but fall on him like a thunderclap and pursue him to his utter destruction, regardless offatigue,
casualties, or cost.
Announce your intentions to the enemy, in order that he may have time to remove his women and
children to a place of safety - and time to counter your plan. At all events, stop what you are doing
as soon as he pretends to have had enough, so that he may gather again somewhere else.
Casualties, damage, losses, cost, are only some of the many factors to be considered when making a
battle plan. If any factor is given undue weight, the plan is likely to fail.
Pardon us, but your plan does not interest us. We are happy to say that that is your business.
However, casualties cause questions in the House, damage brings complaints in the Assembly,
losses get in the newspapers, and cost we cannot stand, in view of the depleted state of the country's
finances. Remember all that, and get the war over quickly. And if you should fail - Ah, but there -
you won't fail, old chap, will you?
In the end a reasonable compromise was reached and the thing was done, in an attitude varying
between the soldier's downright description of the Pathan as "enemy," and the political's opinion of
him as a "misguided fellow citizen." It was seldom done as quickly as the army would have liked,
given the men, the money, and a free hand to make a job of it; nor as pleasantly and as cautiously as
the politicals would have liked, given the time to alter circumstances. Sensible soldiers, in spite of
furiously grousing and bitter complaints - more bitter every time we saw our mutilated dead -
realized well that we were not in fact fighting a true enemy. We accepted with good will most of
the limitations placed on us, but always remembered our overriding duty to the men who trusted
105US.
Masters' commentary is telling not simply in its clever summary of the contrasts,
but in its admission that both parties were probably half right. Diplomats may have
advocated greater restraint than was feasible in the border wars, but soldiers may have
been too quick to define the problem as total war. The process of interagency argument
produced, in Masters' opinion, a solution superior to that of either the diplomats or
soldiers alone. It is also worth noting that Masters highlights the red line drawn by the
military in this compromise - the physical protection of the unit and soldiers. Restraint
may be acceptable, even necessary, but it can never be allowed to compromise the
security of one's own.
Military Control of Counterinsurgent Strategy
The creative tension that Masters describes is often missing in the prosecution of
counterinsurgency campaigns. Governments cede policy leadership in counterinsurgency
to the military for a number of reasons. First, the outbreak of insurgency reflects the
105 John Masters, Bugles and a Tiger (New York: Viking Press, 1956), pp. 195-197.
failure of civil authority. If civilian authorities were capable of righting the situation,
then there would be no need to employ the military. In practice, however, governments
tend to assume that the breakdown of civilian administration demands a complete transfer
of responsibility to the military until order has been restored. That the visible symptoms
of insurgency appear to match the job description of the military only reinforces the
government's instinct to pass control to the army.' 06 Second, the military is often the
only government agency capable of implementing counterinsurgency policy. The
military has at its disposal enormous human and material resources and is designed to
operate in hostile environments. 107 By contrast, the civil service, with its traditional focus
on diplomacy and bureaucratic policymaking, generally lacks the training, organizational
structure, or inclination to implement policy. For these reasons, the military is seen as the
only agency that can put a political-military plan into action. 08 Over time, the line
between implementation and policy formulation blurs, and the cumulative decisions of
military leaders come to define the government's counterinsurgency policy.
The natural flow of resources in counterinsurgency reinforces the government's
inclination to delegate policy to the military. The violent symptoms of insurgency lead
the government to allocate the majority of resources to the military. These include not
only weapons, but also the staff and logistical assets that are central to political and civil
reconstruction. The decision to steer the majority of funds to the military increases its
106 The governments of established, stable societies often lack skills or experience relevant to the creation
of new political orders. Politicians in established political systems are caretakers, they are not designers or
builders of political systems. In this sense, the missing skill set in counterinsurgency is not the diplomatic
or parliamentary one. Instead, counterinsurgency demands the sensibility of the boss of a political machine
or organized crime group.
107 Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam War (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1986), pp. 42.
108 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing,
2005), pp. 88.
organizational advantages over other government agencies, and makes less likely the
development and implementation of large-scale, non-military programs.
Two more general influences add to this momentum in favor of military
leadership in counterinsurgency policy. First, conventional beliefs on civil-military
relations may lead politicians and military leaders to assume that delegation of strategy in
wartime will improve policy performance and civil-military relations. °9 If this is true,
then the maintenance of separate spheres of military strategy and state policy in
counterinsurgency, as in conventional war, is a logical objective. Second, civilian leaders
often seek to concentrate authority in a single individual or organization. The sheer
difficulty of building new organizational structures to manage counterinsurgency policy
and the friction involved in forging ad hoc inter-agency coordination makes the
delegation of policy to the military more appealing.
The true test of who leads has little to do with the nominal responsibilities of the
competing agencies. In many cases, nominal authority for overall counterinsurgent
strategy rested with the senior civilian decision makers on the ground and in the
respective capitals. In practice, however, it was the agency that consistently won inter-
agency disputes over the content of policy or the allocation of resources that was the real
policy leader. Measured in these terms, policy leadership in Algeria and Vietnam,"o0 and
to a lesser extent in Afghanistan and Iraq, has rested in the hands of the military
command rather than the civil authorities.
109 Samuel P. Huntington , The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp.85; ibid., Cohen, pp. 225-228.
110 My interpretation here is broadly consistent with that advanced by Eliot Cohen in Supreme Command.
While the Johnson Administration was deeply involved in the conduct of the air war, it left the execution of
the ground war almost entirely to General Westmorland and the Chiefs of Staff (ibid., Cohen, pp. 175-185).
The Results of Misunderstanding
The mismatch between the mental models of military organizations and the task
of counterinsurgency produces a dominant pattern of intrawar and interwar behavior. In
general, military organizations will start by applying known rules and routines to a
problem they consider familiar. Mixed performance feedback, including positive
battlefield results, will lead to exploitation rather than exploration or search. Only when
the opportunities for process refinement and escalation have been exhausted are militaries
likely to explore. The first step is to develop new routines and incorporate them into
existing military models. The final step is to substitute new rules and models that help
the organization apply existing and new routines to the specific challenges of
counterinsurgency.
Patterned Response and Exploitation
Military leaders will tend to respond to the presence of armed rebellion with a
show of force and large unit offensive operations. Military leaders generally assume that
an opponent who is vastly weaker in material terms will recognize, either in principle or
on the battlefield, the futility of resistance. With its emphasis on coercion and decisive
battle, the military operational code encourages military leaders to devote the majority of
their efforts and resources to a direct attack on the armed insurgents (+3) and their
supporters (+2) (see diagram below). Preferred strategies may include aggressive
patrolling, large unit search and destroy operations, and mass detentions. Colonel C.E.
Calwell, a British officer writing in the early twentieth century, aptly expressed this belief
in the importance of offensive action in forcing the submission of restive populations:
... in a small war the only possible attitude to assume is...the offensive. The regular army
must force its way into the enemy's country and seek him out. It must be ready to fight him
wherever he may be found.... It is not merely a question of maintaining the initiative, but of
compelling the enemy to see at every turn that he has lost it, and to recognize that the forces
of civilization are dominant and not to be denied.... Since fights are difficult to bring about,
and inasmuch as it is on the battlefield that the issue must be decided, it is obvious that when
an action has been brought on, mere victory is not enough. The enemy must not only be
beaten. He must be beaten thoroughly....The mere expulsion of the opponent from ground
where he has thought fit to accept battle is of small account; what is wanted is a big casualty
list in the hostile ranks - they have been brought up to the scratch of accepting battle, they
must feel what battle against a discipline army means.
In short, the emphasis in counterinsurgency settings should be on offensive operations
carried out under an expansive definition of the enemy and its supporters. 112
Offensive strategies of this type almost always produce mixed results. On the one
hand, they can inflict significant damage on the guerillas and their support network. On
the other hand, these strategies can alienate uncommitted segments of the local
population. Sympathetic or neutral citizens (-1 or 0) may respond to coercive tactics by
increasing their support for the insurgent movement (i.e. citizens may move from the
middle of Petersen's spectrum (-1 or 0) towards more active resistance (levels +1 --. +3)).
Military leaders accustomed to treating the population as insignificant and largely passive
may not immediately grasp the connection between collateral damage and campaign level
stalemate.
"' Colonel C.E. Calwell , Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, Third Edition (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 75; 151-152
112 Lest we consider Calwell's views anachronistic, it is worth citing Douglas Pike's characterization of
prevailing military views of the Vietnam conflict: "Some Americans viewed the Vietnam War as ordinary
war, a test of military force. They held that regardless of how esoteric the enemy's tactics might be or how
much he might attempt to confuse the scene by mixing in non-military considerations, the fact remained
that North Vietnam and communist minority in the South were attempting to conquer South Vietnam by
force. This military effort must be matched by counter-force, decimating in character and punitive in
purpose. The enemy must be smashed militarily, North and South....Victory meant enemy capitulation, if
not openly and formally, at least tacitly and in any event obvious and apparent to all." (Source: Douglas





-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
Collateral damage and mass Milhtary attack on guenllas
detention fuel insurgency and known supporters
While the operational code plays an important role in the initial choice of
counterinsurgent strategies, it has an even more profound impact on the military's
reaction to performance feedback. As classical organizational theory suggests,
organizations are unlikely to change their strategy unless there is clear evidence that the
strategy has failed.113 The problem in counterinsurgency is that the military's preferred
set of strategies - attacks on guerillas and their support base - generates clear and largely
positive feedback. Large scale operations against guerillas generally produce some
number of enemy killed and materiel captured, and there is very little chance that such
operations will result in a decisive defeat of the counterinsurgent forces.114 In a sense,
these operations are controlled experiments in which the outcome is largely
predetermined and serves to validate the preferred strategy. Roger Trinquier, himself a
113 Ibid., March, Simon, Organizations, pp. 173.
114 There are important exceptions to this rule. Under certain circumstances, such as the extensive use of
mines or other passive weapons, counterinsurgent loss ratios may favor the insurgent. However, even
when counterinsurgent casualties rise, they almost always control the field of battle after the engagement -
the second familiar measure of effectiveness. Consequently, militaries may still score Pyrrhic engagements
as small victories.
veteran of counterinsurgency campaigns in Indochina and Algeria, describes this effect as
follows:
The certainty of never running a risk of a clear defeat, such as an equally armed opponent
could inflict upon us, enables any military commander to conduct some sort of operation.
Even if the guerilla bands are not destroyed, at least the geographical objectives are secured
within the prescribed time and a few dead rebels will always balance the account. If,
moreover, a few arms are recovered, the operation, which has been carried out like a normal
peacetime maneuver, then assumes the air of battle and victory sufficient to satisfy a
commander who is not too exacting. But what is essential - the destruction of the enemy's
potential for warfare - is never accomplished, principally because it is never seriously
contemplated. 115
An uninterrupted string of such successes, what Petersen calls "small victories," 116 can
convince the counterinsurgent force that its overall strategic approach is sound. This will
lead the military to focus on focus on exploitation of existing routines (e.g., refinement of
patrolling, raids, the employment of new technologies, etc.) and ignore larger problems
inherent in their overall strategy.
At the same time, the military has difficulty internalizing the negative effects of
aggressive the standard military response. On the one hand, performance feedback on the
political dimensions of the counterinsurgent contest is intrinsically opaque; where
performance feedback in conventional operations is simple, quantitative, frequent, and
continuous, feedback on the support of the population or the legitimacy of the regime is
complex, ambiguous, lagged,1 17 and intermittent. In addition, the professional mindset
acts as a subjective filter on incoming performance feedback. Since the results of
conventional military operations are generally mixed - some insurgents killed, some
115 Roger Trinquier, Modem Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (Leavenworth: U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College, 1985), pp. 59.
116 Petersen cites the "small victories" hypothesis as one irrational mechanism that leads insurgents to
continue their struggle even in the face of insuperable odds. The situation here is the converse; the military
regards a series of "small victories" as proof of the validity of its counterinsurgency strategy (Source:
Petersen, pp. 76-78).
"117 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (St. Petersburg: Hailer Publishing,
1964/2005), pp. 96.
innocents and property damaged - militaries must decide whether to continue these
strategies or change them. The operational code, with its implicit set of priorities, leads
militaries to assign greater weight to the military cues that are familiar, clear, and
positive. By contrast, feedback that is less familiar, less positive (e.g. the political impact
of offensive operations on the local population), and less encouraging is discounted.
The objective measurement problem and the subjective weighting of performance
feedback represent enormous barriers to organizational learning. On a local level,
militaries will tend to see their innumerable "small victories" as proof of the validity of
their initial strategy. They will assume that these gains are cumulative and permanent.
The inability to translate these victories into an overall victory will be chalked up to
insufficient force, time, or efficiency; since the aggressive policy appears sound on a
micro-level, the solution is generally to loosen strictures, add more resources, continue
the offensive, and refine existing routines. Simply put, militaries will exploit rather than
explore; they will invest in improving performance of the existing strategies and will not
re-examine the fit between those strategies and the state's policy goals. Together, the
temptation to exploit and escalate will tend to delay broader search and produce an
escalating stalemate.
Selective Interwar Retention: Misinterpreting past experience
The same ideas and incentives that impair organizational performance within
counterinsurgency campaigns distort post-war behavior. Militaries that have failed to
subdue an insurgent opponent will tend to find explanations and solutions within the
bounds of the MOC. Military leaders will typically point the inadequacy of means
(military manpower or equipment) or insufficient civilian resolve rather than underlying
flaws in strategy. Conventional routines which have been refined as part of counter-
guerilla operations (raids, cordon and search, encirclement, patrols) will be retained.
"Dual use" routines that have clear utility in conventional war are most likely to be
retained. Advances in mobility, precision attack, and firepower will be incorporated into
general doctrine.
Retaining the strategic lessons of counterinsurgency will prove more difficult than
learning them. By contrast, uncomfortable organizational changes that are justifiable
when lives and reputations were at stake may not be rejected when that pressure is
removed. Pent up demands for modernization will collide with attempts to retain
capabilities that are specific to counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgent strategies that
impinge on military autonomy or emphasize interagency coordination will be jettisoned.
In general, routines are more likely to be retained than new rules or models.
Within each of these categories, changes that are compatible with existing beliefs are
likely to survive the transition; those that are not are likely to be rejected.
Disliking the Solution: The Role of Motivated Bias
Simple bias provides a compelling explanation for much of the trouble militaries
encounter in intrawar adaptation. The military operational code explains the standard
progression of inappropriate patterned response, misinterpretation of feedback, and
delayed search for appropriate strategies. By extension, it provides an explanation for the
postwar misinterpretation of wartime experience; the same beliefs that distorted strategic
choice and performance evaluation during the conflict can easily lead military
professionals to ascribe campaign failure to inadequate resources, time, civilian
commitment, or ruthlessness rather than more basic flaws in strategy.
Where simple bias falls short is in the explanation of the phenomenon of the
postwar counterinsurgency purge. While most militaries improve their
counterinsurgency strategy over the course of a campaign, they tend to cull many of the
core lessons in the period immediate following the war. In the course of almost every
campaign, advocates emerge who recognize the fundamental differences between
insurgency and conventional war and propose more appropriate strategies: John Paul
Vann, Robert Komer, David Galula, Roger Trinquier, Robert Thompson, David Petraeus.
Instead of elevating these leaders and incorporating these lessons into official doctrine
and training, most militaries sideline them and retain only those routines and strategies
that are consistent with the core interests of the organization.
Consequently, even those armies with extensive and recent experience in
counterinsurgency enter subsequent campaigns with the same set of ineffective routines
and strategies they applied in the opening stages of earlier campaigns. Strategies and
routines developed over time and at great expense in earlier campaigns are not applied,
while the "worst practices" are applied instead. These militaries tap neither their own
best practices nor those of other militaries. This is true in spite of wide agreement on the
principles of counterinsurgency and the ready availability of such ideas in their own
history and that of other nations. Far from building on their experience, most militaries
fail the far easier test of simple, short term retention.
The speed and selectivity of the postwar purge suggests that this is not a matter of
simple forgetfulness.8" The same militaries that struggle mightily to unlearn
conventional strategies over the course of a long campaign seem quite adept at unlearning
unconventional ones in the immediate postwar period. Whether measured in terms of
spending, doctrine, training, or professional education, military interest in
counterinsurgency tends to drop sharply almost as soon as the fighting subsides.
I argue that the serial amnesia of professional militaries is an expression of
motivated bias. Simple bias explains why it is hard to develop appropriate solutions in
wartime and why past experience might be misinterpreted; motivated bias explains the
rejection of proven solutions once task pressure has been removed. Militaries that
develop effective solutions to the problems of counterinsurgency ultimately discard many
of these solutions on the grounds that they undermine the fundamental organizational
interests. Militaries are not selfless problem solvers; they are bureaucratic organizations
that must balance the desire to succeed in their appointed task against their interests in the
long term health of the organization. Military bureaucracies, like their civilian counter-
parts, seek to maximize their resources, autonomy and prestige. 19 What makes the
"
8As noted in Chapter One, there are two potential alternative explanations for this type of organizational
forgetting: rational expectations and organizational attrition. First, militaries might discard these ideas
because they assume they are unlikely to face similar situations in the future. The problem is that
counterinsurgency has proven far more common than conventional, great power war for much of the past
century. Second, militaries might forget as personnel turnover and the passage of time erode organizational
memory. The suddenness of the counterinsurgency purge belies this explanation - the shift away from
counterinsurgency occurs long before personnel turnover and simple memory loss could have a dramatic
effect.
119 Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1974); Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study of Politics and Organization
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949); Graham Allison, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Harper Collins, 1971); James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What
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strategic lessons, the so-called "best practices" of counterinsurgency, so impermanent is
their incompatibility with these core organizational interests. 120
The assumption of some level of bureaucratic as opposed to task motivation
explains a number of common patterns in the intrawar adaptation as well. On closer
examination, the allocation of resources and attention in counterinsurgency campaigns
reflects more than a single minded focus on task performance. Population security is
paramount in almost all theories of counterinsurgency. In order to provide that security,
militaries must disperse their troops and accept the increase risk that this dispersion and
exposure entails. In practice, many militaries resist the implementation of such proven
operational concepts because they threaten the survival of personnel and units. Instead,
militaries frequently give precedence to force protection over task performance.
Militaries expend copious resources on the construction of fortifications and the
protection of convoys even though these measures are at best secondary to the problem of
population security. Debates about rules of engagement also reflect the fundamental
tension between the desire to succeed and the desire to survive. The principle of minimal
or proportional force means the assumption of greater risk on the grounds of task
performance. Where there are clear tradeoffs between task accomplishment and self-
preservation, the military organization will resist operational concepts that jeopardize the
force and embrace them only as a last resort. By contrast, militaries will tend to overfund
those routines that are related to the task and reinforce the survival imperative.
120 There are other examples of high risk, low benefit missions which militaries have sought to purge in
postwar periods. Close air support, antisubmarine warfare and naval mine countermeasures are examples
of missions that are learned in wartime at great expense only to be jettisoned in peacetime. What
distinguishes them from counterinsurgency is the absence of an equivalent level of cognitive
misunderstanding of the task. Air forces understand close air support and dislike it. Armies not only
dislike counterinsurgency, they misunderstand it. In general, the combination of misunderstanding and
revulsion is more difficult to overcome than revulsion alone.
Militaries as Bureaucratic Maximizers
One of the central insights of organization theory is that bureaucracies, whatever
their formal mandate, are self-interested. While they may seek to accomplish the tasks
that are set before them, they are also careful to guard against policies that undermine the
long term health of the organization.
The literature on organizational interests suggests that bureaucratic organizations
share a common set of general core motivations. Organizations, like organisms, seek to
survive. In order to survive and prosper, organizations seek to maximize their autonomy,
resources and prestige. While there are important constraints on the impulse to maximize
these goods,121 and tradeoffs among these goals are significant, 122 it is sufficient for the
purposes of this study to posit that militaries are motivated by these same impulses.
Autonomy, Resources, and Prestige
James Q. Wilson, building on the work of Philip Selznick and others, observes
that bureaucracies seek to maximize their autonomy in both an internal and an external
sense. 123 On an external level, organizations seek to establish monopoly control over
their domain and resist external constraints, oversight, and cooperation with other
organizations. On an internal level, autonomy means control over the identity, mission,
and central tasks of the organization.124 Organizations will tend to resist efforts by
121 Ibid., Wilson, pp. 182.
122 Ibid., Halperin, pp. 51; ibid., Wilson, pp. 179.
123 Ibid., Wilson, pp. 188.
124 Morton Halperin makes a similar point in his discussion of the "organizational essence." According to
Halperin, organizations will seek to preserve or advance the organizational essence (Source: Halperin, pp.
28, 39-40)
outside actors of organizations to redefine this identity. On both levels, the organization
seeks to preserve its "freedom of maneuver," minimizing competition with rival
organizations and oversight by other government entities. Wilson also notes that
organizations generally prefer autonomy to resources. Given an opportunity to acquire
additional resources at the cost of reduced autonomy, most organizations will forgo those
resources in the interest of preserving internal and external autonomy.' 25
While organizations may prefer autonomy to resources, they will seek to
accumulate resources if this is possible without compromising that autonomy.126
Resources may come in the form of expanded budgets or in the form of additional human
resources. Resources are welcomed so long as leaders are free to use them as they see fit.
Resources that must be spent in ways that are prescribed by outsiders are mixed blessings
as they represent encroachments on the autonomy of the organization.
All things being equal, organizations prefer policies that increase the long terms
prestige and influence of the organization. Prestige matters because it indirectly
determines the autonomy and resources available over the long term. Organizations that
are held in high esteem will tend to attract more resources and fend off oversight; those
with low prestige may see their budgets cut or oversight tightened. Not surprisingly,
organizations will avoid courses of action that are likely to undermine their prestige and
influence. Some such decisions may be "learned vulnerabilities," ' 27 areas in which
organization has failed in the past and is eager to avoid repeated debacles. Concern for
prestige also amplifies the organization's distaste for interagency or collaborative
125 Ibid., Wilson, pp. 179-180, 182.
126 Ibid., Wilson, pp. 179.
127 Ibid., Wilson, pp. 192.
endeavors. The absence of complete control over strategy leaves partners in interagency
policies exposed to the failures of the other parties. 128
The "Best Practices" of Counterinsurgency: The Unpalatable Solution Set
A review of the twentieth century literature on counterinsurgency reveals a
broadly accepted and historically stable set of principles of counterinsurgency - a rough
canon of "best practices" that stands in sharp contrast to the conventional principles of
war. These principles are not unique to any one national tradition. Drawing on very
different historical experiences, a wide range of Western authors have articulated a
remarkably similar set of principles and operational concepts specific to
counterinsurgency.129 While these principles and concepts represent at best an
incomplete model, they are nonetheless internally consistent and squarely at odds with
generally accepted principles of conventional war.
What is clear is that the content of this "best practices" set is deeply unappealing
to professional militaries. It is not simply that the ideas are foreign, though this
undoubtedly plays some role. Foreign ideas that have proved their worth ought to be
candidates for retention and inclusion in military doctrine. Here the problem is that what
must be done to solve the problem impinges on the core equities of the military
organization.
128 Ibid., Wilson, pp. 191.
129 Major General Sir Charles Gwynn, Imperial Policing (Edinburgh: MacMillan & Co., Ltd, 1936); Robert
Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (New York: Praeger, 1966); Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five
(London: Faber & Faber, 1977); Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency
(Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1985); Robert Komer, Bureaucracy at
War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict (London: Westview Press, 1986).
Principles of Counterinsurgency
Writing in the mid-1930s, British Major General Charles Gwynn outlined a set of
basic principles of that would be familiar to almost any student of modern counter-
insurgency.130 While subsequent authors have generated more comprehensive lists,
Gwynn's formulation is among the simplest and highlights the tension between the
military organizational imperatives and the "best practices" of counterinsurgency.
Gwynn proposes four core principles: civilian control of policy, minimum force,
firm and timely action, and civil-military cooperation.131 Gwynn argues that the military
must, even when in "full executive control," act in accordance with the policy of the
civilian government. 132 While the military commander must provide relevant advice on
the employment of military assets, he is not entitled to "force the hand of the
Government." 133 In his call for the use of minimum force, Gwynn notes that the
members of the opposition are not true enemies but rather fellow citizens. 134 For this
reason, every effort must be taken to ensure that the restoration of order does not
undermine reconciliation over the longer run. Gwynn sees this commitment to minimum
force as entirely consistent with his third principle, that of firm and timely response. He
argues that it is imperative that violent opposition be confronted in its early stages lest it
expand in scale and severity. Gwynn's final principle is the importance of civil-military
cooperation. He observes that rebellion requires the unfettered cooperation of civil and
130 Major General Sir Charles Gwynn, Imperial Policing (Edinburgh: MacMillan & Co., Ltd, 1936), pp. 10-
16.
131 Ibid., Gwynn, pp. 13-16.
132 Ibid., Gwynn, pp. 13.
133 Ibid., pp. 14.
134 Ibid., pp. 14.
military authorities. Such coordination between the civilian authorities is particularly
important when the question of overall executive control is unclear.
Gwynn goes on to outline a rough strategy to address the outbreak of rebellion:
The suppression of such movements, unless nipped in the bud, is a slow business, generally
necessitating the employment of numbers all out of proportion to the actual fighting value of
the rebels, owing to the unavoidable dispersion of troops and the absence of a definite
objective. It becomes a battle of wits in which the development of a well-organised
intelligence service, great mobility, rapid means of inter-communication, and close co-
operation between all sections of the Government sources are essential. 135
Seen from the vantage point of the professional military, Gwynn's prescription is
deeply unappealing. While most military leaders would embrace Gwynn's call for swift
and firm action against rebels, his remaining injunctions run counter to the military's
fundamental interests in survival, autonomy, resources and prestige.
Civilian control of policy and close coordination involve the functional
subordination of the military in its own stated realm of expertise - the exercise of force.
Far from enhancing military autonomy, this mode of operation guarantees extensive
constraints and an essentially a subordinate position. It is one thing to argue in favor of
unity of effort; it is another to embark on a course that reduces the military to a minor
player in the arena of armed conflict.
The minimum force principle is objectionable on similar grounds. Demands to
restrict force and subordinate the exercise of force to the strictures of law undermine
military autonomy. They represent fundamental incursions by civilians into the
management of violence. What is more, the specific compromises in this area inevitably
expose counterinsurgent forces to greater risk. Maximum force protects the
counterinsurgent force at the expense of the population; minimum force protects the
population at the cost of additional military casualties.
135 Ibid., Gwynn, pp. 11-12.
While counterinsurgency might be expected to deliver additional resources to the
military, these resources are seldom the kind militaries want. Counterinsurgency often
sets up a tension between the military's desire to modernize its capital base and the need
to fund ongoing operations of indeterminate duration. Armies often receive additional
funds and manpower in the short run, but they are seldom available for use in
modernization. When the campaign is over, pent up demand for delayed modernization
schemes generally exceeds the funds available for all services. Viewed over the long
run, counterinsurgency seldom brings armies the kind of resources that enable them to
pursue their preferred modernization plans.
Counterinsurgency campaigns prosecuted in this way are unlikely to improve the
prestige of the military as an organization. Military prestige, as perceived by relevant
domestic audiences, is a function of task performance and professional conduct.
Deliberate and carefully circumscribed military operations offer little in the way of glory
and unlimited potential for disgrace. Even when they are competently run,
counterinsurgency campaigns are long and almost devoid of spectacular victories. Given
a balance of forces that overwhelmingly favors the counterinsurgent forces, tactical
victory is assumed and the occasional tactical reverse is an embarrassment.
Counterinsurgency by its nature brings troops into contact with a population that includes
civilians and armed insurgents. The difficulty of distinguishing friends and enemies in
populated areas makes incidents of abuse and overkill almost inevitable. Public exposure
of such incidents damages the prestige of the military. Not only are they likely to suffer
in budget terms, they are also less likely to attract and retain personnel necessary to
maintain the organization.
Operational Concepts and Routines
The tension between what is useful and what is organizationally palatable is
present at the level of routines as well as strategy. The accepted canon of "best practices"
includes a number of operational whose practical appeal is offset by their implications for
the health of the organization.
At the tactical level, the problem is generally the tradeoff between security and of
the counterinsurgent force and the security of the population. Steps taken to ensure the
protection of the local population increase the vulnerability of the counterinsurgent
forces. Dispersion, whether in the form of advisory efforts, Combined Action Platoons,
or the forts of the beau geste, exposes the counterinsurgent force to greater risk of tactical
losses. The converse is also true. Steps taken to insulate counterinsurgent forces from
the risks of insurgent attack, whether in the form of mounted patrols, large fortified bases,
or permissive rules of engagement, purchase force protection at the cost of reduced
information and decreased population security. Militaries will tend to resist the adoption
of operational concepts and routines that entail the acceptance of additional force risk.
While they may come to accept them as a last resort, they will be the last to be accepted
and the first to be jettisoned.
Personnel rotation policy is another area in which the clash of function and
organizational interest is clear. Effective population security can only be established if
the counterinsurgent forces have a detailed understanding of the local area and its
inhabitants. Frequent rotation of personnel effectively resets the process of
organizational learning for the local unit and breaks the trust between the population and
the occupying forces. While all this is well understood, relatively short rotations are
generally the rule. Framed in organizational terms, the explanation is quite simple.
Longer rotations pose a threat to the morale of the military. Discontent among the troops
or among the families of the troops will tend to undermine the military retention. Faced
with a choice between a clearly suboptimal rotation policy and the threat of diminished
morale and retention, most militaries put the long term health of the organization and its
members before the accomplishment of the task.
Political military strategies, even when successful, represent long term challenges
to the professional military as a bureaucratic entity. Clear and hold strategies focused on
re-establishing security for the local population are intrinsically costly for the occupying
force - they involve restrictive rules of engagement and dispersion that inevitably
increase the casualties the force must sustain. While counterinsurgency will tend to
bring additional resources to the ground forces during the war, these long campaigns are
generally followed by a severe retrenchment in spending. Operations during the
campaign consume funds that might otherwise have been devoted to capital
modernization. Once the storm has passed, the ground forces, not to mention the air and
naval components must compete to fulfill their pent up modernization demands in the
face of steeply declining funding levels.
While this tension between task pressures and bureaucratic interests explains
certain important anomalies in the course of intrawar adaptation, it is most evident in the
interwar period. The sudden disappearance of immediate task pressure brings suppressed
bureaucratic interests to the fore. Unpalatable strategies and routines that were
grudgingly accepted over the course of a counterinsurgency campaign can be safely
discarded once the campaign is over. The organization can protect itself from future
involvement in structurally unpleasant category of conflict by excising those capabilities.
Such a purge decreases the likelihood that it will be forced to take up similar tasks in the
future. 136
In short, professional militaries that expend enormous energy developing
counterinsurgency expedients in wartime often jettison them shortly thereafter. While
this rejection in part reflects the same cognitive problems that bedevil intrawar efforts,
the speed and selectivity of the purge suggests something far more deliberate. Militaries
do not like what the "best practices" of counterinsurgency entail: functional
subordination to civilian politicians, increased risk, delayed modernization, and
significant reputational risk.
Explaining Variation in Learning
Core beliefs and organizational interests exert a powerful systematic influence on
the lessons militaries derive from counterinsurgency. While the patterns they generate
are visible across a number of historical cases, these patterns are not laws. What
militaries learn and what they retain varies in response to at least four broad, independent
variables: perceived task performance (success/failure), task pressure, resource
abundance, and civilian participation. These variables make themselves felt through their
136 This is one interpretation of the Powell/Weinberger Doctrine in the U.S. context. By imposing strict
limits of the type of missions the military can undertake, the military can avoid the undesirable task set. In
reality, this approach only offers protection when counterinsurgency campaigns are the result of deliberate
choice. If counterinsurgency campaigns are the unintended byproduct of conflict termination or alliance
entanglements, then the "purge and avoid" approach may leave the military embroiled in counterinsurgency
without the tools to address it.
influence on the timing, structure and extent of the organizational search for performance
improvement.
Task Performance: Failure induced search 137
The military's perception of its own performance determines the timing and
extent of organizational search in counterinsurgency. Since change is both costly and
risky, the military is likely to continue on a given course unless there is clear evidence
that they have failed to meet their goals. 138 Only when it clearly falls short of its
aspirations is there a clear rationale to search for alternative solutions.139 The desire to
search is inversely proportional to the organization's level of performance satisfaction. 140
The perceived severity of failure will determine the extent of search and the costs the
organization is willing to incur in order to rectify it.
While this basic logic holds in counterinsurgency, the structure of the problem
introduces certain complications. First, unambiguous military defeat in
counterinsurgency is rare, especially in the opening phases of these campaigns.
Counterinsurgent forces generally enjoy substantial numerical and qualitative advantages
over their opponents, making the chance of their suffering a major military defeat quite
low.14 1 When it occurs, clear military defeat does prompt militaries to search for new
solutions. The shock of the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu prompted a wholesale
reappraisal of French counterinsurgency doctrine. Similarly, the shock of the Tet
137 See James G. March, A Primer on Decision making: How Decisions Happen (New York: Free Press,
1994), pp. 28.
138 Herbert A. Simon, James G. March, Organizations (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1967), pp. 173-174.
139 Richard M. Cyert, James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Malden: Blackwell Publishing,
1992), pp. 41-44.
140 Ibid., March, Simon, pp. 174.
141 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (St. Petersburg: Hailer Publishing,
2005, pp. 72.
Offensive in Vietnam set off a process of self-evaluation that changed the shape of
American strategy in the latter phases of the war.142
Given the typical balance of forces between the insurgents and the government,
failure is most likely to come in the form of stalemate. Over time, the military's inability
to achieve its stated ends in spite of apparently uniform tactical success may prompt a re-
examination of strategy. Unfortunately, the military's response to the paradox of tactical
success and campaign stalemate is often to refine existing routines and escalate the
intensity of the fight. This diversion costs time and resources and reduces the chance that
a sound compelling strategic solution can be implemented once it is found.
While the recognition of failure may prompt search, it tells us very little about the
structure or extent of that search. In and of itself, failure simply sets in motion a process
whose outcome depends heavily on beliefs, interests and the remaining independent
variables. Without a recognition of failure, ambitious search is highly unlikely; with it,
the chance of search rises but its course and extent remain indeterminate.
Task Pressure
Militaries are interested problem solvers engaged in an ongoing balancing act.
On the one hand, they seek to solve current and anticipated military problems. On the
other hand, they are bureaucrats eager to defend the autonomy, resources, and prestige of
the organization. The relative influence of these two sets of pressures, one external and
task driven, the other internal and bureaucratic, depends on the level of task pressure they
face.
142 Lewis Sorley, Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes (1968-1972) (Lubbock: Texas Tech University
Press, 2004); Douglas Pike, The Bunker Papers: Reports to the President from Vietnam, 1967-1973
(Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1990), Volumes 1-3.
For the purposes of this study, task pressure is the probability that task failure will
lead to physical extinction. In total war, the prospect of extinction is real and ever
present. The threat of extinction prompts militaries to focus on task performance and
shelve longer term parochial concerns. As survival and task success become
synonymous, the full energies of the military are devoted to practical problem solving.
By contrast, peacetime militaries face little or no immediate task pressure. 143 While they
may prepare for to fight future wars, they face no immediate threat of extinction. Under
these circumstances, bureaucratic motivations tend to play the dominant role in
explaining the course of organizational change. Limited war occupies a middle ground.
Here the military must balance task performance against the desire to protect the
organization's core interests.
While task pressure may vary over the course of counterinsurgency campaigns,
this study focuses primarily on the step changes in task pressure between war and peace.
During the course of expeditionary counterinsurgency campaigns, the moderate level of
task pressure explains the mixed motives of military leaders. During such conflicts, the
military tries to improve task performance but bureaucratic interests play a role in the
screening of proposed routines and strategies. The transition from limited war to peace
radically alters the balance between task concerns and bureaucratic interests. These sharp
swings in task pressure act as a switching mechanism between the two categories of
organizational motivation: one external and task oriented and the other internal and
primarily bureaucratic.
143 One could argue that peacetime armies are engaged in efforts to anticipate future conflicts; in some
sense these expectations amount to some form of attenuated task pressure. That said, these pressures are
not only uncertain and distant, they are as yet unrealized. They are far weaker influences on the military
than the reality of limited war.
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Moderate task pressure explains the modest pace, order, and extent of the search
for counterinsurgency solutions. Where the threat of major defeat is modest, militaries
are slow to engage in costly search. If such search proves necessary, then militaries will
explore solutions in the order of increasing disruption; militaries will try solutions that
are the least costly and least disruptive of core interests rather than those that are most
likely to be effective. Finally, some solutions to counterinsurgency may be so disruptive
that they are only acceptable to the military if the state or army is in peril. In limited war,
there may be a set of strategies that are acknowledged to be effective but essentially off
limits.
Although this study does not include any cases of domestic counterinsurgency,
this subset of cases should follow the pattern laid out here. As the threat to the army and
the state increases, the influence of parochial interests should recede. While the military
may still struggle with cognitive obstacles to understanding counterinsurgency, it should
not suffer the penalties associated with bureaucratic disincentives to change.
Task pressure is defined as a categorical variable with three values: high pressure
(total war), moderate pressure (limited war), and minimal task pressure (peacetime).
When task pressure is high, militaries will behave as simple problem solvers. They may
continue to suffer the effects of the cognitive biases but they will tend to ignore or
downplay bureaucratic pressures. When task pressure is moderate, as in the case of
limited war and specifically expeditionary counterinsurgency, militaries will act as
interested problem solvers. While they will seek to develop solutions to wartime
problems, they will balance the utility of those solutions against their impact on
bureaucratic interests. Under these circumstances, mixed motivation will influence the
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order in which solutions are explored and implemented. Solutions that improve
performance and are compatible with organizational interests will be implemented first.
Solutions that run counter to bureaucratic interest may be considered, but only when
more palatable alternatives have been tried and found to be inadequate. When task
pressure is low or non-existent, the military will respond primarily to bureaucratic
pressures. Routines and strategies will be judged primarily on their compatibility with
bureaucratic imperatives rather than their proven or expected task utility. Routines and
strategies that fit the bureaucratic imperatives and are useful will be retained and
developed; those that are useful but bureaucratically suspect will be expunged.
Resource Abundance
The level of resources available to a state in counterinsurgency will exert a strong
influence on the timing, order and extent of organizational search. In the context of this
study, resources refer to the manpower and capital made available for the prosecution of
a counterinsurgency campaign. What matters most is the level of resources available
relative to the scale of a given counterinsurgency problem. All things being equal,
resource scarcity will tend to accelerate search and push militaries to move beyond their
preferred solutions. Abundant resources enable militaries to follow apply their preferred
strategies and to use escalation as an alternative to search.
For several decades there has been a lively and unresolved scholarly debate on the
influence of resources on innovation. 144 One group has argued that resource abundance
144 Riitta Katila, Scott Shane, "When does lack of resources make new firms innovate?" Academy of
Management Journal, Vol. 48, No. 5, 2005; Jitendra Singh, "Performance, Slack and Risk Taking in
Organizational Decision making," Academy of Management Journal, Volume 29, No. 3, 1986.
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encourages innovation. 145 This group has argued that slack, the existence of spare
resources above and beyond the normal requirements of the organization, enables
organizations to engage in open ended search for innovation. The second group has
argued that resource scarcity stimulates search. This study argues that military behavior
in counterinsurgency conforms to the second hypothesis - that scarcity stimulates
wartime search and abundance impedes it.
Resources influence search in three ways: budget constraints, bureaucratic
influence and factor endowment effects. First, resource scarcity prevents militaries from
pursuing military strategies that are resource intensive. Lacking the resources to pursue
their preferred strategies, militaries are forced to explore alternative strategies far earlier
than they normally would. The inability to pursue large scale conventional operations
allows militaries to sidestep the illusory gains and collateral damage of conventional
response and forces them to engage in conscious search rather than patterned response.
The gap between the requirements of a conventional campaign and the available
resources may need to be quite severe to trigger this switch in initial response. So long as
militaries believe that they can engage the enemy in conventional military operations, the
temptation to do so will be great. Second, resource abundance affects the leadership of
the campaign, particularly the degree of military dominance in decision making. When
resources are abundant, militaries will play a disproportionately powerful role and will
tend to crowd out the influences of other parties (civilian administrators, police, special
forces, intelligence services).146 When the military is the hegemon in the interagency
process, the military operational code is the logic that dominates counterinsurgency
145 Christos Pitelis, "A Behavioral Resources Based View of the Firm: The Synergy of Cyert and March
and Penrose," Organization Science, Vol. 18., No. 3, May-June 2007.
146 Austin Long has made this point in various formal and informal discussions.
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strategy. When resources are scarce, non-military groups are more likely to play
prominent roles in strategy and are more likely to challenge the reflexive application and
interpretation of conventional strategies.
Third, the mix of resources committed, particularly the balance between capital
and manpower, will affect the structure and outcome of search. High manpower to
capital ratios will encourage militaries to engage in large scale pacification operations.
When weapons rather than financial aid are extended, the weapons provided will
themselves influence the path of military strategy. Militaries provided with conventional
military platforms will be more likely to follow that path.
Sharp changes in resource abundance over the course of a campaign will act as
environmental shocks. 147 Resource shocks will jar militaries out of existing strategies
and into new ones. This effect holds in both directions. Sharp decreases in available
resources will force militaries to reconsider strategy and look beyond military solutions;
sharp increases in resources may entice leaders into a rapid conventional military
escalation aimed at inflicting a decisive defeat on the insurgents.
In short, resource scarcity will tend to stimulate early search for alternative
strategies; resource abundance will tend to prolong the application of preferred military
solutions that rely on conventional military operations. Intrawar resource shocks may
drive militaries to switch strategy with new resources encouraging a return to
conventional operations and resource cuts driving militaries to non-traditional solutions.
147 Cynthia Lengnick-Hall, Tammy Beck, "Adaptive fit versus Robust Transformation: How Organizations
Respond to Environmental Change," Journal of Management, Vol. 31, No. 5, 2005; Gerard George, "Slack




Military domination of decision making in counterinsurgency explains the
tendency of states to pursue conventional military strategies and delay the search for
more effective strategies. Increased civilian participation in routine, operational
decisions on the use of force increases the chances that the state can avoid inappropriate
response. While it is quite common for militaries to bemoan excessive civilian
intervention in wartime policymaking, this is a case where non-intervention practically
guarantees inappropriate response to the problem.
Objections to civilian participation in the development of strategy fall into two
categories. Military professionals often argue that civilian leaders lack the fortitude to
endorse necessarily violent solutions to counterinsurgency problems. By diluting the
state's commitment to such courses of action, civilians may increase the chances of
campaign failure. Others argue that civilian participation necessarily undermines unity of
effort. Not only are civilians likely to downplay the necessary role of violence, but the
clash of civilian and military opinion will impede the formulation of an effective state
strategy.
High levels of civilian participation in counterinsurgency strategy can interrupt
the counterinsurgency spiral in three ways. First, active civilian participation can force
militaries to examine their otherwise reflexive reactions to counterinsurgency - the
mechanism of deliberate choice. Many early responses to counterinsurgency are
patterned responses rather than carefully examined choices and simple contestation early
in the process increases the chances that inappropriate responses will be scrutinized
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earlier. Second, civilians bring a separate set of beliefs and preferences to the
counterinsurgency problem that enable them to evaluate performance in different ways.
This makes possible a parallel search for new solutions rather than a serial one pursued
from a distinctly military starting point. Third, civilians, particularly those with
experience in domestic politics as opposed to international diplomacy, will be more
attuned to the relevance of political exchange. Whereas militaries will tend to approach
counterinsurgency as some variety limited war, civilian politicians are more likely to
recognize the underlying problem of state consolidation. They more than their military
peers, are likely to recognize the distinction between state power and state authority.
Civilian may enter the decision making process in two ways: they may assert their
intrinsic authority over the objections of military leaders or they may be invited to
participate by the military leadership. While both options may force contestation, the
latter course is more likely to lead to substantial overhaul of strategy. Senior military
sponsorship of civilian participation will lend civilian input credibility that would be
lacking in the case of direct intervention. This dynamic explains the significance of the
uniformed statesman in a number of successful counterinsurgency campaigns.
The Dependent Variable: Strategic Choice in Counterinsurgency
Summary
Changes in the independent variables cause variation in the timing, order and
extent of organizational search. The parameters of that search will determine the lessons
militaries derive from the counterinsurgency experience. This organizational learning
takes place on two distinct levels: that of routines or tactics, and that of rules or strategy.
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Left to their own devices, militaries will tend to favor exploitation over
exploration. This is both a natural organizational response and a reflection of the "self-
hiding" nature of performance problems in counterinsurgency. On the level of strategy,
militaries will tend to move from small war strategies (Model 1) to political war (Model
2). Militaries generally encounter great difficulty coping with the political aspects of
counterinsurgency. Consequently, they are usually content to modify their military
model of problem solving rather than replace it.
The Tools of Counterinsurgency
Most militaries make rapid progress at the level of routines and tools. Militaries
are adept at improving and modifying existing tactical routines to boost efficiency. They
will typically improve mobility, human intelligence and defensive tactics in response to
the exigencies of the conflict. This learning is local in origin and is often supported by
various ad hoc schools established to disseminate adaptations developed at the local
level. Militaries also manage to develop novel routines to address the peculiar problems
of counterinsurgency. While some of these are simple extensions of conventional
capabilities (e.g. the introduction of helicopters to improve mobility), others are
genuinely new. Though there appears to be relatively little conscious attention to the
experience of other armies in similar circumstances, and true innovation lags line
extensions significantly, professional militaries nevertheless manage to develop a series
of tools aimed at influencing the population. These innovations come in the areas of
civic action and reconstruction, population resettlement and psychological operations.
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Strategies of Counterinsurgency
If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be.
When and why do men obey? Upon what inner justifications and upon what external means
does this domination rest?' 48
Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation
Where militaries struggle and often fail is in the act of assembling these new and
existing routines into an effective strategy. The ultimate goal of counterinsurgency is to
re-establish a durable political order, one that can survive the end of routine military
operations by large bodies of troops. The outbreak of insurgency represents the collapse
of the unitary power and authority of the state and the devolution of violence from the
state to groups and individuals has set off a Hobbesian "war of all against all."
Though it often takes some time for leaders to recognize it, the central task of
counterinsurgency is the restoration of the power and authority of the state. To restore
that authority leaders must answer Weber's two questions. When and why do men obey?
Upon what inner justifications and upon what external means does this domination rest?
Each of the three strategies described below is organized around a different
answer to these questions and a different theory of how to restore "organized obedience"
to the state. That theory of victory in turn rests on assumptions about the significance,
agency and motivation of the insurgents and the population. Each strategy bears the
mark of one or more routines that symbolize these abstract foundations. The content of
each strategy sets up tradeoffs between task performance and organizational fit.
148 Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," pp. 1.
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Model 1: Counterinsurgency as Small War
Militaries often treat counterinsurgency as a variety of conventional war. While
the war is dispersed and is often carried out in populated areas, militaries assume that it is
still a struggle in which direct attack on the armed opponent is the shortest path to
victory.
Counterinsurgency as Small War
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This response rests on the implicit assumption that obedience is a product of fear.
Men obey the state because the state holds overwhelming power and this power
engenders fear. Individuals and groups base their behavior on a cold calculation of the
consequences of rash action against a powerful state.
This logic leads militaries to apply overwhelming force to the armed insurgents
and their supporters under the assumption that military victory will usher in a new period
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of stable order. The presence of military forces and their use against insurgents should
convince the population to submit to the authority of the authorities. If the
counterinsurgent forces are visibly superior to the insurgents in military terms, then the
population should submit to this manifest power. This reliance on conventional measures
of guerilla capabilities leads militaries to understate the threat posed by such groups and
overstate the likelihood of conventional military victory over them.
The small war response involves on a number of unstated supporting assumptions
about the population. First, the insurgents are the center of gravity of the rebellion and
the population is a distinctly secondary concern. While it may be wise to avoid wanton
destruction of civilians and property, militaries pursuing this model assume that the
defeat or destruction of the insurgents and their supporters will restore state authority.
Second, the agency of the population is limited; individually as well as collectively, they
are assumed to be passive. Third, to the extent that militaries consider the question of the
population's motivation, they assume that they will respond to the simple calculus of
power.
The routine that best exemplifies Model 1 is large scale cordon and search. In
cordon and search operations counterinsurgent forces surround an area in which rebels
are believed to be hiding. Once the cordon is in place, the forces comb the area in an
effort to apprehend the rebels and their supporters. In theory, such operations should lead
to the capture of enemy forces and engender respect for the power of the state. In
practice, the operations tend to produce small positive results and antagonize the local
population. Actions taken against innocents, damage to property, and the imposition or
collective responsibility for guerilla actions tend to increase popular resentment of the
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government. Reproduced on a mass scale, such operations neither reduce the total
number of guerillas nor produce the desired psychological effects on the population.
The problem is that the simple application of coercive force is an ineffective
means of re-establishing the state's monopoly position. Counterinsurgent forces must
expend vast resources and time chasing very small numbers of armed opponents. Even
when they find them, the collateral damage of search and destroy operations tends to
alienate the population rather than impress them.
The Model 1 prescription is quite simple: men obey the state because they fear it
and will obey only when that power is overwhelming. The problem of restoring the state
is one of maximizing force and applying it against those who oppose the new order.
Those who resist the state are destroyed or imprisoned. Those who observe these actions
will fear the state and obey it.
Model 2: Counterinsurgency as Political War
Political war (Model 2) rests a different answer to Weber's questions. Men obey
the state because they fear its coercive power and desire the material benefits it can
provide. Even if sticks alone cannot compel obedience, a clever mix of carrots and sticks
can.
Political war combines a grudging recognition of the importance of political
aspects of counterinsurgency with a stubborn defense of the military operational code.
Militaries generally adopt this strategy because small war strategies have failed to deliver
decisive results on the campaign level. When countless small victories and prolonged
escalation fail to reduce or even check the expansion of the guerilla movement, the
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military is forced to reexamine its assumptions about the significance of the population
and the origins of resistance. While the first instinct may be to attribute increased
guerilla strength to foreigners, the puzzle of guerilla regeneration eventually forces most
militaries to enter the unfamiliar realm of mass politics.
Political war appears quite different from small war in a number of respects.
First, it involves a recognition of the importance of the population in counterinsurgency.
Whereas the armed insurgents are clearly the center of gravity in Model 1 strategies,
militaries embracing modified strategies single out the population as the center of gravity.
Military leaders often redefine the counterinsurgency campaign as a contest to control the
population.
To secure control over the population, the military adds new weapons and new
targets. While they continue to pursue the insurgents (+3) and their supporters (+2) using
military force, the military begins to employ a mix of psychological operations, civic
action, and population control to compel the population (-2, -1, 0, +1, +2) to submit.
With these new tools comes the need for new measures of effectiveness. Militaries
engaged in the civic action and the provision of basic government services begin to
measure their progress in terms of the benefits delivered to the population. Militaries
attempt to measure popular opinion and to incorporate these considerations into the larger
military struggle against the insurgents.
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Counterinsurgency as Political War
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While the move from small war to political war is a major one, much remains
unchanged. While the military considers the population and its sentiments more
important, it continues to treat the problem as one of simple compellance. The military
assumes that the skillful application of some combination of positive and negative
incentives will lead the weaker parties to accept the new order. The relationship between
the counterinsurgent forces and the population remains an inherently unequal one: the
military imposes a set of clear incentives on a passive population, and the population
responds to these incentives based on a logic of unbiased self-interest. If the
counterinsurgent forces offer a superior mix of advertising and incentives, then the
population is bound to support them.
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For all its political trappings, Model 2 still relies heavily on the logic of the
military operational code. Militaries react to the unavoidable incorporation of political
ideas by redefining politics in their own image. Political conflict, like battle, remains a
simple test of strength and power in which victory goes to the stronger party. Militaries
can secure peace by bombarding the insurgents and the population with a mix of
incentives. Rather than adopting the logic of exchange or bargaining, Model 2 makes
politics an extension of war by other means. 149
Two sets of routines are the hallmarks of Model 2: civic action and psychological
operations. Civic action involves the provision of public goods to secure the loyalty and
appreciation of the population. Civic action may take the form of construction projects or
in the provision of basic services such as food, power and water. Military leaders assume
that "good works" will produce positive reactions and that this gratitude will decrease
support for the insurgents and boost support for the government.
Psychological operations represent an attempt to gain the support of the
population through effective advertising. The state uses media to transmit messages that
cast the insurgents in a negative light while highlighting the positive image an
accomplishments of the state. This implicitly this rests on the assumption that lack of
support for the government is a function of incomplete information or inaccurate or
inarticulate communication of the government's message.
What military enthusiasm for civic action and psychological operations
demonstrates is the belief that a powerful and benevolent state will inevitably command
the respect of a passive population. The relationship between the state and the population
149 Richard Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime 1919-1924 (London: The Harvill Press, 1994), pp.
499.
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is still an essentially unequal one in which the state provides incentives and the
population reacts according to a simple cost/benefit calculus.
Model 2 brings its own variety of learning trap. Population control is intrinsically
coercive; it may be possible to produce submission through force, but it is almost
impossible to gauge genuine public opinion when force is present. Without a valid,
coincident measure of public sentiment, states and militaries fall back on measures of
performance. Rather than trying to measure the political effects of their actions, they
measure the political tasks they perform - the number of wells dug, roads built, villages
resettled, etc. Reliance on measures of performance in turn leads them to overstate their
success in the political dimension.
While Model 2 strategies are generally more effective than Model 1 strategies in
suppressing violence, this progress is generally temporary and costly. Populations often
resent the strictures placed on them but hesitate to show resistance when the agents of the
state are present. Once they have left, the population is often more likely to assist the
guerillas than they were prior to the imposition of the "protective" scheme. This is why
progress is so costly and open-ended. Model 2 control depends on the permanent, direct
administration of the subject population.
Model 2 is often the last stop in military organizational learning. Since it
incorporates political considerations while preserving the core problem solving model of
the profession, the solution appears more appropriate to the situation and institutionally
non-threatening. Once military leaders have acknowledged the nominal centrality of
politics, and have redefined politics in ways that are consistent with their model of
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problem solving, they are resistant to outside efforts to push further in the direction of
political interaction with the population.
Model 3: Counterinsurgency as State Consolidation
Model 3 strategies provide a third answer to the question of why men obey. Over
the long run, men obey the state because they accept its authority as legitimate. In order
to restore organized obedience to the state, the state must convince local elites and the
local population to accept its authority voluntarily. In practical terms, integrated political
strategies involve the search for the minimum winning coalition. The state must, through
the use of bargaining, assemble a coalition of groups and individuals that will willingly
form a bulwark against generalized social violence.
At their core, Model 3 strategies have as their objective the consent of the
governed. Where Model 1 and Model 2 rest on the assumption that the populace can be
beaten, or in the latter case beaten and bribed, 15 into accepting the new order, Model 3
strategies recognize the importance of consent. Without the consent of some large
portion of the population, including many who may have supported or sympathized with
the insurgents, the state cannot reconstruct a durable, low cost political order.
The most important insight is that the political consent of some large portion of
the population is a functional prerequisite for conflict termination. Military leaders
recognize that political consent cannot be obtained simply through the unilateral
application of force or the manipulation of positive or negative incentives. Instead, the
political solution must involve some level of bargaining between the state and local elites
and population. This generally pushes civilian leaders to the forefront, and subordinates
150 This is Barry Posen's turn of phrase.
116
the exercise of military force to the larger political purpose of political reconstruction.
The military relinquishes much of its autonomy and control over strategy, and assumes a
supporting role in a broader political bargaining process. The military moves from the
role of king to the diminished stature of kingmaker.
This shift from the externally imposed obedience of Model 2 to the consensual
obedience of Model 3 has profound implications. As Stanley Milgram has noted, the
origins, permanence and costs of these two forms of obedience to authority differ is
fundamental ways:
While people will comply with a source of social control under coercion (as when a gun is aimed at
them), the nature of obedience under such circumstances is limited to direct surveillance. When the
gunman leaves, or when his capacity for sanctions is eliminated, obedience stops. In the case of
voluntary obedience to a legitimate authority, the principal sanctions for disobedience come from
within the person. They are not dependent upon coercion, but stem from the individual's sense of
commitment to his role. In this sense, there is an internalized basis for his obedience, not merely an
external one.51
In the context of state consolidation, this "internalized obedience" makes the restoration
of stability possible at an acceptable cost. Whereas obedience under Model 2 strategies
depends on the costly and open ended maintenance of large numbers of security forces,
Model 3 strategies use consent and internalized obedience to facilitate a return to low cost
governance.
151 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), pp.
140-141.
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One signature routine of Model 3 strategies is amnesty. Amnesty involves the
conversion of onetime opponents into members of the state coalition. Under amnesty
programs, the state offers the individual or group safe treatment and political rights
within the new order. In return, the individual or group agrees to accept the authority of
the state and abandon extralegal violence as a tool of political competition. Amnesty will
not work without powerful positive and negative incentives. But the presence of these
incentives alone is generally insufficient to cause individuals or groups to willingly
submit. Writing on his experience in turning onetime guerillas into counter-guerilla
fighters, Frank Kitson highlighted the role of political ideas and rationales in securing
individual loyalty to the state:
... three separate factors have to be brought into play in order to make a man shift his
allegiance. In the first place he must be given an incentive which strong enough to make him
want to do so. This is the carrot. Then he must be made to realize that failure will result in
something very unpleasant happening to him. This is the stick. Thirdly he must be given a
reasonable opportunity of proving to himself and to his friends that there is nothingfundamentally dishonorable about his action. Some people consider that the carrot and stickprovide all that is necessary, but I am sure that many people will refuse the one and face the
other, if by doing otherwise they lose their self-respect. On the other hand few people will
choose the harder course if they think that both are equally consistent with their ideals. 152





Once an individual has chosen to switch sides, the source of control becomes
internal rather than purely external. This is the fundamental step, which, on the much
larger scale of populations and elites, is the process that must take place in order for the
state to restore its claim to authority.
One objection to Model 3 strategy is that negotiation and state consolidation are
matters for the government and not the military. According to this line of reasoning,
militaries "fail" to adopt Model 3 strategies because it is not their job to do so. In a
normative sense, this is correct. In the context of interstate war, it is the civilian
government that controls the policy aims and any eventual negotiation. In
counterinsurgency, this division of labor is less distinct. Military leaders are often the de
facto stewards of both strategy and policy, particularly at the local level. Whether this is
the result of civilian abdication or military usurpation, the result is essentially the same.
The military commander is the de facto sovereign of the occupied territory, and his
actions will dictate the terms of the political competition. As the would be monopolist on
the legitimate use of violence, the commander cannot extract himself from local politics.
He can only decide if and how he chooses to interact with the population.
For this reason, an understanding and acceptance of Model 3 assumptions is
central to state success in the restoration of state authority. A military leader who
recognizes and accepts the limits inherent in Model 1 and Model 2 can advise the civil
authorities of these limits and increase the likelihood of cooperation.1 53 By contrast, the
153 The clearest example of this is General Templer's interaction with Oliver Lyttelton and Winston
Churchill in early 1952. Templer clearly recognized the political object and the importance of soliciting
input from the civilian government in London (Source: Sir Gerlad Templer, "[The task in Malaya]: minute
by Sir G Templer to Mr Churchill, PREM 11/639, 12 Jan 1952," in A.J. Stockwell (ed.), Malaya: Part II:
The Communist Insurrection, 1948-1953 (London: HMSO, 1995), British Documents on the End of
Empire, Series B, Vol. 3, pp. 361).
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military leader who restricts his activities to the military sphere of Model 1 can always
scuttle civilian negotiation. Successful implementation of Model 3 strategies always
requires military deference to civil authority; in many cases it requires active advice from
the military leaders who are the de facto sovereigns of the territory.
Men obey the state because they accept its authority. The restoration of state
authority depends on the assembly of a minimum, winning coalition of elites and
individuals who accept the new order. This solution may involve violence, but it is
violence applied with the final reconciliation in mind.
Changes in Counterinsurgent Strategy
When resources are abundant and the military is free to dictate strategy, the
natural progression is to begin with a Model 1 response. Only as this proves inadequate
is the military likely to move to a Model 2 strategy. Under these conditions, militaries
are unlikely to embrace Model 3 strategies. Faced with a choice between a model that
incorporates politics without upsetting core models, and one that subordinates military
action to political constraints, the military is likely to choose the former.
Unlearning
Moves from one strategy to another involve some level of unlearning. 154 The
adoption of new strategies, as opposed to the incorporation of new routines, inevitably
entails the overthrow of existing ideas about how to relate actions to the desired ends.
The burden of unlearning varies significantly across the three strategies in question.
154 William H. Starbuck, "Unlearning Ineffective or Obsolete Technologies," International Journal of
Technology Management, Vol. 11, 1996, pp. 725-737.
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Militaries find it easiest to embrace conventional military response, and often develop
Model 2 strategies in response to prolonged military stalemate. Militaries find political
strategies much harder to understand and intrinsically unappealing.
Moves into conventional military response are clearly the easiest. Conventional
military response is a straightforward application of the tents of the military operational
code to small scale violence of counterinsurgency. The jump from Model 1 to Model 2 is
more substantial. It involves the development and incorporation of completely new tools
necessary to influence the population. The coordination of psychological operations,
resettlement, and civic action and existing military actions demands a substantial
overhaul of the planning process and the daily routine of headquarters and field units.
More important, Model 2 involves a shift in the perception of the local population. A
group that was once considered a bystander is now, at least nominally, the real prize in
the insurgent/counter-insurgent struggle.
What makes the development of political war strategies substantially easier is that
Model 2 retains most of the military's core ideas about how to accomplish its objectives.
Like the Model 1, Model 2 assumes that the new tools - psychological, economic and
social - can be applied in much the same way as conventional weapons. The military can
treat incentives as non-lethal munitions, applying incentives on a passive target in the
expectation that such bombardment will force the target to submit in the face of superior
force. Political concerns are incorporated without challenging the basic theory of victory.
The leap from Model 2 to Model 3 is by far the most challenging. Model 3
strategies replace the core problem solving construct of the professional military with a
foreign and unsatisfying theory of political coalition building. Once leaders recognize
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that they need the consent of the governed to re-establish a stable and effective state, the
one way application of positive and negative incentives is obviously inadequate approach
to the problem. Instead of acting as "managers of violence" or managers of incentives,
they must become involved in a more complex game of two way exchange and
bargaining. Integrated political strategies also involve the fundamental subordination of
military action to political strategy. The reduced prominence and severely restricted
autonomy inherent in the new model are repellant to most military professionals. For
these reasons, militaries are unlikely to adopt these approaches in the absence of strong
civilian pressures and resource constraints.
Interwar Stability
When the counterinsurgency campaign is over, militaries will tend to embark on a
campaign of "purge and prevent." The purge will involve the selective retention and
rejection of routines and strategies developed over the course of the war. In many
instances, this will be accompanied by attempts to avoid future involvement in
counterinsurgency.
Routines are screened on the basis of their compatibility with conventional
military logic and the organizational interests. Routines that have proven useful and pass
both tests are the most likely to be retained; those that clash with either set of motives
will be discarded.
The pattern is most striking on the level of strategy. Here the overwhelming
tendency is to revert to Model 1. While militaries may retain some routines and even
some understanding of Model 2 strategy, they are likely to expunge Model 3 strategies
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and concepts almost immediately. The foreign nature of the theories and beliefs
involved, combined with the organizational implications of such formulas, make them
easy candidates for rejection. Integrated political strategy is an unstable equilibrium in
the interwar period.
There is a deep irony of the purge and prevent phenomenon. What militaries are
most likely to retain in the wake of counterinsurgency campaigns is what they need the
least -improved routines for the application of force a new tools for creating positive and
negative incentives at the population level. What is actively discarded is what is needed
most - a theory of victory that combines the tools of the state in a way that is effective in
solving the problem of state disintegration.
Predictions
The theory's predictions can be broken into two parts. The first is the prediction
of professional similarity. Most of the existing works on counterinsurgency suggest that
differences in experience and culture produce variation in organizational learning. If this
is true, we should expect to see wide variation in strategic choice and interwar retention.
This study, by contrast, argues that militaries, in spite of these differences, respond in
remarkably similar fashion. Separated by language, national and organizational culture,
history, experience and circumstance, these militaries struggle with the same cognitive
and bureaucratic barriers. The study of counterinsurgency has been dominated by
"splitters" - those who have emphasized the particulars of specific cases and looked for
causal explanations for learning at the unit level. I argue that this has been a mistake.
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The most striking aspect of organizational learning in counterinsurgency is the similarity
of military response across national boundaries.
The second test of the theory comes in the form of more specific questions and
testable hypotheses. In each of the empirical cases, we will ask the same four questions.
First, are the dominant patterns of intrawar and interwar learning present? Second, can
these patterns be traced to the operational code and bureaucratic interest and the
associated causal mechanisms? Third, do changes in the independent variables explain
deviation from the dominant patterns? Fourth, do the causal mechanisms explain the
connection between changes in the independent and dependent variables?
The Dominant Intrawar Pattern
Militaries will respond to insurgency with small war strategies (Model 1); they
will attempt to extinguish resistance by attacking their armed opponents and intimidating
the population. These operations will generate small victories and campaign stalemate.
Militaries will respond to this paradox with exploitation. They will refine existing Model
1 strategies, increase the level of resources employed, and relax restrictions on the use of
force. The exploitation phase is generally the longest period in a counterinsurgency
campaign; militaries will pursue exploitation until they run out of resources or have failed
to resolve the campaign stalemate over a period of months or years.
Having exhausted the possibilities of Model 1, militaries will shift from small war
(Model 1) to political war (Model 2). The focus of operations will shift from attack on
the guerillas to control of the population. This new phase will see the application of new
tools including civic action, psychological operations and coercive population control
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(resettlement and detention). While these measures will tend to suppress violence, they
will create a new, high cost stalemate. The maintenance of order will demand enormous
reserves of manpower and an indefinite commitment to the direct rule of subject
populations.
Dominant Interwar Pattern
Militaries that emerge from counterinsurgent campaigns will engage in an
interwar purge. Retention will be highest at the level of tactical routines. Militaries will
catalogue and disseminate the tactical lessons of the past campaign. The routines most
likely to be retained are those with clear applicability to interstate war: "dual use"
routines. Retention will be much lower at the level of strategy. While they may have
employed Model 2 or Model 3 strategies in the preceding campaign, and these strategies
may have contributed to campaign success, they will tend to jettison Models 2 and 3 and
revert to Model 1. The strategic purge means that militaries will enter subsequent
counterinsurgent campaigns with a collection of tactical routines and Model 1 strategy.
Deviation from the Dominant Patterns
The military operational code and bureaucratic interests produce the dominant
patterns of intrawar and interwar learning dysfunction. Militaries will deviate from these
patterns in response to changes in task performance, civilian participation and resources.
These changes will be expressed through specific causal mechanisms.
The influence of changes in these variables is asymmetric; it takes far more
energy to push a military up the strategic spectrum (Model 1 -* 2 or Model 2 -- Model
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3) than it does to push it down (Model 3 -+ Model 1). The military operational code and
bureaucratic interests act like an elastic band. The farther counterinsurgent strategy is
pulled away from the Model 1 anchor, the greater the resistance and the energy necessary
to maintain such a strategy. Even small reductions in the forces supporting Model 2 or
Model 3 strategy may lead the military to snap back to its Model 1 default. To borrow
the terminology of economics, strategic choice is sticky upward but not downward.
Task Pressure
When task pressure is high, as in the case of domestic insurgency, militaries will
behave as simple problem solvers. While they may struggle with the mismatch between
counterinsurgency and existing organizational beliefs and preferences, militaries will tend
to focus on the problem of counterinsurgency and ignore parochial concerns. In cases of
limited war or expeditionary counterinsurgency, moderate task pressure will lead
militaries to balance the task utility of strategies and routines against their implications
for the organizational health of the institution; organizational search will be both local
and biased. Militaries will seek to preserve existing beliefs and belief systems and will
explore new solutions in the order of bureaucratic fit. Those strategies that are most
consistent with the military operational code, and most consistent with organizational
interests will be implemented first; strategies that involve radical overhaul of the
operational code or clash with core bureaucratic interests will be implemented only as a
last resort. Militaries will prefer Model 1 to Model 2 and strongly prefer Model 2 to
Model 3.
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In peacetime, when task pressure is low or non-existent, parochial interests will be
ascendant. The retention or development of counterinsurgency routines and strategies
will be depend primarily on their fit with the organizational interests of the military
In short, task pressure is the switching mechanism that regulates the influence of
the two casual constants on the patterns of intrawar and interwar learning. Variation in
task pressure over time will determine the relative influence of external task pressures
and internal bureaucratic ones.
Task Performance
Task performance is a categorical variable with four values: success, stalemate,
trend failure, and episodic failure. In each case, the propensity to engage in search is a
function of perceived rather than objective performance. When the military considers a
strategy successful, it is unlikely to search for alternatives. When strategy produces
stalemate - the absence of success - the military is more likely to explore alternatives.
When strategy produces negative trends, such as increasing violence or increased enemy
strength, then the military is still more likely to engage in search. The probability of
search reaches it maximum in the case of episodic failure: a major battlefield defeat or
equivalent reverse.
While failure is generally a necessary precondition for serious organizational
search,155 its influence on the path of that search is indeterminate. When militaries
recognize failure, they are likely to explore alternative strategies. When performance is
155 An important exception to this rule is the influence of positive resource shocks. In Indochina and
Thailand, a sudden influx of resources was enough to propel a military backward from Model 2 or Model 3
strategies to Model 1. Even in the absence of trend or episodic failure, the expanded availability of
manpower and materiel encouraged military leaders to move from Model 2 or Model 3 solutions to Model
1 small war.
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mixed or ambiguous, they are likely to channel resources into exploitation and escalation
rather than exploration or search.
Failure is an equally limited guide in interwar behavior. Campaign failure may
stimulate search but cannot guarantee effective search or even effective retention in the
interwar period. Militaries respond to campaign failure by shedding counterinsurgency
capabilities in order to avoid involvement in future counterinsurgency conflicts.
Civilian Participation
Increased civilian participation in strategic choice and performance evaluation
accelerates search and increases the chances that Model 3 strategies will be considered.
Civilian participation in decisions on the use of force is an important check on the
counter-productive use of violence. Changes in civilian participation are expressed
through three causal mechanisms: deliberate choice, parallel evaluation, and norms of
politics exchange. Increased civilian participation increases the likelihood that a
military's initial response will be subjected to careful scrutiny. Deliberate choice reduces
the likelihood of reflexive Model 1 response and increases the likelihood that Model 2 or
Model 3 will be explored. Once a strategy has been chosen, high civilian participation
ensures that there will be a parallel evaluation of performance. Civilians bring different
measures of effectiveness than their military peers and are less likely to fall into Model 1
or Model 2 learning traps. Parallel evaluation encourages early search by accelerating the
recognition of Model 1 and Model 2 strategic failure. Increased civilian participation
also brings the norms of political exchange into counterinsurgency strategy. Civilian
politicians accustomed to logrolling and other norms of political exchange are more
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likely to see solutions outside the simple application of coercive force. These norms
increase the likelihood that strategic search will result in Model 3 strategy.
Resource Abundance
Resource abundance will delay the search for new solutions to counterinsurgency
and encourage an extended period of exploitation. Resource scarcity, whether in
manpower or capital, will tend to accelerate search and steer it into less coercive
strategies. Resource abundance or scarcity can influence the course of adaptation at any
point in the counterinsurgency timeline. Resource abundance or scarcity in the opening
phase of a campaign may influence initial strategic choice. Sharp changes or even the
expectation of sharp changes in resource levels during the course of a campaign may
induce major shifts in strategy. Sharp reductions in resources may force militaries to
explore less resource intensive and more political strategies; by contrast, major surges in
resources may lead militaries to return to more familiar and comfortable military
responses to counterinsurgency.
Resource scarcity influences the learning process through four casual
mechanisms: budget constraints, resource regression, bureaucratic influence, and factor
endowment effects. Budget constraints narrow the choices available and drive militaries
away from Models 1 and 2. When militaries lack the resources to pursue Model 1 or
Model 2 strategies, the budget constraint can force militaries in the direction of Model 3.
Resource scarcity, measured relative to the scale of the threat and the subject population,
must be severe enough to render a Model 1 response infeasible. Resource regression
refers to the opposite effect: the power of positive resource shocks to drive militaries
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down the strategic spectrum. Abundant manpower or military materiel may tempt
militaries to abandon even successful Model 2 and particularly Model 3 solutions in favor
of the test of battle. Resource abundance also often alters the bureaucratic balance of
power, amplifying the voice of military leaders. Increased bureaucratic influence on the
part of the military decreases the likelihood that Model 3 strategies will be pursued.
Conversely, resource scarcity enables civilian leaders to maintain their relative
bureaucratic influence, increasing the likelihood of Model 3 choice.
The impact of resource abundance also depends on the composition of the
resource flows. When resource shocks come in the form of increased manpower, this
increases the likelihood of Model 1 or Model 2 strategy. When resource flows come in
the form of military capital equipment, the likelihood of Model 1 strategy increases.
When the resource shock comes in the form of financial aid rather than manpower or
capital, then the likelihood of Model 3 strategy increases. When resources come in the
form of military capital equipment, the specific tools provided will exert an influence on
strategic choice. For instance, the provision of tanks and landing craft will encourage
militaries to pursue Model 1 strategies that enable them to use these new tools.
Interaction Effects: Civilian Participation and Resource Abundance
Under certain circumstances, changes in resource levels and civilian participation
will pull in opposite directions. When resources increase in environments of rising
civilian participation, the likelihood of civil-military crisis increases. Military leaders
respond to resource abundance by leaning in the direction of Model 1 escalation; civilian
leaders often advocate Model 3 alternatives. This combination is explosive and sets the
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stage for a test of power between civilian and military leaders for control of
counterinsurgent strategy. When resources and civilian participation fall in tandem, the
effect on strategic choice depends on the magnitude of the negative resource shock. If it
is great enough to represent a binding constraint, then the likelihood of Model 3 strategy
rises. If, on the other hand, there remain sufficient resources to pursue Modell options
the likelihood of Model 3 choice is much smaller.
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Bureaucratic Interest (C2)





















Task Performance (IV 2)
Hypotheses
H1: Symptoms of insurgency -- misclassification as small war
patterned response (Model 1)
H2: Model 1 -+ mixed feedback -* overweighting small victories,
underweighting political costs --+ positive self-evaluation of
performance
H3: Small victories + campaign stalemate -- exploitation (process
refinement + escalation)
H4: Model 2 -+ clear measures of performance and ambiguous
political effects -- fixation on MOP -- perceived success --* reinforced
attachment to Model 2
H5: Militaries will retain routines, particularly "dual use" routines
H6: Militaries will purge Model 2 and particularly Model 3 strategies
H7: If TP = 0 (Peacetime), Then Bureaucratic Interest Primary, MOC
Secondary
H8: If TP = 1 (Expeditionary Counterinsurgency), Then MOC
Primary, Bureaucratic Interest Secondary
H9: If TP = 2 (Domestic Counterinsurgency), Then MOC only
H10: Episodic failure -- 1 P(Search)
H11: Trend failure --+ 1 P(Search)
H12: Stalemate --* 1 P(Search)
H13: P(Search Episodic Failure) > P(Search Trend Failure) > P(Search Stalemate)
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H14: T Civilian Participation --, 1 P(deliberate evaluation of responses)
---, P(Model 1), 1 P(Model 2 or Model 3)
H15: " Civilian Participation --, alternative interpretation of
performance -- t P(early exploration), I P(exploitation)
H16: Political experience -- norms of political exchange -- P(Model
3)
H17: $ Resources --, 1 P(Model 1, Model 2), 1 P(Model 3)
H18: I Resources --, T P(Model 1, Model 2), $ P(Model 3)
H19: 1 Resources - " relative military influence in strategy -,
lP(Model 1, Model 2)
H20: I Resources -- 4 relative military influence -- $ P(Model 1, 2), T
P(Model 3)
H21: 1 Labor -+ T P(Model 1, Model 2)
H22: T Capital --* P(Model 1)
H23: t Cash --, P(Model 3)
H24: Conventional equipment --) T P(Model 1)
H25: (T Resources) + (T Civilian Participation) - P(civil-military
crisis)








Part II of this study tests the theory developed in Chapter 2 using a series of
historical cases. The research design comes in two sections. The first is a test of the
internal validity of the theory. Does the theory explain the observed behavior within the
confines of three core cases? The second section examines challenges to external validity
of the theory. Do the generalizations made in the theory and evaluated in the three core
cases apply to the larger population of counterinsurgency cases? Together, these sections
test the power and explanatory range of the theory.
Tests of Internal Validity: Three Cases in Time Series
In the first section, we examine the behavior of a single state over a series of
historical cases. The first and third cases are counterinsurgency campaigns; the second
case is the interwar period that separates them. By examining the evolution of
counterinsurgency strategy over this series of three cases, we can effectively isolate the
problems of intrawar and interwar organizational learning in a single national tradition.
Within each case, we seek to do three things. First, we trace the evolution of
strategic choice from the initial response through subsequent change or stasis. What
explains strategic choice at key decision nodes? Why do militaries choose to pursue
strategic search? Why, in other instances, do they respond to these opportunities with the
exploitation of existing strategies? What is the structure of strategic search when it
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occurs? Second, we examine whether the dominant intrawar or interwar patterns are
present and can be traced to the causal influences and mechanisms laid out in the theory.
Third, we examine the influence of changes in the independent variables on strategic
choice. Do changes in the independent variables result in the predicted changes in
strategy? Do the causal mechanisms associated with each independent variable explain
the connection between this variation and changes in strategy?
The three case series also enables us to examine the influence of task pressure on
strategic choice. The transition from war to peace highlights the effect of falling task
pressure. Does the disappearance of task pressure in the interwar period lead to the
expected patterns of retention and rejection? The transitions from the interwar period to
the second campaign demonstrate the relative influence of past experience on successive
tests. Do militaries pick up where they left off in the late stages of the last
counterinsurgency campaign or do they revert to their defaults?
Tests of External Validity
While the three core cases offer an opportunity to test the theory in considerable
depth, there are inherent limits to any qualitative, small n design. Even if the theory
explains outcomes in the three cases, there is a possibility that the sample is biased. The
question remains whether the sample is representative of the larger population of
counterinsurgency cases, or whether the patterns observed and theories proposed are
limited to that particular sample.
The most robust test of the generalizability of the theory is "out of sample"
prediction or retrodiction. Does the theory explain the behavior of militaries in other
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counterinsurgency cases? While this is the fundamental test of any theory, it places the
burden of testing on the skeptical reader. There are at least two alternative ways to
demonstrate the external validity of the small n design.156 The first is the large n
quantitative design. By examining a much larger number of cases and coding them in a
standardized fashion, it may be possible to test the statistical relationships between the
independent and dependent variables. There are two problems inherent in this approach:
coding and compression. In order to perform quantitative tests such as regression in the
social sciences, it is frequently necessary to transform qualitative phenomena into
quantitative data. This coding process introduces significant bias; the researcher's coding
decisions can influence the apparent results of the quantitative tests. What makes this so
pernicious is the scale of the barriers to test/retest reliability. In order to evaluate the
validity of the theories developed with large n, regression, the outside observer must
invest considerable time in auditing the data set in its entirety. In many instances, the
process of coding may introduce as much or more bias than the sample bias it was
designed to offset. Even when coding is relatively unbiased, the increase in the number
of cases forces the researcher to compress complex, qualitative data. This compression
may lead the researcher to filter out causally relevant data, raising the likelihood of
omitted variable bias or spurious correlation. We may discard information that offers
alternative explanations of the observed phenomena, or we may overstate the degree to
which the chosen parameters explain the outcome. When historical cases or complex
156 As Campbell and Stanley note, the problem of external validity is intrinsically open ended. We can
increase our confidence in a theory by expanding the case set or developing more elaborate quasi-
experimental designs, but the explanatory range of the theory can seldom be conclusively established
(Source: Donald T. Campbell, Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for
Research (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), pp. 5).
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social interactions are reduced to a handful of numerical codes, it becomes very difficult
for the audience to evaluate the validity of the theory relative to alternative theories.
One alternative to large n, quantitative analysis is the inclusion of shadow cases.
These shorter cases may be used to evaluate specific challenges to the external validity of
the theory. While the shadow cases may lack the level of detail and in case variation of
the core cases, the level of compression is far lower than in large n regression. The
researcher can select cases whose attributes allow him to test for omitted variables. This
is the approach I have taken here. By examining two British and one Thai case, I
examine several alternative explanations for the patterns of behavior seen in the core
French cases.
Case Selection
The core cases were chosen based on three criteria: control, variation, and
historical importance.' 57 The selection of three French cases control for a number of
factors that would otherwise be variable: national culture, organizational culture,
organizational familiarity with past cases, etc. The French cases also offer substantial
within case and cross-case variation on the independent and dependent variables. The
series of cases demonstrate the effects of large swings in the independent variables: task
pressure, task performance, civilian participation and resource abundance. The richness
of the historical data available on these cases makes it possible to test the theory against
the alternative explanations proposed in Chapter 1. Over the course of two decades,
under conditions of falling resources, and loosening strictures on the use of force, the
157 Alexander L. George, Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 82-83; Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political
Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 77-88.
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French tested Model 1 twice and failed. Only in 1957 did they abandon this path and
seek an answer in Model 2 population control. The French counterinsurgency campaigns
of this period are also historically important. French strategic choices set the stage for
domestic, political upheavals in Vietnam, Algeria and France itself.
The shadow cases have been chosen with similar attention to control and
variation. Each, however, has been chosen to address a specific challenge or challenges
to the generalizability of the theory. The British cases are useful because they allow us to
control for a number of structural factors (expeditionary counterinsurgencies, historical
period, and colonial transitions) and isolate the effects of national and organizational
culture. The conventional wisdom in most studies of counterinsurgency is that the British
are more adept at counterinsurgency than the other, Western powers. If the British
respond differently and more effectively to the challenge of counterinsurgency, then these
differences in initial response, intrawar adaptation, and interwar retention should be
visible in the British cases. If on the other hand, shared professional beliefs and
preferences explain the dominant patterns of organizational learning, then we should
expect to see similar behavior in the British and French cases. Furthermore, the pairing
of Palestine and Malaya affords us an opportunity to examine the influence of campaign
success and failure on subsequent behavior. Did failure in Palestine have a discernably
different effect on subsequent behavior than the success in Malaya?
The Thai case tests a number of other challenges. The case involves a small,
Asian state waging a domestic counterinsurgency. As such, it helps test two alternative
explanations for British and French behavior. The first alternative is that French and
British responses are products of some larger, Western tradition of conventional, great
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power war. If this is true, we might expect to see a different response by a small Asian
power with little or no experience in modern, conventional warfare. The second
explanation is that expeditionary counterinsurgency, particularly in the era of postwar
decolonization, was essentially unwinnable. The British and the French were unable to
pursue Model 3 alternatives because nationalism prevented compromise. In a domestic
insurgency, where the counterinsurgent and insurgent are co-ethnics, and where the
counterinsurgent understands the political landscape, he should respond differently and
move towards Model 3 more rapidly. If either of these alternative explanations are valid,
we should expect to see major differences between French and British behavior on the
one hand and Thai behavior on the other. If the Thai response closely resembles that of
the two Western armies, and supports the predictions of the theory, then we should be
more confident that it is broadly generalizable.
Internal Structure of the Cases
All six cases examined in this study are, in the terminology of Alexander George,
"structured, focused comparisons." 158 Their structure is a function of the common set of
questions posed. The overriding question in each case is simple: what explains patterns
and variations in strategic choice in counterinsurgency? Four more specific questions
flow from this. First, are the dominant intrawar and interwar patterns predicted in the
theory present in each case? Do militaries respond to insurgency with Model 1, exploit
this strategy for a prolonged period of time, and then adopt Model 2? Do militaries
respond to the transition from war to peace by purging Model 2 and Model 3 strategies
and retaining tactical routines? Second, if the dominant patterns are present, can they be
158 Ibid., George, Bennett, pp. 67.
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traced to the military operational code, bureaucratic interests and the causal mechanisms
associated with them? Third, do changes in the independent variables explain deviation
from the dominant patterns? Fourth, do changes in the independent variables operate
through the causal mechanisms proposed in the theory?
The cases are focused on the evolution of counterinsurgent strategy; as such they
are not fully rounded histories of each conflict, but analytical narratives designed to test
the theory and its leading alternatives. I have consciously minimized the role of strategic
interaction between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent. Except in those instances
where insurgent actions played a decisive role in influencing strategic choice, I have
sought to hold insurgent behavior constant and examine the adaptive problem through the
eyes of the counterinsurgent.
As in any piece of qualitative social science, the decision of what to include and
what to exclude is an act of judgment. An account that seeks to include all relevant data
will overwhelm the reader and defeat the attempt to draw specific, theoretical
comparisons across a series of historical episodes. An account that is too narrowly
focused, that excludes significant portions of data on the grounds that they do not bear
directly on the predictions of the theory, runs the risk of overstating the validity of the
theory and excluding residual variation. 159 In recent decades, qualitative social science
has erred on the side of excessive focus. While this has often been done in the pursuit of
parsimony, excessive focus has often become an excuse for excluding data that either do
not fit or actively contradict the theory. Instead of presenting data in an unbiased fashion
and offering the audience an opportunity to judge the theory against the data and against
alternative explanations, many authors have reported only the data that support their
159 Ibid., George, Bennett, pp. 93.
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proposed theory and excluded the rest. This data scrubbing, nominally performed in the
interests of focus, has diluted the explanatory power of those theories and deprived the
skeptical reader of the data necessary to make informed judgments of their absolute and
relative validity.
In this study, I have erred on the side of inclusion. I have sought to provide an
unbiased and historically rich account of the evolution of counterinsurgent strategy. I
have focused my accounts on the problem of strategic choice. Consequently, the
empirical chapters focus on the military's initial response to insurgency, its decisions to
exploit initial strategies or explore alternatives, and the structure and results of strategic
search. 160 Rather than simply report those pieces of data that support my theory, or
restrict the account to a catalogue the values of the variables and mechanisms, I have
included sufficient historical detail to support alterative interpretations of these events. If
I have erred on the side of inclusion, it has been deliberate. Faced with a tradeoff
between unbiased and less focused reporting and the interested or unintentional exclusion
of causally relevant data, I have chosen the former.
Each case has certain common elements. The chapters open with a summary
table breaks each campaign into a series of phases. The transitions between phases are
defined by key decision nodes: points at which militaries clearly choose either to search
for new strategy or to exploit an existing one. The table also records the values of the
independent and dependent variables and a list of the operational innovations developed
in that phase. Operational innovations are included for two reasons. First, they serve as
160 King, Keohane and Verba's propose two guidelines for the process of summarizing historical data.
First, historical "summaries should focus on the outcomes we wish to describe or explain." Second, such
summaries "must simplify the information at our disposal." (Source: Gary King, Robert O. Keohane,
Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton University
Press, 1994), pp. 54-55).
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objective markers of the prevailing strategy. Militaries pursuing Model 1 strategies tend
to develop routines that maximize mobility and firepower; militaries pursuing Model 2
strategies tend to develop new tools including information operations, resettlement, and
civic action. The presence or absence of these markers provides support for the coding of
strategy in each phase. Second, they highlight the tradeoffs between operational
innovation and strategic search. Much of the existing academic literature on military
innovation has focused on strategic or doctrinal innovation; tactical and operational level
adaptation has been treated as a separate and subordinate issue. This study argues that
operational innovation and strategic search are competitive goods. The exploitation of
existing strategies competes with exploration for the finite resources and attention of the
organization.
The coding of counterinsurgent strategies raises three separate issues. First, the
three models developed in the theory are ideal types. As such, we should expect to see
some variation in the expression of these models across the historical cases. Second,
changes in counterinsurgent strategy are seldom as abrupt and unanimous as the ideal
typology would suggest. More often than not, strategic search is the result of perceived
failure of an existing strategy. In the absence of clear, episodic failure, militaries are
likely to experiment with elements of a new strategy before they implement it in full.
Strategic choice is seldom unanimous. Different factions within the state and within the
military may propose alternative solutions to the same perceived failure or stalemate.
Even when a decision has been reached, senior commanders must often impose the new
strategies over the objections of subordinate commanders and skeptical civilian
audiences. In an environment where a theater commander announces a change from
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Model 1 to Model 2 strategy, certain subordinate commanders may continue to pursue
Model 1 strategies. As a result, the coding of strategy in any given phase is at best a
measure of central tendency - the best estimate of the prevailing, theater strategy at that
point in time. While the case studies document the gaps between theater strategy and the
conduct of local commanders, the coding of strategy tends to overweight the theater
strategy vis-ha-vis de facto local strategy.
Third, some strategies may contain elements of more than one ideal type. This is
most often the case in transitions between Models 1 and 2; the shift from small war to
political war may be more gradual than the categorical coding might suggest. During
General Salan's tenure in Indochina, the French military remained focused on the Model
1 problem of defeating the Viet Minh army but launched a series of Model 2 experiments
aimed at overcoming the abject failure of pacification in Tonkin. To code strategy in this
period as either Model 1 or Model 2 would alternatively understate or overstate the
degree of change in theater strategy. I have sought to address these issues though
fractional coding. In the case of Indochina, I have coded the strategy as an average of the
two ideal types - a strategy of 1.5. In short, fractional coding, where it appears, is a
conscious attempt to capture significant variation that falls short of the categorical
boundaries. 161 The methodologically cleaner but analytically weaker alternative would
be to ignore significant changes that fall short of these boundaries.
The core and shadow cases are structurally similar; both are designed to answer
the same basic set of questions and hypotheses. What separates them is the level of
161 One alternative would have been to code the strategies as integers and provide a supplementary
indication of command bias. If strategy is grounded in one ideal type but has begun to move in the
direction of another, then the strategy might be scored as the base Model with an upward or downward
bias. Using the same Indochina example, Salan's strategy could be coded as Model 1 strategy with an
upward bias.
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historical detail and the basis for selection. The core cases include more historical detail
in order to examine within case variation and establish the internal validity of the theory.
The shadow cases, by contrast, seek to address specific, plausible challenges to the
external validity of the theory.
As noted earlier, the empirical data provided in the three core cases and three
shadow cases are at best a preliminary test of the internal and external validity of the
theory proposed in Chapter 2. The ultimate test of the theory is its observed fit to cases
outside the test sets provided here. If the theory explains observed patterns of learning in
other cases of counterinsurgency, then the theory will have proven its utility. If it fails
the out of sample test, no number of instrumentally chosen supplementary cases can
salvage it.
Data and Analysis
In this study, I have broken the process of theory testing into two parts: the
presentation of historical data and the evaluation of the fit between the theory and those
data. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I present the data in the form of detailed, analytical
narratives. These are structured, focused comparisons of strategic choice in
counterinsurgency. In Chapter 6, I address the fit between the theory and the historical
data presented in the preceding chapters. What does the theory predict? What is the
evidence? How well does the evidence fit the theory?
I have separated the presentation and evaluation of the data for two reasons. The
first is the issue of reporting bias. As noted above, a case study that reports only the
parameters specified in the theory denies the reader the ability to evaluate alternative
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explanations. The second and related issue is coherence. A decision to evaluate each and
every decision node would interrupt the thread of the argument and make the process of
evaluating theoretical validity more difficult.
146
Chapter 3
The French War in Indochina (1945-1954)
Theory and Prediction
The theory suggests that professional militaries will struggle to develop effective
responses to counterinsurgency. The military operational code will distort their initial
response, interpretation of performance, and subsequent strategic choices. The military
operational code and bureaucratic interests will produce dominant intrawar and interwar
patterns of learning dysfunction. Militaries will respond to insurgency with Model 1.
Failure to resolve the problem will lead to Model 1 exploitation rather than search. When
exploitation options have been exhausted, militaries will adopt Model 2 strategies and
shift their focus from attack on the guerillas to population control. The transition to
peace will trigger a selective purge of recent experience. Bureaucratic interests and the
operational code will lead militaries to retain routines and jettison Model 2 and Model 3
strategies.
Changes in three independent variables - task performance, civilian participation,
and resources - will explain deviation from these intrawar and interwar patterns. High
civilian participation increases the likelihood that Model 3 strategies will be explored
early in the campaign when their efficacy is greatest. Low civilian participation will
increase the likelihood of prolonged Model 1 exploitation. High resource levels will
reinforce the military's enthusiasm for Model 1. Low resource levels will increase the
likelihood that Model 3 strategies will be chosen. Changes in these independent variables
will be expressed through specific causal mechanisms. Civilian participation influences
strategic choice through three mechanisms: deliberate choice, parallel evaluation, and
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norms of political exchange. Resources influence strategic choice through four
mechanisms: budget constraints, resource regression, bureaucratic influence, and factor
endowment effects.
The French war in Indochina validates many of the theory's predictions. The
dominant intrawar pattern is clearly visible. From December 1946 through 1951, the
French applied a Model 1 solution under the belief that the problem was essentially
military in nature. By 1952, with their exploitation options exhausted, the French began
to experiment with Model 2 strategies of population control. In the final year of the war,
frustration with Model 2, rising enemy pressure, and the advice of American military
advisers led the French back in the direction of Model 1.
The impact of the military operational code on French choice is also clear. The
long Model 1 campaign began with a failure to recognize the political nature of the
problem. The illusion of familiarity led the French to apply Model 1 small war strategies.
Confronted with the paradox of small victories and campaign stalemate, the French chose
exploitation over exploration - an example of the Model 1 learning trap at work.
Extreme resource scarcity, high civilian participation, and individual insight
explain the only major deviation from the pattern: the French decision to adopt a Model 3
response in the first year of the war. Extensive civilian participation ensured that the
response was a deliberate choice rather than the standard patterned response. Resource
scarcity influenced choice through two mechanisms: binding budget constraints and
bureaucratic influence. The French lacked the manpower to pursue Model 1 and the
small military footprint meant that civilian diplomats retained significant influence in the
early stages of the campaign. Resources played an equally significant role in the collapse
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of this Model 3 strategy. Rising French military manpower lifted the budget constraint
and encouraged a return to the more familiar Model 1 formula. This same surge meant
that civilian opinion was increasingly eclipsed by the bureaucratic influence of military
staffs.
Summary
French strategy in Indochina can be divided into five phases. During the first
phase, stretching from the reoccupation of Cochinchina and Annam in the fall of 1945
through the spring of 1946, the French military under General Leclerc pursued a mixed
strategy of military action and political negotiation that culminated with the reoccupation
of Tonkin and the conclusion of political accords with the Viet Minh. The second phase
began with the outbreak of open hostilities between the French and the Viet Minh in
November and December of 1946 and stretched through the fall of 1950. During this
period, the French pursued a Model 1 strategy focused on the defeat of the Viet Minh
military forces. This period saw major advances on the level of military routines; the
French introduced innovations in the areas of airborne operations, armored pursuit,
amphibious and riverine operations, and fortification. The third phase stretched from the
French defeat at Cao Bang in October 1950 through the launch of the French offensive at
Hoa Binh in late 1951. General de Lattre's strategy in this period was overwhelmingly
conventional in nature, focusing on efforts to expand the size and capacity of French
forces in theater. De Lattre's victories over the Viet Minh regular army in 1951
reinforced the French commitment to Model 1 strategy.
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The fourth phase, from December 1951 through March 1953, covered the tenure
of General Salan. Under Salan, the French military mounted parallel responses to the
rising power of the Viet Minh. At Na San, Salan introduced the concept of the fortified
camp as a means of introducing and sustaining French heavy forces into the remote
regions of Tonkin. On the unconventional front, Salan sponsored a number of
experiments in political war (Model 2). While the majority of the energies of the military
remained focused on the conventional war with the Viet Minh, the French began to make
investments in psychological operations, population resettlement, and the sponsorship of
guerilla movements among ethnic minorities. The final phase, from March 1953 through
the defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, corresponded with the command of General
Navarre. The relief of Salan and the appointment of Navarre marked a return to the
search for decisive battle. Though Navarre did nothing to suppress the unconventional
initiatives developed under Salan, the weight of French strategy shifted once more to
Model 1.
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French Phase 1: Phase 2: Phase 3: Phase 4: Phase 5:
Indochina Reconquest From Politics Conventional Conventional Return to(1945-1954) to Defeat and Defense and Decisive
Conventional Conventional Experimentation Battle
Response Resurrection
(10/45-3/46) (4/46-10/50) (11/50-12/51) (1/52-5/53) (5/53-5/54)
Military Leclerc Valluy' 62  de Lattre Salan Navarre
Commander
COIN Strategy Model 3 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1.5 Model 1
Operational * Partisans * Amphibious * Mobile Groups * New Pacification
Innovations * Riverine Groups * De Lattre Line Groups (GAMOs)(Dinassaut) * Dinassaut (Tonkin * Resettlement
Expansion fortifications) * GCMA/GMI
* Outposts System * Vietnamese (maquis)




Success/Failure Success Stalemate Episodic Trend Failure Episodic Failure
(Reconquest) Success Episodic Failure (Street without
Episodic Failure (Vinh Yenh, (Highland Joy, Dien Bien
(Cao Bang) Mao Khe, Day Offensives, Na San, Phu)
River) Delta pacification)
Resources Very Low Medium Medium Medium Medium
(Manpower)
Resources Very Low Low Medium Medium High
(Equipment)
Civilian High Low Low'63  Low Low
Participation
Indochina before 1945
On the eve of the Second World War, the French had occupied Indochina for
almost a hundred years.164 During that time, the French developed a detailed
understanding of the culture and politics of Indochina, and built an administrative and
162 General Valluy was the military commander from October 1946 through January 1948.
163 De Lattre's simultaneous assumption of the senior military and civilian posts of G6ndsuper and High
Commissioner gave him unified control over civil and military administration in Indochina. This
unification did not lead to expanded civilian influence over strategy. Instead, it led to the redefinition of
civilian policy as an extension of the effort to boost military resources, manpower and materiel.
164 The formal conquest of Indochina began in 1858 in Annam. By 1878 the French had formalized control
over all of Indochina under the Union of Indochina (Source: Jacques Dalloz, The War in Indochina, 1945-
1954 (New York: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 1).
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police structure to keep resistance groups in check. While they were forced to mount
periodic campaigns against bandit groups in the north, 165 the maintenance of colonial
control was relatively inexpensive. Gallieni and Lyautey, the intellectual fathers of the
French colonial tradition of counterinsurgency and colonial administration, both served
long tours in Tonkin and their experiences exerted a powerful and lasting influence on the
colonial army. For a significant portion of the colonial officer corps, and for many of the
senior leaders who would set French strategy from 1945 on, the Indochina war was to be
fought on familiar ground.
While the French possessions in Indochina included what we now know as
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, the Indochina war was largely confined to the three parts
of present day Vietnam. Under French rule, Vietnam was divided into three separate
administrative regions: Tonkin in the north, Annam in the center, and Cochinchina in the
far south. The terrain of each region dictated the patterns of settlement and economic
activity. Tonkin, home to 8.5 million people, or roughly 40-45% of the population of the
three provinces, 166 could be further divided into the Red River delta and the hinterlands
of northern and western Tonkin. The Red River delta was the center of intensive
agriculture in northern Vietnam and the Indochina war would revolve around French
attempts to pacify this region and Viet Minh attempts to seize it by force or subversion.
Far fewer people lived outside the Red River delta, and most that did belonged to the
non-Vietnamese minorities or hill tribes. Lacking the arable land to grow rice in large
quantities, these tribes relied on a mix of subsistence agriculture and poppy cultivation.
165 Raoul Salan, Memoires. Fin d'un Empire, Le sens d'un engagament, juin 1899-septembre 1946 (Paris:
Presses de la Cit6, 1970), pp. 32.
166 These population statistics are based on the 1936 census and inflated based on estimated growth rates
(Source: Judith Banister, The Population of Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Commerce Department,
October 1985), International Population Reports, Series P-95, No. 77).
152
Tonkin and northern Annam were also home to a large portion of the Catholic population
of Vietnam.167
Annam, which stretched from the narrow northern neck of the country at Ninh
Binh to the base of the central highlands at Phan Thiet, was home to 7 million people or
roughly 30% of the overall population of Vietnam. The topography of Annam,
dominated by the rugged and less arable central highlands, meant that the majority of the
population was concentrated along a narrow coastal strip.
Cochinchina, though much smaller than Annam or Tonkin, was situated in the
fertile Mekong delta. Like the Red River delta in the north, the Mekong delta was a
center of rice cultivation and settlement. While the 6 million inhabitants of Cochinchina
(-25% of the total population of the three provinces) were relatively homogenous in
ethnic terms, the Hoa Haol 6 8 and Cao Dai 69 religious sects were socially distinct from
the Buddhist majority.
The Collapse of French Order (1940-1945)
The Viet Minh rise to power in 1945 was the direct result of the collapse of
French colonial control during the Second World War. France's defeat in 1940 left a
weakened Vichy colonial regime to face encroachment by Japanese forces. The slow
167 The Catholic population of Vietnam in the immediate postwar period was around 1.7 million or 6-7% of
the toal population. The Catholics represented 15-20% of the population of Tonkin during the same period.
(Source: Paul et Marie-Catherine Villatoux, La Rdpublique et son armee face au "peril subversif:" Guerre
et action psychologiques (1945-1960) (Paris: Les Indes savants, 2005), pp. 277.)
168 The best estimates of the size of the Hoa Hao sect in 1950 fall between 600,000 and 700,000 (Source:
Pascal Bourdeaux, "Approches statistiques de la communaute du bouddhisme Hoi Hao" in Christopher E.
Goscha, Benoit De Tr6glod6 (eds.), Naissance d'un Etat-Parti: Le Viet Nam depuis 1945 (Paris: Les Indes
Savantes, 2004), pp. 299).
169 The Cao Dai population of postcolonial Vietnam numbered somewhere between 1 and 2 million
(Source: A. Terry Rambo, Searching for Vietnam: Selected writings on Vietnamese Culture and Society
(Kyoto University Press, 2005), pp. 85).
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erosion of French colonial authority from 1940 through 1944 was followed by three sharp
shocks that put paid to French control in the region. A severe famine in Tonkin, the
Japanese takeover in March 1945, and the vacuum that followed the Japanese surrender
five months later, stripped the French of any remaining power in Indochina. When
French troops returned in the fall of 1945, they faced not simply a restoration of order but
a reconquest of three lost colonies.
Though the French managed to retain the vestiges of colonial control in
Indochina from the fall of France in 1940 through March 1945, real authority had shifted
increasingly into the hands of the Japanese forces that had been stationed in the country
from the fall of 1940 on. While the French authorities maintained military forces, police
and security services in the colonies, their freedom of action and their ability to control
native resistance steadily declined over the course of the occupation. 170
The first sharp blow to the weakened French regime came in the winter of 1944-
1945 in the form of widespread famine in Tonkin. Over the preceding two decades,
increasing population and decreasing acreage devoted to rice cultivation had reduced the
margin of survival in Tonkin to a bare minimum. Tonkinese farmers struggled to meet
their own needs and the heavy burden of colonial taxation, and by late 1944 these efforts
were not enough to overcome the added pressures imposed by the war and natural
disaster. Drought, waves of insects, and a series of typhoons severely damaged the rice
crops in the spring and autumn of 1944. The French authorities did little to lighten the
burden of taxation and focused instead on maintaining adequate stockpiles for military
garrisons. Even as the enormity of the problem became clear in the spring of 1945, the
170 David G. Marr, Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995),
pp. 37, 48, 67.
154
French authorities were slow to respond to the plight of the Tonkinese population. The
delay was in part logistical; the deterioration of French transportation systems, in part the
result of Allied bombing of rail systems and coastal shipping, made a transfer of excess
rice supplies north from Cochinchina very difficult. 171 Even so, the French did little to
reallocate existing capacity from military or colonial purposes to relief shipments. On the
eve of the Japanese coup in March 1945, Tonkinese peasants were beginning to perish in
large numbers. While flawed French policy was only one of many causes of the disaster,
the death of nearly 1 million peasants or 10% of the population of Tonkin in six months,
contributed to the perception of the French authorities as impotent and indifferent.
The second blow to French authority was more direct. The fall of the Vichy
regime in late 1944 and Free French moves to reoccupy Indochinal 72 prompted the
Japanese authorities to seize direct control of Indochina on March 9, 1945. While French
forces in Indochina put up serious but scattered resistance to the Japanese coup, they
were unequal to the task and most were either killed or captured. 173
The Japanese seizure of power had important and lasting political effects. In
Indochina, as elsewhere in colonial Asia, Japanese conquest removed the aura of
European invincibility and with it their natural claim to governmental authority. The
Japanese proceeded to install a Vietnamese puppet government in Tonkin and Annam
171 Ibid., Marr, pp. 99.
172 In 1944, the leaders of the Free French movement began to plan their return to Indochina. French and
American preparations for action in Southeast Asia played a role in the Japanese decision to launch their
coup against the Vichy authorities in March 1945 (Sources: Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The
Early Years of the U.S. Army in Vietnam 1941-1960 (New York: The Free Press, 1985), pp. 29; Dixee R.
Bartholomew-Feis, The OSS and Ho Chi Minh: Unexpected Allies in the War against Japan (Lawrence,
KS: University Pressof Kansas, 2006), pp. 119-121).
173 Several large contingents managed to escape north to KMT controlled China (Source: Jacques Dalloz,
The War in Indochina, 1945-1954 (New York: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 43-44).
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with the Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai as its nominal sovereign. 174 Anti-colonial
resistance groups, including the Viet Minh, were the primary, local beneficiaries of
regime change. The disappearance of the French security services removed an important
check on their ability to organize resistance and assert power in the remoter regions. In
some cases, Japanese authorities eager to expunge any remaining French influence
offered open or clandestine support to such groups.
The Japanese surrender five months later opened the way for the Viet Minh
seizure of power. In the vacuum that followed the surrender, the Viet Minh took control
of Hanoi and Saigon and declared itself the government of a sovereign and independent
Vietnam. Weeks before the first Allied occupation forces arrived in Indochina, the stage
had been set for the clash between the former colonial authorities and the newly installed
Viet Minh government under Ho Chi Minh.
Phase 1: Leclerc and the Reconquest of Indochina (October 1945-March 1946)
In the first phase of the Indochina war, the French applied a Model 3 solution to
the emerging counterinsurgency problem. This response was the product of at least three
influences: the imprint of an unusual military commander, extreme resource scarcity and
high civilian participation in policymaking. Though General Leclerc managed to pursue
an integrated political military strategy from the fall of 1945 through the signature of the
interim accords in March 1946, the equilibrium he established was unstable. Deep
military skepticism, increasing French military forces in the region, and the very success
of the reconquest encouraged senior French leaders to invite a direct military
confrontation with the Viet Minh. Integrated political-military strategy would not survive
174 In Cochinchina the Japanese maintained direct military rule.
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the weight of French military opinion, increased military resources and the departure of
General Leclerc.
The French responded to the Japanese surrender and the Viet Minh seizure of
power by pushing for the rapid introduction of French forces into all three provinces.
General de Gaulle, as leader of the French provisional government, directed the newly
appointed High Commissioner for Indochina, Admiral d'Argenlieu, and his military
commander, General Leclerc, to re-establish French sovereignty in Indochina as swiftly
as possible. 175 Severe limits on the forces available, and complete dependence on Allied
shipping for the transit, combined to delay the introduction of those forces until October
15, 1945.
In accordance with Allied occupation plans agreed upon at Potsdam in July
1945,176 it was the Chinese Nationalists and the British who were to assume
responsibility for the initial postwar occupation of the country and the disarmament of the
Japanese. The Nationalists were to occupy all of Indochina north of the 16 th parallel,
effectively taking control of Tonkin; the British were to assume responsibility south of
the 16 th parallel. Twelve days after the Japanese surrender Chinese Nationalists moved
into Tonkin, reaching Hanoi on September 9, 1945; on September 12, the first sizable
British troop contingents arrived in Saigon.
The Chinese and British took radically different approaches to Viet Minh claims
of sovereignty in Vietnam. The Chinese commander Lu Han extended de facto
recognition to the Viet Minh government in Hanoi in return for supplies and the freedom
175 Frederic Turpin, "1945, I'amiral d'Argenlieu et le general Leclerc, en Indochine, aux sources d'une
rivalit6 c6dlbre," Revue historique des armies (RHA), No. 213 (December 1998), pp. 89; ibid., Bodinier, Le
Retour de la France en Indochine, pp. 148.
176 Ibid., Spector, pp. 51.
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to manipulate the local currency for his personal benefit. The Chinese occupation of the
north was to be dominated by the extraction of wealth for personal gain, and the
maintenance of political order was subordinated to this project. 177 The British, in
contrast, sought to unseat the Viet Minh government in the south and restore some
measure of French colonial control. The British commander, General Gracey, declared
martial law in Saigon on September 21, 1945 and committed British, rearmed French
POWs and Japanese troops to the suppression of the revolution in the south.178
Well before setting foot in Indochina, Leclerc proposed a mixed strategy of
military reconquest and political concession. Leclerc insisted that the most important
first step was to reintroduce sizable French military forces. 179 Without such forces, the
French could not hope to eject either the Viet Minh or the Chinese Nationalist forces
intent on looting the Northern provinces. Once French military control had been
demonstrated, negotiations with the other political parties would cement French
authority.
While Leclerc was eager to achieve the stated aim of re-establishing French
sovereignty, he was keenly aware of the role of local nationalist fervor and the profound
limits of French power in 1945. Jean Saintenay, the senior French representative in
Hanoi, had made Leclerc aware of the widespread popular support for the Viet Minh. In
a meeting at Kanty in September 1945, Lord Mountbatten stressed to Leclerc that there
177 David G. Marr, Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997),
pp. 543-544; ibid., Spector, pp. 53-54.
178 John Springhall, "'Kicking out the Vietminh': How Britain Allowed France to Reoccupy South
Indochina, 1945-1946, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2005, pp. 115-130; Geraint
Hughes, "A 'Post-war' War: The British Occupation of French-Indochina, September 1945-March 1946,"
Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 263-286.
179 Commandant Gilbert Bodinier, La guerre d'Indochine 1945-1954, Textes et Documents, Vol. 1, Le
Retour de la France en Indochina 1945-1946, pp. 150-15 1; Lieutenant-colonel (er) Gilbert Bodinier, "Le
g6n6ral Leclerc et la n6gociation vietnamienne," Revue historique des armes (RHA), No. 227 (June 2002),
pp. 62, 64.
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could be no return to the colonial status quo of the prewar period. The Western powers
would be compelled to offer major concessions in order to retain and protect their
essential interests in the colonies. 180 Leclerc appears to have accepted this argument,
writing soon afterward that the achievable goal would be a flexible defense of French
interests but not necessarily a return to the prewar sovereign relationship.' 81 Leclerc
appeared to accept the need to grant some real measure of autonomy in Indochina in
order to preserve a meaningful French role in the area.' 8 2
Leclerc's plan to accomplish this was simple and remarkably bold.' 83 In light of
the weakness of his military forces and the enormity of the task, Leclerc set out to
reconquer Indochina in two phases. The first would involve an invasion of Cochinchina,
with French forces first securing Saigon with the help of the British and then rapidly
driving north into Annam. The second step would be to reoccupy the north and eject the
Chinese nationalists. Once those two goals were accomplished, the French could set
about reshaping the internal politics of the provinces. Leclerc left open the possibility
that this might involve contact with the Viet Minh, but he insisted that these matters
could only be resolved after the French seizure of control.
Leclerc opened the campaign with a demonstration of pure audacity. On October
15, 1945, the same day that the first French expeditionary troops landed in Saigon,
Leclerc flew into Phnom Penh and called for a meeting with the self-appointed
180 Andre Martel, Leclerc: Le soldat et le politique (Paris: Albin Michel, 1998), pp. 362-363.
181 Lieutenant-colonel (er) Gilbert Bodinier, "Le g6dnral Leclerc et la ndgociation vietnamienne," Revue
historique des armies (RHA), No. 227 (June 2002), pp. 65; General Leclerc, "Rapport du G6n6ral Leclerc
sur l'evolution de la situation en Indochine depuis la fin du mois d'aout, Kandy, le 25 Septembre 1945,"
Gilbert Bodinier, Le Retour de la France en Indochine 1945-1946 (Vincennes: Service Historique de
l'Armee de Terre, 1987), pp. 187.
182 General Leclerc, "T6dlgramme du G6n6ral Leclerc, Saigon, le 14 f6vrier 1946," in Bodinier, Le Retour
de la France en Indochine, pp. 208-209.
183 General Leclerc, "Memorandum du G6n6ral Leclerc pour le Colonel de Guillebon, Kandy, le 7
Septembre 1945," in Gilbert Bodinier, Le Retour de la France en Indochine 1945-1946, pp. 164-171.
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Cambodian Prime Minister who had overthrown the King in a nationalist coup some two
months earlier. When Prime Minister Son Ngoc Thanh arrived for the meeting at the
British embassy, Leclerc invited him to join him in his car, then promptly arrested him
and flew him to Saigon. With Thanh out of power, Leclerc installed the uncle of the
Cambodian king as the new Prime Minister and monarch and proceeded on to Saigon. 184
Leclerc then set in motion the reconquest of Cochinchina and Annam. With a
mere 4,500 troops at his disposal, Leclerc had to rely as much on stagecraft as on brute
force. Leaving a mix of British, liberated French POWs, and semi-willing Japanese
troops to clear Saigon, Leclerc ordered the French expeditionary forces under Colonel
Massu to stage a series of armored and amphibious raids in the areas south and north of
Saigon. 8" Leclerc hoped that rapid and visible displays of French military force would
keep the Viet Minh off balance and impress the local populace and restore French
prestige.186
The results of Leclerc's strategy in the south were mixed. On one level, the
campaign was a remarkable coup de main. In roughly two months, Leclerc's forces
managed to recapture control of the major arteries and towns of Cochinchina at the cost
of 477 dead. 187 Starting in January 1946, Leclerc used his expanded force of some with
30,000 troops to repeat the same feat in Annam. 88 While these raids established nominal
French control over Vietnamese territory south of the 16th parallel, there were early
indications of the limits of real control. French units generally found that the population
184 Gdndral Yves Gras, Histoire de la Guerre d'Indochine (Paris: Librarie Plon, 1979), pp. 54-55.
185 Ibid., Gras, pp. 57-58, 63.
186 Ibid., Gras, pp. 58.
187 This figure is based on French records of the total French losses (killed in action, died, and missing)
between October 1945 and the end of January 1946 (Source: Bodinier, Le Retour de la France en
Indochine, pp. 82.
188 Ibid., Gras, pp. 62.
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fled in advance of the armored columns and subsequently refused to cooperate with the
French or volunteer information on the insurgents. 189 The Viet Minh pursued a deliberate
scorched earth policy, often destroying major towns and cities and executing local
notables and Europeans.' 90 Though Viet Minh units rarely opposed the arrival of French
troops, they began a campaign of harassment that progressively sapped the strength of the
Expeditionary Corps. Even in the absence of major combat engagements, the 9 th
Colonial Infantry Division had lost fully a third of its effectives to combat or disease in
the first two months of the reconquest.'91 Though Leclerc could claim as of February 6,
1945 to have conquered Cochinchina and southern Annam, the level of permanent
control in the countryside was quite limited. With 2.5 French soldiers for every 1,000
inhabitants at the peak of the reconquest, a tenth of the Quinlivan threshold, and far fewer
after the withdrawal of British and Japanese forces in January 1946, real consolidation
and pacification of the south remained largely undone.' 92 As General Valluy would put
in September 1946, "We have laid our hands on the entire country. We hold it only by
our fingertips."' 93
As his campaigns in Cochinchina and Annam drew to a close, Leclerc was eager
to parley these military successes into a rapid occupation of the north. In his
communications with de Gaulle, Leclerc made it clear that the 150,000 Chinese
Nationalist troops,' 94 rather than the self-appointed government of the Viet Minh, were
189 Cite Gras, pp. 63.
'90 Ibid., Dalloz, pp. 60.
191 Ibid, Gras, pp. 63-64.
192 Ibid., Gras, pp. 65.
193 General Valluy, "Extraits d'un rapport mensuel paru sous le timbre du conseiller militaire du haut
commissaire et sign6 G6n6ral Valluy, Saigon, le 10 septembre 1946," in Bodinier, Le Retour de la France
en Indochine, pp. 286.
194 Ibid., Spector, pp. 52.
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the principal obstacle to the reassertion of French sovereignty in Tonkin. 19 5 In order to
unseat them and avoid an expansion of hostilities Leclerc sought negotiated agreements
with the Chinese and the Viet Minh government in Hanoi. Leclerc encouraged his
principal negotiators to flatter their counterparts and concede non-essential points in
order to facilitate a swift and unopposed entry into Tonkin.196 These efforts culminated
in separate agreements with the Chinese and the Viet Minh.
The latter agreement, the March 6 interim agreements, established a modus
vivendi governing relations between the French and Viet Minh authorities. In return for
an agreement to suspend hostilities and welcome French troops in Tonkin, the French
recognized the Republic of Vietnam as a "free state with its own government, parliament,
army and finances, forming a part of the Indo-China Federation and the French
Union." 197 In addition, the French offered to hold a popular referendum on the question
of the unification of the three provinces of Vietnam. 198 In the military annex to the
agreement, the French agreed to limit the number of French forces in Tonkin to 25,000199
and set a timetable for their phased withdrawal within five years.200
While not all French parties were comfortable with the concessions made in the
March 6, 1946 agreements, 201 they paved the way for a largely unopposed French return
195 Gnd6ral Leclerc, "Lettre de Gdndral Leclerc au G6n6ral de Gaulle, Saigon le 14 janvier 1946," in
Bodinier, Le Retour de la France en Indochine, pp. 200.
196 G6ndral Leclerc, "Note pour le G6ndral Salan r6digde par l'6tat-major du G6n6ral Leclerc, Saigon, le 27
fevrier 1946," in Bodinier, Le Retour de la France en Indochine, pp. 213-216.
197 Ibid., Dalloz, pp. 69.
198 "Texte de l'accord conclu a Hanoi" in Bodinier, Le Retour de la France en Indochine, pp. 221-222.
199 The agreement allowed 15,000 European troops and an additional 10,000 Indochinese troops under
French command.
200 "Accord compl6mentaire de Hanoi, 7 mars 1946" in Bodinier, Le Retour de la France en Indochine, pp.
223-224.
201Amiral d'Argenlieu, "Lettre de l'amiral d'Argenlieu au General Leclerc, Saigon, le 10 mars 1946" in
Bodinier, Le Retour del la France en Indochina; ibid., Bodinier, "Le g6n6ral Leclerc et la ndgociation
vietnamienne," pp. 72.
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to Haiphong and Hanoi. 20 2 It appears clear that neither side considered the concessions to
be final. For Leclerc the concessions were a means to introduce forces into Tonkin and
set the stage for more contentious discussions later.203 If, as Leclerc argued at the start of
the negotiations in January 1946, the agreement was simply a means to prevent the
outbreak of a "holy war"204 against the French in spring 1946, it was a masterful
achievement. With a force of fewer than 55,000 men, Leclerc had managed in the space
of five months to reoccupy all of Indochina, pressure the Chinese Nationalists to leave
and avoid the outbreak of open hostilities with the Viet Minh in Tonkin. As he noted to
General Salan on March 10, French military action and the conclusion of the March 6
accords were but the opening phase of a broader negotiation that must be carried on in
Paris.
Origins of Early French Strategy in Indochina
The French embrace of a hybrid political-military strategy in the opening phase of
the Indochina conflict was a product of judgment and circumstance. Leclerc's flexibility
and political acumen were the result of a career devoted in large measure to irregular
warfare and political-military intrigue. As one who had unseated several Vichy
governments in central Africa between 1940 and 1942, Leclerc was fully at ease in the
grey area between conspiratorial politics and war. Equally important, Leclerc clearly
recognized that he lacked the military resources to reconquer and pacify all of Indochina
202 When the French landed at Haiphong on March 6, 1946, Chinese troops opened fire on the French
vessels inflicting a number of casualties. The signature of the March 6 accords with the Viet Minh
effectively forced the Chinese to relent and drop their opposition to French reentry (Source: Gras, pp. 95-
98).
203 Ibid., Bodinier, "Le g6ndral Leclerc et la ndgociation vietnamienne," pp. 70.
204 Ibid., Bodinier, "Le g6ndral Leclerc et la n6gociation vietnamienne," pp. 66.
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directly in 1945 and 1946. It is far from accidental that the period of maximum French
political flexibility coincided with the nadir of French military strength in the region.
General Leclerc was far from a typical product of the prewar French army. First,
he was uncommonly young, by far the youngest of the three French marshals to emerge
from the Second World War. A 38 year old captain on the eve of the German invasion of
France, Leclerc's active service record included six years of pacification duty and combat
in French Morocco.205 After joining the Free French cause in 1940, Leclerc was sent on
an explicitly political mission to Africa to rally the Vichy colony of Cameroun. In spite
of the untimely desertion of the only battalion of troops assigned to the mission, Leclerc
led a handful of officer and NCOs to the capital of Douala, seized the city and declared
himself the military governor of Cameroun. 206 Leclerc's subsequent success in the
administration of Cameroun and the invasion of neighboring Gabon explain his unique
appreciation of the dynamics of coups. 20 7 Though his subsequent conventional service in
Chad and the liberation of France were later to overshadow these early experiences in
irregular war and insurgent activity, the latter would prove far more relevant to the
problems he faced in the opening months of the Indochina conflict.
Leclerc's reconquest of Indochina in 1945-1946 was the high water mark of direct
civilian participation in French counterinsurgency strategy. Leclerc afforded Jean
Saintenay, the lead French negotiator in Hanoi and the primary architect of the March 6
accords, substantial latitude to craft a settlement that enabled the French to reoccupy the
205 Andr6 Martel, "Philippe Leclerc de Hauteclocque 1902-1947," Revue historique des Armies, No. 227
(June 2002), pp. 48; Anthony Clayton, Three Marshals of France: Leadership after Trauma (London:
Brassey's UK, 1992), pp. 36-37.
206 Ibid., Clayton, pp. 43-44.
207 Ibid., Clayton, pp. 45-46.
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north and set the stage for further consolidation. No civilian leader in Indochina would
wield similar influence for the remainder of the Indochina struggle.
Circumstance played a major role in early French war strategy as well. The
absence of manpower, materiel, and transport precluded a straightforward conventional
military campaign in Indochina in 1945 and 1946. Leclerc's reports and commentary at
the time make it clear that resource constraints drove strategy in the reconquest of the
south and the need to pursue a negotiated outcome in Tonkin. 208 Where Leclerc stood out
from his colleagues was in his relatively keen perception of the future burdens of major
war in Indochina.209 While many of his colleagues appear to have interpreted early
military successes in 1945 and 1946 as proof of the weakness of the opposition and the
superiority of French forces, Leclerc highlighted the risks of an open ended guerilla
conflict.
Circumstance also played a substantial role in Leclerc's dominant role in shaping
the strategy of this period. De Gaulle's appointee for the post of High Commissioner in
Indochina, Admiral d'Argenlieu, was far less enthusiastic about Leclerc's flexible
approach to the problem of restoring French authority. A loyal Gaullist but a more
traditional military leader, d'Argenlieu feared that Leclerc's concessions might
jeopardize French claims to full sovereignty in Indochina. Only Leclerc's early arrival in
theater and the press of events in the ground campaign enabled him to dominate French
strategy in spite of the growing skepticism of his superior d'Argenlieu.
208 Ibid., Bodinier, "Le g6n6ral Leclerc et la n6gociation vietnamienne," pp. 65-66.
209 Raoul Salan, Le Vi&t-Minh Mon Adversaire (Paris: Presses de la Cite, 1971), pp. 34-35.
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Phase 2: From Politics to Conventional Military Response (1946-1950)
The Model 3 strategy set by Leclerc and embodied in the March 6 accords never
sat well with the High Commissioner or several of the other senior military commanders.
Power sharing, even of a temporary nature, appeared inappropriate in an environment of
rising French power and resources. Almost as soon as the March accords had been
signed, d'Argenlieu and many of Leclerc's subordinates began to advocate a rapid move
to assert full French authority. 210 The outbreak of fighting in Haiphong and Hanoi gave
the French the opportunity to move from the uncomfortable modus vivendi (Model 3) to
more familiar realm of small war (Model 1). From the suppression of the Viet Minh
uprisings in Tonkin to General Valluy's major offensives in 1947, early French victories
reinforced the military's attachment to Model 1. From the winter of 1947 on, French
command sought to crush the rebellion by defeating the Viet Minh armies in the field and
by flushing the guerilla forces out of the populated areas of Tonkin and Cochinchina.
Even before the signature of the March 6 accords, Admiral d'Argenlieu had
begun to express grave reservations about Leclerc's policy of negotiation in Tonkin.
Though it appears clear that Leclerc harbored few illusions as to the permanence of such
accords or the good faith of the Viet Minh delegation, 211 d'Argenlieu feared that
Leclerc's conciliatory approach had seriously undermined the French position in
Indochina. Where Leclerc acknowledged the new power of local elites and Vietnamese
210 The French military's preference for a Model 1 solution to the reconquest can be seen as early as 1944
in the comments of General Sabattier (Source: G6n6ral Sabattier, "Note pour le gouvernement du g6ndral
Sabattier, commandant les troupes frangaises en Chine, Chungking, le 28 mai 1945," in Bodinier, Le
Retour de la France en Indochine, pp. 143). G6n6ral Valluy made similar views known in the aftermath of
the signing of the March accords (Source: G6n6ral Valluy, " Expose du G6n6ral Valluy sur les raisons
d'ordre militarie qui s'opposent a l'execution d'un 'coup de force"' in Bodinier, Le Retour de la France en
Indochine, pp. 233).
211 Andrd Martel, "Leclerc au tournant de l'Indochine (janvier-f6vrier 1947)," Revue historique des Armees,
No. 204 (septembre 1996), pp. 65.
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nationalism, d'Argenlieu sought a stricter and carefully managed transition to limited,
local autonomy.212 If d'Argenlieu acknowledged that the prewar could not be restored in
its entirety, and insisted that the new order would be more liberal, he nonetheless resisted
Leclerc's calls for concessions on granting "independence" to local parties. 2 13
D'Argenlieu's subsequent actions in Indochina reinforced the impression that local
aspirations would play a very minor role compared with the imperative of French power.
Instead of granting the Vietnamese independence and a union of the three provinces,
d'Argenlieu offered limited autonomy and federal status within a French administered
union.214 De Gaulle's late war proclamations of a new order in Indochina
notwithstanding, d'Argenlieu's new government installed in October 1945 did not
include a single native member.215
The split between liberal pragmatists under Leclerc and more conservative
restorationists under d'Argenlieu widened as the negotiations in Tonkin approached the
March 6 climax. 216 While Leclerc argued that local nationalist sentiment demanded some
level of conciliation and negotiation, d'Argenlieu grew increasingly wary of concessions
he felt might amount to a "new Munich" in Indochina. 217 D'Argenlieu and other
longtime observers of the region began to suspect that Leclerc had conceded far too much
to an enemy whose military strength was trifling. They believed that the return of good
governance and clear French control would be accepted by a populace. 218
212 Ibid., Gras, pp. 102.
213 Amiral Thierry d'Argenlieu, "Instructions politiques de I'Amiral d'Argenlieu" in Bodinier, Le Retour de
la France en Indochine, pp. 173; Francis Foronda, "Le dernier moine-soldat: l'amiral Thierry d'Argenlieu,"
Revue historique des Armies, No. 204 (September 1996), pp. 82.
214 Ibid., Dalloz, pp. 63.
215 Ibid., Dalloz, pp. 63.
216 Ibid., Gras, pp. 100.
217 Ibid., Dalloz, pp. 71; Gras, pp. 103.
218 Ibid., Gras, pp. 101.
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Almost as soon as the accords were in place, d'Argenlieu began to draw back
from the rapprochement. His sponsorship of a declaration of independence by the state
of Cochinchina was clearly an attempt to block Viet Minh moves for a referendum on
national unification. Similarly, d'Argenlieu's decision to overrule Leclerc and hold
follow on negotiations with the Viet Minh in Dalat rather than in Paris was a calculated
snub to the Viet Minh government in Hanoi.219 In private conversations, d'Argenlieu
made clear that growing military strength made negotiation unnecessary and humiliating:
I am amazed, yes, that is the word, amazed that France has such a fine Expeditionary Corps and yet
its leaders would rather negotiate than fight. 220
The growing rift between Leclerc and d'Argenlieu over the implementation of the March
6 accords led Leclerc to request reassignment in April 1946.
The dispute between Leclerc and d'Argenlieu took place in the context of military
success and the rapid expansion of available military resources. While Leclerc had had
to make due with a shoe string force of less than 5,000 in the opening months of the
reconquest of Cochinchina, d'Argenlieu could call on a force of nearly 90,000 troops by
the time of Leclerc's eventual departure in July 1946.221 With Chinese forces
withdrawing and French troops flowing into Tonkin, the balance of forces appeared to be
shifting in favor of the colonial authorities. Faced with what they considered an upstart
and illegitimate government in Hanoi, d'Argenlieu and his senior military commanders
began to believe that renewed confrontation might lead to a favorable change in local
219 Ibid., Dalloz, pp. 71-73.
220 Amiral d'Argenlieu as cited in Ronald Spector, In the Ruins of Empire, pp. 234; ibid., Bodinier, "Le
g6n6ral Leclerc et la n6gociation vietnamienne," pp. 68.
221 Total French military forces in Indochina equaled 90,152 as of July 31, 1946 (Source: Bodinier, Le
Retour de la France en Indochine, pp. 85). The Viet Minh appear to have had some 80-100,000 troops in
1946, of whom roughly 35,000 were in Tonkin (Source: Bodinier, Le Retour de la France en Indochine,
pp. 96-97).
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government. 222 As Bernard Fall pointed out, rising French power made some bid for full
control almost irresistible:
"The French forces sent to Indochina were too strong for France to resist the temptation of
using them; yet not strong enough to keep the Viet-Minh from trying to solve the whole
political problem by throwing the French into the sea." 223
The uneasy cohabitation of French force and the Viet Minh in Tonkin did not last long.
Viet Minh leaders frustrated by the breakdown of negotiations with the French at Dalat
and later Fontainebleau, believed that war might lead to a precipitous French withdrawal.
The French or their part suspected that confrontation might provide an opportunity to
break the Viet Minh and restore full French sovereignty in Tonkin.224
222 Ibid., Gras, pp. 141. In anticipation of a breakdown in negotiations, d'Argenlieu informed Valluy that
French forces must be prepared to deliver a decisive blow (Source: Amiral d'Argenlieu, "Lettre de l'amiral
d'Argenlieu au general Valluy, Saigon, le 12 novembre 1946," in Bodinier, Le Retour de la France en
Indochine, pp. 315).
223 Bernard Fall, Street without Joy (Harrisburg, PA: The Telegraph Press, 1964), pp. 27.
224 Ibid., Gras, 142.
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French Force Levels in Indochina (1945-47)
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An armed clash in Haiphong on November 20, 1946 provided the pretext for this
test of strength.226 What started as an exchange of gunfire between French and Viet Minh
forces over a customs dispute soon widened into a full scale, urban battle. In spite of
some local efforts to re-establish a cease fire, the senior French commander and acting
High Commissioner General Valluy ordered his subordinates Debes and Morliere to
break Viet Minh resistance in Haiphong:
The time has come for us to give a hard lesson to those who have treacherously attacked us.
You must make yourselves absolute masters of Haiphong by all means at your disposal and
force the command of the Vietnamese army to repent.227
Within six days, the French had managed to defeat the Viet Minh forces in Haiphong at
the cost of 100 French casualties and some 300-6,000 civilian casualties.22 8
225 The data for this graph is drawn from Bodinier's two volumes of primary documents: Le Retour de la
France en Indochine and Indochine 1947: Re'glement politique ou solution militaire?
226 See Gras, pp. 136-138 for information on the ongoing, undeclared war in the south.
227 General Valluy in Dalloz, pp. 80.
170
The sharp military defeat inflicted on the Viet Minh did not have the intended
political effect. Instead, the Viet Minh began to prepare for a wider struggle in Tonkin.
On the night of December 19, 1946, the Viet Minh launched a series of sharp attacks on
French garrisons in Hanoi and across Tonkin. While French troops managed to stave off
a Viet Minh takeover of Hanoi, the fight to retake first the French quarter and then the
Vietnamese sections of the city dragged on through January. Once again, Valluy
encouraged his commanders to use maximum force to compel submission: "strike hard
with the cannon and the bomb... to finish it quickly and prove to our adversary the
crushing superiority of our means." 229 The French military managed to parry these initial
blows and regain control over the major urban areas and roads of Vietnam. The Viet
Minh retreated into the countryside and began a low level guerilla struggle against French
outposts and convoys.
Leclerc's final contribution to Indochina strategy came not as a commander but as
an inspector. The new French government under Leon Blum, eager to appoint Leclerc
High Commissioner, sent him on a formal inspection tour in January 1947. Though
Leclerc would later decline the post of High Commissioner, the inspection report he
delivered to the French government reveals a clear alternative policy and strategy for the
war. Leclerc's policy had three pillars. First, he favored concessions to Indochinese
independence and nationalism within the framework of the French Union. Though
Leclerc had privately labeled Ho Chi Minh "a great enemy of France" 230 well before the
fighting in Haiphong and Hanoi, he insisted that some form of independence in Indochina
228 Ibid., Gras, pp. 148
229 General Valluy as cited in Gras, pp. 163.
230 General (CR) Jean Compagnon, "Janvier 1947, la d6cision du G6n6ral Leclerc," Revue historique des
Armies, No. 208 (September 1997), pp. 128.
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was unavoidable. Second, the new order had to protect French interests in Indochina.
Third, the French must maintain substantial military forces in coastal enclaves.23 1 On the
level of military strategy, Leclerc argued there were two choices. First, the French could
reconquer the country by force, a task that would demand a minimum of 350,000 troops.
Second, the French could pursue a negotiated outcome provided that they established a
position of military strength. The second option would require a minimum of 115,000
232troops (including 100,000 Europeans) for two years.
Leclerc's recommendations demonstrate a conception of counterinsurgency
fundamentally at odds with the military operational code and the opinion of most the
senior French military commanders in Indochina in 1946. Where most commanders
considered the Viet Minh military and government the primary problem, and the
Vietnamese population a secondary consideration, Leclerc consistently highlighted the
active role of popular opinion and considered the battlefield test secondary and
potentially distracting. Where d'Argenlieu and Valluy saw military domination as a
precondition for a stable political outcome, Leclerc saw the resort to force and the urge to
dictate terms as highly problematic. A political settlement acceptable to the Vietnamese
population and compatible with French interests was the objective, and military conflict
with a popular Viet Minh government a sure path to French entanglement and frustration.
The events late 1946 and 1947 proved a test of these diametrically opposed beliefs about
the relationship between force and political outcomes.
231 Andre Martel, "Leclerc au tournant de l'Indochine (janvier-fevrier 1947)," Revue historique des Arm&es,
No. 204 (September 1996), pp. 67.232 Raoul Salan, Fin d'un Empire.- Le Viet-minh mon adversaire (Paris: Press de la Cite, 1971), pp. 48.;
ibid., Gras, pp. 168-169.
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First False Dawn: French Suppression of the Viet Minh Uprisings (1946)
The Viet Minh uprising in December 1946 provided a convenient test of the two
models of counterinsurgency strategy in Indochina. For d'Argenlieu and his senior
commander Valluy, the uprising was proof of the intrinsic flaws of cohabitation and an
opportunity to restore real French control by force of arms. For Leclerc, the collapse of
order first in Tonkin was the product of short sighted intransigence by d'Argenlieu. Far
from restoring French control, the rupture was likely to provoke an interminable guerilla
struggle in which French military force would prove inadequate. 233 This dispute, which
hinged on very different assessments of the balance of power, the role of mass politics,
and the likely effects of military action, was a clear illustration of the clash of Models 1
and 3.
Leclerc, who had been approached by the French government as a potential
replacement for d'Argenlieu as High Commissioner, painted a very bleak portrait of the
Viet Minh uprising and its implications for French strategy. In his official inspection
report, Leclerc highlighted the indivisibility of the military situation and the larger
political problem:
The action by French troops charged, in this country, with the restoration of order and the
protection of national interests, represents [only] one of the means available in the service of
French government policy. It follows that the military problem cannot be isolated and
treated separately. Under the current conditions, military operations do not represent an end
[in themselves]. One cannot consider their development or their duration except as a
function of the evolution of events and the political policy that will be pursued with respect
to the Indochina question in broad terms.2 3 4
Leclerc went on to describe the tenuous state of French control in Tonkin and Annam.
While he noted that French control was considerably stronger in Cochinchina, he warned
233 Ibid., Bodinier, "Le g6ndral Leclerc et la n6gociation vietnamienne," pp. 72.
234 G6n6ral Leclerc, " Project de Rapport du G6n6ral Leclerc a MM. le Pr6sident du Conseil de la
R6publique Francaise, le Ministre de D6fense Nationale, le G6n6ral d'Arm6e Chef de I'E.M.D.N., janvier
1947," in Bodinier, Le Retour de la France en Indochine, pp. 383-384.
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that open war in Tonkin would increasingly degenerate into a guerilla campaign. 235 As
he had argued in the past, French military success only mattered in so far as it could be
translated into a stable and acceptable political outcome. Leclerc flatly stated that the
French policy of the previous ten months had ended in failure; performance in the next
phase was uncertain and would be measured in the ability to achieve a political settlement
as distinct from military victory. 236 In closing, Leclerc returned to the political core of
the problem and the perils of a strictly military response:
The Indochina problem is above all a political problem. It remains unresolved. If one wants
to avoid a new Napoleonic war in Spain, or another Mexican expedition, it is absolutely
necessary to win the political contest without delay.23 7
D'Argenlieu's estimate of the same situation was strikingly different. While he
acknowledged that the French had yet to land "decisive blows" on the Viet Minh,
d'Argenlieu argued that French forces had made substantial progress on both the military
and political fronts: "I simply note that the political situation thus created bit by bit
without spectacular raids or battles, will allow the people of Indochina to make
themselves freely heard in a voice that will not be that of the Viet Minh."238 The High
Commissioner noted that within the first month of the Viet Minh uprising they had
managed to free most of the major garrisons in Indochina, restore movement along the
Hanoi-Haiphong corridor, and regain operational initiative across Tonkin and central
235 Ibid., Leclerc, pp. 386.
236 Ibid., Leclerc, pp. 388-389.
237 Ibid., Leclerc, pp. 390 (italics in original text).
238 Amiral d'Argenlieu, "T616gramme de Haut-Commissaire de France pour l'Indochine, ler janvier 1947"
in Gilbert Bodinier (e.d.), La Guerre d'Indochine 1945-1954, Textes et Documents frangais et viet-minh,
Volume 2, Indochine 1947: Rglement politique ou solution militaire? (Vincennes: Service Historique de
l'Arm6e de Terre, 1989), pp. 181.
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Annam. 239 According to d'Argenlieu, the military successes of the Expeditionary Corps
had demonstrated the superiority of French arms:
In short, in one month, we have closed ranks, delivered rude blows to the enemy, and retaken
the initiative everywhere. Certainly the effort to produce these results has been hard: the
losses occasionally heavy and frequently the result of early surprises and inexperience, but
clearly less severe as our men have begun to understand the enemy's tactics, his strengths
and weaknesses. It is in this manner that over the past days, our superiority vis-A-vis the
enemy army in the Hanoi sector has been clearly validated and demonstrated concretely by
the capture of numerous prisoners and substantial stocks of materiel.
The effectiveness of our present action is a measure of the success of the [future] operations
that we will be able to undertake once the anticipated reinforcements arrive.240
D'Argenlieu's assessment was a clear illustration of the small victories dynamic in
action. Small battlefield successes were cumulative and were leading indicators of
broader military and political success. Patience and reinforcements were the only
missing ingredients of an effective French strategy.
General Valluy, Leclerc's successor as military commander in Indochina, shared
d'Argenlieu's upbeat assessment of the counteroffensive and the potential for French
success. Writing in May 1947 to d'Argenlieu's successor, High Commissioner Bollaert,
Valluy argued that firm French reaction to the Viet Minh uprising had gone some way to
reversing the confusion of the modus vivendi period. Valluy argued that the majority of
the population was paralyzed by fear and insecurity; their only genuine desire was to live
in peace and in the hopes of some positive improvement in their material livelihoods. 241
Leclerc's misguided courtship of the Viet Minh had led the people to regard the Viet
Minh as a legitimate national government, and French forbearance had been taken by the
239 Amiral d'Argenlieu, "Note sur les operations en Indochine du nord du Decembre 1946 au 20 janvier
1947" in Bodinier, Indochine 1947, pp. 181
240 Ibid., d'Argenlieu, "Note sur les operations en Indochine du nord du d6cembre 1946 au 20 janvier 1947"
in Bodinier, Indochine 1947, pp. 183.
241 G6n6ral Valluy, "Fiche sur la situation en Cochinchina, Saigon, le 4 mai 1947" in Bodinier, Indochine
1947, pp. 191.
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population as a sign of weakness. 242 While military action could not in and of itself
deliver victory, Valluy suggested that continued military action alone could set the
conditions for effective political action by French civil authorities:
Pure military action, by landing multiple blows on the rebel forces, by seeking out the
destruction of their bases and supply depots, by inflicting elevated casualties, by making
their lives as difficult as possible, by forcing them, at the start of monsoon season, to a
precarious, has as its goal to create, among the rebel troops and their chiefs, lassitude and
discouragement that can be exploited through political action to split the Viet Minh.243
For Valluy, the most important elements of an effective counterinsurgency strategy were
firmness and clarity. The French could not afford to rekindle, through compromise, the
aspirations of independence or unification that would inevitably lead to their
"eviction."244
With the suppression of the Viet Minh uprisings essentially complete, the high
command faced a choice of what do next. The French controlled the urban centers of
Hanoi, Haiphong, Saigon and the major road arteries connecting them, and the thinly
populated highlands of western and northeastern Tonkin. Outside these areas, French
control was tenuous. The Viet Minh controlled most of the populous Red River delta
south of Hanoi and Haiphong, and their government had retreated to the remote areas of
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upper Tonkin to direct a guerilla struggle against the colonial administration.
V1 "w I. m .m .
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With Leclerc's refusal to accept the post of High Commissioner, General Valluy
proposed a conventional military campaign first to pacify the countryside and then to
destroy the Viet Minh army. Peace could only be achieved by the clear demonstration of
French power and authority. Valluy's articulation of his strategy offers a clear example
of Model 1 reasoning:
General Valluy had his own idea of the way in which they must pursue "the restoration of
order and a durable peace."...In contrast to the high Commissioner, who wanted to put an
end to hostilities through negotiation, General Valluy believed that before negotiating they
must first beat the Viet Minh, if not "all the conventions in the world would amount to
nothing, the insurrection would restart and that rebellion would, sooner or later, expel us
245 This figure is drawn from Gilbert Bodinier (e.d.), La Guerre d'Indochine 1945-1954, Textes et
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definitively, completely and villainously from Indochina." The insurgent movement that the
Viet Minh maintained was, in his opinion, "of uneven depth" and "far from insurmountable."
Le General Valluy proposed therefore as his objective to "seek the isolation of the Viet Minh
front, followed by its disintegration. " It would be necessary in the first place "to detach the
Vietnamese masses from the effective head." This would be reached "by demonstrating our
material superiority and our will to triumph." The Vietnamese masses, whose weak points
were a "fundamental passivity" and an "extreme fickleness," would conclude by
"recognizing the uselessness of the current conflict and their powerlessness to drive out or
defeat the French." Lassitude would then overcome them and it would be possible to
provoke the disintegration of the Viet Minh by inflicting "an obvious and definitive military
defeat," that would lead to discord between opposing camps, forcing the extremists to
disappear or depriving them of their supporters. 246
All the elements of the Model 1 are present in Valluy's February plan: the primacy of
force, the weakness of the insurgents, and the malleability of the population. The
exercise of military force would cow the native population, setting the conditions for the
decisive military defeat of the insurgents.
In February 1947, Valluy sketched out a two phase military plan. In the first
phase, the French reinforcements dispatched in the wake of the December uprisings
would be channeled into Cochinchina. The troops would launch a concerted campaign to
pacify the south. Valluy expressed confidence that successful pacification in
Cochinchina might be decisive. Pacification of the region was:
... the veritable touchstone of our capacity to resolve the [Indochina] problem...If, in the
several months to come, we succeed in detaching Cochinchina from the rest of the war, we
will have settled three quarters of the Indochina problem.2 47
Once French control in the south had been restored, Valluy proposed a direct assault on
the Viet Minh government and army in northern Tonkin.
The Problem of Pacification
The spring pacification campaign in Cochinchina failed to meet Valluy's
optimistic expectations. In spite of the commitment of 38,000 regular troops, roughly
246 Yves Gras citing 10 February plan by General Valluy (Source: ibid., Gras, pp. 177).
247 General Valluy as quoted in Gras, pp. 177.
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40% of the French Expeditionary Corps and some 16,000 local partisans and paramilitary
forces, the French failed to extinguish Viet Minh resistance in the southern countryside.
Pacification involved two related problems. Military commanders had first to
uproot the Viet Minh guerillas and local Communist government. Once an area had been
cleared of Viet Minh influence, the authorities had to reintroduce French colonial
administration.
The first phase of pacification relied on offensive operations in the form of small
patrols or larger cordon and search operations. These operations generally failed to
deliver decisive results:
... the actions of the expeditionary force, whether ambitious, spectacular operations or small
multiple missions combined with routine pacification, were often unsuccessful. In the case
of the former, the preparations for operating the heavy artillery immediately alerted the
enemy. There could be no element of surprise and however much equipment or however
many troops were deployed, the area was rarely brought under total French control. In any
operations it was always difficult to choose between speed, which prevented the thorough
"cleansing" of the area, and the systematic "combing," which gave the insurgents time to
disappear.248
Though the structure of the operational problem made contact with enemy troops
unlikely, the results of any direct engagements heavily favored the counterinsurgent
forces:
The difference in strength between the two sides at the time made any defeat inconceivable
and the affair invariably ended with a dispatch such as the following:
"We have it from military sources that operations have been in progress for several
days on the Plain of Reeds to the north of Cai B6. Heavy losses have been inflicted
on the supporters of Ho Chi Minh's government, who left 200 dead and abandoned a
considerable amount of equipment in the field. A training center for officers was also
destroyed. On the French side, a few losses have been notified - AFP."
A few "Viets" killed, some arms and equipment recovered, a favorable communiqud - it was
easy for any military commander to undertake without much risk grand but ineffectual
operations. 249
Here then was the small victories dynamic imbedded in the structure of the rural
pacification problem. Since the probability of meeting main units was low, the chances
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of large scale success were low. But the certainty of victory in smaller encounters
created the illusion of cumulative progress and encouraged the expenditure of additional
resources and organizational energies in the pursuit of the ever elusive tipping point.
French efforts to hold their gains proved costly and frustrating. The default
response, itself derived from nineteenth century pacification campaigns in the area, was
to erect guard towers or outposts at close intervals throughout the cleared areas.250 In
theory, these outposts could provide security, intelligence and contact with the
population. In practice, they absorbed enormous numbers of troops and, in the absence
of enthusiastic local support, often proved vulnerable to insurgent attack. Once under
siege, neighboring French outposts had to weigh the benefits of relieving their comrades
against the risks that ambushes would decimate the relief forces.251
The few genuine successes of French pacification in the south owed more to the
split between of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious sects from the Viet Minh movement
than the government's efforts. The defection of the religious sects, brought on by Viet
Minh terror tactics aimed at the control the groups and unseat their leaders, delivered
sizable areas of Cochinchina to French control. In return for arms, French military
support, and a measure of autonomy, the sects agreed to expel the Viet Minh and pledge
allegiance to the French government. 252 This pattern was to be repeated on multiple
occasions over the course of the war. Whether in the sect controlled areas of
Cochinchina, the hill tribe areas of Tonkin, or the Catholic parishes of Tonkin,
250 Michel Bodin, "Le sous-secteur de Vinh Long, (mars 1947-aout 1948)," Revue historique des Armies,
No. 204 (September 1996), pp. 124-125.251 Lieutenant-colonel (ER) Hubert Tourret, "L'6volution de la tactique du corps exp6ditionnaire franqais
en extreme-orient" in L'Armne francaise dans la guerre d'Indochine (1946-1954): adaptation ou
inadaptation? (Vincennes: Centre des Etudes d'Histoire de la defense, 2000), pp. 175-176.
252 Ibid., Gras, pp. 217-221.
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pacification generally succeeded where local populations harbored an existing, identity
based antipathy towards the Viet Minh. French pacification was far less successful where
such animus was absent. Without the seed crystal of ethnic or religious identity, the
French found it difficult to suppress Viet Minh guerillas and local government.
The Search for Decisive Battle: Decapitation Strike in Tonkin (Fall 1947)
By early summer it was clear to Valluy and his subordinates that the pacification
campaign in Cochinchina had fallen short. While they had bested the enemy in every
tactical engagement, and had benefited from the defection of the religious sects to the
French cause, they had failed to take the Cochinchina out of the rebellion. In July 1947,
Valluy addressed the failure in a directive to his senior commanders. In it he stressed the
inadequacy of traditional French pacification methods, the colonial inheritance of
Gallieni and Lyautey. Faced with a determined, centralized, and ideologically motivated
opponent, the French needed to do two things to succeed. First, they needed to strike at
the head of the enemy movement - the Viet Minh government and regular army units.
Second, they needed to provide an alternative centralized, hierarchical order around
which the Vietnamese people could rally.253
Pointing to the success of more modest conventional operations in Tonkin during
the spring, 254 Valluy suggested that a more conventional decapitation strike on the Viet
Minh government might deliver the results that had so far eluded them in the south. In a
reversal of his earlier logic, Valluy argued that the destruction of the Viet Minh army
253 General Valluy, "Commandement Superior des Troupes franqaises en extreme-orient aux commandants,
Saigon, le 23 juillet 1947" in Bodinier, Indochine 1947, pp. 302-303.
2540perations Georges and Papillon and were the two largest of these operations. French successes in re-
establishing control in both areas fueled enthusiasm for similar operations in the coming months (Source:
Gras, pp. 181-182).
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would set the conditions for successful pacification. Valluy acknowledged in later
writings that his decision to turn from pacification to decapitation was motivated by the
impending redeployment of 15,000 of the French forces now at his disposal. A revolt in
the French colony of Madagascar and waning parliamentary enthusiasm for the war were
the driving forces behind this impending withdrawal, and this left a narrow window in
which to land a decisive blow:
One thing appears certain, and it is that we will lose more than 15,000 whites [European
troops], from the first half of 1948 onward, and that this loss will not be compensated by the
arrival of 5,000 Senegalese...255
If the French were to strike a concentrated blow at the head of the Viet Minh government,
they had to do so in the fall of 1947.25
6
Valluy's plan, which was to mature into Operations Lea and Ceinture, envisioned
an attack the Viet Minh government and army in its remote sanctuaries in northern
Tonkin. Valluy planned to isolate and destroy the Viet Minh apparatus in northern
Tonkin. Airborne troops would be dropped on Bac Kan, the headquarters of the Viet
Minh government, to ensure surprise and deliver the initial punch. Two French columns,
an armored one driving northwest along the Chinese border from Lang Son to Cao Bang
and an amphibious one would pushing north from Hanoi along the Clear and Song Ga
rivers, would relieve the airborne forces at Bac Kan and surround the Viet Minh.
255 "Note pour le G6n6super sur la conduite d'operations possibles, Saigon, le 22 octobre 1947," in
Bodinier, Indochine 1947, pp. 315.
256 Generale Valluy, "Note mauscrite du g6n6ral Valluy au sujet de l'operation Ho Chi Minh 15 juillet




Once the forces had reached their initial objectives, they would sweep through the sector
attacking all enemy forces and destroying Viet Minh supply bases and factories. The
isolation and destruction of the Viet Minh main body was the immediate goal. Once in
place, the French hoped to sever the Viet Minh supply lines running into China and the
Red River Delta.258 Operation Ceinture was to be the follow on operation. In Ceinture,
French forces would continue to push south towards Hanoi, hoping to trap the remnants
of the Viet Minh regular forces.
Judged solely on the basis of the performance of French troops, Operation Lea
was a success. The French achieved tactical surprise in their October 7 airborne drops on
Bac Kan, narrowly missing an opportunity to capture the senior Viet Minh leaders. The
257 This map is drawn from Salan's Le Viet-minh mon adversaire, pp. 102.258 Gendral Valluy, "Instruction personelle et secrete pour le G6n6ral Commandant les T.F.I.N." in
Bodinier, Indochine 1947, pp. 305.
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armored push from Langson to Cao Bang had to overcome tremendous physical obstacles
to meet the specified timeline. By feats of engineering, they closed on Cao Bang and
turned south to relieve the paratroopers. The amphibious group encountered more
serious delays and was forced to move on foot to complete their drive north.
Nevertheless, within the space of 10 days, the French had managed to strike the Viet
Minh headquarters and push some 12,000 troops into what had been the enemy's central
stronghold.259
The results of the sweep south were less conclusive. While the French pushed
through the Viet Minh area and sought to rally the local population in the cleared areas,260
they did not inflict the crushing military blow they had sought. Unwilling to meet
superior French forces in open battle, the Viet Minh army broke into company sized
elements and filtered south.
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Operation "Ceinture"
Operation Ceinture (19 November -10 December 1947), the push south from the
Tonkin highlands towards Hanoi, produced similar results. While French forces won
numerous small engagements and captured or destroyed large quantities of enemy food
and munitions, they did not manage to force any large conventional engagements. As the
official after action report indicated, pursuit in the forested and mountainous terrain of
upper Tonkin proved enormously challenging:
For this reason [the French imitation of Viet Minh light infantry tactics] and in spite of traps
laid along the paths, our detachments maintained the operational initiative everywhere;
unfortunately in covered terrain, they could not generally force combat on the enemy and in
practical terms the pursuit proved impossible with the adversary simply dissolving into the
forest.2 62
261 This figure is drawn from Salan, Le Viet-minh mon adversaire, pp. 111.
262 Commandement des troupes franqaises d'Indochine du nord, 6tat-major, "La campagne d'automne au
Tonkin" in Bodinier, Indochine 1947, pp. 339.
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By the end of Ceinture in mid-December 1947, the French had splintered the Viet Minh
force but had not defeated it.263 The French command estimated that the Viet Minh had
lost 1,500 tons of munitions which, according to captured Viet Minh documents,
represented close to two thirds of their total stocks. The French estimated that the Viet
Minh had lost close to 8,200 troops in the two operations. 264 The French had swept
through the Viet Minh sanctuaries and had re-established a string of outposts along the
Chinese border, but lacked the forces to maintain a permanent presence in the area. In
spite of the mixed results, the after action review closed on a triumphal note, arguing that
the French forces had managed to call the "Viet Minh bluff (of its 'government,' and its
'army') [revealing] its real level, that of a terrorist and dissident political party." 265
While senior French leaders acknowledged that the operations had yet to deliver
victory on the campaign level, they saw little need to change strategic course. The troops
of the Expeditionary Corps had driven the Viet Minh government into hiding and broken
their regular army into company sized elements. It stood to reason that similar efforts,
executed on a greater scale and with the benefit of experience, would deliver even greater
results. General Valluy and his senior ground commander, General Salan, commissioned
an extensive study of the 1947 operations in an effort to glean tactical and operational
insights that might be applied in future operations. The lessons learned effort was self-
congratulatory in tone and almost exclusively tactical and operational in focus. 266 If the
operations had failed to secure complete victory, the real problem was insufficient forces
and time. General Salan, who had boasted to the High Commissioner in September 1947
263 Vo Nguyen Giap, "Ordres de Vo Nguyen Giap a la suite de l'offensive frangaise en Haute et Moyenne
Regions," in Bodinier, Indochine 1947, pp. 325-328.
264 Ibid., Fall, pp. 30.
265 Ibid., "La campagne d'automne au Tonkin, le 27 octobre 1947," in Bodinier, Indochine 1947, pp. 341.
266 For a full account of this effort, see Salan, pp. 115-117.
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that he needed only three weeks to "crush the head" of the Viet Minh argued after the fact
that time and manpower had been the only real obstacles to a more definitive outcome:
On a military level, [the operations were] incontestably effective. It is equally certain that
would have been more complete if the operations had been extended for an additional month.
The dispatch of four battalions to the south, by forcing the premature withdrawal of the units
engaged, interrupted the progress of a campaign whose success could scarcely have failed to
be even more decisive on a military level and above all on a political level. 267
Valluy and Salan were in agreement that the fall offensives in Tonkin had been
successful and had broken the back of the Viet Minh regular forces. In his report to
Valluy dated November 17, Salan flatly noted that "Territory held by the Viet Minh has
now almost ceased to exist. It has been fragmented and its most important areas have
been wiped out."268 As Valluy put it, "at the end of 1947, this Viet Minh army, reduced
to leading the errant life of partisans and pirates, no longer represented a means of
pressure on the political level." If work remained, it was more a matter of refinement and
escalation than the development of new strategies. With more forces, more time, and
improved execution, French military leaders were confident they could grind the Viet
Minh into insignificance.
Marginal Civilian Involvement (1947-1950)
While the French civil authorities were eager to see the Indochina problem
resolved, their practical impact on counterinsurgency strategy was minimal. The political
upheavals and deep ideological divisions of French Fourth Republic (21 governments
267 General Salan as quoted in Gras, pp. 207.
268 General Salan as quoted in Dalloz, pp. 96-97.
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over the course of the Indochina war)269 made major policy changes unlikely. Unwilling
to concede the basic French claims to control in Indochina, but hesitant to commit scarce
French resources to an expansion of the war effort, successive French governments clung
to the notion that modest French military efforts would, over time, lead to a positive
outcome. Pierre Mendes-France, speaking to the Chamber of Deputies in November
1950, aptly summarized the disconnect between French strategy and policy:
The whole concept of our action in Indochina is wrong, because it is based both on a military
effort which is insufficient and incapable of bringing about a solution by force and on a
policy which is insufficient and incapable of ensuring us the support of the local population.
It is a fact that our forces, even with the support of local units, cannot achieve a military
solution, especially since the developments in China, and it is a fact that our policy of
unsatisfactory concessions, constantly re-defined or revoked, has not achieved and will, alas,
increasingly fail to achieve the rallying of the Vietnamese masses.2 70
While the tension between French aims and the strategies employed was increasingly
obvious, no French government before 1954 was willing to concede the major issues and
confront the military. The path of least resistance for a weak and divided political elite
was to back the generals and cling to expansive and increasingly unachievable ends.
The volatility of French domestic politics meant that any meaningful civilian
input to French strategy would have to come from the High Commissioners. On several
occasions between 1947 and 1950, civilian high commissioners did attempt to change
French strategy. When these changes clashed with the senior military commanders'
priorities, the High Commissioners generally lost.
The clash between High Commissioner Emile Bollaert and Valluy in the spring
and summer of 1947 demonstrates the clear dominance of military leaders over both
political strategy and military strategy in Indochina. In their formal instructions to the
269 Hugues Tertrais, La piastre et lefusil: Le coit de la guerre d'Indochine, 1945-1954 (Paris: Comit6 pour
l'histoire dconomique et financibre de la France, 2002), pp. 519; George Armstrong Kelly, Lost Soldiers:
The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947-1962 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 55.
270 Pierre Mendis-France as quoted in Dalloz, pp. 134.
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incoming High Commissioner, the government of Prime Minister Paul Ramadier
encouraged him to use French military advantage to explore political negotiations:
During the test of force that was imposed on us, our supremacy was affirmed. We can
therefore search for a political solution, that we have always had in view in any case, by
negotiating with the Vietnamese government or governments. 271
Accordingly, Bollaert responded to tentative Viet Minh ceasefire proposals sent in April
1947 by began to draw up the terms of a cease-fire agreement.
The suggestion that the French authorities might negotiate with the Viet Minh
sparked strong opposition among the military leadership. After having defeated the Viet
Minh uprising, Valluy and his subordinates did not want to remove the pressure on the
insurgents by returning to some cloudy modus vivendi. Valluy therefore insisted on that
the ceasefire proposal include at least five conditions: 1) the surrender within 15 days of
substantial stocks of military materiel, 2) the immediate cessation of all hostilities to
include political propaganda and terrorism, 3) the immediate release of all hostages and
prisoners of war, 4) the transfer of French and Japanese deserters, and 5) complete
272
freedom of movement for French forces throughout Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina.
273Valluy's harsh conditions made Viet Minh acceptance nearly impossible. Bollaert's
adviser Paul Mus presented the terms to the Viet Minh leadership and was promptly
rebuffed.274
As Valluy concluded his pacification campaign in Cochinchina and prepared to
launch the autumn offensive in Tonkin, Bollaert made a second and bolder attempt to
271 "Instructions pour Monsieur le Haut-Commissaire de France en Indochine, 27 mars 1947," in Bodinier,
Indochine 1947, pp. 237.
272 Ibid., Gras, pp. 173.
273 Ibid., Gras, pp. 173; ibid, Dalloz, pp. 85.
274 Ibid., Gras, pp. 173; ibid, Dalloz, pp. 85.
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open negotiations with the Viet Minh. Bollaert proposed to announce a unilateral
ceasefire whose duration would depend on reciprocal concessions by the Viet Minh. This
plan, no matter what its specific substance, was a direct threat to Valluy's plan for a
decisive strike in Tonkin. Valluy flew to Paris to register his strong opposition to
Bollaert's plan and lobby in favor of his Tonkin operations. 275 Valluy argued that the
Viet Minh were reeling and must not be offered a premature respite. According to
Valluy, it would be far better to postpone peace negotiations until after the conclusion of
the planned autumn offensives than to risk forfeiting the gains of the recent French
military actions. The Ramadier government, confronted with the strong objections of the
senior French military commander, recalled Bollaert to Paris. The compromise solution
that emerged proposed negotiations with the deposed Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai to set
up an independent, non-Communist Vietnamese government. This shift effectively
ended Bollaert's bid to open negotiations with the Viet Minh and guaranteed the
execution of Operations Lea and Ceinture.
Whether Bollaert or Valluy had the stronger case on negotiations in 1947 remains
an open question. What is relatively clear is that senior military commanders were
hostile to any return to negotiation; they were both capable and willing to block moves by
the High Commissioner and even the Paris government to pursue such options. Whether
by poison pill as in the case of the May proposals or by direct opposition as in the case of
Bollaert's unilateral cease-fire proposal, Valluy managed to stymie moves by senior
political authorities to pursue political projects that jeopardized military plans.
Though direct confrontation of the kind seen between Bollaert and Valluy was
relatively rare, it became relatively common for High Commissioners and French military
275 Ibid., Gras, pp. 184.
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commanders to be at odds over fundamental questions of military strategy. Whether it
was a question of the appropriate regional priority of effort or the advisability of
escalation, most conflicts ended with military prerogatives intact. Very seldom did senior
civilians manage to block or reverse decisions made by senior military commanders.
Unable or unwilling to confront the Indochina military command directly, French
governments expressed their anxiety about Indochina by dispatching prominent general
officers on formal inspection tours of the theater. Starting with the Leclerc report of 1947
and followed by General Revers' report in 1949 and General Juin's report in October
1951, French governments used this tactic to garner expert opinion, maintain political
cover, and refine strategy and policy.276 In practice, this approach was ineffective. Local
military leaders tended to implement recommendations that fit their strategies and ignore
those that conflicted. While civilian policy makers may have improved their
understanding of the Indochina, the indirect approach to civilian control did nothing to
impose heterodox solutions on the local command.
The Revers report illustrates both the promise and the profound limitations of the
formal inspection tour approach. Sent in May 1949 to evaluate French military and
political progress in Indochina, General Revers and his inspection team spent a month
interviewing countless French and Vietnamese notables, civilian as well as military.
Revers' conclusions, laid out in a 190 page formal report to the government, were
damning. Contradicting the local command's upbeat interpretation of the war, Revers
argued that French control in Tonkin was extremely limited:
276 Fr6d6ric Turpin, "Cao Bang, automne 1950: autopsie d'un d6sastre," Revue historique des armies, No.
220 (September 2000), pp. 26-28.
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We do not control any province in which the pacification could be considered to be going
well. We hold Hanoi-Haiphong solidly, and more poorly the road and the rail line emanating
from these two centers. We have absolutely no hold on the [Red River] delta.277
Revers went on to catalogue a series of profound French weaknesses in Tonkin. The
dispersion of troops across countless outposts278 and border forts left the command open
to attack by both the Viet Minh and the largely unknown Chinese Communist forces to
the north.279  The French Expeditionary Corps was ill prepared to deal with the problem.
Manpower shortfalls and worn out military equipment left many French units unfit for
sustained combat with major enemy forces. 280 Even when French commanders could
locate the enemy and mount substantial offensive operations, the results were more
illusory than real:
From time to time an operation is mounted, we capture some [enemy] materidl, which
enables us to say that the war potential of the enemy has been reduced.281
Revers blunt appraisal of the military situation drew into question the core assumption
underpinning French conventional strategy in Indochina: the notion that small military
victories contributed to cumulative progress, and that French investments from December
1946 through the summer of 1949 had indeed produced meaningful results on the
campaign level.
Revers' critique of the broader military and political policy was no less trenchant.
Breaking with both the French government and the local military command, Revers
argued that the Bao Dai solution was effectively bankrupt. While the French had
promised to transfer meaningful authority to the government of the Associated States, the
277 General Revers as cited in D. Domergue-Cloarec, "La mission et le rapport Revers," Guerres Mondiales
et conflits contemporains, No. 148 (octobre 1987), pp. 104.
278 D. Domergue-Cloarec, "La mission et le rapport Revers," Guerres Mondiales et conflits contemporains,
No. 148 (octobre 1987), pp. 107.
279 Ibid., D. Domergue-Cloarec, pp. 105.
280 Ibid., D. Domergue-Cloarec, pp. 107.
281 General Revers as cited in D. Domergue-Cloarec, pp. 105.
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new government was weak, corrupt, under-resourced and incapable of administering the
territories. In practice, French authorities had imposed a direct colonial administration
even more onerous and less inclusive than the one in place in the prewar era.282 The
notion that the ersatz government of Bao Dai could provide an appealing alternative for
Vietnamese nationalists was . The weakness of the Bao Dai regime had practical
consequences in the context of a French strategy predicated on burden sharing. Though
the French command had argued that the new Vietnamese army might assume an
increasing share of the wartime missions in Indochina, Revers was deeply skeptical. He
argued that the new forces lacked the cohesion and training to confront their Viet Minh
opponents and that most missions were simply beyond their capability.283
Revers used these observations as a basis for a series of specific recommendations
on future French strategy and policy. On an operational level, he argued that the French
should pull back from their exposed positions along the northern border with China and
establish a defense in depth in the Red River delta.284 On the policy front, Revers
recommended a complete overhaul of the French system of command. In order to avoid
future deadlock between the High Commissioner and the G6ndsuper, 285 Revers proposed
the appointment of a Generalissimo capable of forging a coherent French strategy.286 On
the political level, Revers argued that France had to move rapidly from de facto colonial
rule to real Vietnamese self-rule:
282 Ibid., D. Domergue-Cloarec, pp. 105.
283 Ibid., D. Domergue-Cloarec, pp. 108-109.
284 Ibid., D. Domergue-Cloarec, pp. 109.
285 The paralytic standoff between the then High Commissioner Pignon and the G6ndsuper Blaizot had
been one of the primary motives behind the Revers' mission.
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What we must avoid is the impression that we want to slow down or avoid the creation of
this [Bao Dai] administration and that we simply want to retain for the benefit of France a
direct [colonial] administration that would contradict the terms of our accords. 287
Reactions to this sweeping indictment of French policy and strategy were telling.
Military leaders were unanimous in embracing Revers' call for additional materiel and
manpower. Similarly, Revers' proposal that a senior military be placed in charge of all
civil and military affairs was warmly received. This recommendation, whatever its
intrinsic validity, was deeply ironoic; a mission designed in part to address the
breakdown of civil-military cooperation, and endorsed by senior civilian leaders, ended
with a further official dilution of civil authority in Indochina. Military opinion was split
on the operational question of a pull back from the Chinese border. While the French
General Staff in Paris and some senior commanders in Indochina embraced the logic of a
withdrawal to the delta, General Alessandri and others effectively blocked this
recommendation by citing the lack of immediate pressure and the potential for loss of
face. More disturbing still, the political aspects of Revers' critique were essentially
ignored. Neither the civilian government nor the senior military command in Indochina
addressed the intrinsic flaws of the Bao Dai arrangement. Rather than transferring real
authority to the Vietnamese government, French leaders continued with the fiction that de
jure local sovereignty and rapid expansion of the Vietnamese army were the building
blocks of a long term solution to the rebellion in Indochina. The selective adoption of the
recommendations of Revers was representative of the de facto dominance of military
leadership in Indochina and their ability to resist pressure from civilian and even
metropolitan military leaders.
287 General Revers as cited in D. Domergue-Cloarec, pp. 109.
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The image that emerges from this period is one of clear military dominance over
decision making on strategy in Indochina. Civilian leaders in Paris pursued a policy of
minimal engagement; they dictated the level of forces dispatched into the theater and
responded to requests for reinforcements by dispatching some fraction of the number
requested. Indirect efforts to influence policy through the use of official inspection tours,
most notably in the Revers report of 1949, generally failed. Military leaders accepted the
proposals that were consonant with their view of the problem and ignored proposals that
were not. They seldom attempted and never succeeded in imposing major changes in
strategy over the objections of senior military commanders.
Operational Experimentation and Innovation (1946-1950)
Between 1947 and 1950, the French developed a number of novel and effective
operational concepts. With the exception of the ongoing refinement of the outpost
system of pacification, these innovations were focused on offensive operations in pursuit
of the enemy main force units or in support of offensive pacification sweeps. The
innovations and refinements of this period produced major advances in French
operational and tactical mobility across a number of different types of terrain.
The paratroopers of the French expeditionary corps became both the primary
offensive striking force and the defensive fire brigades of the war effort from 1948 on. In
the absence of any enemy air threat, airborne operations enabled the French to insert elite,
light infantry formations into even the most forbidding terrain on short notice. 288 The
French airborne force in Indochina was tiny in the opening phase of the war. From a base
288 Howard R. Simpson, The Paratroopers of the French Foreign Legion, From Vietnam to Bosnia
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1997), pp. 9.
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of several hundred troops in 1946, the airborne force grew to 5,700 by 1950 and 10,600
in 1951.289 The rapid expansion reflected the growing French reliance on airborne
operations to offset the numerical inferiority and limited mobility of French forces in the
field.
The second major innovation was the development of large scale amphibious
formations. French units engaged in pacification sweeps in Cochinchina in 1948
recognized the utility of amphibious vehicles in the rice paddies and swamps of the south.
By 1949, the French had created two squadrons composed of a mix of unarmored jeep
sized vehicles (29C Crabs) and larger armored amphibious tractors (LVT4 alligators). 290
By the war's end, the units had grown into amphibian equivalent of combat commands,
integrating reconnaissance elements, lightly armored personnel carriers carrying infantry
and machine guns, and light artillery.29 1 These amphibian units proved enormously
useful in pursuing Viet Minh units in terrain crisscrossed with flooded fields and small
rivers. Whether used as independent battalions or in conjunction with airborne units, the
amphibian units greatly increased French mobility in the deltas of Tonkin and
Cochinchina. 292
The successful use of amphibious landing craft in the reconquest of Cochinchina
in 1945 led the French navy to develop large riverine units built around an assortment of
troop carrying landing craft and heavy weapons carrying monitors. 293 These naval
assault divisions, the Dinassauts, were used to move troops and heavy weapons along the
289 Ibid., Tourret, pp. 185.
290 General de corps d'armde Alain Bizard, "Adaptation de l'arm6e blind6e a la guerre d'Indochine" in
L'Armie franqaise dans la guerre d'Indochine, pp. 257-258.
291 Colonel (Ret.) V. J. Croizat (tr.), A Translation from the French Lessons of the War in Indochina,
Volume 2 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, May 1967), RM-5271-PR, pp. 266-267.
292 Ibid., pp. 267.
293 Ibid., Fall, pp. 44.
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extensive river networks of northern and southern Vietnam. First deployed in 1947, they
grew considerably in complexity over the course of the war. Most Dinassauts included a
mix of locally armored landing craft filling a range of roles from assault landing, fire
support, command and control to minesweeping. 294 Over the course of the war, the
French developed a number of armor and armament modifications to better suit the
evolving Viet Minh threat and the peculiarities of riverine warfare. The standard
Dinassaut formations could be task organized to suit the particular mission. Dinassauts
proved extremely useful two basic missions: the rapid insertion and support of infantry
forces and more general logistical support. The U.S. military would later model their
own riverine forces in the Second Indochina War on the Dinassaut formations developed
by the French and later transferred to the Vietnamese navy.
The airborne forces, amphibious, and riverine units all represented new tools
developed to enhance the operational mobility of French military forces. Even more
impressive than these specific tools were the French advances in the combined and joint
employment of the range of military assets at their disposal. Whether in conventional
operations such as Lea or Ceinture, or in large scale pacification operations, the French
managed to integrate the efforts of multiple arms in difficult terrain. In large
encirclement operations, the French often knitted together multiple maneuver forces -
infantry, armored units, amphibious and riverine units - and multiple forms of fire
support - artillery, air support and naval gunfire. Their growing facility in these
combined arms actions helped them maintain important qualitative advantages in direct
engagements with the Viet Minh into 1953 and 1954.
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In order to secure the gains of their pacification sweeps, the French developed a
dense network of outposts and watchtowers. As noted earlier, these posts were supposed
to serve as the focal points of the French occupation of reclaimed territories. The posts
began as simple and largely unfortified structures but grew in complexity and cost as the
siege weaponry available to the Viet Minh grew. 295
In short, the first four years of the war saw considerable innovation on the
operational level. Faced with the task of pacification and large unit combat across a
number of different types of terrain, the French developed a host of operational
innovations aimed at improving the mobility and combat effectiveness of their forces.
These innovations would provide the French with important tactical advantages for much
of the Indochina war.
The problem was that marginal improvements and even genuine innovations at
the operational level tended to divert attention from strategy. So long as the refinement
of conventional combat routines, or dispatch of additional troops, were considered valid
and promising responses to the Viet Minh threat, there was no need to address the weak
connection between battlefield victories and political outcomes. Exploitation was too
often a substitute for sound strategy.
295 For a detailed treatment of the evolution of French posts and field fortifications, see Croizat, pp. 116-
142.
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Phase 3: Conventional Defeat and Conventional Resurrection: The Viet Minh
Offensives of 1950 and de Lattre's Riposte
In October 1950, the French suffered a stunning defeat at the hands of a new Viet
Minh army trained, supplied and advised by the Chinese Communists. The destruction
of the French forces at Cao Bang, the loss of 6,000 troops and the string of French border
forts along the Chinese frontier, left the French Expeditionary Corps in total disarray at
the close of 1950. This clear defeat did not provoke a move beyond conventional
response. Instead, the new French commander, General de Lattre, sought to restore the
French position by conventional reorganization and an expansion of manpower and
materiel. De Lattre's charismatic leadership, and the premature Viet Minh decision to
launch a series of ground attacks on French positions in the Red River Delta in 1951,
produced three major French victories and seemed to validate a revitalized Model 1
solution. The events of 1950 and 1951, conventional defeat, conventional response, and
conventional validation, demonstrate the fundamental indeterminacy of defeat. The
disaster at Cao Bang may have unhinged the French command, but it did not prompt
extensive strategic search. The conventional response and conventional victories of 1951
pushed any meaningful search for alternative strategy further into the future.
The Chinese Revolution and the Closing Window of Opportunity (1948-1950)
From 1947 through the fall of 1950, the French command continued to wrestle
with the problems of large unit war and pacification. General Valluy's two phase
offensive of 1947 was repeated in various forms as subsequent French commanders
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sought to end the Viet Minh insurgency either through direct attack on the Viet Minh
government and regular units in Tonkin or the gradual clearance and consolidation of the
densely populated areas of the Red River and Mekong deltas. 296 These operations
invariably produced the same mixed results; the French won almost every tactical
engagement but were unable to translate their obvious advantages in conventional battle
into decisive and durable outcomes on the campaign level. Pacification sweeps, whether
in Cochinchina, Annam or Tonkin, were frustratingly slow but generally forced Viet
Minh forces out of the area for a time. Holding these gains proved far more difficult. As
Jean-Pierre Dannaud, a contemporary observer noted, French control was often largely
illusory:
During the day, of course, we saw nothing, we moved around as we wished in the towns, on
the roads. We carried out operations in the rice paddies, operations of the road rally genre,
with artillery, amphibious vehicles, close air support, the paras who turned up one after
another at the appointed hour, to smash the crust [of enemy resistance]. We concluded that
with a number of mobile groups we could still move from Lang Son to Ca Mau if we were so
inclined. But if our senior leaders had spent one hour of the night in the field with some
partisans, they would have understood that, even during the day without doubt, we did not
hold the country, we held the outposts. And these outposts held the country as securely as
thumbtacks attach a map to a table. 297
On the second front, that of conventional battle, results were promising but
equally ephemeral. As General Yves Gras has noted, the French continued to chase the
elusive final battle that would deliver the collapse of the rebellion and peace on French
terms:
The French command had never completely abandoned its initial idea of eliminating the Viet
Minh by a direct engagement against its principal stronghold in Tonkin. From time to time,
it launched raids of varying depth in the oft thwarted hope of destroying the Viet Minh forces
or at the very least their infrastructure. But they always determined that they lacked the few
thousand men necessary to deliver the decisive blow. 298
296 For a discussion of this basic strategic impasse see Gras, pp. 243-248.
297 Dannaud in Tourret, pp. 177-178.
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For a command firmly wedded to the conventional military strategy, local successes and
campaign stalemate invariably elicited earnest calls for additional reinforcements in the
assumption that escalation could crush the revolt.
Starting in 1949, the advance of the Chinese Communist armies towards the
borders of Tonkin introduced a new and unwelcome dimension to the French problem in
Indochina. These armies might provide indirect or direct support to the Viet Minh forces
that had hitherto lacked substantial external sponsors. The window for a clear resolution
to the conflict appeared to be closing. The dispatch of additional French reinforcements
in 1949 and 1950 in response to the pessimistic appraisal of General Revers prompted a
last push to secure Tonkin in advance of the Chinese arrival. Though the senior
commander in 1949 and 1950, General Carpentier, was cautious about the prospects for
rapid French victory, the commander of ground forces in Tonkin, General Alessandri,
pushed for a final pacification of the Red River delta.299 In a series of operationally
successful operations, Alessandri employed some 40 French battalions to drive the Viet
Minh forces out of most of the Red River delta, an area they had dominated for the first
four years of the war. Alessandri's successes promised for the first time in the war to cut
the Viet Minh off from their principal source of food and deliver the French control over
the bulk of the northern Vietnamese population. 300
French progress in Tonkin was to prove fleeting. The arrival of Chinese forces on
the borders of Tonkin dramatically changed the terms of the conflict. While some French
commanders had entertained the notion that they might cooperate with the new Chinese
government, it soon became clear that the Chinese were prepared to extend massive aid
299 Ibid., Turpin, pp. 28-29.
300 Ibid., Gras, pp. 294-298.
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to the Viet Minh regime. In 1950, as the French worked to wrest control of the Red River
delta from the Viet Minh, the Chinese transferred some 4,000 tons of aid to the insurgents
including over 1,000 tons of military supplies.301 Whatever advantage the French had
gained by cutting the Viet Minh off from their traditional sources of Chinese weapons
and Red River rice was more than offset by the large scale assistance of the Chinese
Communist regime.302 In addition to this material aid, the Chinese set up training camps
inside that churned out 20,000 trained infantry between May and September 1949.303
These trainees were to form the basis of four new and fully equipped Viet Minh divisions
that would soon be committed to the war in Tonkin.304
Chinese aid was not limited to material assistance or training. From 1950 through
the end of the Indochina War, Chinese military advisers were involved to varying degrees
in the planning of most major Viet Minh offensives.305 Chen Geng, the senior Chinese
advisor, developed the first of these offensives in an effort to break the French hold on
the border region and establish secure supply routes into Tonkin. Chen personally drew
up the plan and reportedly delivered it to Vietnamese general Giap for execution.30 6
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Chen's plan was to attack the French border outposts at Dong Khe and Cao Bang.
Vietnamese success against the isolated position at Dong Khe 30 8 set in motion a series of
French withdrawals that would soon prove disastrous. When French units were
ambushed as they withdrew from Cao Bang, and the Viet Minh forces destroyed both the
retreating forces and the columns sent to relieve them. The collapse at Cao Bang was the
first clear, French defeat of the war. As panic spread within the French command, the
decision was made to abandon the hitherto unthreatened post of Langson. 30 9 A military
situation that had appeared stable and even encouraging before the Viet Minh offensive
now looked nearly catastrophic.
The surge of Chinese aid and the shock of defeat in the border regions did elicit a
strong response from the French. That response, however, was almost entirely
conventional and military in nature. The first clear French defeats of the war did not
307 This map is drawn from Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 27.
308 Ibid., Zhai, pp. 29-30.
309 Ibid., Gras, pp. 349-354.
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provoke a search for alternatives to the two well worn strategies of the French high
command: traditional pacification and conventional strike. Instead, rising American
military aid and the growing power of the Chinese trained Viet Minh divisions were to
divert French energies away from the problem of population control and towards
conventional battle. Though the Expeditionary Corps was to undergo a "resurrection" 310
under the charismatic leadership of General de Lattre, the response to Cao Bang, and the
string of conventional victories in 1951 would reinforce rather than weaken French
attachment to the notion of decisive battle.
De Lattre, Escalation and Conventional Response
In the wake of various high level inspections by senior civilians and generals, 311
the government persuaded General de Lattre, one of the three top commanders of the
Free French forces in WWII, to assume command of the war in Indochina. De Lattre
accepted on the condition that he be appointed High Commissioner as well as senior
military commander. This fusion of civil and military authority was to offer one of the
few opportunities for genuine strategic unity of command in the Indochina War.
The effect of de Lattre's arrival was striking. Four hours after arriving in Hanoi,
Leclerc addressed a group of French and Vietnamese soldiers, making clear his authority
and his belief in the cause of Indochina:
Our struggle here is selfless - it is civilization in its entirety that we defend in Tonkin. We do
not fight for domination but for liberation. Never has a war been so noble. I bring you the
war but also pride in this war....The era of wavering is past. I guarantee you, military and
civilian, French and Vietnamese, that you will be commanded.312
310 Ibid., Gras, pp. 367.
311 Ibid., Turpin, pp. 29.
312 General de Lattre as quoted in Gras, pp. 368.
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His optimism and determination rallied a French command that had yet to recover
from the shock of Cao Bang. He set about sacking officers he considered incapable and
replacing them with proven combat leaders. In order to bolster the war effort, he sought
to breathe life into the moribund French sponsored government of Bao Dai.
De Lattre's military policy was a comprehensive plan to overcome the problem of
inadequate manpower and materiel. On the manpower front, de Lattre pushed for
reinforcements, both French and Indochinese. He managed to extract some 15,000 troops
from French North Africa under the condition that they would be withdrawn from
Indochina no later than July 1952. 313 The more important pillar of the manpower
expansion was Vietnamese. While previous French Commissioners and military
commanders had sponsored the development of a Vietnamese army, de Lattre made rapid
expansion of the army the centerpiece of his long term strategy. When de Lattre arrived
in 1950, the Vietnamese army consisted of a dozen infantry battalions. By the end of
1952, under severe pressure from de Lattre, the Vietnamese had managed to field one
airborne battalion, 40 infantry battalions, three reconnaissance squadrons, two batteries of
artillery and six riverine squadrons. This rapid expansion of the Vietnamese regular army
understates the significance of Indochinese manpower to the war effort. De Lattre also
accelerated the "jaunissement" of French units to cover shortfalls in French personnel,
and directed the airborne forces to develop native commandos to foster resistance in Viet
Minh controlled areas. 3 14
313 Note that the shell game undoubtedly contributed to growing unrest in North Africa (Source: Gras, pp.
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De Lattre's answer to the problem of materiel was Americanization. With the
outbreak of the Korean War, de Lattre managed to play on American fears of Communist
expansion in Asia to extract vast increases in military aid. American aid came in two
varieties: equipment transfers and financial assistance. U.S. transfers of modern military
equipment enabled de Lattre to refit a French Expeditionary Corps that had run much of
its WWII stock into the ground. Likewise, these transfers in kind furnished the rapidly
expanding Vietnamese National Army with the means to achieve operational status.
From 1950 through 1953, American aid to the French and to the nominally independent
military forces of the Associated States, tripled moving from 40 billion francs to more
than 119 billion francs in 1953. The U.S. also provided substantial sums of financial
support to the French and the Associated States. Such aid climbed from an initial level of
some $330 million in 1952 to over $810 million in 1954. Taken together, U.S. military
and financial aid had climbed to 71% of the total annual cost of the Indochina War by
1954.315
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With French reinforcements, expanded American military assistance, and a
Vietnamese army prepared to shoulder the duty of pacification, de Lattre was confident
that he could hold the line in Tonkin and consolidate French gains in the south.
On the level of strategy, de Lattre focused his energies on the defense of the Red
River delta against Viet Minh and possibly Chinese Communist assault. Cao Bang 
and
the arrival of the new Chinese trained Viet Minh divisions had forced a shift from
conventional attack on Viet Minh stronghold to a conventional defense of the delta.
To bolster French defenses in the delta, he introduced two operational
innovations: a line of fortifications and the development of mobile groups. The
fortifications, collectively known as the de Lattre line, were essentially as series 
of 920
316 The data for this graph are drawn from Hugues Tertrais, La piastre et lefusil, pp. 605.
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blockhouses built from 1951 on to form a ring around the delta.317 The line served two
functions. First, it could blunt Viet Minh main force thrusts into the delta. Second, it
could serve as a barrier against the ever present threat of guerilla infiltration of the delta.
The mobile groups were essentially an adaptation of the Combat Command structure of
American Second World War doctrine to the specifics requirements of Indochina. 31 8
These motorized units, composed of three infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, and
assorted supporting arms, were to become the building blocks of French conventional
force in the delta from 1951 to 1954.319
Conventional Success and Delayed Search: The Victories of 1951
De Lattre's reforms were put the test in three Viet Minh conventional attacks
launched over the first six months of 1951. Giap's forces tried first at Vinh Yen (13-17
January 1951), 320 then at Mao Khe (23 March 51), and finally at the Day River (29 May-
18 June 51) to break into the Red River delta and defeat the French Expeditionary corps
in the field. These battles, fought close to French bases and on terrain that enabled the
French to apply their advantages in firepower, ended in major Viet Minh losses. On a
conventional balance sheet, these victories were one sided. While the Viet Minh lost
20,000 men in this six month push to break the French hold on the delta, the French
forces sustained a total of roughly 1,500 dead and wounded. 321 Not only had the French
held the perimeter of the delta, they had broken three concerted pushes by the best
317 Ibid., Croizat, pp. 86; Anthony Clayton, Three Marshals of France: Leadership after Trauma (London:
Brassey's, 1992), pp. 151.
318 Ibid., Croizat, pp. 206.
319 Ibid., Croizat, pp. 212.
320 Alexander Zervoudakis, "Vinh Yen," Revue historique des armies, No. 194 (mars 1994), pp. 61.
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equipped and trained Viet Minh forces. Beneath the surface, the level of French control
in the delta was less encouraging. As part of their assault on Ninh Binh, the Viet Minh
had managed to slip six regular battalions into the delta.322 These forces ultimately
forced the French to launch a new series of large unit sweeps to re-pacify the area.
M- 323
The three victories of 1951 restored French confidence in their own military
superiority. The surge in American material assistance from 1951 on enabled the
command to refit the Expeditionary Corps that had hitherto depended on increasingly
dilapidated WWII equipment. Together, charismatic leadership, conventional victory and
massive military assistance encouraged the French state and military to believe that
322 Ibid., Gras, pp. 409.323 This map is drawn from Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 138.
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victory in Indochina was still achievable. De Lattre appeared to have salvaged the
collapsing French campaign and shown that even Chinese supported Viet Minh armies
could be defeated under the right conditions.
Ironically, de Lattre was, by the end of his tenure, less confident that his successes
were indeed significant and cumulative. The three French victories in the delta had
proven that the Expeditionary Corps could win conventional battles against numerically
superior forces. The Viet Minh had nonetheless proven enormously resilient. In spite of
the loss of enormous numbers of trained troops in their six month push, the Viet Minh
were able to rebound in time to inflict severe losses on the French later in 1951 and
1952.324 Furthermore, the Viet Minh had managed to seize and retain the strategic
initiative from Cao Bang onward. It was they and not the French who had dictated the
place and time of battle in 1951 and de Lattre was unsettled by the essentially reactive
state of French strategy. Mixed results on the pacification front, and the growing strength
of the Viet Minh regular armies, led de Lattre to voice private doubts about the long term
prognosis in Indochina. As he put it in a September 1951 report to the government in
Paris, "There may be a catastrophe in Indo-China; there is little chance of a miracle." 325
These doubts notwithstanding, de Lattre's final major decision in Indochina was
to mount a conventional offensive outside the Red River delta at Hoa Binh. On a purely
military level, the capture of Hoa Binh might accomplish two objectives. First, it might
cut off the Viet Minh forces in Tonkin from their supporters in Annam and
Cochinchina. 326 Second, it might force Giap to fight yet another conventional battle on
324 Ibid., Gras, pp. 404.
325 De Lattre as cited in Dalloz, pp. 148.
326 Ibid., Salan, Le Viet-minh mon adversaire, pp. 262.
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French terms.327 De Lattre was also under heavy personal and political pressure to
resume the offensive. As his deputy relates, he was stung by French and American
accusations of excessive delay and caution:
They understand nothing in Paris! They consider me static and lacking in offensive spirit.
They have no idea that I need several more weeks to finish the fortifications and build a
Vietnamese Army as large as that of Giap. They want me to attack, that I finish it! To them,
I am dragging my feet and this conflict will never end. Very well, I am going to
attack....Attack, attack! I am going to Hoa Binh and I will cut the Viet Minh in
two....Believe me, it must be done! Up to now, we have never taken the initiative, we have
been content to put out the fires the Viet Minh have set. I will throw down the gauntlet and I
will see if Giap accepts my challenge. 328
A victory brought on by French offensive action promised to silence criticism and furnish
positive proof to the Americans of the soundness of their growing investment in the war.
Faced with a growing enemy and mounting criticism of French strategy, de Lattre
proposed a classic conventional military operation. The benefits of his plan made sense
in a conventional conflict: "cutting the enemy in two," bringing him to battle on
favorable terms, and regaining the initiative all proceeded from the assumption that the
contest was being waged on the battlefield. The risks of the Hoa Binh operation fell
outside the bounds of that conventional contest. By committing the French mobile
reserves to a battle outside the Red River Delta, the command left itself open to increased
subversion and backsliding on the pacification front.
In spite of the reservations of many on his staff,329 de Lattre launched the Hoa
Binh operation in November 1951. As in 1947, the initial results of the conventional
push were encouraging; the French managed to seize their objective with no real
opposition and proceeded to build a fortified salient connecting Hoa Binh to the Red
327 Ibid., Salan, Le Viet-minh mon adversaire, pp. 263.
328 De Lattre as quoted in Salan, Le Viet-minh mon adversaire ,pp. 262-263.
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River delta. 330 De Lattre's gamble upset Giap's plans for offensive action in the
upcoming campaign season leading him to commit the bulk of the Viet Minh striking
force to an assault on the French positions at Hoa Binh.33' By January, however, Viet
Minh pressure on French supply lines had become severe. In order to maintain a force of
five infantry battalions at Hoa Binh, the French had to commit a further twelve battalions
and three artillery groups to hold the salient connecting Hoa Binh to the Red River
delta.332 While the Viet Minh assaults were as costly as those of the earlier offensives of
1951, they cost the French dearly. The French lost close to a thousand dead between
November and February 1952, and the defense of Hoa Binh tied down almost the entire
operational reserve of the Expeditionary Corps. 333
Phase 4: Conventional Defense and Experimentation (1952-1953)
General Salan's sixteen month tenure as Gendsuper saw major innovations and
the first real hints of a strategic shift from Model 1 to Model 2. On the conventional
front, Salan's approach was more defensive and was focused to an unprecedented extent
on pacification. Mounting Viet Minh conventional strength and the curious combination
of abundant American materiel and limited manpower, led Salan to experiment a novel
way of bringing the enemy to battle of French terms - the fortified camp supplied entirely
by air. On the unconventional front, Salan sponsored experiments in psychological
operations, resettlement, and counter-guerilla warfare. While these efforts never entirely
330 Ibid., Fall, pp. 48; ibid., Gras, pp. 430.
331 Ibid., Gras, pp. 430.
332 Ibid., Fall, pp. 59.
333 Ibid., Gras, pp. 451, 454.
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superseded the overall emphasis on the conventional dimensions of the war, they were
the clear precursors of political war (Model 2) in Algeria.
With de Lattre's death from cancer in December 1951, General Salan, his
principal deputy, assumed command of the French forces in Indochina. Salan was in
many ways an ideal successor. A longtime veteran of the colonial army in Indochina,
Salan was intimately familiar with the culture and politics of the region. His personal
familiarity with local leaders, to include Ho Chi Minh and Giap, made him a particularly
astute operator on the political level. As the architect of Valluy's 1947 offensives in
Tonkin, he was familiar with the potential and the limitations of conventional battle
against the Viet Minh. Under his stewardship, the French Expeditionary Corps would
continue to chase the perennial goals of decisive battle and pacification. But to a larger
measure than in previous periods, Salan encouraged the exploration of unconventional
methods and increased emphasis on the role of mass politics in the struggle.
Salan's willingness to sponsor Model 2 reflected both his personal experience
with the limits of conventional response against the Viet Minh and his greater sensitivity
to the political dynamics of the war in Indochina.
Salan's first major decision was to evacuate Hoa Binh in favor of renewed
pacification in the Red River Delta.334 In late February 1952, Salan managed to extract
French forces from the salient and redeploy them in a series of what he hoped would be a
final set of pacification sweeps of the delta. French entanglement at Hoa Binh had
enabled the Viet Minh to slip two full divisions into the area,3 35 and Salan's local
commanders mounted a series of large scale sweeps to flush out and destroy these regular
334 Ibid., Salan, Le Viet-minh mon adversaire, pp. 287; Ibid., Dalloz, pp. 147.
335 Ibid., Gras, pp. 451; Ibid., Fall, pp. 61.
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units. These operations showcased ongoing French refinements of large scale cordon and
search operations. Generals de Linares and Cogny conducted a series of operations from
February 1952 through late spring, each involving combined arms formations of up to
fifteen and twenty battalions. The trick, as in all previous episodes of pacification, was to
surround the guerilla units and apply overwhelming French advantages in firepower.
Each commander experimented with his own approaches to these problems. In the
southern portion of the delta, General de Linares used large units to encircle large areas
and press inwards. While he managed to push one of the Viet Minh divisions out of his
area of operations, the results fell short of the anticipated battle of annihilation. General
Cogny, by contrast, used smaller units to pin point the location of the enemy before
encircling him. His operations around Bac Ninh managed to trap a number of large
enemy units and inflict heavy losses on them.
As a result of de Linares and Cogny's battles in the spring of 1952, the French
had managed to drive the two Viet Minh divisions out of the delta and inflict severe
casualties. 336 The elimination of main force units set the stage for the second and third
phases of pacification: detailed search of the cleared areas and the restoration of local
government administration. The process of combing through each village was extremely
time and labor intensive. By Salan's own estimate, the "combing" of cleared areas could
be reduced to a depressingly simple formula: one battalion, one village, half a day.337
Even this process fell short of the necessary goal - the restoration of clear and durable
local administration. To accomplish this task, and move beyond the limits of 19 th century
methods of Gallieni and Lyautey, Salan introduced new civil-military formations called
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GAMOs. These "Mobile Operational and Administrative Groups" were composed of
150 Vietnamese administrators and their security details. Each group was to root out the
Viet Minh political apparatus in a cleared area and replace it with a new local
government. Though the employment of these groups represented a major step forward
in French thinking on pacification, they failed to live up to expectations. While Salan
and other commentators insisted that diversion of resources and limited time were the
chief obstacles to broader success with the GAMO approach, 338 it is unclear whether the
simple substitution of new Vietnamese government personnel would have permanently
rolled back Viet Minh domination of the region.
Conventional Threat and Conventional Response: Na San and Operation Lorraine
(1952)
Salan's focus on pacification was upset in the fall of 1952 by a new round of Viet
Minh offensives in the western highlands of Tonkin. Giap unleashed an attack by three
Viet Minh divisions on the thinly populated region between the Red River and the
Laotian border to the west. The French could not resist the offensive in a region they had
long held with a skeletal force and a network of tribal militias. Giap's attack on the
highlands forced Salan to make an unenviable choice: accept battle far from French bases
or surrender large portions of western Tonkin and Laos.339
Salan first move was to establish a center of resistance at Na San. Na San was an
innovative twist on earlier French attempts to wage conventional battle with the Viet
Minh and one that took advantage of the growing availability of American materiel.
338 Ibid., Salan, Le Viet-minh mon adversaire, pp. 307-8; ibid., Gras, pp. 461.
339 Ibid., Gras, pp. 473.
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Salan decided to build a fortified camp, complete with infantry and artillery units, and
built around an airstrip, in order to force Giap into yet another set piece engagement. If
Giap refused to attack the base directly, Salan planned to use it as a base for offensive
operations against the anticipated Viet Minh into Laos. Within a matter of days, Salan
had pushed eight infantry battalions and four artillery batteries into the position and had
begun to airlift in bulldozers, tons of barbed wire and the other materials necessary to
construct a small fortress. 340 The airlift was enormous by contemporary French
standards. Between October 16 and the first Viet Minh assaults on November 30, the
French managed to push 1,473 cargo sorties into Na San. According to Salan, a C-47
aircraft landed every ten minutes for the full six usable hours of each flying day. 341 By
November 30, the French had managed to build two concentric rings of fortified
positions. The outer ring was composed of independent, company sized strong points.
Inside this ring, the French built a second ring of field fortifications and wire to protect
the mobile reserves, artillery positions and the airfield. The French force of twelve
infantry battalions and six artillery batteries prepared to meet an assault by a large portion
of the Viet Minh regular army.
340 Ibid., Salan, Le Viet-minh mon adversaire, pp. 349.
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Giap could not resist the opportunity to strike the exposed French position at Na
San. Between November 30 and December 2, 1952, the Viet Minh threw 19 battalions
against the defenses of Na San. Though the Viet Minh managed to break into the outer
defensive works, the French used their artillery, heavy mortars, and mobile reserves to
drive them back. This tactical success against a numerically superior and fanatical
opponent appeared to validate a new approach to the problem of decisive battle. The
flood of American materiel made such a capital intensive answer enormously appealing.
342 These maps are drawn from Martin Window, The Last Valley, pp. 10.
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In the absence of any air threat, the French might be able to thwart Viet Minh advances
by building isolated, fortified camps along the Na San model and supply them entirely by
air.
To relieve Viet Minh pressure in the highlands, Salan also launched a large scale
attack on the Viet Minh supply depots and lines of supply in northern Tonkin. Salan
hoped that this move, Operation Lorraine, would force Giap to divert forces from the
offensive to defend his links to his Chinese sponsors. Salan committed some 30,000
troops to this ambitious raid: four mobile groups, three airborne battalions, two infantry
battalions, two Dinassauts, and substantial artillery and armored cavalry support. The
French push from their bases in the delta towards the ultimate objective at Phu Doan
mirrored earlier large scale French conventional raids. The technical execution of the
operation was impressive; French units managed to drive some 75 kilometers,
overcoming numerous natural obstacles and Viet Minh attacks. Superlative execution did
not, however, produce the desired results. Though the Viet Minh did divert one regiment
to meet the French thrust, this reaction fell well short of Salan's expectations. French
units did capture or destroy large supply depots, but these accomplishments were out of
proportion to the effort expended.343
The shock of the Viet Minh offensives in western Tonkin triggered major changes
on the level of operational routines. The David and Goliath outcome at Na San led some
in the French to believe that this was a generalizable solution to the French dilemma of
limited manpower and abundant materiel. On the other hand, the loss of the highlands
343 Ibid., Salan, Le ViUt-minh mon adversaire, pp. 341; Ibid., Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 159; ibid.,
Gras, pp. 482.
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prompted Salan to devote greater resources to unconventional solutions to the problems
of population control.
Model 2 Experiments: Politics as war by other means
Though junior officers had engaged in local experimentation from the early days
of the war, it was not until 1952 that three initiatives in unconventional approaches to
pacification received major support. All three projects shared certain common features
typical. All saw the control of the population as the true object of the struggle, and all
emphasized the importance of psychological and political means in securing that object.
Inspired by Viet Minh successes in French junior officers sought to develop innovative
approaches of their own to the problem of population control. All three approaches were
based on a view of the local population as centrally important but effectively malleable.
While the impact of the experiments on the course of the war would be relatively modest,
the interpretation and misinterpretation of their results was to fuel the development of the
Model 2 approach to counterinsurgency in the subsequent Algerian War.
The Maquis
In the wake of the 1952 offensives, Salan supported a major expansion in a
French support for anti-Viet Minh guerilla groups or maquis in Tonkin. While these
guerilla forces, formally known as the GCMA (Groupement de Commandos Mixtes
Adroportis) and later the GMI (Groupement Mixte d'Intervention), were formally
established under de Lattre, 344 the collapse of French control in western Tonkin made
them an increasingly attractive alternative to direct French control of large swathes of
344 Ibid., David, Guerre secrete, pp. 65-73; ibid., Pottier, pp. 128.
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highland territory. 34 5 The maquis concept began as a straightforward application of
partisan warfare to weaken a numerically superior Viet Minh opponent. 346 Over time,
however, many of the leading proponents of the GCMA, among them their last
operational commander, Colonel Roger Trinquier, came to see the groups as an effective
and generalizable way to apply and improve upon Viet Minh methods of population
control.
Highland resistance against the Viet Minh had been present from the beginning of
the Viet Minh rebellion. Many of the tribal groups were resentful and suspicious of the
Viet Minh's aggressive push into the highland areas. Their traditional dislike of lowland
intrusion made them eager to accept take up arms against the Viet Minh. French support
began with the transfer of arms to existing tribal groups, but soon expanded into more
active efforts to recruit, train, indoctrinate and lead native maquis.
The French approach was based on the use of small numbers of French and native
cadre to foster and support hill tribe resistance groups. A small team or "antenna" of four
French and native officers and NCOs, equipped with radios, would be introduced into an
area to make contact with hill tribes and organize resistance. In theory, groups of 1,000
native guerillas and 3,000-5,000 native supporters would enable the maquis to control a
large swathe of territory and hold off all but the most determined Viet Minh efforts to
345 Resistance to American encroachment may also have played an important role in de Lattre's
endorsement of the GCMA concept. CIA offers to run similar groups in Tonkin led the French to develop
their own (Source: David, pp. 65).
346 General Carpentier, the G6ndsuper during the Cao Bang disaster, proposed the development of
resistance groups in Tonkin to help stabilize his position in the aftermath of the collapse of frontier outposts
along RC 4. Carpentier had a relatively limited ands strictly military interpretation of their utility; he hoped
that these groups could disrupt the Viet Minh lines of supply and communication by mounting small scale
guerilla attacks (Source: David, Guerre Secrte, pp. 46-47).
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root them out.347 By 1953, the French had managed to build a force of over 14,000
348guerillas.
What had begun as a conventional use of partisans to disrupt Viet Minh
operations in Tonkin soon grew into a more ambitious program to cultivate resistance and
establish French control over the native populations. The French used a three step
approach consciously modeled on the Viet Minh methods of political struggle or dau
tranh.349 French teams first identified local grievances, the raw material from which
anti-Viet Minh resistance might be built. The cadre next tried to stimulate increasing
levels of resistance behavior. By convincing the locals to assist first in reconnaissance
and later in military action against the Viet Minh, the French hoped to bind native
populations ever closer to their cause. Once the native populations were inextricably
linked to the French cause, the French could build an organization capable of controlling
the population. 350
While the GCMA/GMI concept was an explicit attempt to blend political and
military action, the motivating political vision had a foot firmly in the military
operational code. Though they emphasized the importance of identifying local
grievances, French organizers tended to treat the population as essentially passive and
malleable. From the French point of view, the population might be the ultimate prize in
revolutionary warfare, but it was not an independent actor. French observers tended to
attribute Viet Minh or French success in population control to the actions of external
347 Roger Trinquier, Les Maquis d'Indochine (Paris: Socidt6 de Production Litt6raire, 1976), pp. 95.
348 Ibid., Pottier, pp. 125.
349 For an extensive discussion of Vietnamese theories of the relationship between political mobilization
and armed struggle, see Douglas Pike, PA VN: People's Army of Vietnam (Novato, CA: Presidio Press,
1986), pp. 17-35.
350 The three step conversion process is drawn from a January 1952 memorandum written by Roger
Trinquier (Source: David, Guerre Secrite, pp. 118-119).
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organizers rather than the endogenous preferences of the local population. The maquis
concept was the embodiment of the Model 2 version of politics: a struggle to control a
largely inert population through the use of positive and negative incentives.
While the contribution to the war effort was relatively modest,351 the impact of the
GCMA/GMI experiments on French concepts of counterinsurgency was more profound.
The architects of the maquis held them up as examples of effective mass mobilization and
counter-subversion in revolutionary war. Just as the Viet Minh had succeeded in
organizing large swathes of the Vietnamese population to support their cause and resist
French pacification, the pioneers of the maquis program appeared to have sponsored and
shaped a resistance movement on a substantial scale. While the scale of French
supported resistance in western Tonkin was impressive, the question was how much of
this was the product of French conversion as opposed to existing anti-Viet Minh
sentiment. Even within Indochina, it is telling that successful maquis almost always
relied on ethnic or religious minority groups. Since the ethnic minorities constituted no
more than 10% of the Vietnamese population, 352 and were concentrated in the western
and northern highlands of Tonkin, it is hard to see how even a fully developed maquis
program could have helped overcome the pacification problem in the Red River delta.
351 The net contributions of the maquis are open to debate. Proponents have emphasized the role of the
maquis in diverting Viet Minh troops and enabling the difficult withdrawal from Na San in 1953. Skeptics
have noted that these efforts did little to slow the progress of the Viet Minh and could never have expanded
beyond the confines of the hill tribe population. For a sample of this debate, see the conference reactions to
Michel David's presentation on the maquis in Vaisse, L'Armiefrangaise dans la guerre d'Indochine, pp.
167-169.
352 Though estimates of the population of the highlands were notoriously unreliable, a recent estimate based
on a 1947 study by French military intelligence put the total minority population in Tonkin at 915,000.
Using an estimated Tonkinese population in 1947 of 8.7 million, this makes the ethnic minorities equal to
10% of the northern population (Source: Michel David, Guerre Secrte, pp. 28.).
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Population Resettlement in Cambodia
Between 1945 and 1952, the French command had developed few viable
alternatives to their three stage approach to pacification. Offensive operations, followed
by thorough search and detention, were supposed to make the reintroduction of French or
Associated States' control, in the form of administrators and fortified strongpoints, both
feasible and lasting. In practice, French played the role of Sisyphus in the pacification
struggle. No sooner had they cleared an area at great expense, than the Viet Minh local
cadre and guerillas, often with the help of infiltrated regular units, began to undermine
the local government and reassert Communist control. An area that had been cleared in
one year often had to be pacified yet again in the following season.
The French pacification campaign in Cambodia in 1952 marked an important
departure from this core French model. 353 Viet Minh subversion in western Cambodia in
1951 had undermined French and Cambodian control over a large portion of the rural
population. The French had applied the standard responses of outpost construction and
local militia development between 1950 and 1951 to no avail. In 1952, the local
command decided instead to resettle large portions of the Cambodian population in
fortified villages. Resettlement offered an entirely new way to protect the population and
separate them from the insurgents.
The results of the Cambodian campaign were encouraging. By resettling some
500,000 Cambodian peasants in 1952, 354 the French managed to roll back the Viet Minh
advances and provide an unprecedented level of security to the local population. The
353 The most complete account of the Cambodian resettlement program was written by Capitaine Andrd
Souyris, "Un proc6de efficace de contre-guerilla: l'auto-defense des populations," Revue Defense Nationale
(juin 1956).
354 Souyris puts the total number closer to one million or roughly two thirds of the rural Cambodian
population (ibid., Souyris, pp. 686).
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concentration of the population made military protection and local self-defense more
effective. In theory, resettlement also gave the government the opportunity to pursue
positive social development. Through programs of education, economic assistance and
the like, the government planned to drive economic progress and cement popular support.
The Cambodian campaign appeared to offer an alternative to serial pacification.
As in the case of the maquis in Tonkin, however, the French tended to attribute success to
the validity of their new models. Ignoring many of the particular circumstances that
made local populations accept French protection in these areas, they tended to assume
that the models were exportable. In truth, Cambodia was different in ways that favored
resettlement. Lower population density in eastern Cambodia made resettlement less
disruptive in economic and social terms; resettled populations could be guaranteed
equivalent land for cultivation in the new villages. Cambodian culture, with its more
flexible and less hierarchical structure, was less resistant to these changes than the more
rigid Vietnamese one. Most important, the Viet Minh were foreigners in Cambodia.
Though ethnic Vietnamese had long played an important role in social and economic life
in Cambodia, they were socially and ethnically foreign. 355 The Cambodian experiment
was yet another example of the French tendency to overstate the generalizability of
pacification solutions. Instead of focusing on the unique set of circumstances that had
made the Cambodian population receptive to resettlement, the French came to believe
that the experiment demonstrated the potential of Viet Minh style population control.
355 These observations on high Cambodian receptivity to resettlement are drawn from George Armstrong
Kelly, Lost Soldiers (pp. 101).
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Psychological Action: From public affairs to psychological warfare
Though the French military had engaged in small scale psychological operations
in Indochina from 1945 on, the scale, focus and form of these operations changed
significantly starting in 1952. Whereas early French operations had been focused on
bolstering French morale and countering Viet Minh claims, and had relied on relatively
blunt, mass appeals, the psychological warfare projects of the late war were conscious
attempts to replicate Viet Minh successes in population control. Growing recognition of
the sophistication and apparent efficacy of Viet Minh methods led middle level French
officers to explore similar approaches to pacification. In spite of the increased interest in
and refined focus of French psychological operations from 1952 on, their impact on the
course of the Indochina war was quite limited. The primary significance of these
initiatives lay in their influence on French thinking in the Algerian war. The appeal of a
new tool to control restive populations was immense, and the early practitioners of
psychological action in Indochina were to be the prophets of much broader and more
ambitious efforts in Algeria.
Early French efforts were largely confined to loosely targeted, mass appeals.
From 1945 through 1951, the French did use fliers and media addresses to communicate
basic appeals to several audiences: the Vietnamese population, the French Union forces,
and the French home front. Though poorly coordinated and thinly resourced, these
appeals were intended to bolster confidence in the French and later Associated States'
authorities and counter the appeal of the Viet Minh. This concept of psychological
operations reached its zenith under de Lattre. In his appeals to a range of audiences -
Indochinese, American and French - de Lattre sought to use ideological appeals and
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public recognition of battlefield victories to increase moral and material support for the
war effort. Though de Lattre was keenly aware of the potential importance of media
relations, his vision of the psychological dimensions remained at the level of strategic
communications and public affairs. True to his upbringing as a conventional soldier, de
Lattre could grasp the importance of morale and the role of publicity in amplifying
battlefield successes; he did not embrace a vision of warfare in which the targeted control
of local populations was a principal object of struggle.
Problems with bureaucratic coordination and performance measurement further
inhibited the development of effective psychological warfare. Before 1952, French
initiatives in psychological operations had been split among a number of different
civilian, military and intelligence bureaus. This division led to numerous clashes over
authority and over the messages. 3 56 Only the clear unification of psychological warfare
under the Propaganda Service and the Gndsuper in 1952 brought some semblance of
unity to the psychological operations community.357 Performance measurement was a
more difficult problem. Though many were willing to grant the possibility of effective
psychological manipulation, even the most ardent supporters had difficulty supporting
their claims of effectiveness. 358 Even where the French were clearly successful in
pacification, the specific causal role played by psychological action remained unclear. In
the absence of clear measures of effectiveness, the advocates of psychological warfare
356 Paul et Marie-Catherine Villatoux, La Rpublique et son armie face au "peril surversif": Guerre et
action psychologiques (1945-1960) (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2005), pp. 254
357 Ibid., pp. 258.
358 Ibid., pp. 253-254.
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had to fall back on some mix of expert opinion, prisoner testimony and captured enemy
communications. 359
While certain French leaders recognized the utility of a more precise, targeted
approach to psychological action, it was not until 1950 that the French began to
appreciate the scale and intensity of Viet Minh political warfare. 360 The Viet Minh had
developed a sophisticated and methodical approach to population control. Subversion
typically began with a comprehensive and clandestine survey of local grievances. Once
they had developed a detailed understanding of the leading issues in the community, the
Viet Minh cadre would seek to channel these grievances into increased support for local
resistance. At the same time, the cadre set about organizing the population into various
groupings by profession, age and function. These organizations gave the Viet Minh a
powerful means of controlling and monitoring community members and subverting
traditional authorities. 36 1 With the groundwork for control in place, the Viet Minh could
extract material resources and manpower from the community.
Heightened awareness of Viet Minh methods, and their failure to consolidate
pacification gains in the Red River and Mekong deltas, led a growing number of French
officers to model their approaches to population control on those of the enemy. French
initiatives in the highlands, in Cambodian resettlement programs, and in the sect
controlled regions of Cochinchina appeared to yield impressive results and validate a Viet
Minh style campaign to control the local population.
That these initiatives never became the main French effort is doubly significant.
The local successes in areas where native populations were hostile towards the Viet Minh
359 Ibid., pp. 254.
36bid., pp. 218.
361 Ibid., pp. 270.
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led the French to overstate the generalizability of their new methods. Second, the
relatively late and uneven introduction of these techniques suggested that greater
resources and greater refinement of such techniques might hold the key to controlling
subject populations in future cases of revolutionary war. Only in Algeria would the
French be able to test these classic Model 2 approaches to population control.
American Critiques of French Performance in Indochina
With their growing sponsorship of the war, Americans began to develop strong
views on French counter-insurgent performance. These views are important to this study
for two reasons. First, the American military's evaluation of French performance is a
natural experiment in the influence of the military operational code. If, as supporters of
cultural explanations often argue, historical experience and national tradition determine
organizational responses to counterinsurgency, then we should expect to see significant
variation in the responses of officers of different military traditions. If, on the other hand,
the shared professional lens is the primary source of learning dysfunction, then we should
expect to see similar interpretations from officers regardless of country of origin. These
outside opinions also control for the influence of bureaucratic drivers of military
response. While the French military, especially the General Staff in Paris, had to weigh
changes in Indochina against the needs of NATO rearmament, American military officers
were free of such bureaucratic pressures.
American views on French performance also played an increasingly direct role in
French strategy as the war progressed. As American contributions increased, military
leaders sought to influence the conduct of the war and even the selection of senior French
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military leaders. American military advisors were to play a significant role in shaping the
last major French war plan in Indochina - the so-called Navarre Plan of 1953-1954.
From the start of major military assistance in 1950 through the end of the war in
1954, the basic American critique of French strategy was remarkably stable. To most
American officers, military stalemate was an overly defensive approach to
counterinsurgency. By committing the majority of their troops to static, defensive
missions, the French had failed to mount large and aggressive operations against their
numerically and qualitatively inferior Viet Minh opponents. General Erskine, the Marine
general in charge of the first military advisory mission to Indochina, argued that " the
French appeared to have 'lost most of their offensive spirit."'362 After the French defeat
at Cao Bang, General Douglas MacArthur echoed this frustration with the apparent
French failure to act:
The French have 150,000 of their best troops there with an officer of the highest reputation in
command [General Carpentier]....I cannot understand why they do not clean it up. They
should be able to do so in four months yet we have recently seen a debacle....They have the
flower of the French army in Indochina and they are not fighting.363
To most American officers, it was clear that the French inability to crush an apparently
weak guerilla opponent could only be the product of inaction or incompetence.
On the political front, Americans argued that the French needed to grant true
independence to the Vietnamese in order to transform the conflict from a colonial war of
liberation into an anti-communist crusade. The Americans, drawing on their recent
experience in Korea and the Philippines, believed that such a move would enable the
French to raise a Vietnamese national army equal in quality and quantity to that of the
Viet Minh.
362 Ibid., Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 114.
363 Ibid., Spector, pp. 126.
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Mounting American frustration with French political and military performance
led then President Eisenhower to apply pressure for a change in command and in
strategy. In a May 1953 letter to the U.S. Ambassador to France, Eisenhower called on
the French Prime Minister to replace General Salan with "a 'forceful and inspirational
leader' in the tradition of de Lattre. Eisenhower recommended either Lt. Gen. Jean E.
Valluy, who had long experience in Indochina and was the officer responsible for the
bloody bombardment of Haiphong in 1946, or General Augustine Guillaume, who had
commanded French occupation troops in Germany and was then inspector of French
forces in North Africa." 364 Eisenhower's unusual request betrayed a firm belief in basic
American critique. French forces evidently suffered from a lack of energetic leadership
and a de Lattre type figure could restore the situation, presumably through aggressive
efforts to engage the enemy main body. While the French had already chosen to replace
Salan with General Navarre, American pressure and advice reflected a firm belief in the
conventional origins of stalemate and the potential for a second conventional
resurrection.
Phase 5: Navarre and the Return to Conventional Battle (1953-1954)
The appointment of General Navarre as overall commander marked the last major
turning point in French strategy in Indochina and a clear return to conventional response
(Model 1). This return reflected at least three major influences: the increasing flow of
American materiel, mounting U.S. pressure for offensive action against the Viet Minh
main body, and the reliably conventional appreciation of the problem by a new
commander and his inexperienced staff. Though Navarre did not stamp out the
364 Ibid., Spector, pp. 172-173.
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unconventional developments sponsored by Salan, and even provided support to certain
specific initiatives, his tenure was to be dominated by a return to a modified and
expanded version of Valluy's conventional plans of 1947. Like Valluy, Navarre sought
to pacify significant regions of the country to set the stage for a decisive battle with the
Viet Minh forces in Tonkin.
Navarre's appointment was a demonstration of profound French and American
dissatisfaction with his predecessor Salan. Local successes such as Na San
notwithstanding, French control in Indochina had declined substantially in the year
following de Lattre's exit. The Viet Minh had seized control of the western highlands
and had overcome repeated efforts to consolidate control in the Red River Delta. French
political leaders wanted a rapid and decisive conclusion to a conflict that continued to sap
French political will and military resources. American military leaders were convinced
that Salan had been excessively cautious, and this had cost the French the initiative. 365
Both groups believed that a return to the offensive held the best chance of success.
Navarre, who lacked any pervious experience in Indochina, opened his tenure
with a comprehensive survey of conditions. In the absence of any detailed political
guidance, he set as his goal a complete military victory or a severe weakening of the
enemy to make possible negotiation on French terms. 366 While on paper he commanded
the largest military force in the history of the conflict, he swiftly recognized that
widespread popular support for the Viet Minh effectively negated his slim numerical
advantage. With fully 90% of French forces tied down in defensive missions, the French
365 Major General Thomas J.H. Trapnall, "Remarks made by Major General Thomas J.H. Trapnall, Jr.,
former Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina, 3 May 1954," in The
Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of Decisionmaking on Vietnam.: The Senator Gravel
Edition, Vol. 1 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), Document 41, pp. 495.
366 Ibid., Gras, pp. 512.
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had a mere 23,000 troops in the general reserve to confront a Viet Minh regular force of
nearly 125,000.367
Having concluded that the French forces lacked the means to achieve a victory in
the very near term, Navarre produced a plan deeply reminiscent of Valluy's of 1947.
Drawing on the advice of his largely inexperienced staff368 and American advisers,
Navarre produced a Model 1 strategy. In the 1953-54 campaign season, the French
would avoid decisive battle and focus instead on developing the capacity of the
Vietnamese national army. In 1954-55, the French would launch a pacification campaign
in the south. Only once the south was firmly in hand, and pacification and area control
missions were turned over to the expanded Vietnamese national army, would the French
Expeditionary Corps turn its energies to Tonkin. Freed from its pacification duties and
assembled en masse, the Expeditionary Corps would seek out and defeat the Viet Minh
main body in northern Tonkin in 1955.369
The Navarre Plan, as it was called, received a mixed reaction in the American
camp. General O'Daniel, the new chief of the American military mission in Indochina,
had pressured Navarre to return to the offense at the earliest opportunity. In his
subsequent reporting to Washington, O'Daniel, who had played an important personal
role in shaping the final document, praised Navarre for his "aggressiveness" and his
willingness to part with the defensive posture of Salan. 37 Those American observers
who expressed reservations about the "Navarre concept" generally cited the lingering
367 This figure excludes the Vietminh regional forces (75,000) and the local Popular Front forces (125,000)
(Source: Gras, pp. 514-515).368 Salan's departure in 1953 was followed by an exodus of senior staff officers with experience in
Indochina. As a result, Navarre began his tour, as his political superiors and American advisers had hoped,
with a perspective entirely unfettered by practical experience in the theater.
369 Ibid., Gras, pp. 512-513.
370 Ibid., Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 175.
232
influence of defensive thinking. The JCS objected to the precedence given to early
pacification in the south and inadequate concentration of the Expeditionary Corps into
large striking units.37 1 The JCS insisted that the French undertake local offensive
operations from 1953 on and accelerate the development of division scale Vietnamese
army units.372 As if to underline their insistence on a return to open battle and the
conditionality of U.S. military assistance, the text of the Franco-American aid
communique of 1953 clearly stated that "the French government had decided to attack
and to destroy the regular forces of the enemy in Indochina." 373
Navarre's plan did not survive contact with the Vietminh. His campaign to pacify
the south soon foundered as the French again failed to translate conventional military
advantages into complete or lasting control. 374 Operation Camargue, launched in July
1953, was the third French attempt in two years to crush a single Viet Minh regiment
along the Colonial Route 1 between Hue and Quang Tri, the so-called "Street without
Joy." 375 The operation, which pitted 30 French battalions against this single regiment,
revealed the profound limitations of even the best orchestrated offensive pacification
encirclements. The French infantry, armor, and airborne units, lavishly supported with
naval gunfire and close air support, proved unable to overcome the limitations imposed
by terrain and a hostile population. Instead of destroying Regiment 95 and re-
establishing permanent French control in that region of Annam, the French produced the
usual mixed results: 182 enemy dead, 387 captured at the cost of 17 French dead and 100
371 Laurent Cesari, "Les tentatives am6ricaines pour implanter le 'modle cor6en' en Indochine" in Vaisse,
L'Armde frangaise dans la guerre d'Indochine, pp. 95.
372 Ibid., Cesari, pp. 95-96; ibid., Trapnall, pp. 492, 494-495.
373 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume XIII (Indochina), Part 1, pp. 810-812.
374 For a more complete account of Operation Atlante, the pacification campaign in the south, see Michel
Grintchenko, "Atlante-Arethuse:" une operation de pacification en Indochine (Paris: Economica, 2001).
375 Ibid., Gras, pp. 517; ibid., Fall, pp. 144.
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wounded. 376 French attempts to replace Viet Minh local leadership were even less
encouraging. The bulk of the regiment had managed to elude the best French efforts to
seal off their escape. As Bernard Fall noted in his account of the operation, the
replacement administrators faced an almost impossible dilemma. If they asserted their
authority, they risked elimination by local supporters or the remnants of the
unvanquished Viet Minh forces. If they relied on local French troops for protection, they
lost all authority in the eyes of the locals. As one officer noted, these problems meant
they would undoubtedly need to return again in "three months" to re-pacify the area. 377
The French fared little better in Tonkin. Though Navarre garnered positive
attention for a successful airborne and armored raid on Langson in late July 1953, Viet
Minh preparations in western Tonkin soon revealed the degree to which they and not the
French held the strategic initiative. In order to block Viet Minh offensive action against
Laos, Navarre approved the creation of a new fortified camp, a "super-Na San" at Dien
Bien Phu. This move, brought on by the threat of Viet Minh pressure on Laos, would
soon absorb over 12 French battalions and the majority of French air support and air
transport in Indochina. The attempt to repeat Salan's feat at Na San soon proved to be
disastrous. Not only had the French chosen a location much farther from the airfields of
Hanoi and one surrounded by dominating terrain, the Viet Minh had obtained the heavy
artillery and anti-aircraft artillery that they had lacked at Na San. These differences
doomed the French to a one-sided siege in which the Viet Minh were to bring both
overwhelming numerical superiority and abundant firepower to bear on the isolated
garrison. Though the war would drag on until August 11, 1954, the fall of Dien Bien Phu
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376 Ibid., Fall, pp. 171.
377 Ibid., Fall, pp. 170.
on May 11, 1954, and with it the loss of the bulk of the general reserve effectively sealed
the French fate in Indochina. 378
Indochina and the Theory
The French case validates many of the theory's most important predictions. With
the exception of Leclerc's early Model 3 strategy, French behavior closely matched the
dominant intrawar pattern: Model 1 response, followed by Model 1 exploitation, and
ending in Model 2 experimentation. French strategic choice had clear roots in the
military operational code. The record of d'Argenlieu, Valluy, and de Lattre's diagnoses
and prescriptions leave little doubt that all succumbed to the illusion of familiarity. Like
most French (and American) military officers in Indochina, they believed that the end of
the rebellion would come through decisive, offensive operations against the Vietminh
army. The Model 1 learning trap, too, was omnipresent. Small victories, combined with
the assumption that gains were cumulative and permanent, led French military leaders to
assume that exploitation could translate tactical success into campaign victory. In the last
two phases of the war, Model 2 experiments revealed the Model 2 learning trap. Unable
to measure local opinion, the French focused on their own measures of performance and
were repeatedly surprised by the relapses that occurred whenever military forces were
removed.
Task performance, civilian participation, and resources all played significant roles
in the evolution of French strategy. Stalemate and even trend failure failed to provoke
strategic search between 1946 and 1950. When episodic failure at Cao Band in 1950
opened the door for search, the incoming commander opted for Model 1 exploitation
378 Ibid., Gras, pp. 578.
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rather than exploration. Episodic failure was sufficient to provoke search but the
operational code and rising resources played the leading roles in the result.
High civilian participation helped Leclerc overcome the illusion of familiarity and
resist the temptations of Model 1. Reports and advice from civilian emissaries played an
important role in shaping Leclerc's decision to forgo direct confrontation in favor of
mixed negotiation and fighting. The rapid decline in civilian participation in late 1946
and 1947 reinforced the Model 1 equilibrium. Perennial weakness in the French
metropolitan governments of this period meant that counterinsurgency strategy and
policy were determined locally. This set up an unequal contest between the French
military command and the modest civilian presence.
Resources played several important roles. Resource scarcity in 1945 imposed
binding constraints on military choice and played a major role in Leclerc's choice of
Model 3. The removal of those constraints led to strategic regression; once the military
had the tools to pursue Model 1, they gladly traded Model 3 condominium for set piece
battle. The bureaucratic influence of civilians was a function of the resources provided.
The military was the beneficiary of most of these flows, and this amplified their influence
over strategy. What the French military received also mattered. American military aid
came in the form of military capital equipment. Not surprisingly, these factor
endowments influenced the strategies chosen. Flows of conventional materiel reinforced
the French military's attachment to Model 1.
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Chapter 4
The Interwar Pause: French Military Change from Indochina to Algeria (May-
November 1954)
Armies emerging from counterinsurgency campaigns face two primary
challenges. First, they must interpret their own performance and explain their own
successes or failures. Second, they must decide how to respond as an organization.
Should the military continue the development of counterinsurgency strategy and routines,
or shift resources and attention elsewhere? If militaries were unbiased problem solvers,
then the two tasks, the first intellectual and the second bureaucratic, would be logically
connected. Given some reasonable expectation of future counterinsurgency problems,
the military would seek at the very least to retain and perhaps build upon the insights
gleaned from recent experience. The theory presented in Chapter 2 offers an alternative
prediction - that military organizations will respond to the removal of task pressure by
discarding strategies and routines that are specific to counterinsurgency and shift their
emphasis to the preferred mission set of conventional war. This purge is motivated by
two forces: the retrospective misinterpretation of wartime experience and the conscious
effort to move away from a set of counterinsurgency strategies that undermines the
organization's core bureaucratic interests in autonomy, resources and prestige.
The French military's behavior in the interwar period is consistent with the theory
and inconsistent with the image of the organization as a simple and unbiased problem
solver. The end of the war did prompt an extensive formal and informal debate over the
causes of defeat and their implications for future war. The struggle to explain failure in
Indochina exposed major divisions between those who saw primarily conventional
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military causes and those who emphasized the strategic flaws of the French response to
counterinsurgency. The bureaucratic reaction to defeat in Indochina was far less
equivocal. In spite of clear indications of nascent rebellion in Tunisia, Morocco and
Algeria, the French army took the end of the war in Indochina as an opportunity to return
to the task of conventional modernization and European defense. The lively intellectual
debate over the lessons of Indochina did not lead to major investments in doctrine,
procurement or organization commensurate with a continuing interest in revolutionary
war.
This particular interwar period is distinctive in at least two respects that bear on
the theoretical predictions of the study. First, it was remarkably brief. Whether one takes
the narrowest definition, from the conclusion of the Geneva conference on July 20, 1954
to the first shots of the rebellion in Algeria on November 1, 1954, or a broader period
from fall of Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954 to the start of major pacification operations in
the last week of 1954, the French army had very little time to explain defeat and react as
an institution. The short break between the nine year war in Indochina and the eight year
one in Algeria provides an important test of the theories interwar retention. The three
enemies of organizational memory are time, turnover and indifference. By all three
measures, the transition from Indochina to Algeria should have been an easy test. The
organization had almost no time to "forget" about Indochina and it stands to reason that
the lessons of Indochina should have survived a six month intermission largely
unchanged. Indeed, the French general staff did not complete its three volume, official
lessons learned study on Indochina until May 31, 1955. Personnel turnover does not
seem to be the culprit either. Many of the veterans of Indochina were sent from there to
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Algeria in the months before the outbreak of the rebellion. With Algeria and the presence
of this large number of long-service, Indochina professionals should have made the
transmission of wartime insights relatively easy. And the officer corps that left Indochina
was highly motivated to redress the embarrassment of defeat at the hands of the Viet
Minh.
Equally significant was the general warnings of serious unrest across North
Africa. As the French army weighed its bureaucratic response to the end of the war in
Indochina, it was already deeply engaged in uprisings in Tunisia and Morocco. Within
Algeria proper, increases in attacks on French forces and settlers, combined with a steady
stream of intelligence reports on the growth of clandestine opposition groups, left little
doubt that the army might be called upon to conduct yet another counterinsurgency
campaign in the very near term.
Given the brevity of the interwar period and the reasonable expectation of
rebellion in North Africa, the French army's turn from counterinsurgency to conventional
rearmament in Europe demonstrates the powerful roles played by professional beliefs and
bureaucratic interests in shaping institutional response. While an intellectual debate over
Indochina raged in formal and informal forums, the French not only shifted its weight of
effort from the threats to its overseas possessions to Europe, but did very little to apply
relevant lessons to counterinsurgency in Indochina to the incipient rebellions in North
Africa. Though less than a year separated the fall of Dien Bien Phu from the outbreak of
rebellion in Algeria, and the organization went through an intellectual soul searching over
that defeat, the French army of 1954 appeared to revert to pre-Indochina models of
organization in its early response to colonial policing and counterinsurgency in Algeria.
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Explaining Defeat: Model 1 vs. Model 2
Between the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the clear emergence of the Algerian
rebellion in 1955, the French military establishment made a deliberate attempt to evaluate
its performance in Indochina and extract meaningful lessons for future revolutionary
wars. The ensuing debate over the origins of defeat revealed major divisions of opinion
within the officer corps. Senior officers and those who had not served in Indochina
generally favored a Model 1 interpretation, while younger officers and Indochina
veterans were more likely to espouse a Model 2 explanation of French failure. The
overdetermination of the defeat in Indochina and the brevity of the interwar pause left
these debates largely unresolved on the eve of the Algerian revolt.37 9
Contemporary critics of the French war in Indochina agreed on a number of
points. Most pointed to a combination of flawed political policy and inadequate national
support for the war effort. They were split, however, both on the role of French military
strategy in explaining the defeat. For the adherents of Model 1, Indochina was a simple
case of conventional defeat. The solution to conventional defeat appeared equally
straightforward: greater political purpose, greater resolve, more resources, and a more
refined conventional strategy could deliver victory in colonial war. For the younger
officers who had been involved in the failed pacification campaigns and the late war
experiments with population control, the conventional strategy was itself the problem.
Only by identifying the population as the center of gravity, and by developing
379 Peter Paret has noted the inherent ambiguity of the Indochina experience and the formidable gap
between explanation and prescription: "The defeat did rouse the army, or, more correctly, groups within it,
to the recognition that against a politically sophisticated enemy fighting on his native ground, conventional
methods of colonial repression were insufficient .... What the defeat did not indicate was exactly how future
conflicts should be fought." (Source: Peter Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to
Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine (Dunmow: Pall Mall Press, 1962), pp. 100).
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revolutionary approaches to population control, could the French hope to best their
Communist opponents.
At the outbreak of the Algerian war, the clash between these camps remained
unresolved. The problem was that the French defeat in Indochina was fundamentally
overdetermined. Almost all of the charges leveled at French strategy and policy were
valid and any one of them or any combination could plausibly have explained the
collapse. With a number of competing explanations available, and no clear way to
distinguish between consequential and inconsequential causes, it was difficult for
professionals and outside observers to settle the argument let alone prescribe alternatives.
In the face of evidentiary ambiguity, both camps tended to revert to their cognitive and
bureaucratic priors. The overdetermination of failure in Indochina made Algeria the
logical testing ground for these two competing approaches to counterinsurgency.
Model 1: Conventional Diagnosis and Conventional Prescription
All adherents of Model 1 tended to look to the military balance for explanations
of French defeat. Most stressed the problems of inadequate resources, excessive
dispersion of forces, and weak political leadership. The Chinese role in fueling the
rebellion from 1950 on only amplified these problems. Politics mattered only insofar as
it influenced the provision of manpower and materiel or impinged on the military
commander's freedom to control operations. While Model I adherents agreed on these
basic themes, their interpretations were far from monolithic. At one end of the spectrum
were those who sought to reduce the dilemmas of Indochina to a simple problem of
military operational planning. At the other end were those who saw greater resources,
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particularly manpower, and operational refinements as the keys to the larger policy of
suppressing colonial rebellion. Nearly all such commentators, including the majority of
the French high command and most American military observers, downplayed or
oversimplified the role of mass politics in the outcome of the war.
The dispute within the Model 1 camp was played out in the pages of the official
French military journal, the Revue de Difense Nationale. In December 1955, Admiral
Castex, a leading French military theorist, proposed an alternative solution to the French
dilemma in Indochina. Castex's critique of French strategy was an extreme example of
the application of military logic to the Indochina problem. According to Castex, the real
French problem in Indochina had been a mismatch between the territory to be controlled
and the military resources available. Noting the clear shortfall in military manpower,
Castex argued that the answer lay in a massive contraction in the amount of territory
occupied by French forces. By withdrawing to a coastal enclave that included Haiphong
and perhaps Hanoi,380 and placing the 150,000 troops of the Expeditionary Corps within
a defended perimeter of 150 km, France could have held its ground against any
conceivable enemy offensive. 381 Within the perimeter, whose exact length would be
scaled to achieve a troop density equaling that of First World War French defenses on the
Western front (3,000 troops/km), 382 the French could resettle any Vietnamese who chose
to follow them, and pacify that territory without fear of enemy infiltration. According to
380 Castex cited Wellington's successful defensive stand in Spain against Massena as the model for the
Indochina enclave strategy (Source: Amiral Raoul Castex, "Les enseignements de la Guerre d'Indochine,"
Revue de Dgfense Nationale (D6cembre 1955), pp. 3).
381 Amiral Raoul Castex, "Les enseignements de la Guerre d'Indochine," Revue de Difense Nationale
(d6cembre 1955), pp. 3.382 Ibid., Castex, pp. 3.
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Castex, French strategists had failed to live within their means. The simple solution to
this dilemma was to reduce the amount of territory defended.
Castex's solution was simple, elegant and entirely apolitical. To Castex, the
problem was how to avoid defeat on the battlefield; the idea that military force was being
applied to secure an intrinsically political objective was largely absent. By removing all
political logic from the equation, Castex managed to fashion a solution that appeared to
minimize the probability of defeat only by surrendering the object of the war - French
territorial control in Indochina.
General Navarre, the Gindsuper at the time of the French defeat, argued that
Castex's solution, while internally coherent, ignored French policy and interests in
Indochina. According to Navarre, his late war strategy flowed from the two missions set
by policymakers in Paris: the retention of Indochina within the French Union and
resistance against Communist expansion in Asia.383 In order to fulfill those missions,
Navarre, like all the French military commanders before him, was compelled to defend
Indochina in its entirety. Navarre argued that Castex's proposed withdrawal option,
however seductive, was tantamount to surrender. Once the most productive and populous
territories had been abandoned, there would have been no compelling reason to maintain
French forces of any size Indochina. 384
In his memoirs, published in 1956, Navarre elaborated on his explanation of the
defeat and placed the burden squarely on the shoulders of the French political elite.
According to Navarre, the lack of a clear and flexible policy had doomed the French
383 G6n6ral Navarre, "Les donn6es de la d6fense de 1'Indochine," Revue de la Defense Nationale (mars
1956), pp. 273.
384 Ibid, Navarre, pp. 275-278.
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campaign in Indochina. 385 Over the course of the war, indifferent support, the lack of
active mobilization of the French polity, and active subversion by the left wing
governments had prevented the French military from achieving its goals. 386 Navarre's
analysis of the military lessons of the conflict remained largely within the bounds of
Model 1.
Navarre identified a number of problems with French military policy: inadequate
resources, a lack of unity of command, underestimation of the enemy, insufficient
mobilization of the manpower of the Associated States, and a force structure ill suited to
the terrain and conditions of Indochina.38 7 What was absent from Navarre's list was any
significant reference to the perennial problems of French military strategy in Indochina -
the failure of pacification or the endless search for decisive battle. His wartime strategy
and his subsequent analysis of the defeat suggest that Navarre, though he acknowledged
the importance of politics as it related to goal setting and the provision of resources,
shared Castex's basic conviction that Indochina had been an essentially military problem.
By highlighting the role of resources and the importance of improving tactical mobility,
Navarre seemed to infer that a larger and more mobile military force could have
succeeded where the undersized and immobile Expeditionary Corps had failed.
Having outlined his explanation for the defeat in Indochina, Navarre went on to
link these lessons to the emerging campaign in Algeria, then more than a year underway.
While Navarre acknowledged the surface similarities between the two conflicts, he was
optimistic about the chances for French success in Algeria. Algeria was, in Navarre's
385 General Henri Navarre, Agonie de l'Indochine (1953-1954) (Paris: Librarie Plon, 1956), pp. 316-317,
319-320.
386 Ibid., Navarre, Agonie de l'Indochine, pp. 320-321.
387 Ibid., Navarre, Agonie de 1'Indochine, pp. 317.
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opinion, a much easier test of the French state and military.388 He pointed out that
terrain, proximity and climate all made Algeria an easier theater for French military
operations. There was no external sponsor to assume the role played by China in the
Indochina war.389 What is more, the problem of population control appeared far simpler.
The existence of large settler population meant that the potential base of rebel support
was much smaller than in Indochina.390 And Navarre argued that the Muslim population
was less vulnerable to the appeals of Communist insurgents:
The native populations of North Africa are themselves, psychologically, closer to us than
those of Indochina. If Islam tends to favor fanaticism and xenophobia, it makes them less
susceptible to communist influence. If the [native] elites...that we have formed become in
part hostile [to communist influence], the masses can be retained and brought into our
camp.39 1
Implicit in his upbeat assessment was the assumption that Communist ideology
rather than anti-colonial nationalism was the motive force behind resistance movements
in Indochina and Algeria. Above all, Navarre pointed to the much greater French
national commitment to North Africa and Algeria in particular. 392 Mass being the chief
ingredient for military success in colonial war, Navarre insisted that France must meet the
challenge of the Algerian revolt through a massive escalation of means:
One thing is certain: that military action has not reached the massive character that alone
brought - while limiting our losses - rapid and decisive results. Scarcely more than in
Indochina we have not understood how to avoid the fatal onset of "rot" [colloquial reference
to the loss of control in once pacified areas]. There are numerous gaps in the equipment, the
armament, and the training of our troops that could only be overcome by a real national
mobilization. Our troop strength - whatever has been said about it in official circles - is still
too weak. In truth, troop levels have been calculated not according to the real needs
388 Ibid., Navarre, Agonie de l'Indochine, pp. 324.
389 Ibid., Navarre, Agonie de 1'Indochine, pp. 322.
390 The French in Algeria were to discover that the settlers were a double edged sword. While the French
forces could count on the loyalty of the European population, they found it difficult to control their
excesses. Vigilante actions by armed settlers frequently undermined French attempts to avoid overkill in
pacification operations. Similarly, the presence of a large settler population place major constraints on
French policy in Algeria. The political power of the settler block in metropolitan politics made them a veto
player in attempts to develop administrative reforms or forge compromise with local Muslims.
91 Ibid., Navarre, Agonie de l'Indochine, pp. 323.
392 Ibid., Navarre, Agonie de l'Indochine, pp. 323.
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expressed by the local military authorities, but instead according to what the government,
relying on highly questionable political and economic considerations, considered the
maximum number "possible." This is a method that has always produced bad results. 393
With greater resolve, expressed in greater manpower, materiel and patience, the odds of
French success in suppressing the rebellion in Algeria were far higher than in Indochina.
Navarre went on to highlight military lessons he considered applicable to the
Algerian problem. Having restated the importance of unity of command, inter-service
cooperation, and the dangers of underestimating the opponent, 394 Navarre highlighted the
importance of mobility. By jettisoning their heavy motorized equipment, the French
forces in Algeria would be better prepared to pursue and defeat a small, light and mobile
insurgent opponent. Returning to the theme of manpower, he argued that massive
numbers of troops were essential both to pursue the enemy and control the population:
The importance of numbers is another lesson of capital importance. Against an adversary
who cannot succeed in his enterprises without the support of the population, the essential
problem is the population in our camp while watching them, reassuring them, and protecting
them. Only the omnipresence of troops in constant and confidant contact with them [the
population] will enable us to obtain this result. 3 95
Navarre's statement is a clear illustration of the "show of force" hypothesis implicit in
Model 1. Under this assumption, the simple presence of large numbers of troops would
enable the military to isolate, monitor and protect a largely passive, native population.
Navarre shows little recognition that the population might sympathize with the rebels and
be capable of independent action even in the presence of overwhelming numbers of
French troops.
American military officers tended to see French performance in Indochina
through this same Model 1 lens. As they had in the earlier years of the conflict,
American officers castigated the French for a needlessly static and defensive posture in
393 Ibid., Navarre, Agonie de l'Indochine, pp. 325.
394 Ibid., Navarre, Agonie de l'Indochine, pp. 324.
395 Ibid., Navarre, Agonie de l'Indochine, pp. 324.
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Indochina. Like Navarre, these officers tended treat the political dimension as a subset of
the larger problem of military resources. Policies that made possible the expansion of the
native or French military forces were critically important as they might influence the
struggle on the battlefield. In American eyes, the primary French failing on the political
front was their failure to apply the Korean model of mobilization: the sponsorship of non-
Communist nationalists in order to boost popular support and build a large native
army.396
The notes of the formal debriefing of General Trapnall, the outgoing Chief of the
U.S. Military Advisory Group (MAAG) Indochina, on May 3, 1954397 capture the
essence of the standard American critique. 398 While Trapnall acknowledged that the
French had been engaged with a guerilla opponent in the early stages of the war, he
argued that the growing size of the Viet Minh regular forces and the scale of U.S. military
assistance had transformed the war into a conventional contest. To make progress in
Indochina, the French had to improve their conventional war fighting capabilities:
Since it is neither practicable nor completely desirable to meet the enemy on the basis of
guerilla versus guerilla, the ultimate solution will require the isolation of the Viet Minh from
his base of supply in Red China and then overwhelming him by materiel superiority.....A
significant weakness on the part of the French is their failure to project their system of field
operations and staff planning beyond their experience in Indochina. Imagination is
frequently lacking. Also evident is the fact that their limited experience in World War II has
stunted their overall development in modern warfare. This is basically the reason underlying
their poor staff work, logistics and operational plans. In addition, the French are sensitive
396 Laurent C6sari, "Les tenatives Amdricaines pour implanter le "modale corden" en Indochine" in
Maurice Vafsse, L'Armie franqaise dans la guerre d'Indochine, pp. 89-90.
397 The briefing took place roughly a week before the fall of the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu. The full
text of Trapnall's comments are included in "Remarks made by Major General Thomas J.H. Trapnall,
Junior, former Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina, 3 May 1954" in The
Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 1, Document 41, pp. 487-499.
398 There were other officers who were more optimistic about French fortunes in the spring of 1954, chief
among them Trapnall's successor, General O'Daniel. While the two Chiefs of the MAAG differed in their
expectations for French performance in 1954 and 1955, they agreed that a plan predicated on an expansion
of the Vietnamese army and a concentrated offensive against the Viet Minh armies were the path to success
in Indochina. As noted earlier in this study, O'Daniel played a major role in the drafting of the Navarre
Plan with its emphasis on major offensive action in Tonkin.
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and touchy and loath to accept advice. We frequently encounter outdated techniques dating
back to colonial campaigns and World War I.399
Having identified substandard mastery of modem conventional doctrine as the underlying
cause of French difficulties in Indochina, Trapnall went on to lament the half-hearted
execution of the Navarre Plan:
Few of these aims [of the Navarre Plan] are progressing satisfactorily. The training of the
National armies [of the Associated States] is woefully inefficient and the series of tactical
offensive operations engaged in during the 1953-54 fighting season, instead of retaking the
initiative, has lost it to the Viet Minh. After a rather encouraging beginning with the Lang
Son operation, Navarre's later operations reveal that he is following the same conservative,
defensive tactics as his predecessor, General Salan. Although [Operation] Mouette400 was
highly publicized as a successful offensive, it in fact was nothing but a reconnaissance in
force with the objective of occupying a strong position and awaiting attack by the enemy in
the hope of dealing him a crippling blow. The enemy refused to be taken in. The current
campaign season has been dominated by the Viet Minh, and the present position of the
French Union Forces is no improvement over that of last year. Dien Bien Phu is not only
another Na San but a grave tactical and strategic error. The only hope for gain from the
battle now raging is that the French can survive. The French have consistently postponed
seizure of the initiative through failure to select and pursue vital military objectives such as
the obvious enemy troop concentration depot and communications area in the foothills north
of the Tonkin delta. Viet Minh leadership, on the other hand, has capitalized on this vacated
opportunity by seizing and holding the initiative. The French battle corps, which was built
up hopefully by energetic withdrawal of implanted units, has now been dissipated into four
sizeable components....The lack of initiative which the French have is emphasized by the
day-to-day reaction of the French to enemy moves and activity as expressed in recent
requests for emergency assistance in the way of U.S. equipment and maintenance personnel.
French tactics are based primarily on defense, even though the French Union Forces
outnumber the Viet Minh forces by almost 2 to 1, have overwhelming firepower, an
unopposed air force, a balanced naval force and strategic transport capability....Viet Minh
regular battle corps troops have been avoided unless the French troops are well dug in behind
barbed wire or have astronomical odds in their favor.4 01
Trapnall, like his predecessor General Erskine,402 could not comprehend how a
professional, Western military, lavishly supplied with American equipment, could fail to
defeat an ostensibly smaller force. Their default explanation for the stalemate was a lack
of professional skill and lack of offensive spirit. These critiques overlooked the skillful
399 Ibid., Trapnall, pp. 490.
400 Operation Mouette was the French attack on Lang Son mentioned earlier by Trapnall.
401 Ibid., Trapnall, pp. 495.
402Ronald Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years of the U.S. Army in Vietnam (1941-1960) (New
York: The Free Press, 1985), pp. 112-115.
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but ultimately inconsequential French efforts from 1947 onwards to defeat the Viet Minh
in open battle in Tonkin. Trapnall's suggestion of an offensive strike on enemy
concentrations in the "foothills north of the Tonkin valley" is exactly what the French had
tried in Operations Lea and Ceinture in 1947 without success. His recommendation is
telling on two levels. First, the idea that a second Operation Lea would destroy a Viet
Minh army many times the one that had escaped destruction in 1947, conveys the
fundamental American misunderstanding of the parameters of the strategic dilemma in
late war Indochina. Second, the uncanny similarity of Trapnall's recommendation to
earlier, failed French operations demonstrates the shared, if deeply flawed, professional
interpretation of the Indochina problem.
The frequent American references to the numerical superiority of the French
Union Forces also missed the role of guerillas and local supporters in tilting the real
balance of forces in favor of the Viet Minh. Whereas the French had to employ the
majority of their force to hold terrain and maintain their lines of supply and
communication, the Viet Minh could use their regional units and broad popular support to
tie down the French occupation forces without employing their strategic reserve. The
true comparison of the regular maneuver forces available for set piece battle gave the
Viet Minh a distinct advantage of nearly 3.6:1.403
In short, the American evaluation of French performance was negative in tone and
conventional in emphasis. French strategic failure was a product of defensive strategy
403 This argument is made by Yves Gras and Ronald Spector (ibid, Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 168-
169). Both agree that American observers systematically and substantially overstated the numerical
advantages of the French Union forces. Spector estimates that each side had roughly 90 battalions
available in 1953, but the French had to devote two thirds of the force to static defense and pacification.
With only 25 battalions to face 90 Viet Minh battalions, the French stood at a distinct disadvantage even on
the conventional battlefield.
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and professional incompetence. To most American military observers, it appeared that
concerted offensive action with the manpower and materiel already on hand could have
delivered campaign success on the battlefield in 1953 and 1954.404 The French failure to
transfer real sovereignty to the Vietnamese compounded the problems of military
strategy. American observers pointed out that so long as the French insisted on direct
administration in Indochina they could not hope to mobilize the nationalist spirit and
human resources necessary to break the Viet Minh army. This basic critique would serve
as the foundation for the singularly ineffective US strategy of the middle phase of the
Second Indochina War (1964-1968).
Model 2: La Guerre Rdvolutionnaire: Strategic Failure and the Virtues of Imitation
While the French high command and most American observers clung to
conventional military explanations for defeat in Indochina, many veterans of Indochina,
particularly the younger officers, embraced a more radical interpretation of French
failure. Though few would have disputed the core complaints of more conservative
Model 1 critics - tepid political support, inadequate resources, and civilian betrayal -
these younger officers argued that the root cause of the failure was French strategy.
According to the Model 2 critics, the French high command had ignored the true object
of the contest in Indochina - the control of the local population - and dissipated the war
effort in the pursuit of decisive results on the conventional battlefield. These critics saw
in the methods of their Viet Minh opponents the basis for an effective response to this
revolutionary warfare. If subversion and organization of local populations had delivered
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404 Ibid., Spector, pp. 168.
Indochina to the Communists, then Western success might be possible if they developed
a way to organize and evangelize the local population in future conflicts.
If the Model 1 critics tended to focus on the battlefield fortunes of the
Expeditionary Corps and the Viet Minh regular army, the Model 2 critics pointed to the
failure of pacification, particularly in the Red River delta. They argued that the inability
to clear and hold territory in the most populated and productive regions of Tonkin had
made the more publicized conventional sparring of the opposing battle corps irrelevant.
So long as the French had to devote the vast majority of their forces to an interminable
series of clearance operations in the delta, the Viet Minh did not need a decisive victory
on the battlefield. For officers who had spent multiple tours in largely fruitless
pacification operations, the logic of this argument was self-evident. The center of gravity
of revolutionary war was not the enemy army; it was the native population.
Though it took at least two years for the full guerre re'volutionnaire doctrine to
emerge, the basic elements of the French intellectual reaction to revolutionary war had
coalesced within a year of the collapse at Dien Bien Phu.40 5 According to the early
exponents of guerre rdvolutionnaire, the key to victory was to control two target
populations: the population of the home front through psychological action and the native
population of the affected territory through psychological warfare and counter-
subversion.406 Effective psychological action would ensure sustained support for the
protracted conflict in the affected region. The government and particularly the military,
had to unify the country by silencing defeatists and energizing supporters. 407
405 Ibid., Villatoux, pp. 329..
406 George Armstrong Kelly, Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis (1947-1962)
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 131.
407 Ibid., Villatoux, pp. 316.
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In the affected territory, the key was to organize and evangelize the native
population. By developing a politico-military apparatus to match that of the insurgents
the French could overcome the perennial problem of pacification in Indochina - the
vulnerability of "cleared areas" to subversion and "rot." Military action would remain an
important tool in counterinsurgency, but revolutionary war would revolve around the use
of new psychological weapons modeled on those of the Viet Minh. 408 As the author of
the official review of psychological warfare in Indochina observed,
... in the psychological war pursued by the adversary, it is not enough to respond to fire with
fire (even the terrifying fire of atomic projectiles) or with propaganda alone. The Western
nations must, urgently, develop a complete organization for psychological warfare, and
prepare themselves by serious efforts in this area, in order not to be rapidly overtaken by
their adversaries. 409
Victory in revolutionary war, then, involved the application of these new weapons to a
new set of targets. The population replaced the enemy army as the center of gravity, and
effective action against that center must include the use of psychological as well as
military means. The logic of counterinsurgency as battle remained largely intact. The
incorporation of political targets and political weapons did not change the core approach
to problem solving. In revolutionary war, as in conventional battle, victory was the
product of the application of overwhelming force to an opponent in order to achieve
unilateral submission.
In short, the adherents of Model 2 sought to transpose the logic of battle onto the
unfamiliar realm of mass politics. Based on their interpretation of Viet Minh success in
Indochina, they believed that new psychological weapons would enable them to
overwhelm the populations they targeted.
408 Ibid., Paret, pp. 101.
409 Capitaine Prestat as cited in ibid., Villatoux, pp. 318.
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The Lessons of Indochina Study: Calling for Model 2, Recounting Model 1, Ignoring
Model 3
In the immediate aftermath of the Geneva conference, the French General Staff
under General Ely commissioned a comprehensive review of the campaign in
Indochina.410 This study, completed a year later and issued in three volumes, gives us a
representative snapshot of French professional opinion in the immediate postwar period.
On one level, the study is a candid and direct indictment of a French war effort rooted in
conventional military response to insurgency. It accurately details the serial failures of
French pacification and suggests that the solution to similar challenges might lie in some
Model 2 strategy focused on the population. At the same time, the bulk of the work,
measured by volume, is devoted to an exhaustive accounting of the tactical and
operational lessons of the military struggle. Where a mere six pages are devoted to the
problem of pacification, well over 30 are spent recounting the technical evolution of fixed
fortifications and outposts in Indochina. 411 The work as a whole demonstrates the tension
between a largely upbeat assessment of French performance measured in purely military
terms and the depressing realization that these innovations had failed to influence
political outcomes in any meaningful sense.
410 This section focuses on the core study commissioned by General Ely and issued in three volumes in
May 1954. Colonel Nemo, an influential commander and later contributor to the literature on revolutionary
war, led a parallel three volume study entitled Guerre en Surface au Tonkin de 1946 a 1954 (Source:
Alexander Zeroudakis, "From Indochina to Algeria: Counter-Insurgency Lessons" in Martin Alexander,
Martin Evans, J.F.V. Keiger, The Algerian War and the French Army, 1954-1962: Experiences, Images,
Testimonies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2002), pp. 43.
411 There a number of other examples of this skew in favor of operational routines. Though the French
never possessed more than 28 helicopters in Indochina, more pages (7 pages vs. 6) are devoted to their
operations in Indochina than are devoted to the problem of pacification (Source: Croizat, pp. 299).
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Decisive Battle
The study levels a rather harsh judgment on the French search for decisive battle
with the Viet Minh regular army. On a strictly technical level, the study highlights the
operational challenges of forcing decisive battle on an elusive opponent. On a more
fundamental level, the study acknowledges the secondary importance of the search for a
modem Cannae in Indochina:
Operations led us to take the offensive in Viet Minh territory, either in the form of raids, orby penetration into enemy areas in the hope of attracting and destroying its forces.
Such activities were but incidental. The real and continuous struggle took place in the
regions we wished to control, namely the two deltas and certain portions of the central coast
where there was a high population density and the most fertile lands. The "war withoutfront" that was fought during eight years had as its basic goal the support of a population
most often found in villages.41 2
The study proceeds to highlight the fundamental and perhaps insuperable
obstacles to the use of encirclement tactics in offensive pacification and set piece battle.
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412 Ibid., Croizat (tr.), pp. 51.
The first problem was to locate the enemy.413 In territory where the population was either
sympathetic with the rebels or simply neutral, this task could only be accomplished by
the use of converging columns. This approach demanded tremendous skill and exquisite
synchronization of movement in terrain that impeded the flexible application of
conventional military force.4 14 The French commander had to maneuver large, motorized
and dismounted forces into position without alerting his quarry. 415 Once in position, he
had to close the net without allowing the Viet Minh units an opportunity to escape. Only
with a firm cordon in place could he hope to bring French advantages in artillery and
airpower to bear on a pinned and helpless opponent. Successful encirclement required
great skill, substantial luck and overwhelming numerical strength; according to the study,
late war operations in the Red River delta typically demanded a local, numerical
superiority of 6:1.416
There were numerous potential points of failure in any such operation. The
failure to achieve surprise, the failure to maintain an impermeable cordon, delays in the
application of artillery and aerial firepower, or excessive haste in the combing of the
cleared area could leave the commander holding an empty bag. If the technical difficulty
of the task of encirclement were not enough, the link between the rare success in
encirclement and lasting progress in the campaign was tenuous. As the excerpt above
indicates, the French command had, in the wake of innumerable costly attempts to force
413 Ibid., Croizat, pp. 95.
414 Large portions of this same section were devoted to discussions of the influence of different types of
terrain on the problem of tactical and operational encirclement. Whether in the forested highlands or the
swampy delta regions, the French found that restrictions on mechanized movement and fire support made
the execution of encirclement operations even more challenging.
415 Ibid., Croizat, pp. 97.
416 Ibid., Croizat, pp. 96.
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battle, come to understand that even large scale successes in conventional battle did not
help them control the local population.
Pacification
If the study acknowledged the limited relevance of conventional battle and the
overwhelming significance of population control, it provided few indications of a
comprehensive solution to the latter problem. 417 The report opened with a blunt
statement on the impotence of most pacification sweeps:
Clearing, sweeping, and related types of operations often yield deceptive results not
compatible with the effort involved. In these cases, they irritate the population and
demonstrate their relative ineffectiveness.418
The study was even more pessimistic about the permanence of pacification gains.
The use of fortified outposts and convoys to secure cleared terrain had proven
enormously costly and largely ineffective. While the maintenance of garrisons in cleared
areas might be unavoidable, it consumed most of the available manpower. As of January
1954, nearly 82,500 troops were "immobilized behind the wire of 920 posts" in the Red
River delta alone.419 In spite of this massive investment, which approached 90% of the
troops under French command, 420 the Viet Minh investment of a mere 37,000 guerilla
troops in the same area had produced a steady deterioration in government control in the
417 Ibid., Paret, pp. 100.
418 Ibid., Croizat, pp. 36.
419 Ibid., Croizat, pp. 86.
420 The estimates of the burden of static control missions (outposts plus convoy and route clearance) vary
substantially. Based on Navarre's estimate of 200,000 troops on Tonkin (Navarre, Agonie de l'Indochine,
pp. 148.), it appears that the 82,500 troops devoted to the defense of the fixed Tonkin outposts alone
represented roughly 40% of the force. Yves Gras, on the other hand, argues that the French mobile
reserves in the same period represented no more than 10% of the total combined strength of the
Expeditionary Corps and Vietnamese national armies (Source: Gras, Histoire de la Guerre d'Indochine, pp.
515.). In his memoirs, General Navarre argued that 90% of French and Associated States' forces were tied
down in pacification duty (Ibid., Navarre, pp. 46). What appears clear from a range of historical sources is
that the French forces assigned to static control and route clearance represented well over half of the total
force available.
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delta. Still more disheartening was the realization that periodic re-pacification of the
same areas often alienated the remaining supporters of the Bao Dai regime. 421
The study was remarkably candid about the limits of French success in
pacification. The French attempted to pacify vast swathes of the ethnically Vietnamese
Red River and Mekong deltas. As the authors note, however, the French only succeeded
in holding areas controlled by the religious sects or ethnic minorities:
The success of Viet Minh propaganda themes on the Vietnamese populations and the
weakness of our own political action rendered us incapable of raising any armed opposition
to our enemies in regions with a large Vietnamese majority. Our inability to thwart the
subversion of the Tonkin delta was the best proof of this. The only element that could still
serve our cause was the racial enmity that the Montagnard people and certain ethnic
minorities had for the Vietnamese of the delta and the coasts. 422
The specific way in which the authors describe these outcomes suggests several
important and unexamined assumptions about pacification. They, like many other
contemporary French observers, tended to ascribe Viet Minh success to superior
organization and skill rather than the intrinsic preferences of the Vietnamese population.
This view of the political contests as symmetric and dominated by the actions of
competing armies to mold a passive population made the development of a counter-
doctrine seem achievable.
Model 2 Alternatives?
While the authors of the official study painted a bleak portrait of French strategy,
their enthusiasm for Model 2 alternatives remained relatively abstract. On the one hand,
the Viet Minh example, and the imitative efforts of certain French officers, suggested
possible answers to the seemingly intractable problem of population control. On the
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421 Ibid., Croizat, pp. 40.
422 Ibid., Croizat, pp. 156.
other hand, the counter-revolutionary approach lacked any degree of specificity. The
authors of the official studies acknowledged the failure of early French forays into this
area and were far more guarded in their claims than later proponents of guerre
revolutionnaire in Algeria.
At the outset, the study's authors admitted the failure of French psychological
warfare in Indochina. They argued that French troops had possessed neither the cultural
familiarity423 nor the professional skills 424 necessary to influence the Vietnamese
population. The study also highlighted the absence of an alternative creed around which
a psychological campaign might be built:
Captain P: "If we were unable to effectively fight Communist propaganda, it is because we
did not offer a positive ideology as an alternative to Communism from which we would have
come a doctrine and a faith." Colonel N: "The Franco-Vietnamese backed everything that
was dying in this country: the traditions, the old people, etc. The Viet Minh used all that was
new and emerging: desires, ideals, youth, etc." 425
The report went on to argue that French efforts had come too late to influence the
outcome of the war.426 Once again, the implication is that some combination of an
effective message, greater skill, and more rapid reaction might have altered the larger
political outcome.
Supplementary reports written on psychological warfare and the political military
struggle sketched out the broad outlines of an alternative, Model 2 strategy. According to
Capitaine Prestat, the primary author of these studies, the government's "riposte" must
rest on three organizing principles: cutting the links between the population and the
enemy, inoculating one's own troops against the influence of enemy propaganda, and
423 Ibid., Croizat (tr.), pp. 40.
424 Ibid., Croizat (tr.), pp. 39.
425 Ibid., Croizat (tr.), pp. 38.
426 Ibid. Croizat (tr.), pp. 41.
258
organizing the tools for offensive psychological warfare.427 Beyond this, Prestat argued
that it was vital to employ reliable native cadre who would understand the grievances and
motivation of the local population. 428
Even the more detailed studies were short on the specific tools that might be
needed in a future contest. What emerges from the postwar official reports is less a
proto-doctrine and more an emerging set of assumptions about causality in revolutionary
war. Proponents of Model 2 agreed that the population and not the enemy army was the
center of gravity, and that psychological weapons were the key to attacking this new
target.
Operational Routines: The Fruits of Exploitation
While the tone of the official study was deeply critical of the conventional bent of
French strategy, the bulk of the study was nevertheless devoted to an exhaustive
documentation of conventional military innovations. Nearly 80% of the study429 was
devoted to technical and operational French innovations in areas ranging from airborne,
riverine and amphibious operations to logistical support and combat engineering. The
official study is a powerful illustration of the disproportionate allocation of attention and
resources to operational innovation in the Indochina conflict. To use March's
terminology, the study documents the triumph of operational exploitation over strategic
exploration.
427 Ibid., Villatoux, pp. 317.
428 Ibid., Villatoux, pp. 317.
429 The 80% figure is based on a content analysis of the second volume: 287 of the 357 pages in the volume
are devoted to discussions of the operational routines employed in Indochina and their relevance to future
conflicts. The content of the third volume is even more decidedly skewed in the direction of technical and
operational lessons.
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The study makes clear the high level of organizational effort devoted to French
operational adaptation in Indochina. The French devoted substantial attention to
technical innovations, particularly as they related to mobility enhancements, defensive
fortification, and armor improvements.
Fig. 16-Double central pillbox and command post
with a living area
430
The bulk of the innovations, however, involved the development of new operational
concepts for the employment of existing military equipment and forces in the peculiar
environment of Indochina. Some of these innovations were attempts to overcome
barriers to mechanized mobility. The development of riverine (see figure 18 below 431)
and amphibious forces are the clearest examples of this type of mobility innovation.
Others were attempts overcome the challenges of the "war without fronts." Since the
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430 Ibid., Croizat (tr.), pp. 135.
431 Ibid., Croizat (tr.), pp. 181.
French did not have sufficient forces to maintain continuous lines outside the populated
areas of the Red River and Mekong deltas, the problem was how to insert and then
sustain forces in areas that lacked a substantial road network. The development of
airborne forces and the late war introduction of air supplied, fortified bases were
conscious attempts to overcome the twin challenges of limited manpower and vast
geographical areas of responsibility.
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Fig. 18-Assault landing (North Vietnam)
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432 Ibid., Croizat (tr.), pp. 181.
In many sections of these sections of the study, the authors documented
complaints of lack of men and materil. The unstated implication was that the provision
of additional resources would have contributed to greater French success. The section on
airborne operations highlights the constraints on the number of transport aircraft that
prevented the command from meeting their desired target of lifting three battalions
simultaneously,433 and the section of helicopter operations identifies the slow
introduction of airframes as the chief obstacle to effective employment.4 34 A
supplementary official study written in March 1955 argued that the early introduction of
helicopters could have altered the outcome of the French campaigns of 1954:
.... if the expansion plan for the helicopter fleet had been implemented a year earlier....the
mobility that could have been given to the airborne infantry battalions, the best use to which
they could have been put, would certainly have radically changed the course of events
between January and May 1954." 435
Such statements by study authors and veterans reflected a persistent belief that technical
or operational innovation might unlock the problem of conventional response and make
decisive battle feasible.
Yet for all the emphasis placed on the negative effects of resource constraints, the
official study contains ample evidence that resource abundance did little to boost French
effectiveness in the campaign as a whole. The section on the use of artillery in Indochina
is perhaps the clearest example of the tension between these two arguments - one
433 The authors argue that limits on aircraft and crews meant that the French command could never lift more
than 2 battalions simultaneously. They went on to cite General de Lattre's comment on the minimum
effective airborne force necessary to carry out a battle of annihilation: "The experience gained by the
predecessors of Marshal de Lattre proved that it was futile to seek to fix the enemy and force him to engage
in a battle of annihilation unless there were enough transport aircraft available to drop at least three
battalions in his rear at one time." By this measure, French lift capability never met the proposed minimum
level (Source: Croizat (tr.), pp. 247-248).
434 Ibid., Croizat (tr.), pp. 299.
435 March 1955 campaign report on helicopter utilization in Indochina as cited in Pierre-Louis Garnier, "La
guerre d'Alg6rie et la consecration de I'ALAT," Revue Historique des Armies (No. 229, d6cembre 2002),
pp. 18.
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emphasizing the negative impact of resource scarcity and the other documenting the
indeterminate impact of resource abundance. In the opening paragraphs of the section,
the authors cited an experienced French artillery colonel's negative opinion of the
contribution of that arm to the overall campaign:
Once artillery joins in ground warfare, not as would a local constable, but rather as would a
riot squad, then the game is quickly compromised, for success...is fundamentally more
dependent on political action than upon firepower. 436
This one paragraph admission of the limits of firepower in counterinsurgency, fully
consistent with the late war Model 2 critiques, was followed by ten pages of detailed
discussion of operational and tactical employment of artillery. The section closes with a
chart (see below4 37 ) that clearly shows both the overwhelming French relative advantage
438in artillery and the rapid acceleration in French ammunition consumption. It goes
without saying that the striking French advantage in artillery (which fluctuated between
4:1 and 18:1 over the course of the war), and the rapid expansion in late war French
ammunition expenditure, did little to change the overall course of the campaign. It does
offer evidence, however, of the tendency to respond to stalemate through escalation of
means and the generally lackluster results of this approach.
436 Colonel X, commanding artillery in North Vietnam, as cited in Croizat (tr.), Lessons of the War in
Indochina, Volume 2, pp. 275.
437 The chart shown below combines the original comparison between French and Viet Minh artillery
pieces (Croizat (tr.), Lessons of the War in Indochina, Volume 2, pp. 290) with the data provided separately
on ammunition expenditure (ibid., Croizat (tr.), pp. 275). Together, these data give a sense of the steady
expansion in French artillery strength and the acceleration in artillery rounds fired (105 mm only) between
1951 and 1954. To capture the rate of acceleration in ammunition consumption, I have used an annualized
figure for the rounds expended in 1954 (the average monthly consumption multiplied by 12 months). The
command fired 792,690 rounds between January and July 1954 or 113,241 rounds per month - roughly
doubles the average artillery ammunition consumption in 1953 (53,162 rounds/month).
438 Ibid., Croizat (tr.), pp. 290.
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Summary
The French official study of the lessons of Indochina is important in several
respects. First, it clearly shows the high level of effort devoted to organizational
adaptation in Indochina. Far from being an inert organization, the French military made
major strides in a host of operational and technical areas. The French military not only
tried to modify its practices but invested significant effort in documenting the results in
the wake of their defeat. Second, it provides a snapshot of French performance in
Indochina that is largely uncorrupted by subsequent experiences in Algeria. Third, it
records the growing intellectual consensus on the intrinsic shortcomings of French
conventional strategy in Indochina. Fourth, it demonstrates the general staff's growing
but as yet largely unspecified interest in Model 2 solutions to counterinsurgency. And
finally, the content of the report clearly shows the overwhelming wartime emphasis on
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exploitation over exploration. It documents the French tendency to devote attention and
resources to process refinement, operational innovation, and simple escalation at the
expense of strategic search.
Reacting to Defeat: The Return to Conventional War
While defeat in Indochina triggered a wide ranging debate between adherents of
Model 1 and Model 2, the French military took it as an opportunity to return to the
preferred task of conventional rearmament in Europe. From the point of view of the
defense establishment, the cease-fire in Indochina marked the end of a decade long
diversion of French military spending from modernization and European war to colonial
war on the periphery. After the fall of Dien Bien Phu, military procurement and doctrine
both shifted from the problem of revolutionary war to that of modern conventional war.
Emerging from a decade of war in the Far East, the military was content to implement
those lessons that bore on the preferred problem of conventional war and table or discard
the rest. This decisive swing from the still unresolved debate over revolutionary war, to
the simpler and more familiar task of European defense, ensured that the French Army
would enter its next counterinsurgency campaign in Algeria much as it had in Indochina
in 1945.
Indochina vs. Europe: Operations vs. Modernization, Core vs. Periphery, Conventional
War vs. Counterinsurgency
The French military's desire to move away from revolutionary war and back to
conventional warfighting predated Dien Bien Phu. Though a vocal minority of the
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officer corps argued that revolutionary war was the real future threat in the Cold War,439
the senior leadership of the French military was solidly focused on central Europe and
conventional defense. The Indochina war had set up a structural tension between the
incessant demands for military manpower and equipment in the Far East and France's
under-funded commitments to European defense. The end of the Indochina war released
pent up pressures to focus on the restoration of French power in Europe. This anticipated
change was triply gratifying; it made possible a shift from spending on operations to
modernization/procurement, a return from the periphery to the core, and a break with the
sordid and thankless task of revolutionary war.440
The French political commitment to European defense grew substantially over the
first decade of the postwar period. Growing Soviet strength and calls for German
rearmament combined to push French policymakers in the direction of heavy investment
in Europe. Though the French initially agreed to provide ten fully equipped, active
divisions,441 this proved to be only the first installment on a deepening commitment to the
common European defense. By 1951, France's obligations had grown from 10 divisions
to 14, and by 1952 France had agreed to provide 20 active and 20 reserve divisions to
NATO. 4 42 These paper commitments represented major future liabilities in terms of
manpower allocation and capital investments. With inflation running at 25% and 40% of
439 General L.M. Chassin, "Vers un encirclement de l'Occident," Revue de Dfense Nationale, May 1956,
pp. 548; Colonel Nemo, "La guerre dans la foule," Revue de Dfense Nationale, June 1956.
440 The dual benefit is most evident when compared with the American dilemma in Korea. In that conflict,
the institutional powers argued that spending in Korea threatened more vital capital investments in Europe
and the U.S.. As General Bradley pointed out after the relief of General Macarthur, Korea was the "wrong
war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time." Nevertheless, the war in Korea had the saving grace of being
conventional in nature. The French war in Indochina was twice as distasteful - it involved a diversion to
the peripheral operations and counterinsurgency.
441 Jean-Charles Jauffret, "L'Armde et l'Algdrie en 1954," Revue historique des armes, No. 187, June
1992, pp. 18.
442 Anthony Clayton, Three Marshals of France: Leadership After Trauma (Exeter, UK: Brassey's, 1992),
pp. 183.
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the defense budget devoted to the war in Indochina, 443 the French state and military faced
a looming crisis in its overall defense policy.
The Indochina war, particularly after the influx of Chinese aid in 1950, set up
three distinct tradeoffs: operations vs. modernization, periphery vs. core, and
conventional war vs. counterinsurgency. In 1948, personnel costs and operations
spending combined to consume 87% of French Army spending. Even the 13% of the
budget devoted to capital equipment was split between the needs of the Expeditionary
Corps in Indochina and the unfulfilled commitments to European defense.444
Modernization and technical innovation were squeezed out by operations, and even the
less taxed navy and air force struggled to train and modernize under the austere funding
environment imposed by Indochina. 445
Contemporary evidence makes it abundantly clear that, even in the midst of the
Indochina war, the French military establishment preferred to focus on European defense.
Even before Chinese entry in 1950, it was clear that Indochina was the "ball and chain"
that prevented rapid French rearmament in Europe.446 Among senior French officers, the
European clique was clearly ascendant.44 7 The institutional army's reluctance to sacrifice
its preferred mission and its modernization plans explains the tendency during the
Indochina conflict to send reinforcements in battalion increments. Once Chinese
escalation had made manpower and materiel pressures more acute, the French army
sought to cut back its commitment in Indochina to safeguard its European mission. In the
443 Ibid., Clayton, pp. 183.
444 Michel L Martin, Warriors to Managers: The French Military Establishment since 1945 (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Caroline Press, 1981), pp. 366-367.
445 Ibid., Martin, pp. 60-63.
446 Ibid., D. Domergue-Cloarec, pp. 97.
447 Ibid., Tertrais, pp. 395.
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wake of a 1953 inspection tour of Korea and Indochina, Marshal Juin, the senior ranking
officer in the French army and hero of the Second World War, made his opinion clear to
the government:
It is necessary that we now search for ways to reduce our spending in the Far East....savings
that could be applied to metropolitan defense, where money is obviously short. 448
After his return to Europe, Juin continued to argue that the impact of the Indochina war
on French commitments in Europe had become a source of tension within NATO circles:
The handicap imposed on French rearmament in Europe by our effort in Indochina has been
made in clear in inter-allied meetings. Counted in terms of large units, this handicap is
estimated to be on the order of a dozen divisions. Now this figure is occasionally contested
in certain foreign military circles. The tendency having been to insinuate an exaggeration of
French estimates, sometimes going so far as to estimate that the return of the Expeditionary
Corps would only allow France to add 3 to 4 divisions to her military potential in the
West.44 9
Several months later, General Navarre's request for 78,000 additional troops for his 1954
and 1955 offensives made a decision on the manpower tradeoff unavoidable. The French
General Staff' s report on his request made it clear that meeting the commander's
demands would involve deeply uncomfortable shifts in French defense policy including
the extension of overseas tours and the politically unpopular dispatch of draftees to
Indochina. More important, the staff indicated that the reinforcements would involve the
transfer of 3-4 division equivalents from Europe to the Far East. The report's
conclusions left little doubt that the request would be denied on these grounds:
In the final analysis, it appears that the satisfaction of General Navarre's request [for 78,000
reinforcements], by French national resources alone, is technically possible at the cost of the
disruption of our defense in Europe. 450
448 Mar6chal Juin, "Rapport de la mission effectu6e du 13 f6vrier au 7 mars 1953 par le mar6chal Juin" as
cited in Tertrais, La piastre et lefusil, pp. 394.
449 Mar6chal Juin, "Note signde Juin du mai 1953" as cited in Tertrais, La piastre et lefusil, pp. 395.
450 Secr6tariat d'Etat a la guerre, 6tat-major des forces armies, "Itude sommaire sur l'envoi de forces
suppl6mentaires en Indochine, 27 avril 1954" as cited in Tertrais, La piastre et lefusil, pp. 396.
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After the outbreak of the war in Korea, the French found a partial solution to their
dilemma in the form of American aid. The French government made it clear to their
American counterparts that they could not simultaneously meet their commitments in
Europe and Indochina.4 51 Just as they used Vietnamese manpower to meet the shortfalls
in professional troops, the French military used American equipment to offset their own
material weakness. The surge in American material assistance and financial aid after
1950 made it possible for the French to divert a significant portion of their own capital
investments into conventional rearmament in Europe. As the chart below shows, 452
French defense spending continued to climb significantly after 1950, but less and less of
it was devoted to the war in Indochina. While American aid could not overcome the
fundamental labor constraint on French forces in Indochina, it enabled the French to
channel scarce capital resources into European rearmament.
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451 Ibid., Tertrais, pp. 394.
452 Ibid., Tertrais, pp. 393.
French Military Spending and the Cost of the Indochina War
While the Americans hoped that their targeted aid would be employed in Indochina, 454
the French military was not above siphoning American and even Associated States' aid
into domestic rearmament. In 1953, the American aid team confronted the French
command over the apparent transfer of four billion francs ($11.5 MM (1953 USD); $81.3
MM (2005 USD)) from the Indochina war into military aviation investments. The French
acknowledged that an increase in the Associated States' contributions to the war had
prompted them to redirect an equivalent amount into domestic military investments:
Under these conditions, the French government decided to use the 4 billion francs in order to
keep certain military aviation production lines open (Mystere II and IV models); had such a
453 This graph is drawn from Tertrais, pp. 393.
454 Ibid., Tertrais, pp. 270.
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decision not been taken, the financial difficulties would have forced us to stop the production
at a time when offshore orders [for these aircraft] were being considered.4 55
Over the course of the Indochina war, the French military had been forced to scale back
their modernization plans in Europe in order to sustain operations in Indochina. Though
late war American aid infusions enabled them to pursue a much reduced, capital
modernization program, they were still saddled with enormous manpower and
operational costs. These pressures built up over the course of the war and set the stage
for a decisive post-Indochina return to Europe and conventional war.
The End of Colonial War and the Modernization Window
The fall of Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva accords that followed set the stage for a
basic strategic choice. France could continue to refine its approach to revolutionary war
to meet the rising tide of unrest in North Africa. Alternatively, the military could shift
focus to the long delayed task of conventional rearmament in Europe. The French state
and military chose the latter. Though the high command and the government had ample
and repeated warning of serious unrest in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, they opted to
buttress their position in Europe and relegate the North African problem to second place.
The strategic warnings of looming rebellion in North Africa were clear. During
the Indochina war, unrest in Tunisia 456 and then Morocco 457 had forced the overstretched
French authorities to concede de facto independence without a major fight. These
455 Ibid., Tertrais, pp. 583.
456 Though the French had had been eager to retain some measure of control in Tunisia, the pressure of the
war in Indochina and the depth of local resistance to French rule forced them to grant first internal
autonomy ( the Declaration of Carthage, May 1954) and later full independence in March 1956 (Source:
Anthony Clayton, The Wars of French Decolonization (Harlow, Essex: Longman Group, 1994), pp. 91-93).
457 As in Tunisia, the French made an early bid to maintain control in Morocco. When the dispatch of
105,000 troops by 1955 failed to quell the rebellion, the French decided to transfer sovereignty to Sultan
Mohammed V in return for face saving concessions and long term military basing (Source: Anthony
Clayton, The Wars of French Decolonization (Harlow, Essex: Longman Group, 1994), pp. 101-103).
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revolutionary movements on the eastern and western borders threatened to infect the
ostensibly peaceful Algerian department. The French command was also well aware of
the potential for internal unrest. Violent French repression in the wake of mob violence
in Setif in 1945,458 and the manifest failure of moderate Algerian political parties to force
major changes in the political status of the Muslim population, had led a growing
radicalization of the local opposition parties in the postwar period. While the authorities
continued to hope that moderate, French educated notables like Ferhat Abbas would
remain the focal point of local politics, there was mounting evidence that a number of




The practical steps the French command took to forestall rebellion in Algeria
were modest in scale and provisional by design. Though the high command sent a
number of units returning from Indochina into Algeria in the summer and fall of
1954,461defense planning was squarely focused on meeting existing NATO commitments.
Formations bound for Algeria were organized into Blizzard battalions, units optimized
for operations in the Algerian bled but organized in a provisional status. The unit
rotations and the provisional reorganization of the forces suggested that the French
military considered the unrest in North Africa a temporary problem.
458 Estimates of the number of Muslims killed in the crackdown range from 3,000 to 15,000. For a more
detailed treatment of the S6tif massacre, see Chapter 5, pp. 290.
459 The two leading intelligence agencies in Algeria drew attention to rising nationalist activity in the wake
of Dien Bien Phu (Source: "Bulletin Politique Mensuel, Mois de Mai 1954, Service des Liaisons Nord-
Africaines, N' 1301, NA/3," in Jean-Charles Jauffret (ed.), La Guerre d'Algerie par les Documents, Tome
2, Les portes de la guerre, 1946-1954 (Vincennes: Service historique de l'Arm6e de terre, 1998), pp. 447-
455; G6n6ral Kients, "Synthise de Renseignements, Mois de Mai 1954, Alger, le 28 juin 1954," in Juffret
(ed.), Les portes de la guerre, pp. 456).
460 The French allocation of resources during this period betrayed a primary focus on Europe and
conventional rearmament.
461 In September 1954, the Conseil supirieur de la Guerre announced its intent to increase the garrison in
North Africa from 91,000 to 128,000 by transferring troops from Indochina to Algeria (Source: Jean-
Charles Jauffret, "L'Armde et I'Alg6rie en 1954," Revue Historique des Armees, No. 187 (juin 1992), pp.
23.
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The Oujda-Nemours Maneuvers (March 1954): Show of Force and Atomic
Experimentation
Eight months before the outbreak of the Algerian revolt, and two months before
the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the French army staged a massive set of military maneuvers in
a mountainous area between Oujda and Nemours along the Moroccan border. These
maneuvers, which involved nearly all the operational forces in Algeria, significant
portions of the garrison of Morocco, and significant air and naval assets, provide a
window into the French army's thinking on both colonial war and conventional
operations in the interwar period. 462 First, these maneuvers made clear the army's
undiminished attachment to the Model 1 approach to colonial policing. Even after
countless traditional pacification strategies had failed in Indochina, senior commanders
clearly believed that a muscular demonstration of French military power in the unsettled
rural regions of Algeria might dampen popular support for proto-insurgent groups.
Second, the French command's operational simulations of the tactical employment of
nuclear weapons reveal an army eager to innovate within the bounds of its preferred
mission set. Together, these elements provide evidence of the power of intrinsic
preferences and beliefs in shaping the interpretation of past experience and prospective
strategic choice.
By 1954, the local French command was aware of the threat of rebellion in
Algeria and eager to forestall it. Successive commanders and intelligence chiefs had
identified a hardening of radical resistance groups and the relative weakness of the
462 The primary materials cited in this section are drawn from Jauffret's compilation of documents : La
Guerre d'Algerie par les Documents, Tome 2: Les portes de la guerre: des occasions manquees b
l'insurrection (Chateau de Vincennes: Service Historique de l'armde de Terre, 1998).
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French forces of order. A riot in the town of N6droma in October 1953 raised concerns
among military and intelligence officials that discontent with French administration had
begun to take the shape of organized political resistance. Though the N6droma riot was
relatively small, the direct attacks on French administrators and citizens and the wide
distribution of subversive tracts were important departures from the post 1945 norm.463
The sharp French response to the uprisings calmed the situation, but left informed
observers with few illusions as to the permanence of the resolution. Describing the
volatile state of the region over the preceding two to three years, a senior French
intelligence officer observed that, "Several "demonstrations of force" made by us have
had only passing effects." 464
These doubts did not influence the high command's decision to mount a major set
of maneuvers predicated on this exact theory of colonial policing. Though the military
maneuvers of March 1954 were not pacification operations per se, they were a conscious
attempt to use conventional military exercises to use French military power to cow a
restive population into submission. The combined operations involving airborne
landings, mechanized operations, and extensive air to ground support were designed to
impress the inhabitants of the same region that had produced the N6droma uprising the
previous year. Official documents reveal a two pronged strategy, combining the show of
465
military force with extensive, constructive contact with local notables. 465
463 Ibid., Jauffret, Les portes de la guerre, pp. 363.
464 Paul Henri Schoen, Chef du Service des Liaisons Nord-Africains (SLNA), " Note sur la situation
politique de la Region Marina-Nedroma, Quelques suggestions pour la redresser, 7 janvier 1954" in
Jauffret, Les portes de la guerre, pp. 365.
465 Colonel Cointet de Fillain, "Synthbse sur l'6tat d'6sprit des populations, P6riode du 25 fdvrier au 25
mars 1954," in Jauffret (ed.), Les portes de la guerre, pp. 566.
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Early appraisals of the psychological impact of the Oudja-Nemours maneuvers
were very upbeat. Official reports stated that the show of force and the contact with local
notables had had their desired effect:
On the local level, it is incontestable that the maneuvers made a favorable impression on the
population. The concentration of our military forces, and their movement among the
populations upon whom the P.P.A. [one of the major Algerian resistance parties] had sought
466
to impose their will, reassured the Europeans [the colon settlers] and calmed the Muslims.
This same report went on to suggest that a combination of demonstrations of force and
public works projects would stabilize the situation:
Independently of the contacts that were made with the chiefs, notables and the natives, the
implementation of all our public works (roads, trails, wells, irrigation canals or simple
watering holes) should have the most positive influence on the development of these
populations in a way that is most favorable to our prestige. It is in short the policy of
contact, inspired by the formulas of Bugeaud and Lyautey, to which we must return. This
policy should constitute one of the surest ways if not to roll back nationalism, at the very
least to prevent it from developing in an anti-French vein.46 7
These comments were representative of official opinion on the Oudja-Nemours
operations. The command appeared unanimous in its judgment that a robust display of
force and renewed administrative involvement were an answer both to the acute problem
of local agitation and the chronic problem of rising Arab and Muslim nationalism. 468 The
belief in the power of these measures, consciously modeled on the methods of the
nineteenth century conquerors of Algeria and Morocco, was undiminished by the recent
and repeated failure of similar strategies in Indochina.
466 Commandant Petit, " Synthbse sur l'6tat d'6sprit des populations, 31 mars 1954" in La Guerre d'Algerie
par les Documents, Tome 2: Les portes de la guerre.- des occasions manquees C l'insurrection (Chateau de
Vincennes: Service Historique de 1'arm6e de Terre, 1998), pp. 566.
467 Commandant Petit, " Synthise sur l'6tat d'6sprit des populations, 31 mars 1954" in Jauffret, La Guerre
d'Algdrie par les Documents, Tome 2.: Les portes de la guerre: des occasions manquees a l'insurrection
(Chateau de Vincennes: Service Historique de l'arm6e de Terre, 1998), pp. 566.
468 For a similar official appraisal of the psychological impact of the maneuvers, see Capitaine Brosse, "Etat
d'esprit des populations dans la region des manoeuvres, 29 mars 1954," in La Guerre d'Algirie par les
Documents, Tome 2: Les portes de la guerre: des occasions manquies Ga l'insurrection (Chateau de
Vincennes: Service Historique de l'Arm6e de Terre, 1998), pp. 568-569.
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Even as the French authorities congratulated themselves on the positive,
psychological impact of the maneuvers, the local command was trumpeting the results of
the atomic weapons simulations carried out in the course of the exercises. General
Callies, the senior French military commander in Algeria and the organizer of the
maneuvers, could not contain his excitement over the significance of these experiments:
The maneuvers demonstrated that the introduction of nuclear explosives brings to the
military art a revolution at least as significant as the advent of gunpowder....In short, modern
war has become as different from the last war [WWII] as the wars of classical antiquity were
from the Napoleonic era...469
Callies went on to argue that the simulations revealed a transformation of classical
warfare and a need to rethink existing notions of firepower, spatial dispersion, speed, and
agility:
Nuclear explosives force us to abandon all known formulas, to rethink completely all
problems....More than ever it is the swiftest and the most flexible who will win. It is also
those with the greatest intellectual flexibility who will adapt most rapidly to these new forms
of war and will know how to prepare for atomic war et not simply prolong to the point to
disaster the outdated classical forms of war.470
Callies' commentary on the atomic experiments reveals a French military class eager to
innovate in the realm of conventional warfare. Organizational and doctrinal change, even
revolutionary change, was acceptable and even desirable so long as the object of war
remained the defeat of enemy armies. What is striking is the absence of any similarly far
reaching observations on the French military's approach to revolutionary warfare.
Though Callies was well aware of the threat of imminent rebellion in Algeria, his own
469 General C.A. Callies, "Enseignements tir6s des manoeuvres algero-marocaines 1954 au sujet de la
guerre atomique" in La Guerre l'Algirie par les Documents, Tome 2: Les portes de la guerre: des
occasions manquees a l'insurrection (Chateau de Vincennes: Service Historique de l'Armee de Terre,
1998), pp. 570, 573.
470 General C.A. Callies, "Enseignements tir6s des manoeuvres alg6ro-marocaines 1954 au sujet de la
guerre atomique" in La Guerre l'Alg&rie par les Documents, Tome 2: Les portes de la guerre: des
occasions manquees a l'insurrection (Chateau de Vincennes: Service HIstorique de l'Armee de Terre,
1998), pp. 574.
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area of responsibility, and possessed only the traditional strategies that had failed in the
eight year Calvary of Indochina, he was nevertheless primarily interested in the notional
contributions of atomic weapons to future French warfighting.
Here is proof that an organization's enthusiasm for change is not a fixed value - it
varies on the basis of the content of the changes envisioned. Innovations, even those that
threaten the existing organizational hierarchy, that give militaries the capability to attack
enemy armies in more effective ways frequently elicit positive and even enthusiastic
responses. Innovations that involve major departures from the underlying beliefs of the
operational code, or which require militaries to embrace solutions that impinge on the
bureaucratic interests in autonomy, prestige and resources, generally elicit negative
organizational responses. The introduction of atomic weapons, though it threatened to
upset the old order, was nonetheless embraced by organizations that saw it as a way to
improve their performance of core warfighting missions. Even as the trauma of
Indochina approached its climax, and the threat of rebellion in Algeria mounted, the
General Callies preferred to speculate on future atomic doctrine rather than confront the
unresolved problem of counterinsurgency.
The Oujda-Nemours maneuvers provide a telling snapshot of the French army on
the eve of the Algerian rebellion. Though aware of the threat of native unrest, the French
command appeared confident that the combination of show of force tactics and public
works remained a valid answer to growing Arab nationalism. Nowhere in the official
reporting or strategy discussions in Algeria does one see evidence of the intellectual
debate about the failure of similar traditional pacification methods in Indochina. The
exuberant reaction of the local command to the atomic simulations demonstrates that the
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French military was eager to innovate so long as such changes reinforced the focus on
warfighting as distinct from counter-insurgency. Amid the references to the fundamental
transformation of warfare brought on by the introduction of atomic weapons, the absence
of meaningful commentary on counterinsurgency was deafening.
Summary
In the wake of the defeat in Indochina, the French military plunged into a heated
debate over the lessons of Indochina. These discussions, both in the informal realm of
professional journals and in the formal studies of the General Staff, revealed a split in
interpretations of the defeat. For many senior officers, the problem lay squarely in the
conventional realm; French commanders had failed because they had been denied the
means to defeat the Viet Minh armies in the field. For a smaller but vocal group of
Indochina veterans, the explanation lay in the disconnect between French strategy and the
nature of the war. While most of these officers agreed that inadequate means had
contributed to failure, they argued that the real issue was the failure to recognize that the
local population was the center of gravity. The only way to avoid similar defeats in the
future would be to develop a new set of strategies aimed for population control. The
over-determination of the defeat in Indochina made it difficult to resolve this split
between Model 1 and Model 2 interpretations. So long as proponents of each
interpretation could point to convincing explanations for French defeat, the origins of
French failure would be open to debate.
The actions of the French defense establishment during this period were curiously
detached from the debates over defeat in Indochina. For the General Staff and large
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portions of the political elite, the end of the war in Indochina simply offered an
opportunity to return to the more familiar and more important task of conventional
modernization and rearmament in Europe. The sting of defeat in Indochina did not set
off a formal effort to develop new strategies or capabilities for countering revolutionary
warfare. Instead, the prophets of revolutionary war remained in the wings as the rush to
conventional modernization took center stage. Even for local commanders in an
increasingly unstable Algeria, traditional colonial policing and the development of
powerful new tools for future conventional war were the dominant responses. In spite of
the objections of advocates of revolutionary war, and the rising wave of Arab unrest
throughout North Africa, the French military was firmly wedded to aggressive
modernization of its conventional warfighting capabilities. To the extent that population
control remained a major part of colonial policing duties, the preferred response was
Model 1.
The behavior of the French defense establishment between the fall of Dien Bien
Phu and the escalation of the war in Algeria in late 1955 is a testament to the limits of
experience and the power of theoretical priors. Manifest failure in Indochina and the
emergence of an alternative set of Model 2 strategies in the waning phases of that war,
did little to alter the priorities or strategic course of the French military in the short
interwar period. Instead, the removal of task pressure marked the end of serious inquiry
into counterinsurgency strategy. Far from moving forward in the areas of revolutionary
war, the official establishment in 1954 seemed bent on a return to conventional response
in European and colonial war. The French military did not build on its counterinsurgency
experiences in the interwar period; it did very little to transmit and implement the
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significant insights gleaned from the formal and informal studies of Indochina. An army
that had endured eight years of bruising colonial war in Indochina would enter the
Algerian war with a nineteenth century model of counterinsurgency.
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Chapter 5
Revolutionary War Reprise: The Algerian War (1954-1962)
Theory and Prediction
The theory presented in Chapter 2 suggests that militaries emerging from
counterinsurgency campaigns will engage in selective retention and active purging. The
task utility of a given operational routine or strategy will not be an accurate predictor of
its retention or rejection in the interwar period. Instead, militaries will tend to retain
those things that are compatible with the MOC and core bureaucratic interests, and purge
those that are not. The disappearance of immediate task pressure will increase the
prominence of bureaucratic interests and priorities in the interwar period. In general,
retention will be higher in the realm of operational routines than counterinsurgency
strategies; militaries will find it easier to retain routines, particularly "dual use" routines
that have utility in conventional war as well as counterinsurgency. In contrast, Model 2
or Model 3 strategies tend to provoke an immediate immune response from the
professional militaries. Strategies that are incompatible with the cognitive framework
and that undermine the core interests in autonomy, resources and prestige will be
jettisoned. For these reasons, most experienced militaries will enter their second
counterinsurgency campaign close to where they started the first. While they may retain
some important operational routines, and "recall" certain lessons later in the second
campaign, there will be a strong tendency for professional militaries to revert to Model 1
responses to counterinsurgency.
Over the course of the second counterinsurgency campaign, militaries will tend to
struggle with the same cognitive barriers to effective response and performance
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adaptation that they faced in the previous campaign. The violent symptoms of
insurgency will produce an illusion of familiarity and elicit a Model 1 response. This
response will produce mixed performance feedback that reinforces the commitment to the
underlying Model 1 strategy - the learning trap. The first recourse in most cases will be
to exploitation (escalation of means and process refinement) rather than a search for
alternative strategies. Clear failure or stalemate may force strategic search, but the order
and extent of that search will depend on the level of resources available and the level of
civilian participation.
Summary
The Algerian case confirms the theory's predictions. In the presence of abundant
manpower and limited civilian participation, the French military followed a relatively
predictable path from Model 1 response to Model 2 stalemate. The initial reaction was to
demonstrate French force and pursue the rebel bands. The failure to crush the rebellion
in the first year led to a brief flirtation with Model 3 strategy, followed by a return to
Model 1 escalation. Starting in 1957, the French military moved from Model 1 to Model
2, shifting the focus from pursuit to population control. While the manpower intensive
Model 2 strategy stopped the growth of the rebellion, campaign stalemate elicited further
military escalation in the Challe offensives of 1959 and 1960. Civilian recognition of the
limits of the Model 2 strategy led to a shift to Model 3 policy and a failed military coup.
The Model 3 strategies of the last two years of the war ended in failure and French defeat.
Escalation in manpower and materiel played a major role in reinforcing French
attachment to Model 1 and later Model 2 strategies and inhibiting the exploration of
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Model 3. The two departures from this progression - the liberal moment in 1955-1956
and the move to negotiations in 1959-1961 - coincided with major civilian intervention in
counterinsurgency strategy and were generally met with fierce resistance on the part of
the professional military.
The French possessed a number of circumstantial advantages that should have
improved their ability to respond to the Algerian rebellion. Recent and extensive
experience in Indochina, and the professional debates that followed defeat there, should
have enabled the military to respond more appropriately and adapt more rapidly. The
legal status of Algeria and the presence of a million European settlers made Algeria far
more valuable than Indochina. The value of the object translated into greater political
resolve and the provision of far greater investments of manpower and materi61l. The
Algerian war also had the virtue of structural simplicity. Whereas in Indochina the
French had had to divide their attention between the regular and guerilla wings of the
Viet Minh, in Algeria there was no major external sponsor capable of underwriting a
move from guerilla war to conventional war. In the absence of a Chinese style sponsor,
the Algerian rebels were limited to a small scale, strictly insurgent strategy.
Paradoxically, none of these advantages translated into major gains in learning or
campaign performance. Faced with a simpler and easier test, the French state and
military failed a second time albeit on a larger scale.
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French Phase 1: Phase 2: Phase 3: Phase 4: Phase 5:
Algeria Outbreak Liberal Revolutionary Challe Negotiations
(1954-1962) and Initial Moment and War (Algeria Offensives and Coup
Response Military as Indochina) (12/58-3/60) (4/60-3/61)
(11/54-2/55) Escalation (11/56-11/58)
(2/55-10/56)
Military Cherribre Soustelle Salan (11/56- Challe (12/58-3/60) De Gaulle




COIN Strategy Model 1 Model 3 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2, 3
Operational * Blizzard * SAS * Morice Line * Commandos de
Innovations battalions * Harkis * DPU chasse
* Mule units * DOP * Rolling offensives




Success/Failure Trend Failure Trend Failure Episodic Success Trend Success Episodic Failure
* Battle of * Challe
Episodic Failure Algiers Offensives
* Philippeville * Battle of
* Ben Bella Frontiers
* Suez Stalemate
Resources Low Low -- Medium High High High
(Manpower)
Resources Low Medium High High High
(Equipment)
Civilian Low High Low Low High
Participation
The Setting
As in Indochina, the physical scale of the territory, the demographic and
economic characteristics of the population, and the history of conquest and administration
played important roles in shaping French response. The physical scale of Algeria was to
be one of the major challenges to French counterinsurgency strategy. Covering an area
471 Raoul Salan, Mimoires: Fin d'un empire, Algiriefrangaise, 1er novembre 1954- 6juin 1958 (Paris:
Presses de la Cit6, 1972), pp. 96; ibid., Villatoux, pp. 341-342.
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almost 4.5 times that of metropolitan France,4 72 the Algerian department was divided into
three major geographical zones. Along the coast, a 50 to 100 mile wide strip of arable
land known as the Tell region was the core of intensive agriculture and settlement. This
region, with its large scale agriculture, industry and coastal cities, was home to the vast
majority of the European settlers. Europeans were overwhelmingly concentrated in the
urban centers of this region. Further inland, the high plateau and mountains of Atlas
chain made subsistence herding and fruit cultivation the dominant form of economic
activity. While these areas were far poorer in terms of arable land and water and almost
exclusively Muslim in ethnic composition, they were nevertheless relatively heavily
populated. Together, the coastal strip and the mountain regions accounted for 12% of the
land area and the vast majority of the Algerian population. 473 The vast stretches of the
Saharan desert south of the Atlas Mountains were almost uninhabited.
The population of French Algeria was divided along ethnic and religious lines.
The European population, collectively referred to as pieds noirs, totaled roughly 1.2
million on the eve of the rebellion.474 The Muslim population, divided between Berber
and Arab ethnic groups, totaled 8 million. This striking ethnic imbalance was a product
of a twentieth century population explosion among the native Algerian population.
472 The area of metropolitan France, excluding Algeria, is roughly 545,630 km2. The area of Algeria is
2,381,740 km 2 (Source: CIA Factbook, 2006).
473 Though data on population density in 1954 are unavailable, contemporary Algerian government sources
indicate that as of 1993 fully 87% of the population was concentrated on 17% of the land area - a figure
roughly corresponding to some broad measure of the Tell region (Source: U.S. Library of Congress, A
Country Study: Algeria (U.S. Library of Congress, 1993), Chapter 2).
474 There is general agreement on the European population figure of 1.2 million. The sources put the
Muslim population in 1954 at between 7.5 million and nearly 9 million (Sources: Jacques Soustelle, Aimde
et Souffrante Algirie (Paris: Librarie Plon, 1956), pp. 55; Germaine Tillion (tr. Ronald Matthews), Algeria:
The Realities (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1958), pp. 14; Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace:
Algeria 1954-1962 (New York: Penguin, 1987), pp. 64).
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Starting from a base of 4.5 million in the first decade of the twentieth century, the
Muslim population had roughly in the wake of advances in medical care and nutrition.475
The rapid expansion of the Muslim population and the scarcity of arable land set
the stage for a Malthusian crisis.476 The Muslim population continued to grow but
lacked the natural resources and skills to provide an adequate supply of food. After the
Second World War, mounting population pressure combined with several consecutive
bad harvests had reduced the majority of the Muslim population to a precarious state.
According to Germaine Tillion, who had spent a number of years in prewar Algeria and
returned in 1954, the people of the Aurbs region had gone from relative security to a state
of "pauperization" in which 9 out of 10 families lived from hand to mouth.477
The French had first seized control over Algeria in the 1830s. Though they had
found it relatively easy to secure footholds along the Algerian coast, it took them ten
years to crush native resistance under the leadership of Abd-el-Kader. Though the
French campaigns under Marechal Thomas Bugeaud began with efforts to combine
economic development and military force, the final stages of pacification were singularly
brutal, with the French using punitive campaigns to suppress native resistance. 478
The political order that emerged from the conquest was decidedly unequal.
Though Algeria was made an integral part of France in 1848, the fortunes of its residents
depended above all on their ethnic identity. The European settlers, of French and
Mediterranean ancestry, controlled the major organs of government and the commanding
475 Ibid., Tillion, pp. 24-25; ibid., Horne, pp. 64.
476 Ibid., Tillion, pp. 13, 24-25.
477 Ibid., Tillion, pp. 22.
478 For a complete account of Bugeaud's campaigns and the hardening of his methods, see Anthony Thrall
Sullivan, Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, France and Algeria 1784-1849: Politics, Power and the Good Society
(Hamden, Connecticut: Archon, 1983). For a shorter version of these events, see Alistair Horne, A Savage
War of Peace.
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heights of the economy. French administration in Algeria followed the patterns of
European settlement; it was densest along the coast and in the major cities, and was
practically non-existent in the overwhelmingly native interior.479 While Muslim residents
enjoyed rights and privileges within this system, formal and informal rules restricted their
participation in economic and particularly political life. Only those natives who adopted
French language and religion came close to enjoying full rights under the French system;
for the Muslim masses, the distinction between settler and native was stark and largely
insurmountable. By the 1940s, this two tiered, and profoundly unequal political system
had begun to crack under the pressures of demographic change and modernization. The
resentment and unmet aspirations of the Muslim majority were to provide the fuel for the
Algerian rebellions of 1945 and 1954.
The Origins of the Algerian Revolt
Three developments left the French order in Algeria vulnerable to rebellion in
1954. The first two were longstanding: the failure of political reform and integration, and
the combination of population growth and economic stagnation. The third, the dramatic
reduction in the French security presence in Algeria, was more recent and the product of
the successive strains of World War 2 and the Indochina war.
Parts of the metropolitan establishment had recognized the dangers of the political
status quo in Algeria and sought to relieve the pressure through political reform.
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479 Ibid., Soustelle, pp. 26.
Mar6chal Juin, himself a French native of Algeria, 4 80 aptly summarized the instability of
the system in a memorandum dated January 1946:
The status quo then? It does not seem possible to maintain it indefinitely, even taking into
the reforms already extended. The Algerian Muslim (above all the educated elite) visibly
suffers from an "inferiority complex" that is revealed in elections, in the newspapers, in his
daily attitude towards us, in his resentment (often justified) of our administration. He will
not get past this, we believe, except by the hope of reaching full equality very quickly, with
us or against us, or by the awakening of a patriotism that is Arab and Muslim. 481
By the late 1940s, the growing imbalance between demographic reality and political
representation could no longer be concealed. Under the two college electoral system, the
1.2 million French colons elected 60 members of the Algerian assembly, while 8-9
million Muslims elected the same number.4 82 Since passage of major changes in local
law required a two thirds vote of the Algerian assembly, the pieds noirs were not only
overrepresented but capable of vetoing any provocative reforms. As a result, the passage
of a liberal 1947 reform bill through the French Assembly in Paris had no practical effect.
Settlers leery of transferring power to the Muslim majority blocked the implementation of
the bill, particularly the portions that called for expanded self-rule in majority Muslim
areas. 4 83 Blatant election fraud in the 1948 assembly elections convinced Algerian
nationalists of all stripes that the pieds noirs would never willingly surrender meaningful
480 In addition to being born and raised in Algeria, Juin had spent the vast majority of his military career in
Morocco and Algeria. A native speaker of Arabic, Juin was fully conversant with the cultures and
underlying tensions of the French Maghreb. For a detailed account of Juin's background, see Anthony
Clayton, Three Marshals of France: Leadership after Trauma (London: Brassey's, 1992).
481 Mardchal Alphonse Juin, "Le nceud du problbme alg6rien, assimilation ou siparatisme" in Jean-Charles
Jauffret, La Guerre d'Algrie par les Documents, Tome 2, Les portes de la guerre: Des occasions
manquees a l'insurrection, 10 mars 1946-31 dicembre 1954 (Vincennes: Service historique de l'arm6e de
terre, 1998), pp. 117.
482 John Talbott, The War Without a Name: France in Algeria 1954-1962 (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1980),
pp. 24-25.; ibid., Horne, pp. 69-70.
483 Ibid., Talbott, pp. 24; ibid., Horne, pp. 70;
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power as a result of moderate legal action.4 84 The severe economic pressure of the 1940s
and 1950s only amplified resentment of the system and fueled radical agitation.
Whereas economic and political inequality was an ingrained feature of the
Algerian system, it was the hollowing out of the French security apparatus in the 1940s
and 1950s that opened the door to armed resistance. The French had long practiced an
extreme form of indirect rule in the Muslim interior with local notables and a sprinkling
of European administrators governing ever larger numbers of rural Muslims. In the two
decades preceding the rebellion, the ratio of administrators to governed had fallen to new
lows. G. Hirtz, the French administrator of the commune mixte485 of Biskra, was
personally responsible for 80,000 Muslim inhabitants, 486 while the lead administrator in
Arris was, with his two staff assistants, responsible for 60,000 inhabitants. 487 The
problem was one of distance as well as population; the three French administrators in of
the Aurbs communes of Arris, Khenchela, and Tebessa held sway over a territory larger
than the modern state of Israel. 488 The police presence in these rural areas was little
better. Unable to keep up with the expanding Muslim population, colonial administrators
frequently complained that they lacked the mobile police and gendarme units to maintain
civil order. According to Jean Vaujour, the director of French police and security in
Algeria, the government had a total of 10,500 police and gendarmes to cover Algeria as a
484 Ibid., Horne, pp. 70-74.
485 Commune mixte was the term used to describe majority Muslim communities in the Algerian
department. Under the pre-1947 order, these communities were run by French administrators in
conjunction with local notables. By contrast, the communes de plein exercise, were run along
democratically elected lines. This democratic system was qualified by the forced allocation of three fifths
of the municipal seats to Europeans (Source: Horne, pp. 33-34).
486 Gr6gor Mathias, Les sections administratives specialisees en Algerie: Entre ideal et rdalite (1955-1962)
(Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998), pp. 25.
487 Ibid, Horne, pp. 34.
488 The land area of the three communes was 25,000 km2, whereas the land area of the modern state of
Israel is 20,770 km2 (Ibid., Mathias, pp. 21; CIA Factbook, 2007).
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whole, and these were overwhelmingly concerted in the areas of European settlement
along the coast.489 Wary of arming the Muslim population, the local government chose
instead to rely on pied noir militias to maintain the peace.490
If the dilution of French civil administration had been a function of neglect and
population growth, the weakness of French military forces in the early 1950s was a
product of the war in Indochina. Desperate to satisfy the constant demands for fresh
troops, and determined to protect the forces already committed to European defense, the
French military had stripped the Army of North Africa nearly bare. 49 1 In spite of growing
unrest across the Maghreb, 492 the French had reduced the military garrison of Algeria
from 110,000 in 1945 to a low of 40,000 in 1948.493 Though the French had managed to
increase this total to some 57,000 by October 1954, and more transfers were planned as
troops from Indochina were repatriated, only 15,500 to 20,000 of these were available for
mobile operations. 494 This left the French command in Algeria with roughly half the
number of forces it had maintained in the area in 1945.495
The weakness of the administrative and security framework severely undermined
French control in postwar Algeria. Without an effective administrative apparatus, the
authorities lacked a detailed understanding of the economic crisis in the Algerian interior
489 Jean Vaujour, De Revolte a la Rdvolution: Aux premiers jours de la guerre d'Algirie (Paris: Albin
Michel, 1985), pp. 31-32.
490 Jean-Pierre Peyroulou, "Rdtablir et maintenir l'order colonial: la police franqaise et les Alg6riens en
Alg6rie franqaise de 1945 i 1962" in Mohammed Harbi, Benjamin Stora (eds.), La Guerre d'Algrie (Paris:
Robert Laffont, 2004), pp. 146, 160-1.
491 Jean-Charles Jauffret, "L'Arm6e et L'Alg6rie en 1954," Revue Historique des Armies, No. 187 (juin
1992), pp. 17; Jean-Charles Jauffret, La Guerre d'Algjrie par les Document, Tome 2, pp. 281.
492 In the 1940s and 1050s, the French maintained upwards of 40,000 troops in Tunisia and 100,000 in
Morocco (Source: David Galula, Pacification in Algeria (1956-1958), RAND MG-478-1 (Santa Monica:
RAND Corporation, 1963), pp. 10).
493 Ibid., Jauffret, Les portes de la guerre, pp. 302.
494 Ibid., Jauffret, "L'Arm6e et I'Alg6rie en 1954," pp. 23; ibid., Vaujour, pp. 56.
495 The reductions in the French garrison were doubly significant as the French authorities had long relied
on the military to compensate for the thin police presence (Source: Peyroulou, pp. 151).
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and the development of armed resistance. While major intelligence agencies had
detected a hardening of opposition in the 1950s, and provided strategic warning of
possible rebellion, they lacked the detailed local information to suppress these
movements. Factional infighting among the French civil and military intelligence units
diluted the effect of these warnings on French decision makers. 496 The dramatic
reductions in military strength emboldened Muslim resistance groups and left the French
few options should rebellion erupt. In short, the colonial authorities lacked the insight or
the means to respond to growing unrest in the Muslim population. Unable to target its
radical opponents, the authorities often resorted to collective responsibility or
intimidation to forestall rebellion.
Tremors and the Quake: Setif and the All Saints Uprisings
It is hard to understand the 1954 rebellion or the French response without
reference to the S6tif uprising of 1945. For Algerian Muslims, including many of the
future leaders of the F.L.N., the brutal suppression of the S6tif uprising was proof of the
injustice of the political system and the French authorities' disdain for the native
population. For metropolitan political leaders, it was a sign that the restoration of French
authority in the postwar period might demand substantial political and social reform. For
the French military, the crackdown was proof that nationalist violence could be put down
through the massive and visible application of armed force. Taken together, the S6tif
uprisings and the French response provided both the casus belli for Algerian separatists
496 Ibid., Jauffret, "L'Arm6e et L'Alg6rie en 1954," pp. 19; ibid., Faivre, Le Renseignement dans la guerre
d'Algirie (Paris: Charles Lavauzelle, 2006), pp. 15.
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and an important blueprint for the coercive response of the French authorities in the
winter of 1954-1955. 497
The S6tif uprisings occurred on Victory in Europe Day, May 8, 1945. As the
French and other allied powers celebrated the collapse of the Third Reich, the Muslim
inhabitants of Setif prepared to demonstrate in favor of independence. Though there had
been warnings of political unrest, the local authorities allowed the scheduled parades to
go forward. After a tense standoff between the outnumbered French gendarmes and
some 8,000 Muslim marchers, a burst of gunfire led to the rapid cascade of violence. The
Muslim protestors fell upon the local police and administrators and set off a broader wave
of rape and killing. For five days, the mobs in Sdtif and Guelma ran unchecked, killing a
total of 103 Europeans and wounding 100 more.498 Many of the killings involved sexual
mutilation of the corpses, acts that stimulated savage responses by pieds noirs and the
security forces. 499 Though the scale and brutality of the uprisings suggest pre-meditation,
the uprisings appear to have been spontaneous. Only after the first burst of violence did
Muslim leaders seek, unsuccessfully, to expand the rebellion.50 0
The French response was crushing and often indiscriminate. While the French
command under General Duval sought to limit excesses, 501 there was an inherent tension
between these prohibitions and the desire to make an example of the perpetrators.502
Troops applied the time tested principle of collective responsibility, summarily executing
497 The French historians Bernard Droz and Evelyne Lever have argued that May 8, 1945 should be
considered the true start date of the Algerian Revolution (Source: Bernard Droz, Evelyne Lever, Histoire de
la guerre d'Algirie (1954-1962) (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1991), pp. 33).
498 Ibid., Horne, pp. 27.
4 99Anthony Clayton, "The S6tif Uprising of May 1945," Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 3, No. 1
(Spring 1992), pp. 11; ibid., Droz, Lever, pp. 32; ibid., Horne, pp 27.
500 Gilbert Meynier, Histoire intirieure du F.L.N. (Paris: Fayard, 2002) pp. 66; ibid., Droz, Lever, pp. 32.
501 Ibid., Clayton, pp.
502Ibid., Meynier, pp. 66-67.
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suspects, burning villages and bombarding many they could not reach.503 Vigilante
attacks by the pieds noirs amplified the scale of repression,504 and the Muslim death toll
far outstripped that of the initial uprisings. Though the French official inquiry put the
number of dead at between 1,020 and 1,300,505 with some 500 to 600 attributed to
military action, subsequent historiography suggests that the response was far bloodier.
Western academic sources have put the number at 3,000, 506 6,000, 507 7,500,508 and
15,000, 509 while Arab sources have put it between 40,000 and 50,000.510 While the Arab
estimates appear implausible given the scale and duration of the operations, most
historians agree that the official estimates understate the number of Muslim deaths. As
Alistair Horne has noted, even the official figure "represents a ten to one "overkill" 511 in
relation to the numbers of Europeans massacred...."; if the number of Muslim dead was
closer to 5,000, the ratio rises to 50:1.
The S6tif uprising made a profound impact on all parties. For the pieds noirs, it
confirmed their suspicions of Muslim savagery and justified intransigence on questions
of political reform. Terrified of a repetition of S6tif, many pieds noirs farmers began to
move from rural areas into the larger urban centers of the coast. 512 For the metropolitan
government, the outbreak added urgency to the reform movement the colons bitterly
503 These methods were not peculiarly French. The theory behind British "air policing" in the Middle East
in 1920s and 1930s was broadly analogous.
504Ibid., Clayton, pp. 15-16.
5o5 This figure was the outcome of the official inquiry.
506 Jean-Charles Jauffret (ed.), La guerre d'Algrie par les documents: Tome Premier: L'avertissement,
1943-1946 (Vincennes: Service Historique de l'Arm6e de Terre, 1990), pp. 410; ibid., Clayton, pp. 12.
507 Raymond Aron as cited in Home, pp. 27.
508 Ibid., Droz, Lever, pp. 32.
509 Estimate provided by Teitgen, the secretary-general of the Algiers prefecture (1956-1957) as cited in
Horne, pp. 27.
510 Ibid., Droz, Lever, pp. 32; ibid., Horne, pp. 27.
511 Ibid., Horne, pp. 27.
512 Sylvie Th6nault, Historie de la guerre d'indipendance algirienne (Paris: tditions Flammarion, 2005),
pp. 42.
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opposed. For Muslims, the uprising had been justified, and the repression additional
proof of French iniquity.513 Radical leaders saw in it the power of mass violence, 514
moderate nationalists the dimming prospects for peaceful evolution.
For military leaders far removed from the scene, General Duval's suppression
campaign was proof that prompt and ruthless response by conventional units was
sufficient to suppress future uprisings. Those officers closest to the events were the least
sanguine. Almost a year after the events, General Henry Martin, the commander of
French Forces in North Africa, noted the undiminished nationalist sentiment and
described the situation as one of "superficial calm." 515 General Duval famously quipped
that, "I have given you peace for ten years. But let us not deceive ourselves. Everything
must change in Algeria." Neither man had any illusions about the inevitability of their
success or the permanence of the gains.
From the end of the Setif uprisings in May 1945 to the outbreak of the Algerian
war in October 1954, Muslim resistance receded but did not vanish. As pieds noirs
moved from the countryside to the towns and cities, the French authorities abandoned
large tracts of the rugged interior. Leaders of various stripes sprang up in this vacuum.
While these bandit leaders lacked explicit political agendas, they employed a familiar set
of insurgent tactics to cement their local control: intimidation, attacks on police and
loyalists, tax collection, bans of alcohol and tobacco, religious revival. As early as 1948,
Grine Belkacem, a future leader of the FLN, held sway over a significant portion of the
513 Ibid., Meynier, pp. 67-68; ibid., Clayton, pp. 14-15;
514 Gilbert Meynier, "Le PPA-MTLD et le FLN-ALN, 6tude compar6e" in Harbi, Stora (eds.), La guerre
d'Algerie, pp. 607.
515 General Henry Martin, "Compte rendu bi-hebdomadaire situation en Algerie a la date 25 mars," 29 mars
1946, as cited in Jean-Charles Jauffret (ed.), La guerre d'Algirie par les documents: Tome Premier:
L'avertissement, 1943-1946 (Vincennes: Service Historique de l'Arm6e de Terre, 1990), pp. 498.
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Aurbs. The French authorities, unable to exterminate these influences, avoided direct
confrontation unless French military forces were made available. 516 Normalcy reigned in
the urban centers of the coast while the embers of resistance smoldered in the interior.
When violence erupted again on a national scale in October 1954, it was led by a
splinter group of Messali Hadj's political movement, the MTLD. Though Messali, the
established leader of the Algerian radical movement, was not opposed to the use of force,
he had chosen to forgo rebellion in favor of electioneering and the consolidation of his
urban base.517 The Front de Liberation Nationale or F.L.N. was the latest incarnation of
a younger and more militant faction of Messali's movement. Unwilling to put off a
violent uprising, the leaders of the F.L.N. proposed a national uprising to expel the
French. With fewer than 700 fighters at their disposal, the F.L.N. hoped that the act of
rebellion would unleash Muslim resentment and overwhelm the authorities.
The rebellion began on October 31, 1954 with a wave of attacks against French
authorities and Muslim loyalists, and the publication of political manifesto. Though the
manifesto laid out a series of series of ambitious goals, the results of the first wave of
attacks was modest: the roughly 70 attacks killed eight and wounded four on the first
day.518 Only in the existing bandit fiefdoms of the Aures and the Kabylie could the FLN
claim to hold territory. Writing after the war, Mohamed Boudiaf, one of the leaders of
the uprising, explained that the F.L.N.'s three step plan for liberation. First, they hoped
that guerilla attacks would encourage broader participation in the movement. Second,
they would capitalize on growing insecurity to build a clandestine organization among
516 Ibid., Peyroulou, pp. 162-163.
517 Gilbert Meynier, "Le PPA-MTLD et le FLN-ALN, 6tude compar6e" in Harbi, Stora (eds.), La guerre
d'Algerie, pp. 608; ibid., Th6nault, pp. 43.
518 Ibid., Droz, Lever, pp. 59-60.
295
the people. And finally, they planned to establish a shadow government in a "liberated
area."519 This plan, however poorly resourced and loosely reasoned, ignited the rebellion
that would ultimately cost the French control of Algeria.
Phase 1: Outbreak and Conventional Response (11/54-2/55)
The French reaction was overwhelmingly conventional and military in nature.
While the French government under Pierre Mendes-France and his cabinet articulated a
mixed policy of limited repression and reform, the local military command under General
Cherribre responded with large scale military operations aimed at crushing the rebels and
cowing the population. In the opening weeks, neither the political leadership nor the
military considered the uprising a prelude to general rebellion; both groups believed that
prompt response could contain the threat and restore order in the Algerian department. 5 20
As the suppression campaign dragged on, some military leaders proposed alternatives to
Cherribre's show of force strategy, but these proposals had minimal effect. The police
crackdown was blunt as well, with the police rounding up 2,000 members of the leading
political resistance group, Messali's M.T.L.D., under the false assumption that they were
behind the uprising. 521 Under the leadership of Cherriere, the de facto strategy of the
authorities was to re-establish order by the display and if necessary the visible use of
military and police force.
519 Mohamed Boudiaf, Le Monde, November 2, 1962 as cited in translation in Galula, Pacification in
Algeria, Appendix 1, pp. 254-255.520 General Cherribre, "Evenements survenus en Alg6rie au cours de la semaine du 29 octobre au 5
novembre, Alger 9 novembre 1954," as cited in Jauffret, La Guerre d'Algerie par les Documents, Tome 2,
pp. 728; ibid., Jauffret, "L'Arm6e et L'Alg6rie en 1954," pp. 22; ibid., Droz, Lever, pp. 60.
521 The decision to "round up the usual suspects" followed the pattern set at S6tif. In 1945, the French
authorities assumed that the Communist party had been the motive force behind the S6tif uprisings. In
1954, the authorities made a similar and not implausible assumption that Messali was the architect and
Nasser the external sponsor. Both claims appear false in retrospect.
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Civilian Response: Full Commitment, Limited Repression, and the Pied Noir Veto
The metropolitan government's response had three components: commitment,
limited repression, and reform. First, Mendes-France emphatically restated France's
commitment to the defense of Algeria. In a speech delivered to the French Assembly on
November 12, 1954, the Prime Minister drew a clear line between French colonial
commitments and Algeria:
One does not compromise when it comes to defending the internal peace of the nation, the
unity and the integrity of the Republic. The Algerian departments are part of the French
Republic. They have been French for a long time, and they are irrevocably
French.... Between them and France there can be no conceivable secession.
This must be clear once and for all, in Algeria and in metropolitan France as much as in the
outside world. Never will France - any French government or parliament, whatever may be
their particularistic tendencies - yield on this fundamental principle.
Mesdames, Messieurs, several deputies have made comparisons between French policy in
Algeria and Tunisia. I declare that no parallel is more erroneous, that no comparison is
falser, or more dangerous. Ici, c'est la France!522
The Prime Minister's stand was important on both a symbolic and a practical level.
Unequivocal commitment to l'Algriefrangaise was a signal to domestic and foreign
audiences that France did not consider Algeria a mere colonial possession or protectorate
like Indochina, Tunisia or Morocco. Concessions in Indochina or elsewhere were not be
taken as indicators of French resolve in Algeria. On a practical level, Algeria's status as
a department of France enabled the government to employ the untapped reserve of
French conscripts and reservists. In contrast to Indochina, a war fought exclusively with
professional and colonial troops, the Algerian war would be fought by professional
soldiers and draftees. Access to conscripts lifted an important material constraint on
French military strategic choice.
522 Pierre Mendes-France as cited (tr.) in ibid., Horne, pp. 98.
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Though they insisted on the maintenance of French control and the restoration of
law and order, French political leaders were keenly aware of the dangers of excessive
force. To Mendes-France and his cabinet, the situation demanded "limited repression"
and overdue political and economic reforms. Mendes-France called for the rapid
implementation of the stalled reforms of 1947 and a program to expand Muslim
participation in the local government. 523 The French Minster of the Interior, Francois
Mitterrand, eager to avoid excesses of S6tif, explicitly forbade military commanders to
use napalm or high explosives in populated areas. 524 Under no circumstances were
French forces to respond to rebel outrages by imposing collective responsibility on local
populations.5 25
The French police in Algeria had a foot in both the political and military camps.
On the one hand, Jean Vaujour, the Director of Security in Algeria, insisted on the
importance of civilian control. In the first hours after the All Saints attacks, Vaujour
advised the Governor-General Roger L6onard to avoid the temptation to declare martial
law:
I added, in conclusion, that I considered it essential that the civil powers alone remain in
charge of the responsibilities for the maintenance or restoration of order, even if might be
interpreted with some suspicion by the army: the problem that the government faces is above
all a political one. To declare martial law, to rely on military leaders to make the
fundamental decisions, is to put in motion a heavy machine that we will only be able to
control with difficulty tomorrow. 526
On the other hand, Vaujour and the police establishment shared the military's
belief that swift, coercive action might restore the situation. In an environment
dominated by anti-colonial agitation in Tunisia and Morocco, and pan-Arab propaganda
523 Ibid., Soustelle, pp. 4.
524 Ibid., Horne, pp. 100.
525 Maria Romo, "Le government de Mend6s-France et le mantien de l'ordre en Alg6rie en novembre 1954"
in Jean Charles-Jauffret et Maurice Vaisse (ed.), Militaries et guerilla dans la guerre d'Algerie (Vincennes:
tditions Complexe, 2001), pp. 436.
526 Ibid., Vaujour, pp. 219.
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emanating from Cairo, Vaujour shared the prevailing belief closure of the borders and a
round up of known radical leaders might head off a general rebellion. Acting on a tip by
a previously reliable informer, 527 Vaujour led Operation Oranges Ameres to arrest and
interrogate over 2,000 members of the leading radical Algerian Party, Messali Hadj's
M.T.L.D. The French then subjected the suspects to intensive interrogation and
torture.528 What seemed at the time a prompt response on the sponsors of the revolt
turned out to be a major blunder. By rounding up the "usual suspects" the French police
not only missed an opportunity to apprehend the real leaders but inadvertently fueled
support among the M.T.L.D. membership for the F.L.N. splinter faction.529
Military Response: Show of Force and Traditional Repression
The military responded to the nascent rebellion with aggressive shows of force
and large scale, cordon and search operations. Acting under the assumption that the
uprisings were local in scope and traditional in origin, 530 General Cherriere mounted a
series of conventional, military sweeps and searches to extinguish the rebellion in the
Aures and Kablyia regions. The strategy rested on the assumption that muscular
demonstrations of force could accomplish two objectives simultaneously: the capture or
destruction of the rebel bands and the dissuasion of potential Muslim supporters. 531
Drawing inspiration from past French successes in suppressing uprisings in Algeria and
527 Ibid., Vaujour, pp. 336.
528 Alf Andrew Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1972), pp. 83.
529 Ibid., Heggoy, pp. 83.530 G6n6ral de C.A. Cherribre (C.R.), "Les debuts de l'insurrection alg6rienne (Novembre 1954 a fin Juin
1955)," Revue de Defense Nationale (d6cembre 1956), pp. 1451-1452, 1455.
531 Ibid., Jean-Charles Jauffret, La Guerre d'Algerie par les Document, Les portes de la guerre, pp. 843.
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Morocco, Cherribre was confident that prompt and visible military response was the most
effective response to the Algerian troubles.
The results of the first winter's campaigns were disappointing. Though the
French mounted numerous large scale sweeps and searches, and had some important
successes in killing or capturing rebels bands, they failed to stem rebellion. Even at this
early stage, unsatisfying results produced split interpretations. Civilian observers
highlighted the intrinsic flaws in Cherribre's strategy - the ineffectiveness of large unit
operations and the irritation of Muslim populations. In a similar vein, some officers
promoted alternative strategies based on small unit counter-guerilla operations or the
defense of Muslim populations. These views remained in the minority in the spring of
1955; military leaders generally pushed for rapid reinforcement, improved tactical
mobility and the removal of cumbersome legal restrictions. If the civilian leadership was
inclined to explore alternative strategies, the first recourse of the military was an
escalation of means and the refinement of existing procedures. 532
The local command's response was shaped by four broad forces: overall French
military policy, the local command's evaluation of the threat, prevailing causal beliefs
about the suppression of rebellion, and the assets available. European concerns
dominated French military policy in November and December 1954. Records of the
meetings of the November 18, 1954 show a French military establishment squarely
focused on European rearmament and only peripherally aware of the significance of the
Algerian rebellion. 533 In a meeting held a full two months after the All Saints uprising,
the only mention of Algeria was a passing reference to North African manning levels in a
532 Ibid., Jauffret, La Guerre d'Algirie par les Document, Tome 2, pp. 672-681.
533 Ibid., Jauffret, La Guerre d'Alge'rie par les Document, Tome 2, pp. 672-676.
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longer series of force allocation across the French empire. While the government and the
General staff dispatched ten battalions of reinforcements (-7,000 troops) in the
immediate aftermath, contemporary records show that few leaders appreciated the scale
of the rebellion. Instead, French military leaders were primarily concerned with their
ability to claw back these reinforcements at the earliest possible date.534 As a result, few
steps were taken to reorient French military policy or resource allocation, and the national
military response remained provisional in scale and intent.
Cherriere was confident that the uprising was traditional in origin and motivation
and limited in scale and scope. Writing in 1956, he explained his initial impression of the
threat:
The insurrection was launched on the night of All Saints' Day; the immediate results led us
to believe that we faced a tribal uprising analogous to those which marked our [colonial]
history in North Africa; we therefore assumed that it was sufficient for the army to reduce the
dissident tribes, which were very localized, fielded very weak numbers of effectives, and
lacked any great store of foreign materiel, and for the police to maintain order elsewhere. It
was on this basis that we pursued the restoration of order in the winter of 1954-1955. 53 5
As Cherriere noted, the division of labor between the police and the army appeared
straightforward, with the police maintaining order in stable areas and the military
focusing on the hotspots of the Aurbs and Kabylia. Though Cherribre and others asserted
that "the direct impulsion [for the rebellion] came from Cairo," 536 they believed that
tighter border security and a traditional military response in the Aurbs and Kablyia could
together break the rebels and bring the Muslim populations back into the fold.
534 Ibid., Jauffret, "L'Arm6e et l'Alg6rie en 1954", pp. 23.
535Ibid., Cherrire, "Les debuts de l'insurrection Alg6rienne," pp. 1451-1452.
536 Ibid., Cherritre, "Les debuts de l'insurrection Alg6rienne," pp. 1451.
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While the Algerian garrison had 20,000-30,000 below average postwar levels, 537
the French command nevertheless had ten times the number of troops Leclerc had had in
the opening stages of the reconquest of Indochina. The majority of the 50,000-60,000
troops53 8 were restricted to static roles. The theater reserve available for mobile
operations was initially quite small, numbering somewhere between 6,000 and 20,000.
While military leaders would later point to manpower shortfalls as a major factor in early
FLN success, these were offset by the narrow geographical focus of the early French
operations. In the first winter of the rebellion, Cherribre focused his mobile reserves first
in the Aurbs and then in the Kabylia. Two months after the first attacks, the number of
French troops had risen to 81,145; by June of that year, it had climbed to 100,000. 539
Arrayed against an FLN force numbering in the high hundreds or low thousands, the
French theater reserve dwarfed its opponents in the first year of the war.
Limited mobility and inadequate intelligence were far more formidable obstacles
to French effectiveness in the first year of the war. French formations were organized
and equipped for conventional combat in Europe and relied on wheeled and tracked
vehicles for mobility. The mountainous terrain and primitive road network of the Aurbs
and Kabylia greatly limited the practical mobility of these units. To their credit, the
French command had attempted in the months before the rebellion to develop new
formations capable of operating in difficult terrain. One such formation, the so-called
Blizzard battalion, stripped the heavy vehicles and staff sections out of the standard
537 Paul et Marie-Catherine Villatoux, La Rdpublique et son arme face au "peril subversif:" Guerre et
action psychologiques 1945-1960 (Paris: Les Indes Savanates, 2005), pp. 336.538 Alban Mahieu, "Les effectifs de l'arm6e franqaise en Alg6rie" in ibid., Jauffret, Vaisse, Militaires et
guerillas dans la guerre d'Algirie, pp. 59; ibid., Horne, pp. 96; ibid., Heggoy, pp. 79.
539 Ibid., Villatoux, pp. 337; ibid., Mahieu, pp. 39.
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battalions to form more mobile light infantry formations. 540 In the summer of 1954,
Cherribre's predecessor, General Callies, advanced a similar idea, substituting mules for
trucks, and adding additional intelligence assets. In both cases, the French command
recognized the need to drop weight and add rough terrain mobility in order to prosecute
the war on rebel terms.541
Cherribre's reliance on show of force tactics and large scale cordon and search
stemmed from his belief in the proven formulas of colonial policing. For more than a
century, French commanders in North Africa had shown that a strategy of "punish and
pardon" could restore French authority. This was the apparent lesson of S6tif, and the
rationale behind the deterrent operations at Nemours-Oujda in October 1953.
What "show of force" meant in practice was the execution of cordon and search
operations involving thousands of troops. The French staged over twenty such operations
in the winter of 1954-1955, starting in the Aurbs region and shifting to the Kabylie in the
later phases. 542 Operation Ichmoul III, launched on November 26, 1954 in the Aures
region, was representative of Cherriere's approach:
Goals of the Operation:
1)Penetrate in force into the interior of the Zone of Douar ICHMOUL and by our presence
accelerate the rallying movement that has taken root there.
2)Comb the region notably the populated areas and recover arms and war materiel cached in this
zone.
3)In the case of signs of hostility, proceed with the destruction of the adversary and his installations.
The French employed a force of six infantry battalions, three armored cavalry squadrons,
two tank destroyer platoons, and five artillery batteries to surround the village and then
search it in detail. Over the course of two days, the French seized twelve weapons, 400
540 Jean-Charles Jauffret, Soldats en Algirie 1954-1962: Expiriences contrasties des hommes de contingent
(Paris: Editions Autrement, 2000), pp. 82-85.
541 General Callies, "Note de service: Groupes legers," Alger, 12 juin 1954, in Ibid., Jauffret, La Guerre
d'Algirie par les Document, Tome 2, pp. 597-598.
542 Ibid., Jauffret, "L'Arm6e et I'Alg6rie en 1954", pp. 24.
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rounds of ammunition, fifteen kilograms of explosives, and detained 51 suspects of
whom 47 were eventually released. 543
These encirclement operations ran up against the same obstacles they had in
Indochina. The scale of the operations made it difficult to achieve surprise and the rebels
often fled before a cordon could be put in place. During the search phase, locals were
reluctant to denounce the rebels for fear of retaliation. In the hours of darkness, rebels
found it relatively easy to slip through even the tightest cordon on foot. Consequently,
the psychological impact was often the opposite of what the command had intended. Far
from impressing the locals with the power and effectiveness of the state, the operations
tended to highlight the relative ignorance of the authorities. Unable to identify the rebels,
the authorities detained large numbers of males only to release them shortly thereafter for
lack of evidence. The act of "combing" villages alienated the inhabitants without
seriously damaging the rebels or increasing confidence in the staying power of the
government.
These large, motorized operations tended to overshadow two alternative strands
of thinking within the French command. Colonel Ducournau, commander of the 18 th
airborne regiment, broke his battalions into smaller dismounted teams to pursue the
guerillas on foot in mountainous terrain - an approach he termed "nomadisation." 544
Ducournau's methods delivered the only clear success of the early campaign when one of
his units trapped and then destroyed a major rebel band, killing Belkacem Grine, the
543 "Journal de Marched du G.A.P. 1, Mois de Novembre," in Jauffret, La Guerre d'Algirie par les
Document, Les portes de la guerre, pp. 859.
544 Ibid., Jauffret, La Guerre d'Algirie par les Document, Tome 2, pp. 861, 881 on 11e Choc's use of
similar light tactics in Kabylie; same mix of night combat, ambush, nomadisation, companies broken into
platoon and squad sized elements (T2, 881)
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longtime bandit king of the Aurbs.54 5 Though Ducournau took a radically different
approach to counter-guerilla operations, he shared many of Cherribre's Model 1
assumptions. Both men shared the belief that the use of force against the rebel bands
would break the back of the rebellion.
General Spillman, by contrast, advocated a Model 2 response. Arguing that
simple pursuit of the rebels was insufficient, Spillmann advocated the construction of
permanent, fortified camps within the rebel strongholds and the restoration of positive
contact with the local population. 546 Drawing on the time honored strategies of Lyautey
and Gallieni, Spillmann argued that a mix of aggressive patrolling and constructive social
and economic interaction with the inhabitants were the key. Unlike his superiors,
Spillmann saw the All Saints' uprisings as a more modern and more organized challenge
to French authority in Algeria. In Spillmann's opinion, the seriousness of the rebellion
and its links to the changing social and economic situation of the Muslim population
justified a deeper and more prolonged engagement with the rural population. Neither the
metropolitan General Staff, nor General Cherribre shared Spillmann's pessimistic outlook
and balked at his proposed long term investment in population control.
Though Ducournau and Spillmann offered cogent alternatives to the show of
force strategy, neither strategy took center stage in the first winter and spring of the
rebellion. Even when show of force failed to deliver decisive results, senior commanders
preferred escalation and refinement of a more extensive strategic search. Ironically, both
alternatives would remerge later in the war; the SAS initiatives by Jacques Soustelle and
545 "Rapport du Capitaine B...Commandant la Section de Gendarmerie de BATNA sur l'activit6 des hors-
la-loi dans les Auras pendant la quinzaine 6coul6e," in Jauffret, La Guerre d'Algdrie par les Document,
Tome 2, pp. 849-851.
546 Ibid., Villatoux, pp. 338.
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General Parlange echoed Spillmann's emphasis on population control, while the
commandos de chasse groups of the 1959-1961 owed much to Ducournau's ideas.
306
The First Balance Sheet: Winter 1954-1955
The military and police crackdown produced significant but not decisive results.
Military operations in the Aurbs and Kabylia netted a number of insurgents but failed to
crush the rebellion in its early stages. The police round up of large numbers of Algerian
nationalists disrupted resistance in the short term, at the cost of swinging additional
support to the FLN. Perceptions of progress varied considerably across the organs of the
French state. The military and police were more optimistic, pointing to the elimination of
key rebel leaders and the disruption of the Algerian radical parties. While they
acknowledged the frustrations of the first three months of the rebellion, they generally
explained the failure to crush the rebellion in terms of inadequate resources, limited
intelligence, and excessive legal restrictions. If the results had been less than spectacular,
they were regarded as proof of important and cumulative progress towards the restoration
of order.
The political authorities in France were far less impressed by the results and less
sanguine about the future. Though Mendes-France and Mitterand had set a mixed policy
of reform and selective repression, French strategy had been dominated by blunt and
generally ineffective repression. Mitterrand's fears of overreaction were born out, and it
was the general dissatisfaction that led to the appointment of Jacques Soustelle as
Governor-General in February 1955. More important, the French military and political
authorities emerged from the first winter with divergent interpretations of what remained
to be done. The military called for material and procedural escalation of the military
campaign. A liberal government made a bid to introduce political strategy and reform
into the campaign strategy.
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Military Interpretations of Early Performance
The military authorities in Algeria were generally optimistic about the results of
the early campaign. While they had not crushed the F.L.N. in its entirety, they
considered the accomplishments of the winter - rebels killed and captured, weapons
confiscated - proof of an essentially sound strategy. They attributed the incomplete
nature of their success to inadequate manpower, onerous legal restrictions, and
inadequate support by the local civil administration. Since all three of these obstacles
could be overcome provided sufficient government commitment, General Cherribre and
the high command saw the rebellion as eminently soluble. While they decried the lack of
political support, they made it clear that politics ought to play a supporting rather than
leading role in the suppression of the insurrection.
The tangible, military results appeared to favor the French. Though the campaign
in the Aurbs and Kabylie had absorbed ever larger numbers of French reinforcements, the
tactical engagements had been decidedly one sided with the French inflicting between
three to four times the losses they suffered.547 By sheer weight of numbers, the French
forces had dealt hard blows to the small rebel movement. The F.L.N., which had started
the rebellion with fewer than 1,000 men under arms,548 even the modest losses the first
three months brought the movement to its nadir by the end of the first winter. More
important, the French had killed or captured several leaders of the armed movement,
547 The loss ratio for the first three months of the rebellion, measured in terms of FLN and French forces
killed in action, was 3.59 (133 FLN killed, 37 French troops). The data are drawn from Guy Pervill6, Pour
une Historie de la Guerre d'Algirie (Paris: Picard, 2002), pp. 176. Primary documents relate a similar
story for the first two months: 76 rebels killed, 254 captured, 287 military weapons and 494 hunting
weapons confiscated (Source: Jauffret, La Guerre d'Algirie par les Document, Tome 2, pp. 901).
548 Gilbert Meynier, Histoire Intdrieure du FLN (1954-1962) (Paris: Fayard, 2002), pp. 278.
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notably Belkacem Grine and Ben Boulaid. 549 A General Staff summary dated January
24, 1955, captured the qualified optimism of the military establishment:
The measures undertaken and the effective action of the security forces nevertheless made
possible the neutralization of the principal armed bands and rendered harmless an important
number of terrorists. °
On the other hand, the FLN had not collapsed. In spite of a series of small victories, and
the growing volume of troops in the Aurbs and Kabylia, the rebels had weathered the
storm. Though the rebels had yet to spread far beyond their initial strongholds or make
an impression on the larger Muslim population, 551 the French lacked the means to
maintain a permanent presence throughout the areas, and their preference for large scale
operations left few assets to hold cleared areas. Consequently, by the end of the winter,
French attrition had done little to restore effective control over the terrain or population
of the two FLN strongholds. The psychological impact of the operations was just as
difficult to gauge. The countryside had not risen in open support of the rebels, but the
repeated and heavy handed use of French troops had tended to alienate the local
population rather than encourage them. Even Cherribre, who had confidently spoken of
the positive "psychological shock" of large scale maneuvers, had begun to lament the
growing gap between Muslims and Europeans. 552
The unsatisfying outcome of the winter's campaign did not diminish Cherribre's
belief in a Model 1 solution. In a private conversation with General Salan on February
549 Ibid., Vaujour, pp. 419-420.
550
"Carton no 506, non cot6 EMA 2e Bureau, 24 Janvier 1955, Paris" in Jauffret, La Guerre d'Algirie par
les Document, Tome 2, pp. 900.
551 Ibid., Meynier, pp. 279.
552 General Cherribre, "Message No 1.166/2, General Commandant 10o R.M. Alger A M. Le Secretaire
d'Etat A la Guerre, Situation en Alger, 28 D6cembre 1954," in Jauffret, La Guerre d'Algerie par les
Document, Tome 2, pp. 738.
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11, 1955, Cherribre explained his belief that swift, violent action was the only way to
snuff out the rebellion:
We must react brutally. The adversary, who is driven by a need to kill, to make blood flow, even
among his own countrymen, women and children, must be brought to reason. We saw this clearly at
the time of the massacres at Guelma and S6tif in 1945. General Duval threw in everything he had
and he crushed the rebellion. We must do the same today if we want to avoid a long war of the type
we have just come to know in Indochina.
Still in Salan's presence, Cherribre confronted the Army Chief of Staff, General Blanc,
demanding immediate reinforcements:
When will I see professional troops returning from Indochina? I need mobile troops in order to
inundate the countryside very quickly, if not the internal fight will assume considerable dimensions
and the subversive war that will ensue will be difficult if not impossible to overcome. I have
forwarded you a list of the reinforcements I need. I need 80 battalions to protect the population and
the vital installations. It is true that I have started to receive units but you must do it quickly.553
Cherribre's answer to the spread of the rebellion was clear. Rapid and brutal action by a
larger and more mobile French army could repeat Duval's miracle at S6tif. In his view,
ruthlessness and manpower were the missing ingredients in an otherwise sound strategy.
In an article published in the Revue de Difense Nationale in December 1956,
Cherriere returned to this theme of inadequate government support:
Although the army did not obtain the authorization to react quickly and forcefully in the two douars
of the Auras at the start of the rebellion, and in spite of the limits put on the use of air support,
November and December 1954 saw our troops, progressively reinforced by the metropole, reoccupy
[first] the Auras, then the Grand Kabylie, after having destroyed several [rebel] bands and dispersing
or driving to ground the others. 554
Cherribre then spelled out a less ambitious measure of military success, one which in
which the military guaranteed freedom of movement and the civilian government
assumed responsibility for the elimination of the FLN:
The army nevertheless made clear that this reoccupation only permitted [our forces] to circulate
everywhere more or less with impunity, and it underlined that the rebels of All Saints' and their
armament remained almost intact; only political action and the intervention of the police and courts,
553 Raoul Salan, Mimoires: Fin d'un empire, Algiriefrangaise, 1er novembre 1954- 6juin 1958 (Paris:
Presses de la Cit6, 1972), pp. 18.
554 G6n6ral Cherribre, "Les ddbuts de l'insurrection algirienne (Novembre 1954 5 fin Juin 1955), Revue de
Defense Nationale, December 1956, pp. 1460.
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brought to bear with the support or under the cover of our [military] forces, can henceforth crush the
resistance. 5
In hindsight at least, Cherriere acknowledged the importance of integrating political and
military efforts. 556 Like General Valluy in Indochina in 1947, Cherribre reacted to the
failure of his initial offensives by shifting the responsibility for the residual problems of
popular resistance to the civilian leadership. While Cherribre was eager to transfer
responsibility, he was adamant that the military continue to lead the counterinsurgency
campaign. The clearly subordinate function of political leaders was to provide resources
and to "prepare, accompany, and exploit the battles of the army." 557
What Cherribre and most other French officers strongly resisted was the
imposition of any restrictions on the use of force. The appropriate role for politicians was
to resolve the tiresome problem of native support for the rebellion, not to tie the hands of
military leaders diligently engaged in the systematic destruction of the enemy armed
forces and support base. When political and military considerations came into conflict,
as on the issues of collective responsibility, the use of firepower, population resettlement
and torture, military leaders categorically treated political concerns as subordinate to the
exigencies of military action.
Political Interpretations of Performance
The political authorities in Paris greeted the mixed results with mounting concern.
The failure of Cherribre's suppression campaigns, and the clear military skew of French
actions, raised the possibility that the rebellion might begin to grow and prey on Muslim
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resentment of French rule and economic depression. Periodic visits by civilian observers
did little to allay these fears. According to Pierre Nicoliy, a senior Mitterrand aide
dispatched to the Aurbs in the first weeks of the rebellion, there were two kinds of
military leaders in Algeria: "those who think everything is going well, and those who
muse about napalm."558
Jacques Soustelle, the new Governor-General dispatched to Algeria in February
1955, considered the French military performance in the first winter to be singularly
ineffective. In his subsequent observations, he emphasized the mismatch between French
equipment and strategy and the challenge of guerilla warfare:
Vigorously prosecuted at the outset, the [military] action tended to thicken and slow by
conforming to the inappropriate mold of "grand operations" which they had had the poor
taste to give such bawdy names as "Violette" and "Veronique." It goes without saying that
that several battalions assembled in a great fracas to encircle and then comb through a djebel
find no one there, or perhaps some mocking fellaghas [rebels], who with their rifles stored in
a safe place, lead their horses to graze among the [rocks]. Our army striving, under the hold
of "atlanticist" ideas, to prepare for an ultra-modern war, had completely forgotten her
mission, in my eyes primordial, of presence and sovereignty in Africa. Units prepared for
combat in Europe, with sophisticated equipment, are unsuitable to employ in guerilla warfare
in the mountains of Constantinois. Too heavy and too loud, tied to the roads by their jeeps
and their trucks, they are the easy prey of insurgents who climb the pitons, spring their
ambushes and then disperse. Our forces, on the other hand, were too few in the Aurts to
reassure the populations there and convince them of our will to remain in Algeria; the net
that they threw over such difficult terrain had far too loose a mesh, and more than one douar
that requested our protection against the incursion of the rebels, seeing their demands still
unsatisfied, had to compromise with the rebels. 559
More significant, the military's general distrust for the population had made the
restoration of authority far more difficult:
It is salutary, certainly, to be suspicious in troubled times, but a generalized mistrust defeats
its own purpose. By disarming everyone, we cannot train anyone. It might have been more
judicious to distinguish among the notables and the clans who could bring us their support,
560
and to treat them as allies by giving them the necessary means.
558 Maria Romo, "Le gouvernement Mendis France et le maintien de l'ordre en Alg6rie en novembre
1954," in Jauffret, Vaisse, Militaries et gudrilla dans la guerre d'Algirie, pp. 435.
559 Ibid., Soustelle, pp. 27.
560 Ibid., Soustelle, pp. 28.
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Jean Vaujour, the chief of the Security Services, shared Soustelle's bleak appraisal of
French authority. In his initial report to Soustelle in February 1955, Vaujour highlighted
the tenuous state of the Auras and advocated something like Spillmann's idea of a dense
network of units and outposts designed to reassure the population and disrupt the
F.L.N.. 561 While he supported reinforcement of the army and police, Vaujour clearly
underlined the far greater importance of political measures in restoring stability:
For Algeria, it is important to keep in mind the spirit of demographic disequilibrium that exists
between the two ethnic groups of the population, and to understand that it is impossible keep 9/10 of
this population in a state of inferior status and entitlement with respect to the other fraction which
runs the practical affairs of the country. In fact, far more than military solutions, it is political
solutions, of which the essential arguments have a social and economic foundation, which can
resolve the that confront the destiny of Algeria today.562
While Vaujour, like Cherribre, highlighted the importance of politics, his definition was
of politics was almost entirely different. For Cherribre the political solution was for the
French state to provide unlimited resources and remove the legal impediments to military
action. For Vaujour, the political solution was prompt and radical political and economic
reform on behalf of a restive Muslim population. The almost antithetical renderings of
politics by civilian and military leaders foreshadowed later and more serious clashes over
how to the restoration of French authority.
In short, metropolitan leaders expressed serious reservations about the efficacy of
the initial response, the strategies pursued and the political byproducts of "limited
repression." While sympathetic to the military's complaints about manpower and
unwieldy judicial procedures, civilians emphasized the importance of a mixed policy
incorporating constructive as well as destructive elements. The French command, for its
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part, emphasized the centrality of manpower and expanded autonomy. These
disagreements set the stage for two divergent strategies of the second phase.
Phase 2: The Liberal Moment and the Return to Escalation
By the end of the winter of 1954-1955, the unsatisfying results of the French
campaign prompted the Prime Minister to recall Governor-General Leonard. The
appointment of Jacques Soustelle signaled the metropolitan government's determination
to impose civilian priorities on French counterinsurgency strategy. In his brief tenure as
Governor General, Soustelle developed the only coherent, early war Model 3 alternative
to the military's preferred Model 1 and Model 2 strategies. His influence was both
proscriptive and prescriptive. He sought to limit the excesses of the security forces while
restoring French authority through administrative, political and economic reform.
Soustelle's policy of liberal "integration" met with strong resistance from multiple
parties. The military and local police resisted his efforts to impose restrictions on the
escalating use of force. By end of his tenure, Soustelle's civilian reform agenda and the
military response to the rebellion had split once again with the military prosecuting the
campaign as they saw fit. European settlers were suspicious of attempts to force political
reforms that would elevate the status of Muslim Algerians at their expense. The F.L.N.
rebels, fearful that Soustelle's progressive policies might capture Muslim attention,
responded by taking the war to European non-combatants. The combined resistance of
the French military, local notables, and the rebels vitiated Soustelle plans. While
elements of his program, notably the S.A.S., survived his tenure, Soustelle's
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governorship was the high water mark of civilian participation in French
counterinsurgency strategy.
Shortly after his arrival in February 1955, Soustelle made a tour of the deeply
unsettled Aurbs region. Based on his observations there, Soustelle argued that the French
faced at least five major problems. The first was the misery of the rural Muslim
population. The revolt had erupted in a social environment dominated by unemployment,
subsistence agriculture and deep economic and social discontent. 563 Second, the French
administrative presence in the Aurbs was practically non-existent. Despite the best
efforts of a handful of French civil administrators, there had been little or no formal
contact between the French government and the Muslim population in the postwar
period. In his words, "The administration floated like a rudderless raft on the surface of a
deep sea whose depths it could scarcely plumb." 564 Third, the initial military response to
the rebellion had been almost entirely ineffective. Far from crushing the rebellion or
cowing the population, General Cherribre's "grandes operations" had demonstrated the
maladaptation, numerical weakness and lack of staying power of the French military. 565
Fourth, the reflexive police crackdown on the full spectrum of Algerian nationalist
groups had increased support for the armed resistance. 566 Finally, the local government
lacked the special powers necessary to address the revolt. While the settlers and military
saw martial law as the answer, Soustelle considered the grant of more limited, emergency
powers essential to the restoration of order. 567
563 Soustelle, pp. 24.
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Convinced that the rebellion was more serious than either the military or the
metropolitan government appreciated, Soustelle weighed a series of imperfect policy
options. The policy of assimilation orfrancisation that had dominated the scene prior to
1954 had failed, and the metropolitan government had categorically rejected the other
extreme of independence. 568 That left two intermediate options: federalism and
integration. Soustelle considered federalism something of a political mirage; France
lacked the institutions to support a federal devolution of power, and a premature move in
this direction would inevitably lead to Algerian secession. 569 As a result, Soustelle
embraced the policy of integration. According to Soustelle, integration had three pillars:
the recognition of the distinctive character and traditions of Algeria, a commitment to
rapid social and economic modernization, and an immediate move towards real political
equality on the individual and communal level.570
The next step was to develop a strategy to implement the policy of integration. In
practical terms, Soustelle's strategy had three elements. First, he insisted on the rapid
implementation of the stalled 1947 reforms. The abolition of communes mixtes and the
drive to increase Muslim participation in Algerian public administration 571 were the
tangible expressions of Soustelle's commitment to accelerated political reform. He also
promised economic and social modernization. Shortly after his arrival, the Governor-
General announced a doubling of public investment in Algeria and strongly suggested
that these funds would be targeted at the economically depressed, Muslim interior.57 In
addition to public works, Soustelle envisioned major initiatives in public education,
568 Droz, Lever, pp. 71.
569 Soustelle, pp. 92-93.
570 Ibid., Soustelle, pp. 93.
571 Ibid., Soustelle, pp. 84, 110.
572 Ibid., Droz, Lever, pp. 68-69.
316
sanitation, and agricultural development. Only through by improving the economic and
social condition of the Muslim majority could the French hope to stem the growth of
support for the F.L.N..
Soustelle also sought to recast the security element of the counterinsurgency
campaign. Recognizing that the thrust of the F.L.N. movement was political rather than
military,573 Soustelle advocated a strategy of pacification and local security in place of
the offensive operations of the first winter. Whereas many military leaders were calling
for the removal legal and practical restrictions on military action, Soustelle advocated a
revised, legal framework. Fearful that martial law would mean the end of civilian
control, he argued that temporary, emergency powers could give the authorities necessary
tools without endangering his policy of integration. He was, on the other hand, acutely
ware of the dangers of blind or unlimited repression. 574 In his instructions to senior
military commanders and his public addresses to the Algerian Assembly, Soustelle made
clear that they could not afford to lose sight of their goal of restoring a just and legal
order.
The third and least visible element of Soustelle's strategy was his contact with
leading Algerian nationalists. In a clear break with the initial French crackdown on the
M.T.L.D. and other nationalists, Soustelle and his associates put out feelers to the leading
figures, including Ferhat Abbas and Messali Hadj. 575 These forays included contacts
between Commandant Monteil, one of Soustelle's closest advisors, and the captured
F.L.N. leader, Ben Boulaid. These contacts demonstrated Soustelle's belief that
integration depended on the ability to identify and cultivate moderate, Muslim
573 Ibid., Soustelle, pp. 215.
574 Ibid., Soustelle, pp. 48-49, 125.
575 Ibid., Clayton, pp. 117.
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nationalists. On a more indirect level, these discussions gave Soustelle's circle more
evidence of the political costs of the initial French response. Discussions with detained
nationalist leaders revealed that the military and police actions had increased support for
the rebellion both in political circles and amidst the general population. 76 Soustelle's
efforts to enlist the active and consensual support of Muslim leaders put him at odds with
the military and pieds noirs; the former still saw military operations as the centerpiece of
the campaign, and suspected that negotiation of any kind was a prelude to capitulation.
The pieds noirs correctly feared that any real political reform would jeopardize their
outsized political and economic standing.
Filling the void: The S.A.S., Administration, and Pacification
The sections administratives spdcialisdes or S.A.S. were the most important
operational innovation of the Soustelle period and a concrete expression of Soustelle's
belief in mixed pacification strategies. By placing small teams of military administrators
in the remote regions of the interior, and pursuing a combination of civic action and local
self-defense, Soustelle hoped that the French authorities could reassert their authority and
address the underlying causes of the rebellion. While Soustelle's Model 3 policies did
not survive his departure, the S.A.S. system remained at the core of French pacification
efforts from its introduction in 1955 through the end of French rule in 1962.
The S.A.S. was Soustelle's answer to the administrative void in the Muslim
heartland.577 If the abandonment of the Muslim interior between 1945 and 1954 had
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precipitated the outbreak of violent resistance, 578 then the introduction of additional
administrators might provide a foundation for the reintroduction of French civil authority
in those regions. Soustelle and the military leadership recognized that it would be
practically impossible to push additional civil administrators into the affected regions in
the context of violent rebellion.579 Consequently, Soustelle introduced the idea of using
specially trained military officers to enforce civil administration and restore order.
The S.A.S. initiative was an idea of mixed parentage. In structure, it was a
descendant of the 19th century bureaux arabes (B.A.)580 and the more recent Affaires
indigenes (A.I.)581 system of 2 0 th century French Morocco. In both cases, the French had
used small teams of specially trained military officers to oversee civil and military
administration in unsettled regions of French North Africa. General Parlange, the
architect of the first S.A.S. experiments in the Aurbs in 1955, was a veteran of the
Moroccan Affaires indigenes, as were many of the initial cadres of the Algerian S.A.S. 582
While the S.A.S. was based on the B.A./A.I. model, two other players exerted
powerful influence on its development. The first was the Governor-General himself. As
an ethnologist whose academic work in the 1930s had focused on the problems of rural
578 Jean-Pierre Peyroulou, "R6tablir et maintenir l'order colonial: la police franqaise et les Alg6riens en
Alg6rie franqaise de 1945 1962" in Harbi, Stora, La Guerre d'Algirie, pp. 161.
579 Ibid., Fr6maux, pp. 55.
580 The bureaux arabes had been formed in the 1830s to manage French interaction with local notables and
tribes in post-conquest Algeria. As such, it had been the linchpin of the French strategy of indirect rule in
the territory, and it was only disestablished in the 1870s as French civil administrators assumed many of the
B.A.'s functions. For a complete account of the B.A., see Jacques Fr6maux, Les Bureaux Arabes dans
L'Algirie de la Conquete (Paris: Editions DenoOl, 1993).
581 The Affaires indighnes system had been introduced in Morocco in the first two decades of the 20th
century. Like the Algerian bureaux arabes, the A.I. performed a dual mission of civil
administration/development and security surveillance/pacification in the rural areas (Source: Gr6gor
Mathias, Les sections administratives spdcialisdes en Algirie, pp. 16).
582 It was the abrupt end of French administration in Morocco that made possible the transfer of these Al
personnel. Without these initial, Arab speaking military cadres, it would have been difficult to sustain the
rapid expansion of the S.A.S. network in Algeria (Source: Xavier Dulac, "Les sections administratives
sp6cialisdes d'Alg6rie- S.A.S.," Revue historique des Armies, No. 4 (novembre 1959), pp. 128).
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development in Mexico, Soustelle was convinced that more effective administration and
constructive development might alleviate Muslim suffering and with it the motivation for
resistance. Another clear advocate was General Constans, a prominent member of
Soustelle's cabinet and an Indochina veteran. Constans saw in the S.A.S. an opportunity
to avoid the errors of Indochina and focus the state's attention on the native population.583
S.A.S. cadres might, like the Viet Minh, organize the local population and secure their
loyalty. The ready template of the B.A./A.I., the personal influence of A.I. veterans,
Soustelle's enthusiasm for constructive rural development, and the Indochina veterans'
enthusiasm for population centered strategies, all contributed to the introduction and
rapid expansion of the S.A.S..
As in the earlier B.A. and A.I., the S.A.S. had two missions: civil administration
and military pacification. The most basic civic function of the S.A.S. teams was to re-
establish positive contact with the Muslim population. To accomplish this, the S.A.S.
officer was given broad civic powers in his locale. He wielded the power of a judge and
could impose fines and limited imprisonment in response to minor infractions. 584 The
S.A.S. leader was also responsible for a range of social and economic development
projects. He was the overseer of public works projects, public education initiatives, and
rural economic development. As the the official spokesman for the French authorities,
the S.A.S. commander was also the de facto leader of the local psychological operations
campaign.
583 Gr6gor Mathias, Les sections administratives spicialisees en Algirie: Entre iddal et rdalite (1955-1962)
(Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998), pp. 25.
584 Jacques Fr6maux, "Les SAS (sections administratives sp6cialis6es)," Guerres mondiales et conflits
contemporains, No. 208 (Janvier 2003), pp. 58.
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The S.A.S. also played a leading role in local self-defense, intelligence gathering,
and pacification. The core of each S.A.S. team consisted of one Arabic speaking officer,
one non-commissioned officer, and two to three French enlisted men. This team then
raised a self-defense force of between 30 and 50 Muslim auxiliaries or moghanzis.58 5
The local forces and their French cadre conducted local patrols to limit rebel incursions
and boost local security. In their role as local administrators, S.A.S. officers were well
placed to gauge popular support for the government and the rebels. 586 Using their local
auxiliaries and ties with local notables, they could identify specific rebel targets for police
or military action.
The success of the initial experiments in the Aurbs led to a rapid expansion in the
program. From its launch in 1955, the number of S.A.S. sections grew to 192 by January
1956 and reached a peak of 700 by the war's end.587 Though the command faced
countless problems in building a force of Arabic speaking administrators in this short
time, the injection of the S.A.S. immediately strengthened the French administrative
presence in the interior. Whereas civil administrators in the Aurbs and Kabylie in 1954
had been responsible for upwards of 80,000 inhabitants, the average S.A.S. team had
responsibility over 12,000 inhabitants: somewhere between a five and seven fold increase
in the French administrative presence in the Muslim rural areas. 588 The introduction of
well trained teams focused on civic action and local self-defense rather than large scale
offensive action helped temper the regular army's tendency to pursue an offensive
military response to resistance.
585 Ibid., Fr6maux, pp. 57.586 Ibid., Mathias, pp. 111; ibid., Fr6maux, pp. 59.
587 Ibid., Fr6maux, pp. 56.
588 Ibid., Fr6maux, pp. 56-57.
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The bureaucratic reaction to S.A.S. was mixed. The French military leadership
was initially enthusiastic; Generals Cherribre and Spillmann had both lobbied for the
transfer of Arabic speaking, A.I. officers with experience in pacification and
administration. 589 Over time, however, the friction between the two groups increased.590
Even in the pilot experiments of 1955, General Parlange clashed with Colonel Ducournau
over the negative impact of offensive military operations on population security.
Ducournau, like most French military leaders, saw the problem of pacification in terms of
military pursuit and coercion; Parlange and the S.A.S., by contrast, saw pacification as a
long term act of persuasion in which the blunt use of force might upset months of
progress. 59 1 In practical terms, the static S.A.S. team, dependent on the local Muslim
population for intelligence and protection, was reluctant to endorse mobile operations that
might damage their rapport with the population. Whatever the upshot of a given military
operations, the S.A.S. administrator would inherit the results. Like their forbearers in the
bureaux arabes and A.I., the S.A.S. often developed considerable empathy with the
Muslim population, a sentiment seldom shared by the mobile units of the French theater
reserve:592
The traditional mistrust of the Affaires indigenes on the part of the military regulars lived on.
These officers [the A.I. or S.A.S.], by force of circumstances, did not give priority to military
action. They were frequently the enemies of the Manichaeism that considered all Muslims
who maintained ties with the "rebels" guilty, as if they could do otherwise, and as if it would
not be cleverer to use these contacts for the benefit of the French cause, rather than
embarking on a course of blind repression. 5 9 3
The mixed roles of the S.A.S. led them to reject simple categorizations of the population,
opting instead to focus on the problem of moving the various segments of the population
589 Ibid., Mathias, pp. 20.
590 Ibid., Mathias, pp. 148-151.
591 Ibid., Fr6maux, pp. 61.
592 Ibid, Fr6maux, pp. 60, 63.
593 Ibid., Frdmaux, pp. 62.
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from open or passive resistance to active support for the regime. The tension between the
S.A.S.'s Model 2 and Model 3 vision of pacification and the regular military's Model 1
focus on pursuit and destruction of guerillas and their supporters was never fully
resolved.
Military Response: Deteriorating Stalemate and Model 1 Escalation
While Soustelle and his advisors struggled to introduce political and economic
reforms, the military was squarely focused on the widening guerilla war. The failure of
Cherriere's campaign did not lead to a first order reappraisal of strategy or an immediate
move in the direction of the late Indochina experiments in population control. Instead,
the military's response to deteriorating stalemate was to call for escalation, operational
refinements, and freedom of action. The metropolitan government's willingness to
double the number of troops in Algeria and relax legal restrictions enabled the military to
play out this preferred response to counterinsurgency. By the end of Soustelle's tenure,
the French military had deployed almost twice the level of troops they had at the peak of
the Indochina war but had failed to stop or even slow the spread of the revolt. The failure
of simple escalation set the stage for the emergence of the GR school in the third phase of
the war.
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-- FR Army - -FLN Attacks
By almost any objective measure, the Cherriere initial strategy had failed to
suppress or even contain the Algerian revolt. In spite of the scattered tactical successes in
the Auras and Oranais regions, the rebellion had expanded in scope and scale. 594 By the
beginning of 1956, the F.L.N. had expanded its low level terror campaign to cover two
thirds of Algeria.595 The growth in F.L.N. strength was even more striking; the rebels'
armed strength had expanded from less than a thousand dedicated fighters in November
1954 to 6,000 by the end of 1955596 and 8,050 by mid-1956.597
In spite of the limited effect of the ongoing surge of reinforcements, General
Lorillot's first response upon assuming command in July 1955 was to call for more. In a
report dated October 14, 1955, Lorillot explained the situation and his proposed remedy:
594 Ibid., Home, pp. 151.
595 Ibid., Droz, Lever, pp. 80.
596 Ibid., Droz, Lever, pp. 81.
597 David Galula, Pacification in Algeria (1956-1958), RAND MG-478-1 (Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 1963), pp. 19.
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Since the first of October, the western Oranie is the wellspring of the troubles tied to a plan driven
by external forces and seeking to extend bit by bit over all of Algeria. Without neglecting the
Constantinois region, where an effort has begun to emerge, it is necessary to extinguish the fire on
the Algerian border with Morocco before it can develop, and, at the same time, prevent centers of
resistance like the one being established on the shores of the Mitidja of Algiers, or the one projected
in the Sahara. This situation demands that I my request for reinforcement, numbering thirty
battalions in my letter of July 4, be fulfilled.598
Though Lorillot focus remained the pursuit of the rebel bands, he endorsed a
move away from Cherriere' s brand of large scale operations in favor of Ducournau's
nomadisation. In a directive dated September 17, 1955, Lorillot argued that, "the only
truly profitable form of operations is the nomadisation of unencumbered, light units,
operating offensively or lying in wait, and moving primarily at night." 599
Two aspects of Lorillot's analysis are noteworthy. The first is his emphasis on
the role of external sponsorship. Like Cherriere, Lorillot remained fixated on the external
origins of the rebellion. The second is his abiding belief that the best hope still lay in
reinforcement rather than alternative strategies. Under Cherriere, a more than 100%
increase in French troop levels had not slowed the spread of the rebellion or arrested the
spiral in violence. Still, Lorillot instinctive response was to expand and refine of the
Model 1 strategy rather than explore alternatives.
By the middle of 1956, however, Lorillot had realized that aggressive pursuit
alone was at best a partial answer. Desperate for an answer to the spread of violence in
rural areas, Lorillot poured ever increasing numbers of conscript units into static
defensive roles. 600 The new quadrillage strategy involved a division of labor between a
network of static units and the elite, mobile units of the theater reserve. The static units,
598 Ibid., Salan, pp. 28.
599 General Lorillot, "Directive aux g6n6raux commandant les divisions, 17 sept. 1955" as cited in Olivier
Hamon, "Chronique du conflit alg6rien 1954-1962, Revue historique des Armies, No. 187 (juin 1992), pp.
37.
600 Michel Hardy, Herv6 Lemoine, Thierry Saramant, Pouvoirpolitique et authoritd militaire en Algirie
franCaise: Hommes, texts, institutions 1945-1962 (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002), pp. 59-60.
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working with the newly established S.A.S. detachments, were to eradicate local guerilla
units and then protect the local populations from new rebel incursions. The units of the
general reserve were to respond to larger concentrations of rebel forces along the
frontiers or in the remote areas of the interior.60 1
The problem, as Cherriere and Lorillot soon realized, was that quadrillage was a
bottomless pit. Writing to the French Defense Minister in June 1955, General Cherriere
identified the inescapable tradeoff between the need to protect the population and furnish
mobile units for pursuit:
Territorial defense demands considerable resources in order to simultaneously lay down a
sufficient network of static units [quadrillage] in the countryside and have at the ready the
necessary means of for mobile intervention. 602
As military commanders in Indochina had discovered a decade earlier, the number of
troops necessary to meet both missions could be enormous. By one French commander's
estimate, it would have taken at 400,000 troops to meet the quadrillage needs and another
50,000 to equip an effective theater reserve.603 In spite of the low and declining returns
on these manpower investments, the high command still clung to the idea that additional
troops might save the French cause.
Escalation was not limited to the material dimension. From the beginning, senior
military officers had chaffed at the legal restrictions on military action in Algeria. The
peacetime framework, with its emphasis on individual rights and judicial process, made it
difficult for French security forces to detain and punish rebels and their supporters.
French commanders frequently arrested suspected guerillas only to find that they were
601 Ibid., Galula, pp. 24; Jean-Charles Jauffret, Soldats en Algirie 1954-1962: Expiriences contrastes des
hommes de contingent (Paris: tditions Autrement, 2000), pp. 108.
602 General Cherribre, "Lettre du g6n6ral Cherribre au ministre de la D6fense nationale, 22 juin 1955," as
cited in Villatoux, La Rpublique et son arme, pp. 338.
603 Ibid., Galula, pp. 24-25.
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released by the authorities a short time later for lack of evidence. Intense lobbying on the
part of the military and the settlers led to the passage of emergency powers bill in April
1956.604 The emergency powers curtailed a wide range of personal and collective
freedoms. The authorities were given the power to control the movement of persons and
goods, establish "forbidden zones" in which no residents were permitted to travel, and
conduct searches and arrests. 605
Though the new powers represented a major departure from peacetime law, the
use of force by local military commanders and police had long since rendered official
regulations moot. Summary justice took a number of forms. At its most benign, it
involved the imposition of minor fines or imprisonment on those suspected of active
involvement with the guerillas. As one French commander pointed out, the absence of
any clear set of guidelines left the local commanders to decide guilt and impose
punishment. 60 6 When French forces were the victims of F.L.N. ambushes, it became
commonplace to punish the closest Muslim community for their assumed complicity.
Punishment could vary from heavy fines to the destruction of the village and forced
resettlement of its inhabitants. 607 That these measures contradicted standing civil and
military injunctions was irrelevant. Local commanders, operating under their own
assumptions about the relationship between force and political behavior, were the real
sovereigns in many local areas.
The treatment of captured guerillas was often severe. Though some commanders
turned captured fighters over to the civil authorities, mounting frustration with the slow
604 Henri Le Mire, Histoire militaire de la guerre d'Algirie (Paris: Albin Michel, 1982), pp. 60; ibid.,
Home, pp. 116.
605 Ibid., Galula, pp. 25.
606 Ibid., Galula, pp. 87.
607 Ibid., Jauffret, Soldats en Algirie 1954-1962, pp. 262, 266.
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and porous judicial system led many to execute them on the spot. In some cases were the
"reflexive actions" of units that had suffered losses at the hands of the rebels. 60 8 In other
cases, local commanders engaged in a more deliberate triage of captured suspects; those
who could be rehabilitated were employed as auxiliaries, while the hard cases were
discreetly executed and their bodies dumped in remote areas.609 The military high
command's calls for the "pitiless punishment of the rebels," 6 10 the ineffectiveness of the
judicial system, and the barbarity of the civil war at the local level made extra-judicial
individual and collective punishments commonplace.
Exploitation in all its forms was a substitute for more extensive exploration of
alternative counterinsurgency strategies. Additional troops and new legal and extralegal
means of increasing pressure on the rebels and their supporters led the French command
to postpone strategic reappraisal even in its least onerous forms. In an official report
dated June 1955, Roger Trinquier, the leader of French maquis efforts in Northern
Tonkin, expressed his frustration with the failure to incorporate seemingly obvious
insights from the war in Indochina:
We are currently fighting in North Africa more or less as we did in Indochina in 1946.
Against an adversary who presents the same characteristics, we apply a maladapted
instrument of war; we always try to crush the fly with the same pile driver.611
Trinquier was not alone in his frustration with the escalatory response. David Galula, a
French officer who had been a military observer in the Chinese and Greek Civil Wars and
the Huk rebellion, noted that the manpower costs of quadrillage and pursuit were fast
approaching the limits of French national resources: "We were apparently caught in a
608 Ibid., Jauffret, Soldats en Alg&rie 1954-1962, pp. 265.
609 Ibid., Jauffret, Soldats en Algirie 1954-1962, pp. 278.
610 General Allard, March 1955, as cited in Ibid., Jauffret, Soldats en Algirie 1954-1962, pp. 259.
611 Roger Trinquier, "Rapport du lieutenant-colonel Trinquier sur l'action mende en Indochine par le
Groupement Mixte d'Intervention," as cited in Villatoux, pp. 338.
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vicious circle from which only strategy could save us." 612 Growing military strength
made direct combat with rebels bands possible, but it did little to address the underlying
problems of pacification. While the number of military skeptics increased with the flow
of experienced units, their influence remained limited so long as the original theory of
victory remained plausible. It would take further deterioration and a change in leadership
to bring these views to the fore.
The persistence of Model 1 strategies over the first two years of the Algerian had
little to do with a shortage of plausible alternatives. A number of heterodox solutions
were present from the beginning, and local commanders had stumbled onto many of the
building blocks of the late war strategies - nomadisation, quadrillage, S.A.S., and
Muslim auxiliaries (harkis). In spite of the promising results of local experiments, and
the mounting evidence of the limits of conventional response, the military command
proved remarkably resistant to alternative solutions. In the presence of rising manpower,
tactical success, and minimal civilian participation, the search for alternatives was
indefinitely delayed.
Durcissement and the Death of Integration
Though Soustelle had outlined a policy and assembled the tools to implement it,
his vision was to prove short lived. The French military never fully accepted Soustelle's
proscriptions on collective responsibility and repression, and pied noir leaders were
suspicious of his calls for political reform. As Soustelle sought to overcome political and
bureaucratic resistance in his own camp, the F.L.N.'s decided to escalate the level of
violence by targeting French civilians. The resulting Philippeville massacre, and the
612 Ibid., Galula, pp. 25.
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military repression that followed, sealed the fate of Soustelle's integration policy.
Neither the army nor the colon population could endorse a policy that granted
concessions to a savagely violent Muslim, population; Muslim moderates, for their part,
could not embrace the authority of a state that meted out blind repression in retaliation for
F.L.N. excesses. The F.L.N. had successfully derailed the only pre-1959 French strategy
predicated on the consent of the governed. Philippeville marked the beginning of a
durcissement or hardening of French strategy and policy in Algeria.
While the military had tolerated Soustelle's initiatives in the political sphere, they
bridled at his restrictions on the use of force. Soustelle, like Mitterand and Mendis-
France, had always emphasized the risks of blind repression. In his standing instructions,
Soustelle explained the importance of restraint:
If the repression must be rapid and vigorous with respect to the terrorists, it must at the same
time be just, for all errors would alienate who are in fact the victims or witnesses of terror.
Certainly, in action, innocents may be attacked. It is inevitable, for example, that "porters"
requisitioned by the rebels and accompanying an armed group might be subjected to the fire
of our weapons.
But, outside the context of combat, humanity retakes its rights, and all blind reprisal is
formally proscribed... The individuals arrested, whether their culpability is certain or
probable, are to be handed over to qualified authorities: police, gendarmerie, civil
administrators, military officers of Algerian affairs [S.A.S.].
No one can substitute themselves for these authorities in order to reestablish order or punish
the guilty.... Any idea of vengeance is to be dismissed.
Police operations (searches, arrests, transfers, interrogations) must be conducted without
brutality. Never hold the crimes of the few against a group. Verifications of identity and
various inspections must be performed under the same conditions for all, without racial
discrimination.... Every violation of human dignity, every injury, every physical cruelty is
rigorously prohibited. 61
Soustelle's admonitions had little effect on a military convinced of the need for decisive
action. Faced with their inability to stamp out the rebellion in its opening stages, the
military attacked the remaining legal and procedural restrictions. In a letter to General
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613 Ibid., Soustelle, pp. 232-233.
Allard dated May 14, 1955, General Cherribre, the senior commander in Algeria, directed
his subordinate to ignore Soustelle's standing orders:
I delegate you powers to decide, depending circumstances, employment machine-guns,
rockets and bombs, on bands in rebellion zone. Collective responsibility to be vigorously
applied. There will be no written instruction given by the Governor. 6 14
As in Indochina, the military employed collective responsibility under the assumption
that it would contribute to pacification. The exercise of force, whether selective or
general, would tend to cow local populations into submission and leave the guerillas
exposed to betrayal or direct military action.
The settlers and the police were scarcely more supportive of Soustelle's policies.
Soustelle's plans for large scale land reform were stymied by the pied noir elites who
opposed changes on economic and social grounds. 615 The leaders of the pied noir
community actively resisted political reforms that would weaken their hold on power and
extend political equality to the Muslim majority. The elites who had successfully
blocked the political reforms of 1947 were unwilling to surrender the same ground in the
context of a violent rebellion. The police, largely pied noir and military by
background,616 shared the colons' political views and the military's sensibilities regarding
the use of force. The police generally shared the European population's belief in the
basic inferiority of the Muslim population and their prior military training gave the
Algerian police to a quasi-military bent.
The Philippeville massacres brought to a head the military, police and settler
resistance to integration. The local F.L.N. commander, Zighoud Youssef, desperate to
stimulate Muslim support, planned to provoke French overkill by targeting European
614 Ibid., Horne, pp. 113-114; ibid., Droz, Lever, pp. 74.
615 Ibid., Droz, Lever, pp. 95.
616 Ibid, Peyroulou, pp. 149.
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civilians. In a wave of attacks launched on August 20, 1955, the F.L.N. fighters and local
supporters killed 123 people, 71 of whom were European. The vast majority of the
European dead came from a mining settlement at El Halia. Whipped up by F.L.N. claims
that the Egyptians and the Americans were preparing to land nearby to complete the
liberation of Algeria, 6 17 local Muslim workers helped the guerillas kill and mutilate
dozens of men, women and children.
The appalling scenes at El Halia provoked an almost instantaneous wave of
military, police and settler retaliation. According to Paul Aussaresses, one of the military
commanders on the scene, French troops summarily executed large numbers of guerillas
and their suspected collaborators. 6 18 Estimates of the number of Muslims killed in the
wake of the massacre vary considerably; official French reports put the total at 1,273
killed in the military actions while the F.L.N. claimed that some 12,000 had been
killed.6 19 The military crack down revealed the latent tension between Soustelle's desire
to limit collateral damage and the army's insistence on the primacy of military concerns.
Writing in 1956, Soustelle described his decision to deny the use of bombing against
rebel strongholds in the days after Philippeville:
A dozen mechtas [Algerian hamlets] were pinpointed, thanks to prisoner interrogations and
the observations of the military, as serving as rebel bases of operations. From a purely
military point of view, and in a "normal" war, nothing would have been more justified than
to destroy them by bombing them from high altitude. This is what the military leaders
pressed me to order, and, within the limits of their technique, they were right. But I had to
weigh, in the face of their arguments and the demands of the moment, the fact that these
617 G6n6ral Paul Aussaresses, Les services spdciaux, Algirie 1955-1957 (Paris: Perrin, 2001), pp. 65.
618 Ibid., Aussaresses, pp. 64-69; Pierre Leulliette, John Edmonds (tr.), St. Michael and the Dragon:
Memoirs of a Paratrooper (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), pp. 149-152.
619 As in the case of the S6tif massacres, it is hard to establish a clear and unbiased figure for the number of
Muslim dead. The official figure of 1,273 is probably on the low end, but the F.L.N. figure may well have
been inflated for dramatic effect. Paul Aussaresses, who participated in the post-massacre crack down, put
the total number of FLN dead at 500. British historian Anthony Clayton estimates that the total number
was probably between two and three thousand. As at S6tif, it is safe to say that the number of Muslim dead
was many multiples that of the European dead (Sources: Droz, Lever, pp. 77; General Paul Aussaresses,
Services Speciaux, Algerie 1955-1957 (Paris: Perrin, 2001), pp. 69; ibid., Le Mire, pp. 34).
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enemy bases were not forts but villages where, without a doubt, many innocents lived
alongside the guilty. I decided in the end, in spite of the risks that our troops would have to
run, to attack the mechtas with infantry. 620
Soustelle's account of the collision of civilian and military opinion is revealing on two
counts. First, he draws a clear distinction between what he terms "normal" war and the
campaign in Algeria. Second, he acknowledges the qualified validity of the military's
solution. In the context of normal war, the application of firepower would be eminently
sensible; in the context, the rules of military cause and political effect were
fundamentally different. It was this categorical distinction, and the lack of a parallel
distinction in most military circles, that explained the mounting friction between civil and
military authorities.
After Philippeville
The Philippeville massacre and the repression that followed spelled the end of
liberal integration and the high watermark of civilian policy leadership in Algeria. The
idea of ceding political equality had lost any promise in the eyes of the settlers, and even
Soustelle had begun to question the wisdom of concession in the face of unrestrained
violence. Military and police leaders bent of crushing the rebel bands and their
supporters increasingly ignored formal strictures on the use of force. While the
constructive elements of Soustelle's mixed strategy remained, the counterinsurgency
campaign began to travel on parallel tracks. The military and police, emboldened by the
doubling of the number of French troops in Algeria, waged an offensive, military
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campaign to crush the insurgency. Soustelle and his reformers sought to address the
social and economic plight through various relief and development programs.
The already weakened edifice of civilian control received two additional blows in
February 1956. Prime Minister Mollet's decision to replace Soustelle with General
Catroux, the administrator who had overseen the end of French rule in Morocco, was
seen by the settler community as an unmistakable move towards the surrender of
l'Algiriefrangaise. The ensuing demonstrations in Algiers forced Mollet to withdraw
Catroux's appointment and install a new candidate, Robert Lacoste. The settlers' success
in effectively overturning the metropolitan government's appointment of a Governor
General set the precedent for future settler vetoes of central government policy. At the
end of February, General Guillaume, the French Chief of the Joint Staff and General
Zeller, the Chief of the Army Staff, tendered their resignations in protest over delays in
reinforcements to the army in Algeria. 621 These two shocks, one from the settlers and the
other from the military, set a pattern would hold from 1956 to the end of the war. While
civilians retained nominal control over strategy and policy, they assumed a junior role in
debates dominated by the settlers and military leaders.
Though Lacoste did not repudiate Soustelle's policy of integration, 622 the scope
and scale of the rebellion, the influx of French military reinforcements, and the extension
of new emergency powers made the pull of escalation irresistible. Between Philippeville
in August 1955 and the arrival of General Salan in December 1956, the French military
under Lorillot made a final attempt to resolve the uprising by force of numbers and
ruthlessness. The arrival of increasing numbers of conscripts enabled the local command
621 Ibid., Droz, Lever, pp. 95, fn. 1.
622 Lacoste appointed Colonel Ducournau, the father of nomadisation and a Model I advocate, his military
adviser in the new cabinet (Source: Droz, Lever, pp. 91).
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to garrison ever larger swathes of the countryside and to expand the scale and intensity of
pursuit operations. The passage of the emergency powers legislation in April 1955 gave
the Governor General and his subordinates new and sweeping powers over movement,
commerce, assembly, search and detention.623
On the military front, official guidance encouraged an increasingly ruthless
prosecution of the war in the countryside. In a July 1, 1955 directive on "the attitude to
adopt vis-a-vis the rebels in Algeria," General Koenig the French Minister of Defense,
advocated "a military reaction 'More brutal, more rapid, and more complete."' Koenig
indicated that all suspects using weapons or seen with weapons in hand were to be shot
on the spot and that troops should open fire on all fleeing suspects. 624 The day after the
emergency powers law was enacted, civilian prefects were formally authorized to
delegate their powers to local military authorities. 625 With these official sanctions, the
military was able to bypass or supplant civil authority in the prosecution of the war.
Phase 3: Algeria as Revolutionary War
By the close of 1956, the failure of French policy and strategy had become clear
to most observers. Soustelle's policy of liberal integration seemed increasingly unreal in
the polarized environment of ethnic violence and the military's return to escalation had
been equally ineffective. 626 In spite of countless tactical victories over the scattered and
623 "Loi no 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 instituant un 6tat d'urgence et en ddclarant l'application en Algdrie,
Journal officiel du 7 avril 1955," pp. 3479-3480 as reproduced in Michel Hardy, Herve Lemine, Thierry
Sarmant, Pouvoir Politique et Authorit Militaire en Algiriefranqaise: Hommes, Textes, Institutions 1945-
1962 (Paris: Service Historique de 'Armde de Terre, 2002), pp. 147-151.
624 General Kenig as cited in Raphaille Branche, "La torture pendant la guerre d'Alg6rie" in Mohammed
Harbi, Benjamin Stora, La guerre d'Algirie (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2004), pp. 556-557; Sylvie Th6nault,
Historie de la guerre d'inddpendance algirienne (Paris: Flammarion, 2005), pp. 100-101.
625 Ibid., Th6nault, pp. 59.
626 General Marcel Bigeard, Pour une parcelle de gloire (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1975), pp. 219.
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militarily weak insurgents, the French authorities had been unable to stem the rapid
increase in the strength and geographical reach of the rebellion.
The new military commander, General Salan, brought a decisive shift in French
military strategy. Whereas French counterinsurgency strategy in the first two phases of
the war had focused on the military wing of the rebellion, the new strategy identified the
local population as the campaign's true center of gravity. Under Salan's leadership,
French forces used new psychological weapons to break the hold of the rebels over the
population and restore French authority. Salan's arrival brought with it new strategies
and new operational innovations, both owing a good deal to his own experiences in the
later phases of Indochina. If, as Trinquier had quipped, the first two years of the Algerian
war had been a replay of Indochina circa 1946, then the coming of Salan was a leap
forward to Indochina circa 1953.
The results of Salan's Model 2 strategies were mixed. On the one hand, strategy
appeared to arrest the slide the deterioration in French fortunes. Salan's initiatives,
particularly those in the areas of pacification and border control, appeared to arrest and
even reverse the spread of the rebellion. Major operational successes in the Battle of
Algiers (1957) and the Battle of the Frontiers (1958) inflicted great damage on the FLN
and appeared to validate many of the core elements of the new French strategy. On the
other hand, it was unclear whether these results were decisive or permanent. French
authorities exercised physical control over an increasing share of the Muslim population,
but they were unable to get an unbiased indication of the stability or permanence of that
control. Population control had also involved a sweeping militarization of French
administration. From the declaration of martial law in Algiers in 1957 through the
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decision to grant Salan unified civil and military powers in 1958, this period saw the
progressive diminution of the remaining elements of civilian control in strategy and
policy. By the end of Salan's tenure in late 1958, the stage had been set for a final wave
of offensives against the remaining rebels inside Algeria. Though the French had not
brought the rebellion to an end, the military had managed to contain it. What is more, the
military had convinced itself that complete success was within reach. But containment
by force is not the same as the establishment of legitimate authority. As the French
would discover, the force levels necessary to impose direct rule and suppress violence are
massive and the results fleeting.
From Escalation to Search: Trends and Episodes
It was a combination of trends and episodes that precipitated the shift in French
strategy in late 1956. By that time, the major trends in the rebellion were negative.
Whether measured in terms of rebel attacks, end strength, or unit size, the FLN appeared
to be gaining momentum. Since these trends appeared immune to the massive escalation
in French manpower and the loosening of official and unofficial strictures on the use of
force, the Model 1 strategy had reached its logical limit.
While these trends set the stage for a change in strategy, two major shocks in the
fall of 1956 accelerated the move to Salan's Model 2 strategy. The first involved the
French capture of the external leadership of the F.L.N. on October 22, 1956. Acting
without the approval of either the Governor-General or the Prime Minister, Generals
Lorillot and Beaufre approved a plan to intercept the F.L.N. delegation en route between
Morocco and Tunisia. The French pilot of the civilian airliner agreed to land the plane in
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Algiers rather than Tunis, delivering Ben Bella and several of his high ranking colleagues
into the hands of the French authorities. While the Prime Minister and President were
outraged by this military power grab, they had little choice but to accept the outcome.
The military's rationale was twofold. First, the seizure might decapitate the FLN
movement and sever its ties with Nasser. Second, the capture would make French
negotiations with the FLN impossible. With the movement's leaders in custody, there
was no way that the civilian government could carry on secret talks leading to federalism
or Algerian independence.
The results of the seizure were at once disappointing and ominous. The capture
did not cripple the FLN. As the documents seized from the leaders revealed, Ben Bella
was not the undisputed leader of the FLN and his removal did little to upset rebel
operations inside Algeria. Furthermore, the capture of Ben Bella removed the most
moderate element, inadvertently swinging power to the more radical faction led by
Ramdane Abbane. 627 The seizure also provoked heated reactions in Tunisia and
Morocco. Whatever role these states might have played in pressuring the FLN to
negotiate on terms favorable to France had been lost. From this point onward, both
former French territories would act as sponsors of the FLN rather than intermediaries or
advocates of French policy.
The same fixation on the external dimension of the Algerian rebellion led the
French to embark on the Suez expedition of November 1956. Nasser's decision to
nationalize the Suez canal in July 1956 had provoked strong reactions throughout the
West and led to a curious alliance among the United Kingdom, France and Israel.
627 Ibid., Meynier, Histoire Intdrieure du FLN, pp. 195.
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Though the parties each had distinct and only partially overlapping objectives,62 8 the
primary French motivation was Algeria. There was a consensus among French civil and
military leaders that the Egyptians had sponsored the outbreak and subsequent expansion
of the rebellion. Even Jacques Soustelle, who, more than any other French leader,
appreciated the role that domestic discontent had played, argued in a July 1956 article
that Nasser saw the Algerian rebellion as his "most important task" in a broader African
campaign of "agitation and subversion." 629
Though we now know that Nasser's role was relatively limited,630 French elites of
the time saw Egypt as the China of the Algerian war. Egyptian agitation neatly explained
how a passive and fundamentally pro-French Algerian population could rise up in
organized revolt against the authorities. 631 This condescending view of popular
motivation and radical strength was also reassuring on a prescriptive level; a rebellion
that was external in inspiration could be defeated by external action. The seizure on
October 16, 1956 of an Egyptian yacht, the Athos, bearing a sizeable arms shipment,
appeared to confirm Cairo's central role in Algeria.632
Convinced of Nasser's central role, the French leadership saw a strike on Egypt as
one way out of the Algerian quagmire. In its final form, the plot combined an Israeli
ground invasion of the Sinai with French and British amphibious landings and air drops
(Operation Musketeer) to secure the Suez canal. In retrospect, the strategic reasoning of
628 For a more complete account of the motives of the three players, see Keith Kyle, Suez (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1991).
629 Jacques Soustelle, "La r6bellion alg6rienne dans le cadre du pan-arabisme," Revue de Defense Nationale
(juillet 1956).
630 Robert Holland, "dirty wars: Algeria and Cyprus compared, 1954-1962," in Charles-Robert Ageron,
Marc Michel (eds.) L'are des decolonisations: S9lection de texts du colloque <<Dcolonisations compardes>>
Aix-en-Provence, 30 septembre-3 octobre 1993 (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1995), pp. 40.
631 Ibid., Droz, pp. 103;
632 Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origin of the
Post-Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 114; ibid., Le Mire, pp. 92; ibid., Horne 158.
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the three parties appears deeply flawed. A modest operation that was limited to the Sinai
and the Canal Zone was unlikely to topple the regime. A more direct and aggressive bid
to unseat Nasser might precipitate a new guerilla campaign in Egypt. Neither outcome
bring a speedy resolution in Algeria. As the French commander of the expedition, later
acknowledged, even regime change in Egypt would only have opened breathing room for
overdue political reform in Algeria. Given the weakness of the Fourth Republic and the
vocal opposition of the pied noir lobby, it seems unlikely that a victory at Suez would
have improved the French position in Algeria. 633
The eventual French and British operation against the canal zone was a military
success and a political disaster. While the allied troops easily overwhelmed the Egyptian
air and land forces, the U.S. reacted sharply to the expedition. Through overt financial
and diplomatic pressure, the U.S. forced the two powers to withdraw from Egypt. An
operation that had been designed to relieve pressure in Algeria had backfired. The
diversion of the bulk of the French theater reserve in Algeria into the training and
execution of Musketeer had forced a five month pause in offensive operations inside
Algeria. 634 The humiliating withdrawal of allied forces from Suez demonstrated French
vulnerability to international pressure, a point that was not lost on an FLN leadership
whose chances of outright military victory in Algeria remained slim. The circumstances
633 Andr6 Beaufre, The Suez Expedition 1956 (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 144-145.
634 The forces of the theater reserve began planning for Operation Musketeer on August 7, 1956 and
returned to Algeria on or about December 25, 1956 - a period of 140 days (Source: Jean Delmas, La
Bataille d'Alger (Paris: Larousse, 2007), pp. 39-40; Lieutenant-colonel Claude Carr6, "Aspects
op6rationnels du conflit Alg6rien 1954-1960," Revue historique des Armees, Vol. 166, No. 1 (mars 1987),
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of the withdrawal fueled the military's resentment of a seemingly impotent civil
leadership. 635
The capture of Ben Bella and the Suez expedition had sprung from a shared
understanding of the rebellion. Both were predicated on a belief that the rebellion was
external in origin and that the elimination of the leadership or the state sponsor could tip
the scales of the counterinsurgency campaign inside Algeria. The manifest failure of
both operations delivered the final blow to an already shaky French strategy, drawing
attention to the deterioration of the struggle inside Algeria and the fruitlessness of
attempts to resolve it through external action. The French had pursued four avenues in
Algeria in the first two years of the war: military response, political reform and
repression, decapitation of the external leadership, and direct attack on external
sponsors. 636 All these avenues were now shut. While the need for an alternative strategy
was starkly apparent, that strategy would be confined to Algeria proper.
If the negative trends in Algeria and the shock of Suez provided the impetus for
search, it was the military and the Indochina veterans in particular who directed it. The
increasing scale of the military effort and civilian abdication of police and administrative
functions left the military to chart its own course. While Lacoste and the metropolitan
government did little to interfere or block military initiatives, it was increasingly clear
that the army and not the civil government was the senior partner in Algerian policy and
counterinsurgency strategy.
635 John Talbott, The War Without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962 (New York: Knopf, 1980), pp.
71-72; Gdndral Maurice Challe, Notre Rdvolte (Paris: Presses de la Citd, 1968), pp. 25-32.636 This list does not include the Mollet government's secret negotiations with the FLN exterior leadership
in the spring and summer of 1956. Though these talks made some progress, they did not overcome the
major issues of elections, self-determination and the role of FLN in these matters. French commitment to
these talks remains unclear, and some historians have argued that they were simply an attempt to divert
Algerian attention from the UN (Source: Droz, Lever, pp. 99-102).
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General Salan's appointment as the military commander in Algeria in December
1956 signaled the return of the Indochina veterans. While various veterans of Indochina
had played important roles at the local and even senior levels in the first two years of the
war, Salan brought with him a set of advisers steeped in the doctrine of la guerre
revolutionnaire. Salan and his staff believed that the key to the Algerian war, and the lost
opportunity of the Indochina war, lay in a shift from conventional combat to the political
warfare of their onetime enemies, the Viet Minh. With the growing influx of Indochina
veterans, the French army was increasingly receptive to this alternative paradigm. The
presence of powerful advocates in Paris, including the Chief of Staff, General Ely,637
buttressed Salan's shift from Model 1 to Model 2. Having played out the Model 1
solution to its logical and material limits, the army now turned to the Model 2
experiments of Indochina as the answer to the Algerian dilemma.
Politics as war by other means: Salan's Model 2 Strategy
General Salan's strategy had four principal components: the isolation of the
Algerian battlefield, the imposition of order in major urban areas, aggressive rural
pacification through psychological action, and the pursuit of ALN guerillas in their
sanctuaries. 638 Though Salan's strategy drew on the pioneering efforts of earlier
commanders, his put population control and psychological operations ahead of traditional
pursuit operations represented a clear break with Model 1 in favor of Model 2. The
637 From his sponsorship of the Indochina lessons learned volume through the course of the Algerian war,
General Ely was firmly committed to the concept of la guerre r6volutionnaire and the use of psychological
operations to bolster friendly morale and undermine the insurgent enemy. Colonel Lacheroy, the most
prominent theorist of G,R was a member of Ely's staff from 1956 through 1958 (Sources: Andre-Paul
Comor, "Le g6n6ral Ely et la guerre d'Alg6rie," Revue historique des Armies, No. 229 (d6cembre 2002),
pp. 83-92.
638 Ibid., Salan, pp. 57-58; ibid., Galula, pp. 62-63.
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French army had moved from a Model 1 strategy that denied the importance of mass
politics to one made the imposition of a new brand of authoritarian politics the
centerpiece of French strategy.
Political Indoctrination and Model 2
Salan's strategy rested on a belief in the centrality of politics in revolutionary war.
While a number of Indochina veterans and military theorists shared this belief, not all
soldiers embraced the new gospel. In spite of the defeat in Indochina and the rapid
deterioration of the French position in the first two years of the war, many officers
remained wedded to a Model 1 conception of the war and skeptical of Salan's Model 2
reformulation. 639
Salan's answer to this skepticism was political re-education. Taking the existing
Center for Pacification and Counter-Guerilla Training (CIPCG) at Arzew, a school
established by General Lorillot in December 1955 to prepare newly assigned officers and
non-commissioned officers for the tactical challenges of the war in Algeria, Salan made
its primary mission the transmission of the gospel of GR. 640 Salan directed all
prospective commanders to attend the CIPG in the hope that this psychological warfare
training would convert skeptics into effective cadres for the new doctrine:
Henceforth...every officer posted to ... [Algeria] who is liable to be assigned command of a
sector, a district, or a section will undertake a period of training at the CIPCG. The emphasis
will be placed on psychological action so as to persuade the future leaders of the pacification
effort that regaining the population's adherence to France constitutes the ultimate stake in the
struggle being waged in Algeria. In this vein, I have laid down to the generals in command
of the army corps in Algeria that they shall send elite officers who have particularly excelled
639 Ibid., Salan, pp. 231.
640", Lt. Colonel Fr6d6ric Guelton, "The French Army "Centre for Training and Preparation in Counter-
Guerilla Warfare' (CIPCG) at Arzew" in Martin S. Alexander, J.F.V. Keiger, France and the Algerian War
1954-1962: Strategy, Operations, and Diplomacy (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), pp. 37; ibid.,
Villatoux, pp. 442-443.
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in command, to Arzew for short periods during which they will give talks and direct the
discussions among those on the course.M64
Salan argued that psychological tools would enable the army to influence political events
inside Algeria and in metropolitan France:
The accent will be placed on the psychological action that needs to be initiated or followed
through. These notions are not given much attention in the teaching at the training schools in
metropolitan France. It is important, therefore, to instill it in the cadres who are coming into
the theatre because, here, the stake in the struggle we are engaged in lies not just in the
destruction of an armed enemy and a political enemy, but above all in winning back the
population of France.642
The school's new commander, Lieutenant Colonel Bruge, took a curriculum that
had been focused exclusively on counter-guerilla tactics 643 and recast it as a course in
political warfare. This political instruction had three distinct effects. First, it focused
professional officers on a new set of explicitly political topics, many of which were
integral to successful pacification. Second, it implanted a specific set of political ideas
that emphasized the importance of psychological coercion and potentially extralegal
means. The recognition that Algeria was a "political" war did not alter the military's
underlying belief in coercion as the primary logical framework. Instead, "political" war
meant the addition of new weapons, chiefly propaganda and resettlement, and an
expansion in the set of legitimate targets to include the civil population. And third, the
Arzew curriculum suggested that the French polity and political leadership were
legitimate and necessary targets in the Army's psychological warfare campaign. Implicit
in this characterization of the French polity was the messianic role of the professional
military. Together, these ideas provided the justification for the authoritarian pacification
641 General Salan, letter no. 4399, to the Minister Resident for Algeria (9 September 1957), 1H 2523,
dossier 1, SHAT as quoted in Guelton, "The French Army 'Centre for Training and Preparation in Counter-
Guerilla Warfare' (CIPCG) at Arzew," pp. 41-42.
642 General Salan, Directive no. 4 233/RM 10/PSY (1 October 1957) on reform of CIPCG, 1H 2523, SHAT
as quoted in Guelton, pp. 42.
643 As late as December 1956, the center devoted just 14% of its curriculum to political or psychological
warfare (ibid., Guelton, pp. 38).
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campaigns of the late war and an equally compelling rationale for military disobedience
after 1958.
The Arzew experiment also highlighted the gap between civilian and military
understandings of the political dimension of the war. For civilian leaders, politics meant
bargaining: the use of incentives and threats to convince a party to accept a desired
political outcome, in this case the political integration of Algeria and France. For the
military, politics meant coercion in a novel context. To paraphrase Clausewitz, politics
was an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will. 644 Propaganda, authoritarian
organization and resettlement were non-lethal weapons used to compel the submission of
unwilling opponents; they were not tools for a negotiation between equal or consenting
parties. The legitimate targets for such weapons were far broader, including not only the
native Algerian population but also the French population and political establishment.
For the military, the incorporation of political considerations did not lead to a change in
the logical framework of the profession; instead it meant that politics would be pursued
as war by other means.
Isolating the battlefield: The Morice Line
To make cumulative progress in pacification, the French had to find a way to seal
the borders with Tunisia and Morocco. It was the availability of weapons and sanctuaries
that had made possible the rapid of expansion of the ALN in 1955 and 1956. The
independence of Tunisia and Morocco in 1956 had made the problem far more difficult.
644 Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Howard, Peter Paret (ed., tr.), On War (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1984), pp. 75.
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Long and porous borders, 645 and weak or sympathetic host governments, enabled the
FLN to move men and weapons into and out of Algeria with relative impunity.646 Since
Muslim volunteers were abundant at this time, the binding constraint on the expansion of
the revolt was military weaponry. 647 By the end of 1956, with roughly 800 weapons a
month moving into Algeria across the two land borders, 64 8 the viability of internal
pacification was increasingly in doubt. Even with the eightfold expansion in French
troop levels between 1954 and 1957 (50,000 in October 1954 to 400,000 by 1957), the
French lacked the forces to seal the eastern and western borders using traditional
methods.
Starting in 1956, the local commanders in the border regions began to explore the
use of barrier systems to interrupt the free flow of men and materiel. The systems started
as local experiments with relatively simple barbed wire obstacles along the Moroccan
border. In spite of considerable resistance from a skeptical high command, 649 a local
commander, Colonel Durr, began in January 1957 to build a 14 km line of improved
obstacles that incorporated mines and electrified fences. 650 Though this small array did
not stop rebel infiltration entirely, the combination of mines and electrification enabled
645 The usable border between Tunisia and Algeria stretched some 380 km from the Mediterranean to the
relatively impassable Sahara desert in the south. In the west, the Moroccan border ran some 550 km from
the sea to the desert (Source: G6n6ral Jean Delmas, "L'volution des barrages frontibres en Alg6rie: La
Bataille des Frontibres," Revue internationale d'histoire militaire, Vol. 76, 1997, pp. 56).
646 G6ndral Charles Ailleret, Gindral du Contingent: En Algerie 1961-1962 (Paris; Bernard Grasset, 1998),
pp. 22-24.
647 Ibid., Galula, Pacification, pp. 61.648 General Maurice Faivre, "L'ALN extdrieure face aux barrages frontaliers," Revue internationale
d'histoire militaire, Vol. 76, 1997, pp. 95-96.
649 Senior commanders initially resisted these initiatives on the grounds that a "Maginot line" would not
solve the ALN infiltration problem. These same commanders worried that the ALN would be able to steal
mines along the border and use them against French forces inside Algeria (Source: Delmas, "L'volution
des barrages," pp. 56).
650Contre-amiral Bernard Estival, "Origines et 6volution du barrage 61ectrifi6 a la frontibre Alg6ro-
marocaine: l'exemple du 3e bataillon de la demi-brigade de fusiliers marins," Revue internationale
d'histoire militaire, Vol. 76, 1997, pp. 151; Ibid., Delmas, pp. 57.
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the commander to identify infiltration attempts and employ his reaction forces more
effectively. In the month following the installation, six of the eleven major FLN attempts
to breach this stretch of the Moroccan frontier failed entirely.6 51
The promise of these early experiments, and the accelerating flow of arms and
men across the Tunisian border in 1957,6 52 led Salan and the Defense Minister Andr6
Morice to endorse the application of the barrier principle on a grand scale.653 The
construction of large scale electrified fences and minefields along the Tunisian border in
the summer and fall of 1957 fundamentally altered the nature of the infiltration problem.
FLN leaders in Tunisia found it increasingly difficult to maintain the flows of men and
materiel necessary to maintain the armed struggle within Algeria. For the French high
command, the barriers made cumulative progress in the pacification campaign feasible.
This shift in the terms of rebel supply set the stage for the largest military clashes
of the Algerian war. Initially dismissive of the French system, the ALN command
realized by the end of 1957 that the survival of the internal struggle depended on
overcoming the challenge of the barriers. 654 Determined to bring infiltration along the
Tunisian border to an end, General Salan gave General Vanuxem the bulk of the French
theater reserve, including five airborne regiments, to bring the ALN forces to battle along
the Morice line.655 From January to May 1958, these mobile forces fought a series of
pitched battles in front of and behind the eastern (Tunisian) obstacle belts. The ALN,
desperate to maintain contact with its units inside Algeria, threw entire companies and
651Ibid., Estival, pp. 153.652 By mid-1957 the FLN was moving 2,000 individuals and 1,000 weapons across the Tunisian border
each month (Source: Delmas, "L'tvolution des barrages," pp. 57-58).
653 Ibid., Salan, pp. 64-65.
654 Ibid., Meynier, pp. 296.
655 Ibid., Delmas, pp. 60; ibid., Le Mire, pp. 198
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battalions at the barriers in an attempt to breach or bypass the lines. The concentration of
ALN forces and the availability of large mobile forces enabled the French to fight the
ALN forces on quasi-conventional terms.
By the end of the ALN push in May 1958, the rebels had suffered a crippling
defeat. On the military balance sheet alone the results of the "Battle of the Frontiers"
were stark; for a loss of 279 French dead and 758 wounded, the French had managed to
kill 4,000 ALN fighters, capture nearly 600 others and inflict an estimated 1,000
additional casualties. 656 In the process, the French captured some 350 crew served
weapons and nearly 3,000 individual weapons. More important still, the Battle of the
Frontiers put an end to large scale FLN infiltration from the base areas. From 1958
through the end of the war, the number of armed rebels stranded in Tunisian and
Moroccan base areas rose dramatically as French offensives inside Algeria pummeled
remaining ALN forces of the interior. The interruption of supply led to greater tension
between the FLN exterior leadership and the ALN forces trapped inside the country.
The French command continued to improve the barrier systems from 1957
through the end of the war. Though the core remained the electrified fence lines, the
barriers evolved into complex systems of mines, ground surveillance radars, mechanized
and airmobile reaction forces, and fixed wing aviation that gave the French a genuine
cooperative engagement capability. 657 Many rebel attempts to breach the barriers were
detected by ground surveillance radars and aircraft long before the rebels reached the
fence line. This enabled the French to respond to the attempted penetration with air
656 Ibid., Le Mire, 217-218; ibid., Meynier, pp. 297; ibid., Faivre, pp. 98; ibid., Horne, pp. 266.
657 Philippe Alix, "Une technologies nouvelle pendant la guerre d'Alg6rie: Le systhme radars-canons sur le
barrage alg6ro-tunisien (1957-1962)," Revue internationale d'histoire militaire, Vol. 76, 1997, pp. 171-
187; ibid., Salan, pp. 221-228; ibid., Le Mire, pp. 197.
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mobile troops, armored cars or artillery fire.658 When the rebels reached the electrified
fence, the interruption of electrical current alerted the mobile reach forces. At the cost of
some x MM francs and a dedicated force of 80,000 troops, the French had managed to
isolate the Algerian battlefield. This isolation made possible the aggressive pacification
campaigns of General Challe in 1959 and 1960.
Order in Urban Areas: The Battles ofAlgiers (January-October 1957)
The FLN's decision in 1956 to bring the war to the streets of the capital Algiers
set the stage for one of the climactic battles of the war. Unable to control the spiral of
violence, Lacoste called on Generals Salan and Massu restore order in the city. Using a
combination of force, authoritarian control and organization of the population, and
psychological operations, they managed to crush the FLN cells in Algiers and impose
order in the capital. Dramatic success in Algiers convinced Salan that these strategies
were a viable template for the entire campaign. The battle also marked a new high point
in military power and confidence. Called upon to salvage a seemingly hopeless security
situation, the army emerged from the battle convinced of its basic superiority over a weak
and divided civil apparatus.
The battle of Algiers had its roots in a tit for tat escalation between French
authorities and the increasingly radical FLN. The French decision to step up the judicial
execution of captured FLN leaders prompted Ramdane Abane to order the leaders of the
658 For examples of successful and unsuccessful ALN breaches of the barrier lines, see Mohammed Harbi,
Gilbert Meynier, Le FLN: Documents et Histoire, 1954-1962 (Paris: Fayard, 2004), pp. 88-92, and Matelot
Jer6me Souverain, "L'opdration dans le Djebel du Mzi, Un bin6me de choc: h6licoptbres de l'adronautique
navale et groupement des commandos maritime (7 mai 1960)," Revue historique des armies, no 200
(septembre 1995), pp. 119-126.
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FLN network in Algiers, Ben M'Hidi and Yacef Saadi, to attack French civilians. 659 In
the space of five says in late June, the FLN assassinated 49 European civilians; this
prompted pied noir vigilantes to bomb a suspected FLN safe house in the Casbah, killing
70 Muslims.660 With 150 militants and some 5,000 supporters in greater Algiers,661 the
FLN opted in September to escalate to the use of bombs against European civilian
targets.
The French civil authorities were unable to control the escalation in violence.
Lacoste and the Mollet government feared that rising disorder in Algiers might fatally
undermine the French war efforts. The chaos in the capital contributed to the impression,
at home and abroad, that Algeria was a lost cause. On the local level, Lacoste feared that
his inability to stop FLN violence might ignite a full blown race war between pied noirs
and the Muslims. 662
With no end in sight and indications of an FLN general strike planned to coincide
with the opening of the UN session on January 28, 1957,663 Lacoste turned to his
generals. On January 7, 1957, Lacoste officially transferred sweeping civil powers to
659 Ibid., Delmas, La bataille d'Alger, pp. 37; ibid., Meynier, pp. 322-323.
660 Ibid., Horne, pp. 183-184; ibid., Delmas, pp. 39.
661 There is considerable disagreement about the total number of armed insurgents and supporters in
Algiers. John Talbott argues that the number of militants was considerably smaller, falling somewhere
between 100 and 150 (ibid., Talbott, pp. 80). The Algerian historian, Mohamed Teguia estimates that there
were 200fedayin and five major leaders in the capital; Jean Delmas agrees that the total number of fighters
was small but that the number of supporters was much higher (ibid., Delmas, pp. 70). Roger Trinquier, the
French staff officer charged with organization of the First Battle of Algiers, put the total number of
insurgents considerably higher: 1,200 armed insurgents and 4,500 supporters (Colonel Roger Trinquier, Le
Temps Perdu (Paris: Albin Michel, 1978), pp.243).
662 Paul Aussaresses, the officer in charge of Massu's interrogation and direct action teams states that
Massu had been informed of a pied noir plot to burn the Casbah to the ground if the authorities and the
army failed to bring FLN violence under control (ibid., Aussaresses, pp. 98). For more general concerns
about rising ethnic tensions, see Jacques Massu, La Vraie Bataille d'Alger (Paris: Plon, 1971), pp. 31-32
and Salan, pp. 79-81.
663 Ibid., Massu, pp. 90; ibid., Connelly, pp. 125.
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General Massu, the commander of the 10th Parachute Division. 664 The arrival of the
3,200 paratroopers of the 10 th Division and 1,400 additional troops effectively doubled
the number of military forces in Algiers. 665
With blanket powers and reinforcements at his disposal, Massu turned to a trusted
Indochina veteran, Colonel Roger Trinquier, to develop a plan of action. Trinquier set
out, "to make the inhabitants join an organization capable of cooperating in the fight
against terror by providing us intelligence." 666 In his opinion, the French authorities
could only hope to root out the FLN cells and prevent future resurgence by incorporating
the native population into a new and robust set of French designed organizations.
To accomplish this, Trinquier developed a three step process. In the opening
phase, French troops would restrict the movement of the Muslim population. Using
patrols and traffic control points, and a "shoot on sight" curfew, French military forces
would increase the pressure on the FLN forces in the city. At the same time, teams of
police and military would conduct a detailed census of the population. Each block,
building, and neighborhood in the Muslim areas would be entrusted to a Muslim warden,
generally a veteran of French military service. 667 This warden would be responsible for
reporting the status and activities of all residents under his charge. This system, which
Trinquier referred to as the dispositifde protection urbaine or D.P.U., was the
cornerstone of his strategy to clear and then hold the Muslim neighborhoods. In the
second phase, the French would use existing police files and new information garnered
664 Ibid., Massu, pp. 32-33.
665 Massu estimated that the introduction of his 4,600 troops in January 1957 doubled the number of
military forces present in the capital. In addition, the French authorities had some 1,100 police, 55 national
gendarmes, 800 part time reserve police units (CRS), 1,200-1,500 militia troops (pied noir) (Massu, pp. 44,
99).
666 This was Trinquier's summary as related by Salan in his memoirs (ibid., Salan, pp. 68). Trinquier
echoed these sentiments in his own memoirs (ibid., Trinquier, pp. 243-243).
667 Ibid., Le Mire, pp. 117.
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through the census to round up suspected FLN members. The interrogation of these
suspects would then provide the information necessary to conduct targeted raids on the
remaining FLN safe houses. In the third phase, Trinquier and his staff would use the
D.P.U. system to consolidate French control and maintain a highly intrusive intelligence
network.668
What would come to be known as the First Battle of Algiers stretched from the
assumption of power by Massu in early January 1957 to the capture of Ben M'Hidi at the
end of March 1957. In the First Battle, with the D.P.U. in its infancy, French forces
relied heavily on the 2,000 existing police files6 69 and aggressive interrogation. The
initial roundup of suspects primed the intelligence machine; the interrogation those
suspects gave the French authorities the information they needed to stage follow on raids
against the remaining cells. Over time, Trinquier built a comprehensive, organizational
diagram of the FLN cells - a product he referred to as his organigramme. The perceived
urgency of the task led Massu to condone the use of torture. 670 Though torture had
occurred in the earlier stages of the war, its use by military leaders had been more
sporadic and unofficial. With the assumption of civil powers, and extensive interaction
with the police, torture became more systematic. According to Paul Aussaresses, the
officer responsible for the special army/police interrogation teams, he used torture to
extract the names of FLN cell members and populate the organigramme. The goal of the
teams was to extract the information as quickly as possible. Working at night, the teams
would grab a handful of suspects, extract new names, and grab a second batch before
dawn. The rapid exploitation of enabled the French to roll up entire cells before the
668 Ibid., Aussaresses, pp. 115-116.
669 Ibid., Aussaresses, pp. 99, 108.
670 Ibid., Aussaresses, pp. 97, 146-147; ibid., Massu, pp. 163-170.
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enemy could react.67 1 Once suspects had been tortured, they were generally executed and
their bodies dumped in remote locations outside the city.672
With this combination of movement controls, extensive searches, targeted
military action, and aggressive interrogation, Massu to crippled the FLN structure in
Algiers in three months. As the graph below shows, the introduction of Massu's forces
drove the number of FLN attacks down from 112 in January to 39 in February.673
Reeling under the shock of the French offensive, the FLN leadership went to ground. 674
The capture of the FLN political leader, Ben M'Hidi, on February 16 marked the
culmination of the First Battle of Algiers.675
671 Roger Trinquier, (tr. Daniel Lee), Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (London: Pall
Mall Press, 1964), pp. 23; ibid., Aussaresses, pp. 145-147.
672 Ibid., Aussaresses, pp. 171.
673 All the data in the graph are drawn from Gilbert Meynier, Histoire Intirieure du FLN (1954-1962),
pp.728.
674 Ibid., Massu, pp. 127.
675 Ben M'Hidi died in French custody. While French leaders at the time claimed that he had committed
suicide, Paul Aussaresses has admitted that he personally executed Ben M'Hidi at the behest of General
Massu (ibid., Aussaresses, pp. 162-170).
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French success in the First Battle of Algiers was so complete by March that Salan
pulled three of the four para regiments out of Algiers to pursue the remaining ALN rebels
in the interior. While the success of the campaign and shifts in FLN activity drove this
decision, the unease of civil leaders contributed to calls for a drawdown. French press
reports of widespread torture in Algiers made the redeployment of the bulk of the 10h
Division a welcome step in the eyes of government officials in Paris and Algiers. 676
Within the Algiers administration, Paul Teitgen, the secretary general of police in
Algiers, had had protested the aggressive detention and interrogation of suspects.
Though he had grudgingly signed off on thousands of requests for summary detention,677
he tendered his resignation to Lacoste in May 1957.678
676 Ibid., Delmas, pp. 129-130; Le Mire, pp. 116.
677 Ted Morgan, My Battle ofAlgiers: A Memoir (New York: Smithsonian Books, 2005), pp. 139.
678 Ibid., Aussaresses, pp. 150.
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The withdrawal of the three of the four regiments in April gave both sides an
opportunity to reassess. Yacef Saadi, the FLN military commander in Algiers and
successor to Ben M'Hidi, sought to re-establish the cells and reconstitute the bomb units.
Massu's staff, under the leadership of Colonels Trinquier and Godard shifted their focus
from the imposition of physical, military control ("controle en surface") to the
development of a more durable form of population control ("controle en profondeur").679
Whereas French efforts in the First Battle had necessarily depended on high force levels
and aggressive interrogation or torture, the efforts to hold and consolidate the gains were
built on the D.P.U. system and a growing informer network. Trinquier selected Captain
Paul-Alain L6ger to form a surveillance unit composed of Algerian Muslims. This group,
formally known as the Groupe de Renseignement det d'Exploitation (G.R.E.), disguised
as common laborers or "bleus," would mointor activity in Muslim neighborhoods and
seek to infiltrate the FLN organization. 680
After three months of relative calm, the FLN reemerged in the capital in June
1957. The killing of 80 unarmed Muslims by French paratroopers in the Ruisseau
massacre set off a new round violence. 681 Yacef, eager to respond to the French
massacre, began a new round of bombings. The spectacular attack on the Casino de la
Corniche, a popular pied noir establishment, on June 9 set off another wave of vigilante
attacks. 682 Once again, the city appeared on the verge of a race war. The unprecedented
scale of the Casino bombing (9 dead, 85 wounded) and rising ethnic tensions led Massu
679 For a discussion of the distinctions between these two terms, see Massu, pp. 127-128.
680 Paul-Alain Ldger, Aux carrefours de la guerre (Paris: Albin Michel, 1983), pp. 217.
68 The incident began with the killing of two French paras by the FLN. The paras responded by entering a
nearby Turkish bathhouse and killing all 80 Muslim occupants (Source: Horne, pp. 208-209; Morgan, pp.
197).
682 Ibid., Morgan, pp. 198-201.
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to recall two of his para regiments from the field and reimpose the curfew. 6 83 The
Second Battle of Algiers had begun.
Far from being a replay of the operations of January and February, however, the
Second Battle of Algiers more closely resembled a police sting operation. 684 Colonel
Godard, the de facto coordinator of the second battle,685 capitalized on the work done by
Trinquier and L6ger. Trinquier's D.P.U. organization, whose membership was close to
7,500 by this point, 686 provided the foundation for the renewed hunt for the FLN cells.
L6ger expanded and refined his use of the active GRE units or "bleus." Unable to
penetrate the FLN network with his original team of ex-servicemen, L6ger began to use
captured FLN insurgents. 687 By offering these insurgents an opportunity to avoid
imprisonment or execution, L6ger managed to recruit 70 agents and make significant
progress against the reconstituted rebel network. L6ger's agents first rolled up the
intimidation squads, then used the "turned" insurgents to locate FLN members. 688
According to Maurice Schmitt, a para officer who worked with L6ger during this period,
passive surveillance by the D.P.U. and active collection by the G.R.E. were the keys to
the Godard's new approach. The blanket of surveillance turned the casbah from a
sanctuary into a contested area, forcing the FLN to curtail its operations. 689 When
confronted with detailed evidence of their personal complicity and their specific place in
683 Ibid., Morgan, pp. 198-201.
684 G6n6ral Maurice Schmitt, Alger-Et 1957.- Une victoire sur le terrorisme (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002),
pp. 27; ibid., Massu, pp. 294.
685 Ibid., Massu, pp. 279.
686 Ibid., Trinquier, pp. 245.
687 Ibid., Villatoux, pp. 508-509.
688 Ibid., Schmitt, pp. 65.
689 Ibid., Schmitt, pp. 69.
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the cellular organization, many captured insurgents disclosed information and agreed to
work with the G.R.E..690
The gradual rollup of the FLN network over a two month period led to the capture
of Yacef Saadi, the FLN military commander on August 24. 69 1 Once in custody, Yacef
provided the information to locate and kill the last major FLN operative, Ali la Pointe.
With his death on October 8, 1957, the Second Battle had come to a close. 692
On the military level, Massu's operations in Algiers were a clear success. In
January 1957, Massu had entered an environment of spiraling violence and rising ethnic
tensions. By the fall that year, his forces had managed to stop the attacks and uproot the
FLN cells in the city. What is more, the extensive informer network built by Trinquier
and Godard gave the authorities a tool to maintain control and resist a resurgence of FLN
activity.
However impressive Massu's accomplishments were, they had little direct impact
on the military campaign elsewhere. The FLN, though forced to abandon Algiers,
maintained a dominant position in many rural areas. The losses sustained in Algiers were
easily replaced, and the French were forced to apply their new strategies in far more
challenging rural environments.
Even the local victory in Algiers came at considerable cost. Firm control of the
Muslim population had been won only through mass detention and interrogations that
frequently ended in torture and execution. According to Paul Teitgen, over 24,000
Algerians had been officially detained (close to 6% of the total Muslim population of
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690 Ibid., Schmitt, pp. 71.
691 Ibid., Horne, pp. 216-217.
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Algiers); 693 3,024 remained unaccounted for at the end of the battle. 694 In metropolitan
France, reports of torture set off a wave of protests among by left wing elites. The
French decision to censor a number of anti-war publications lent further credence to the
charges.695 At home and abroad, the means used to secure victory had weakened the
standing and legitimacy of the French government and army.6 96
The most significant impact of the battle was on French strategy. Unsettled by
the army's methods, civilian leaders nevertheless balked at criticizing a clear military
success. Lacoste and the police had failed to maintain or restore order in the capital;
where they had failed, the military under Massu had succeeded. In the wake of Algiers,
the easiest path was to leave strategy to the generals and focus only on clearly political
projects such as constitutional reform.6 97 Military leaders drew two lessons from the
victory in Algiers. First, the formula developed in Algiers - the targeted use of force,
authoritarian population control, and psychological operations - was a viable prototype.
Even after 1962, most leading French military figures cited Algiers as proof of the
feasibility of a coercive solution in Algeria. 698 Second, the victory had come as a result
of unfettered military control over strategy and local administration. Godard's later
assumption of joint civil-military powers in Algiers/Sahel region, 699 and Salan's
693 This detention percentage is based on a Muslim population of 400,000.
694 Ibid., Aussaresses, pp. 195; ibid., Connelly, pp. 131.
695 Ibid., Connelly, pp. 132-133.
696 Gil Merom, "The Social Origins of French Capitulation in Algeria," Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 30,
No. 4 (Summer 2004), pp. 610-612; ibid., Horne, pp. 219.
697 Robert Lacoste spent most of his tenure attempting to craft a political settlement that would satisfy
Muslims and pieds noirs. This loi cadre provided for a nominally federal structure and a single electoral
college. Strong dissent by the pieds noirs and the chaos of late 4 th Republic politics ultimately doomed the
project.
698 Ibid., Galula, pp. 143; ibid., Trinquier, pp. 251; ibid., Massu, pp. 327-328.
699 Ibid., Faivre, Le Renseignement dans la guerre d'Algerie, pp. 25, 41.
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assumption of similar powers throughout Algeria in December 1958, marked the peak of
military control in Algeria.
What French leaders tended to ignore were the peculiarities of the battle - the
features that would ultimately limit the exportability of the Algiers model. The
administrative, demographic, and spatial characteristics of Algiers heavily favored the
French. Whereas the French lacked a detailed understanding of the enemy's rural
networks, they had a far clearer understanding of affairs in the capital. The FLN had
chosen to do battle in a place where French intelligence and informer networks were
densest. 700 Similarly, the victory came in a city that was over 40% European; only in the
city of Oran did demographics favor the French more decisively. Moreover, the enemy's
choice of the casbah as their primary sanctuary greatly simplified the problem for the
French. The French could easily concentrate large numbers of forces on a neighborhood
where movement could be relatively easily controlled and monitored. Maurice Schmitt
has pointed out that FLN errors - relatively poor internal security and the willingness of
key individuals to turn - explain the rapid and complete collapse of the Z.A.A.70 1 What
the French military regarded as a triumph of strategy looks in retrospect like the product
of favorable circumstances, strategy and chance. While the French army would dedicate
the next three years to the application of these methods in rural Algeria, they would never
again encounter as favorable a set of circumstances or as accommodating a foe.
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700 Ibid., Peyroulou, pp. 160-164.
701 Ibid., Schmitt, pp. 115.
Rural Pacification
Salan had made it clear from the outset that his first priority was population
control. While Lorillot and others had laid the physical groundwork by establishing the
quadrillage network, it took Salan to shift the main effort from pursuit to pacification.
As in Algiers, pacification in the rural areas had two components: one destructive and the
other constructive. 702 The first task was to break the rebel hold on the population.
Whereas earlier commanders had done this by attacking insurgent bands, Salan and his
disciples argued that the FLN's political-administrative organization (the O.P.A.) was the
true center of gravity. 7 0 3 Once the O.P.A. had been removed, the guerillas would weaken
and pursuit would become easier. Construction involved the substitution of a French
O.P.A. for that of the enemy. By organizing the population into parallel hierarchies,704
the French could maintain control and prevent rebel resurgence. The S.A.S. would form
the core of this new O.P.A., and they would orchestrate the development of mobile
(harkis) and static local units (self-defense groups (G.A.D.) or maghzen) to bind the
705population to the new organization.
Drawing on his late war experiences in Indochina, Salan championed the slow
and cumulative process of pacification over the more dramatic raids and envelopments of
702 For a detailed explanation of this model by one of its leading proponents, General Allard, see Peter
Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military
Doctrine (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), pp. 30-32. See also Villatoux, pp. 461.
703 Jacques Hogard, "Guerre r6volutionnaire et Pacification," Revue militaire d'information, No. 280
(janvier 1957), pp. 21; ibid., Salan, pp. 214; ibid., Villatoux, pp. 461; ibid., Le Mire, pp. 135.
704 The GR theorists argued that Viet Minh success had depended on the organization of the population into
parallel hierarchies. The first was a vertical hierarchy based on strict chains of command. In theory, this
"unified and territorial" hierarchy enabled the party to control the political, economic and social life of
every member of the society through a series of committees and leaders. The second hierarchy was
horizontal. This hierarchy incorporated every member into some organization appropriate to his "age,
profession or religion." Together these parallel hierarchies gave the Viet Minh or similar states near total
control over the population. For a more detailed treatment of this theory, see Jacques Hogard, "Guerre
rdvolutionnaire et Pacification," pp. 8-9.
705 Ibid., Salan, pp. 234-236.
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the parachute regiments. Whereas previous commanders had generally sought to
concentrate troops to capture or kill significant enemy units, Salan and his supporters
argued that dispersion and static control were a more effective way to defeat the insurgent
threat. 706 David Galula, a company commander and battalion executive officer during
this period, described the shift in strategy in these terms:
Once the grid of static forces [quadrillage] had been established, with the emphasis on
Kabylia, Salan considered his task done; it was now up to the local commander to deal with
the situation in his Army corps or in his zone as best he could, with the occasional support of
the theater reserves. Since the war in Algeria was tactically a multiplicity of small-scale
affairs, no grandiose operation was conceivable, no large shifting of troops was warranted
that would justify a more direct conduct of the operations by the Commander in Chief.707
While Salan and the GR school tended to discount the impact of large scale
operations, arguing that small, local units were more effective in the clearance phase of
pacification. Echoing the official reports on Indochina, Jacques Hogard argued that large
scale encirclement operations were nearly impossible to pull off.708 By contrast, small
units familiar with the local area were more likely to find and destroy the ALN bands.70 9
Moreover, local troops left in place for extended periods of time would be better placed
to gain the confidence of the population and avoid the missteps and overkill associated
with large scale military operations.
This shift in priorities and tactics set the stage for the application of the distinctive
tools of revolutionary warfare: psychological warfare and resettlement. As noted earlier,
Salan and many of his subordinates saw the result in Algiers as proof of the power of
psychological operations and population control. In 1957, Salan placed much greater
emphasis on the use of specially trained propaganda units and the S.A.S. to "rally" the
706 Allard as cited in Paret, pp. 35-36.
707 Ibid., Galula, pp. 63.
708 Ibid., Galula, pp. 195-199.
709 Ibid., Hogard, pp. 21-22.
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native populations to the French cause. Advocates of GR assumed that the removal of
the FLN O.P.A. and the skillful use of propaganda would convince local residents to
710
support the government and convince insurgents of the futility of their own cause.
Salan also sponsored more clandestine and destructive psychological operations.
Paul Lger, buoyed by his success with the bleus in Algiers, applied his defectors to the
larger task of subverting the rural insurgency. Whereas Godard and Lger had used the
bleus in Algiers to identify and eliminate insurgents, L6ger focused his subsequent efforts
on triggering purges inside the FLN structure. In an operation KJ 27, L6ger succeeded in
convincing the leaders of wilayas III and IV 711 that their organizations had been
thoroughly penetrated by French agents. By releasing a fictional list of the FLN traitors
sparked a savage purge by Amirouche and other leading FLN figures. 712 Though the
exact figures remain uncertain, these purges cost the FLN some 2,000 dead in wilaya II
alone. 713 More important, the wave of purges paralyzed much of the FLN organization
from the middle of 1958 through Amirouche's own assassination in March 1959.714 Over
the course of the war, FLN internal purges, spontaneous and French orchestrated, cost the
movement somewhere between 6,000 and 15,000 dead.715 Early French successes in
Algiers and clever manipulation of the paranoid tendencies of the FLN enabled Leger and
his colleagues to inflict substantial losses with minimal investments. 716
710 Ibid., Paret, pp. 58.
71 The FLN had divided Algeria into 5 wilayas or zones of operations. Wilaya III was centered on the
Kabylia region; wilaya IV covered the coastal zone from Algiers to T6nks, including the Ouarsenis region.
Algiers fell under a separate geographical command - the autonomous zone of Algiers or Z.A.A.
712 For Captain Lger's personal account of this "bleuite" operation, see ibid. L6ger, pp. 292-305.
713 Ibid., Villatoux, pp. 509-512.
714 Ibid., Th6nault, pp. 85-86.
715 Charles-Robert Ageron, "Complots et Purges dans l'arm6e de lib6ration algdrienne (1958-1961),"
Vingtimrne Sicle, Revue d'histoire, No. 59 (July-September 1998), pp. 26; Guy PervillI, "La guerre
d'Alg6rie: Combien de morts?" in ibid., Harbi, Stora, La guerre d'Algirie, pp. 713.
716 Ibid., Horne, pp. 260-261.
362
Resettlement of native populations, a strategy employed with some success in
Cambodia in the later phases of the Indochina struggle,717 emerged a natural complement
to quadrillage, S.A.S. organization, and psychological operations. In theory, the
controlled resettlement of rural populations protected them from attack and manipulation
by the F.L.N.; in so doing, it gave the French authorities an opportunity to persuade them
to support the state through a mix of political indoctrination and economic aid. At the
same time, the evacuation of rural populations broke the link between the insurgents and
their support base. Once the native population had been evacuated, any persons caught in
the "prohibited zones" could be treated as hostile, greatly simplifying the offensive
pursuit of the remaining F.L.N. bands.
As early as 1955, the military experimented with small scale resettlement in the
Aurbs region under the auspices of General Parlange's experiments with S.A.S.
pacification. 7 8 Between 1955 and the middle of 1957, the practice of regroupement
remained relatively rare. Salan's enthusiasm for Algiers style population control, and the
writings of GR theorists, encouraged a move from experimentation to general
application. Starting in the summer of 1957, local commanders, in conjunction with local
S.A.S. units, began to uproot existing communities and nomads and resettle them in
temporary camps. 719 Once the Algerians had been resettled, their old dwellings were
destroyed to prevent their use by FLN forces.
717 For a discussion of the Cambodian program, see Chapter 3. The sole source of reporting was one of the
architects of the French program in Cambodia, on Captain Souyris. His 1956 article in the Revue de
Difense Nationale appears to have captured the imagination of the theorists and later practitioners in
Algeria.
718 Charles-Robert Ageron, "Une dimension de la guerre d'Algdrie: Les 'regroupements' de populations"
in Jean-Charles Jauffret, Maurice Vaisse, Militaires et guerilla dans la guerre d'Algirie (Paris: Editions
complexe, 2001), pp. ;ibid., Le Mire, pp. 137.
719 Keith Sutton, "Army Administration Tensions over Algeria's Centres de Regroupement, 1954-1962,"
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (November 1999), pp. 247-248.
363
French authorities then set about organizing the populations in a manner
reminiscent of Trinquier's D.P.U.. The first step was a census of the inhabitants, a
numbering of all dwellings, and the designation of individuals responsible for each house
or group of houses. Once this had been competed, the authorities appointed a village
council and recruited a village self-defense force. 720 True to Trinquier's model, the
desired outcome was an organized, protected, and evangelized community. Trinquier
argued that this approach was far superior to the system of posts applied in Indochina was
because it employed the local population in the struggle against the insurgents.72 By
Trinquier's own description, however, the system was explicitly authoritarian:
We then organize not just the defense of a sole military post, but that of an entire village and
its inhabitants, making it a strategic hamlet. A tight, impassable perimeter is
created...protected by a few armed blockhouses, manned with automatic weapons and
capable of covering the whole perimeter.... Inhabitants of the nearest villages or isolate
individuals are progressively brought within the security perimeter. Most of the others will
come there themselves. The inhabitants are allowed to leave the village only by the gates,
and all exits will be controlled. They are permitted to take neither money nor supplies with
them. No one will be able to leave or enter the village by night. In effect we are re-
establishing the old system of medieval fortified villages, designed to protect the inhabitants
against marauding bands.722
While French authorities insisted that these resettlements were voluntary and
largely a response to the increased threat of FLN reprisals, 723 many civil servants and
S.A.S. officers724 warned of the political and economic risks. If the authorities failed to
provide the food, housing and employment to offset the disruption of resettlement, then
the net result would be the impoverishment of the native population and their political
alienation. Even in the summer and fall of 1957, in the very early stages of the
nationwide regroupement policy, official reports highlighted the inability of the
720 Ibid., Le Mire, pp. 138.
721 Ibid., Trinquier, Modern Warfare, pp. 73.
722 Ibid., Trinquier, Modern Warfare, pp. 73-74.
723 Ibid., Le Mire, pp. 137.
724 Ibid., Ageron, "Une dimension de la guerre d'Alg6rie: Les 'regroupements' de populations," pp. 331.
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authorities to meet many of these basic needs. The loss of agricultural and grazing lands
and livestock led to severe malnutrition in many camps. 725 While the authorities had
planned to provide these populations with standards of living far in excess of those they
had originally enjoyed, most resettled populations had to make due with tent cities and
chronic unemployment. In spite of these warnings signs, military leaders endorsed an
expansion of the program from 1957 on. By the end of 1957, the French had resettled
364,795 natives (-4% of the total Muslim population of 9 million) in 382 regroupement
centers.726
While resettlement may have fallen short of its stated economic and social goals,
it was enormously appealing to the French military. For Model 1 traditionalists, the
removal of native populations from the countryside made the prosecution of a vigorous
anti-guerilla campaign far simpler. The removal of village sanctuaries and food supplies
weakened the military potential of the guerillas and enabled commanders to treat the
evacuated countryside as a free fire zone. For Model 2 advocates, demographic
concentration made rural population control possible. The S.A.S. could reorganize the
population and build their own "parallel hierarchies" of control. Sheltered from the
corrosive influence of the insurgents, the native populations could be re-indoctrinated.
Local troops and native auxiliaries (self-defense forces, harkis and maghzens) could now
defend the population more easily.
The appeal of the regroupement strategy, and its durability in the face of
mounting evidence of its negative impact on the Muslim populations, rested on the both
groups' strongly held assumptions about the population. For the proponents of Model 1,
365
725 Ibid., Ageron, pp. 332-333.
726 Ibid., Ageron, pp. 359-360.
the population was an obstacle to traditional warfare and its removal from the battle space
made possible a return to a conventional contest between armed groups. For proponents
of Model 2, the population was centrally important but essentially Pavlovian. Based on
their interpretation of the outcome in Indochina, these officers believed that the key to
success in revolutionary war lay in the skillful manipulation of passive populations. The
population's own preferences were either treated as benign (the desire for peace),
malleable, or irrelevant. Pacification was treated as a mechanical problem not an
ideological one. Organization and the skillful manipulation of incentives trumped
internal preferences.
The official after action report on Operation Pilote, a year long pacification effort
in the Oranais region (July 1957-August 1958), captures this awkward combination of
apparent military success and political uncertainty. 727 As the author of the report notes,
the French objective was to build a new "political-administrative structure" (O.P.A.) in a
650 square mile region outside Oran. In the three months prior to the start of the
operation, the local French commander had had a series of military successes against the
guerillas. Having worn the FLN forces down, the French introduced a number of
specialized units: loudspeaker and pamphlet companies, medical assistance teams, S.A.S.
administrators, and youth counselors. Using re-educated insurgents as cadre,728 the
French set about organizing the population and building a new O.P.A.
727 This account of Operation Pilote is drawn from Peter Paret's French Revolutionary Warfare from
Indochina to Algeria, pp. 80-92.728 Another theme in GR theory was the use of brainwashing. Based on their experiences in Viet Minh
camps, some French officers believed it was possible to re-educate natives to support the cause. The
French invested significant sums in this re-education program with limited results (Source: Villatoux pp.
519-522).
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Though the ostensible purpose of Operation Pilote was explicitly political rather
than military, the summary of the results opened with a list of tangible military measures:
970 rebels killed, 2,099 captured, and 897 weapons recovered. The results of the
"constructive" efforts were measured in terms of French performance of various
activities: the French had set up self-defense forces in 50 villages, re-educated 60 village
chiefs, and carried out numerous social projects from medical assistance to rural
development. Yet, as the author of the report indicated, the lasting political effects of
these French actions remained hard to pin down:
.... the experiment [Operation Pilote] may be said to have been at least encouraging, if not
conclusive. It is encouraging both in view of the results outlined above and in view of the
atmosphere now existing in in that part of the area where the self-defending douars are
sufficiently numerous. This atmosphere can be attested to by any visitor, and is further
revealed by the amount of information the population furnishes. The experiment will be
conclusive when, after the establishment of a sufficiently close-knit pattern of self-defending
douars [villages] throughout the whole Pilot Area, we will progressively withdraw our troops
- a move presently in its early stages - without the loyalty of the population wavering. 729
This official report reveals the intrinsic measurement problems with Model 2
pacification. While the French had set out to build a durable political order in the region,
they could not measure their political progress. Though they could point to the improved
atmospherics and the scale (number of operations) and scope (administrative, social,
economic and psychological) of their activities, the French had no way of knowing
whether they had rallied the population. This was one of the leading paradoxes of the
coercive model of pacification; while French forces were present, they could organize the
population and suppress resistance. The success of those suppression efforts made it
nearly impossible to measure the true opinion of the local population. Hence French
could find very few valid leading or coincident indicators of political success.
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However noble the intentions, Model 2 pacification often devolved into a brutal
clash of arms that left the prize - the population - in tatters. What Salan's strategy lacked
in large-scale maneuver, it more than made up for in the ferocity at the local level. While
some local commanders placed a premium on improving relations with the populace, 730
most continued to rely heavily on offensive, military tactics to compel the submission of
the native population. French patrols and searches were used to net suspected insurgents,
and commanders frequently resorted to harsh measures and collective responsibility in
response to rebel advances. Mouloud Feraoun, an Algerian intellectual living in the
Kabyle region, captured the escalating violence in a journal entry dated April 1957:
...there are maquis on the one hand, and on the other, there is the army. Between the two
there is the population, which gets beaten up. Just like a punching ball between two boxers.
The army severely rations, sweeps, destroys and kills. The rebels force themselves on the
population, demanding lodging and protection. They also ransom and kill. Healthy men
flee, go to jail, or join the maquis when they can escape death. The children, the women, and
the old ones stay behind as punching bags.7 31
While many Algerian observers deplored the brutal tactics of the insurgents, the net effect
of the use of violence by the army and the guerillas was to shift the population's
allegiance towards the rebels:
The maquis, now better armed and more numerous, are still enforcing the harsh punishment
of hanging and cutting throats. The soldiers of pacification are hitting harder and harder,
with less and less discrimination and pity. The clearest result of all this is, I believe, planting
a definitive hatred for the French in the hearts of the Kabyles. The French refuse to realize
this and seem to forget the evil they sow at the very moment when, after finishing one strike,
they are already preparing to deal other blows.7 32
730 The history of the 584 th Battalion suggests that success in winning hearts and minds could flow from a
scrupulous attention to fairness and legality combined with a willingness on the part of the French
command to accept risk. This "liberal" approach was not without cost, however. Several members of
Major Pouget's command group, including his intelligence officer and a volunteer school teacher, were
assassinated by F.L.N. guerillas from other areas. Though the local inhabitants promptly handed over the
assassins, the killings highlighted the costs of restraint and civic action (Source: Alexander Zervoudakis,
"A Case of Successful Pacification: The 5 8 4 th Battalion du Train at Bordj de l'Agha," The Journal of
Strategic Studies, Volume 25, No. 2, June 2002, pp. 54-64).
731 Mouloud Feraoun, Journal 1955-1962, Reflections on the French-Algerian War, trans. and ed., Mary
Ellen Wolf, Claude Fouillade, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), pp. 201.
732 Ibid., Feraoun, pp. 240.
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While the army believed that the struggle for the population was carried out on level
ground, the French paid a disproportionate and largely unrecognized political price for
the crescendo of violence in the Algerian interior.
Pursuit: Operational innovations
Though Salan had made pacification his priority, the army continued to make
major advances in the pursuit mission. Building on early war experiments, commanders
sought to improve the mobility and precision of their units. The two major innovations of
the period -improved targeting intelligence and air mobility - made the theater reserve
ever more effective at locating and dispatching major ALN units.
One of the chief obstacles to early French operations in Algeria had been a lack of
precise targeting intelligence. In part this was the product of the Byzantine intelligence
organization of the prewar period and early moves to centralize intelligence began to
show benefits in the 1956 and 1957. 733 The increasing density of French troops in the
countryside gave local and theater commanders an improved picture of the Algerian
interior. Additionally, Salan's organization of local populations and native auxiliaries
gave the command more effective tools for locating and attacking the guerillas and the
O.P.A.. The collection and exploitation of human intelligence fell to the newly
established D.O.P. (dispositifs operationnels de protection): joint army/police
interrogation teams that were the direct descendants of Aussaresses' improvised units in
Algiers.734 So integral were these teams to French operations that David Galula, one of
733 Ibid., Faivre, Le Renseignement dans la guerre d'Algirie, pp. 19-20.
734 Ibid., Peyroulou, pp.1 7 6 -17 7 ; ibid., Faivre, pp. 161-163.
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the leading practitioners of Model 2 pacification, identified the D.O.P. as the single most
important innovation of the war.735
These organizational changes and increased troop density produced major
advances in targeting. As late as November 1956, a mere 15% of French operations had
been launched in response to specific intelligence leads. Under these conditions, French
units had to hope that encirclements would catch the rebels more or less by chance. By
May 1957, this percentage had grown to 50%.736 Though the intelligence network was
no closer to answering the central question - the permanence of its pacification gains - it
had built a machine capable of reliably producing large numbers of targets for the mobile
forces. This imbalance between targeting and the measurement of political progress
would dog the French command for the rest of the war.
The elite forces of the theater reserve continued their quest for mobility.
Following the lead of Ducournau and Bigeard, the commanders of the airborne and
Foreign Legion units had discarded much of the heavy equipment in order to match the
mobility of their quarry. As Bigeard famously quipped, he hoped his training would
"transform our officers into veritable fellagha [guerillas] for our side." 737 In this same
spirit, French commanders began experiments with the use of light, dismounted units
composed of mixed French and Algerian scouts. Bigeard's commando Georges, built
around a core of turned FLN insurgents, combined nomadisation with the benefits of
native scouting. This unit served as the prototype for the commandos de chasse of the
later Challe offensives.
735 Ibid., Galula, pp. 183-184.
736 Olivier Hamon, "Chronique du conflit alg6rien 1954-1962," Revue historique des Armies, No. 187 (juin
1992), pp. 39.
737 G6n6ral Marcel Bigeard, Ma guerre d'Algfrie (Paris: Editions du Rocher, 2003), pp. 98.
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The most significant change in French pursuit operations was the introduction of
helicopters. In early 1956, Bigeard had used helicopters to lift multiple paratrooper
companies into the hitherto impassable regions of the interior. 738 These platforms gave
the elite units enormous mobility without many of the disadvantages inherent in
traditional parachute operations. The growing availability of airframes from 1956 on led
to a rapid expansion in the use of helicopter operations.7 39 For the first time in the war,
the French were able to combine their advantages in air mobility and close air support
with greatly improved dismounted mobility. By negating the guerillas' mobility
advantage, these innovations gave the French a decisive edge over their more lightly
armed opponents.
The GR Backlash: Warriors vs. Psychologists
In spite of Salan's efforts to convince them of the importance of psychological
operations, a significant portion of the French officer corps resisted the introduction of
Model 2 strategies. On one level, this was a response to the exaggerated claims of
psychological warfare experts. On a deeper level, it was a fundamental rejection of
Model 2 and its emphasis on the population. What was striking about this late war debate
was the lack of interest in Model 3 alternatives. In the presence of abundant military
resources, tactical success and military control over counterinsurgency strategy, the
search for strategic alternatives was an internal dialogue in which the choices were
limited to Models 1 and 2.
738 These air assault operations, referred to as Operations 744 and 962, are described in detail in Marcel
Bigeard's Pour une parcelle de gloire (Paris: Editionsl 1, 1997), pp. 220-228.
739 Pierre-Louis Garnier, "La guerre d'Algdrie et la consecration de I'ALAT," Revue historique des Armes,
No. 229 (December 2002), pp. 19, fn 4.
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David Galula aptly summarized the philosophical differences between the two
camps and their divergent answers to the problem of counterinsurgency:
In my zone, as everywhere in Algeria, the order was to "pacify." But exactly how? The sad
truth was that, in spite of all our past experience, we had no single, official doctrine for
counterinsurgency warfare. Instead, there were various schools of thought, all unofficial,
some highly vociferous. While the majority of cadres lived in an intellectual vacuum,
waiting for precise orders from above and meanwhile performing the routine combat tasks
for which they had been trained all their lives, these different schools of thought were
championed by minorities. At one extreme stood the warriors, officer who had learned
nothing, who challenged the very idea that the population was the real objective, who
maintained that military action pursued with sufficient means and vigor for a sufficiently
long time would defeat the rebels. They needed just one more regiment, or battalion, or
company to do the trick....At the other extreme were the psychologists, most of them
recruited among officers who officers who had undergone the Vietminh brainwashing in
prisoner camps. To them, psychological action was the answer to everything, not merely the
simple propaganda and psychological warfare adjunct to other types of operations,
conventional or otherwise. "You use force against the enemy," one of their leaders told me,
"not so much to destroy him but in order to make him change his mind on the necessity of
pursuing the fight. In other words, you do a psychological action." They were convinced
that the population could be manipulated through certain techniques adapted from
communist methods.7 40
The clash that Galula describes was played out in print and in the field. In the Revue de
Defense Nationale and the Revue Militaire d'Information, the rival factions presented
critiques and solutions that sprang from rival assumptions about the significance and role
of the population. For the warriors, all talk of the population and psychological
operations had obscured an intrinsically military struggle in which the prize was the rival
army. For the psychologists, the key was either psychological operations or some form
of Vietminh style population control.
Results: Episodic success and campaign stalemate
By end of his tenure in December 1958, Salan had stopped the slide in French
fortunes. Entering on the heels of the Suez debacle and the Ben Bella affaire, he had
overseen the victory in Algiers and the Battle of the Frontiers. After 1957, the FLN was
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unable to exert pressure in the major urban areas of the coast. After 1958, the ALN
inside Algeria was cut off from its base areas in Tunisia and Morocco. With the
mounting pressure of improved French pacification and pursuit operations, the ALN
began to shift from offensive operations to defensive ones and finally to the desperation
tactic of dispersion.
The impact of Salan's new model of pacification proved as difficult to measure as
his earlier efforts in the Red River delta of Tonkin. The tangible measures of
performance were uniformly positive. The number of FLN killed in 1957 (32,088) was
nearly double that of 1956 (16,553). 74 1 For the first time in the rebellion, the growth of
the ALN forces inside Algeria had begun to plateau at around 20,000. Equally important,
the number of attacks had fallen from a monthly peak of 3,988 in January 1957 to an
average of 1,748 over the following two years of his tenure.742 From 1954 through his
arrival December 1956, all these trends had been negative. By the end of 1958, Salan
had stabilized the situation. On the other hand, valid and reliable measures of public
support remained elusive. While Salan could point to rapid increases in French
investments - S.A.S. expansions, civic action projects, etc. - he could not specify their
effect on the ultimate objective - the restoration of French authority.
Salan had brought France to a new and costly plateau. Though rebel strength and
activity had fallen, even limited stabilization had required over 400,000 troops and
sizable economic investments. If Salan could not find a way to rollback the FLN, then
the French would be forced to maintain this state of martial law indefinitely.
741 Ibid., Pervill6, Pour une histoire de la guerre d'Algirie, pp. 176.
742 The data on number of FLN attacks is drawn from ibid., Connelly, pp. 292.
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Phase 4: The Challe Offensives
The next change in French strategy was the product of political upheaval and
military stalemate. The fall of the Fourth Republic in the spring of 1958 and the arrival
of Charles de Gaulle brought major changes in policy and personnel. He quickly
replaced General Salan and restored the traditional division of authority between a new
civilian Governor General, Paul Delouvrier, and a military commander, General Challe.
While de Gaulle had restored some measure of civilian control, he left the development
of military strategy to the army. The resulting Challe Plan retained many of the Model 2
elements of his predecessor Salan, but reintroduced the Model 1 elements of mass and
large scale maneuver.
Challe's rolling offensives of 1959-1960 dealt a nearly fatal blow to the ALN
inside Algeria. The crescendo of violence in the countryside set up a clash of
interpretation. The military leadership, measuring progress in terms of military results
and coercive population control, saw the offensives proof of imminent victory. The
civilian leadership under de Gaulle saw the same results quite differently. The extreme
methods and enormous resources used to suppress the rebellion convinced de Gaulle of
the futility of the Model 2 strategy. While the army continued to pursue a strategy of
total war, de Gaulle began to adjust his political aims to accommodate some form of
Algerian self-determination.
Sakiet, Operation Resurrection, and the Fall of the Fourth Republic
Though the Battle of the Frontiers had a far larger impact on the military fortunes
of the FLN, it was a border incident at Sakiet Sidi Youssef in February 1957 that set in
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motion the collapse of the Fourth Republic. The military's bombing of this Tunisian
border town in response to ALN cross border attacks fatally undermined the weak French
government. Beset by international outcry over civilian casualties and military outrage
over the lack of support by civil leaders, the government in Paris began a policy retreat
that would end in a joint revolt by the settler community and the army. That quasi- coup
of May 1958 would end with the installation of De Gaulle and the birth of the Fifth
Republic.
The high command saw the retaliatory raid on Sakiet as part of a larger campaign
against the FLN's external sponsors. The revolt in Algeria depended on the flow of men
and materials from base areas in Morocco and Tunisia. Salan feared that if the ALN
were allowed to operate from those areas with impunity, then the French would be unable
to defeat the FLN. The ALN's decision to launch raids from Sakiet, and the Tunisian
government's unwillingness or inability to intervene, made a demonstration of French
resolve and capability critically important.
What the military considered just retaliation, the Tunisian government and
international community saw as an act of aggression. Though the newly independent
Tunisian government had repeatedly offered to act as a mediator between the FLN and
the French authorities, the bombing of Tunisian civilians and the subsequent acts by
French forces stationed inside Tunisia led President Bourguiba to throw his weight
behind the FLN. The Eisenhower administration, which saw the Algerian war as a
painful replay of the Indochina disaster, sought to use the Sakiet incident to force a
negotiated settlement. Faced with the interruption of U.S. financial support for its fragile
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domestic economy, the French government under Prime Ministers Gaillard and Pflimlin
accepted the American offer of "good offices."
The French government's backtracking enraged the army and the settlers. The
army saw the government's actions as a betrayal of the military command and a threat to
the entire war effort. In a thinly veiled threat to the civil government, General Salan
wrote to the Army Chief of Staff, General Ely, that recent policy decisions might trigger
a revolt by the army:
The present crisis shows that the political parties are profoundly divided over the Algerian question.
The press permits one to think that the abandonment of Algeria would be envisaged in the
diplomatic processes which would begin with negotiations aiming at a cease-fire.... The Army in
Algeria is troubled by recognition of its responsibility towards the men who are fighting and risking
a useless sacrifice if the representatives of the nation are not determined to maintain Algerie
frangaise....The French army, in its unanimity, would feel outraged by the abandonment of this
743
national patrimony. One cannot predict how it would react in despair....
The incoming Pflimlin government's discussion of a cease-fire, 744 and the FLN's
decision to execute three French POWs, ignited the settler community. Mass
demonstrations in Algiers on May 13, 1958 led to the seizure of the major government
buildings and the declaration of a Committee for Public Safety under the leadership of
Generals Salan and Massu. Unable to control events from Paris, the Gaillard government
granted Salan unified civil and military powers in Algeria.
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Once in power, the Salan and the Committee called for the return of de Gaulle 74 6
from his self-imposed political exile. While de Gaulle considered his return, General
743 G6n6ral Salan to G6n6ral Ely, 9 May 1957 as cited in ibid., Horne, pp. 282. The complete French
language text is available in ibid., Salan, pp. 285-286.
744 George Armstrong Kelly, Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947-1962
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 212.
715 Ibid., Kelly, pp. 224.
746 Philip Williams, "How the French Republic Died: Sources for the Revolution of May 1958," French
Historical Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring, 1963), pp. 21.
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Massu began to plan a military seizure of power in Paris, Operation Resurrection. 747 The
first stage of the operation involved the seizure of Corsica. On May 24, 1958, French
forces under Colonel Thomazo arrived in Corsica and seized power with the help of local
Gaullists. The Pflimlin government's inability to mount any response to this bloodless
coup sealed the fate of the Fourth Republic. 748 Unable to control its own military, the
government under President Coty and Prime Minister Pflimlin approached de Gaulle. An
ambivalent de Gaulle accepted this offer in order to preempt the execution of the second
phase of Operation Resurrection - the French military's planned seizure of power in
Paris. 749
Stalemate and the Search for Victory
While the coming of de Gaulle was the proximate cause of the change in military
leadership and strategy, this shock came in the context of mounting impatience in
military circles. Salan's victories in Algiers and in the Battle of the Frontiers and the
reversal of the major military trends had kindled hopes of military victory. Yet, for all
his success in stopping the spread of the rebellion, Salan had not found a way to roll it
back. Salan's onetime sponsor and advocate of psychological operations, French army
chief of Staff General Ely, lamented his subordinate's dispersal of forces and failure to
pursue the offensive. 750 French civilian leaders, including Defense Minister Chaban-
747 Ibid., Home, pp. 294.
748 Ibid., Williams, pp. 28, 31; ibid., Home, pp. 295.
749 Ibid., Williams, pp. 34.
750 G6n6ral Maurice Faivre, "Le Plan Challe," Revue historique des Armies, No. 238 (mars 2005), pp. 109;
Andre-Paul Comor, "Le g6n6ral Ely et la guerre d'Alg6rie," Revue historique des Armies, No. 229
(d6cembre 2002), pp. 91.
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Delmas, publicly urged a more offensive strategy for victory over the rebels.75 ' As
French confidence, expectations and impatience advanced in lock step, the military was
ready for a change in strategy.
Carrots then sticks: The Constantine Plan and the "Paix des Braves "(September 1958-
January 1959)
While de Gaulle had broken the French military's monopoly on strategy and
policy in Algeria, he did little to intrude on the search for a new military strategy.
Though he shared the impatience of other military and civilian leaders, 752 de Gaulle left
the development of that strategy to his new military commander, General Challe. Having
set the goal of rapid victory, and floated several tentative alternatives to military
escalation, de Gaulle withdrew from the management of military operations. Given a free
hand to reshape counterinsurgency strategy, Challe forged a new and more vigorous plan
for near term victory. While he retained many of Salan's Model 2 strategies, Challe's
concept rested on military escalation and the reintroduction of large scale maneuver.
De Gaulle's first contributions to strategy came in the form of carrots not sticks.
Buoyed by the seemingly overwhelming mandate of the September 26 referendum on his
proposed constitution for the Fifth Republic, 75 3 de Gaulle sought to bring the rebellion to
an end by offering a combination of economic development and individual and collective
751 The French Minister of Defense, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, made the following expression of his
impatience in an April 1957 press conference: "I have always insisted on the need to systematically
increase the mobility of our troops, and thus to reinforce the offensive character and spirit of the units. It is
necessary that the largest possible number of them be engaged in the hunting down the rebel bands and not
simply waiting for them. The defensive is not sufficient, it is the offensive that leads to success and
nothing else." (Source: ibid., Salan, pp. 267)
752 Ibid., Salan, pp. 382.
753 Voter turnout in Algeria was 79.9% with 96.6% of those registering votes in favor of de Gaulle. Not
surprisingly, there was evidence of the military's use of the D.P.U. structure to drive voter turnout and
behavior (Source: Horne, pp. 305).
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amnesty. In his speech in Constantine on October 3, 1958, de Gaulle outlined an
ambitious plan for French investment and development in Algeria that included large
scale job creation, land reform, wage increases, public education, and affirmative action
in civil administration. 754 The intent of all these measures was to improve the standard of
living and political status of the Muslim population.
Three weeks later, de Gaulle offered the FLN a paix des braves - or peace of the
brave. Drawing on his reputation for military rectitude, de Gaulle offered to amnesty all
those FLN fighters who approached under a flag of truce and surrendered their weapons.
To reinforce his point, de Gaulle released some 13,000 prisoners over the course of 1959
as a gesture of goodwill and as an invitation to wholesale surrenders. 755
In spite of de Gaulle's considerable political momentum, his conciliatory offers
fell flat. 756 The FLN categorically rejected the paix des braves offer.757 General Challe,
writing in 1962, observed that the amnesty offer was sensible but premature; 758 so long
as the enemy had the means to resist, he had no reason to submit. Similarly, there is little
evidence that the prisoner releases of 1959 stimulated either individual surrenders or
political reconciliation on the elite level. 759
While many individuals and communities did benefit from the Constantine Plan,
the logical connection between late war civic action and resistance behavior appears to
have been quite weak. While few in the French camp doubted that political and
economic inequality had given the FLN cause its basic appeal, the belated provision of
754 Ibid., Droz, Lever, pp. 197-198.
755 Ibid., Horne, 306; ibid., Droz, Lever, pp. 205.756 Jacques Soustelle, L'espirance trahie (1958-1961) (Paris: Editions d'Alma, 1962), pp. 88-89.
757 Ibid., Th6nault, pp. 169; ibid., Connelly, pp. 197.
758 Maurice Challe, Notre Rdvolte (Paris: Presses de la Cite, 1968), pp. 37.
759 Ibid., Soustelle, L'esperance trahie, pp. 89.
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investments and reforms did not turn back the clock. Reforms and investments that
might have dampened nationalist sentiment between 1945 and 1954 were not strong
enough to independently restore a polity shattered by three years of large scale violence.
From Carrots to Sticks: The Challe Offensives (February 1959-March 1960)
Within a week of his appointment as the senior military commander in Algeria,760
General Challe announced a new plan for victory. While Challe acknowledged Salan's
accomplishments in sealing the borders and developing quadrillage, he argued that the
French army had lacked a comprehensive plan for the employment of the theater reserve.
If the French could use the theater reserve to smash the ALN bands in their mountain
sanctuaries, then it might be possible to restore durable control in countryside. Once
these areas had been cleared, Challe would apply new methods of "dynamic" quadrillage
to reach Challe's goal of "bringing the population in its entirety under our control." 761
Many of the building blocks for this strategy were already in place. Salan's
success in reducing border infiltration had made Algeria, in Challe's words," a closed
battlefield." 7 62 The Battle of the Frontiers in early 1958 had demonstrated the operational
improvements in tactical intelligence, the use of helicopter borne infantry, and close air
support. Though they represented just over ten percent of the French troops in the
Algerian theater, 763 the elite units of the theater Reserve had proven their ability to track
760 General Ely had dispatched Challe to Algeria two months earlier to serve as Salan's adjutant. Challe
had formed many of his basic ideas on counterinsurgency strategy during this period and was prepared to
issue his Directive No. I as soon as he assumed command in late December 1958 (Sources:[Abzac article,
pp. 64]; ibid., Challe, pp. 37-38).
761 "Directive du 22 d6cembre 1958 aux forces terrestres, aeriennes, et maritimes" in ibid., Challe, pp. 96.
762 Ibid., Challe, pp.
763 In April 1959, the theater or "general" reserve numbered 50,000 out of a total force of 425,000 French
troops (Source: Jean-Charles Jauffret, "Une arm6e A deux vitesses en Alg6rie (1954-1962): R6serves
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down and destroy ALN units in almost any terrain. On the pacification front, Salan had
already put in place a comprehensive structure for population control. S.A.S.
detachments had begun to develop a French O.P.A. and apply the psychological tools
advocated by the GR theorists. Equally important, expanded resettlement of the Muslim
population had simplified the problems of population defense and control.
Though he intended to use many of Salan's tools, Challe believed that his
predecessor's lack a comprehensive scheme of maneuver had limited the effectiveness of
pursuit and pacification.76 Challe planned instead to concentrate this theater reserve for
a series of offensive operations. Starting in the less restive areas of the west and rolling
eastward, Challe would apply the full strength of the theater reserve to each enemy
sanctuary area in turn. His objective in each area was to wear the enemy down to a level
where the local quadrillage troops could hold the area and consolidate French control.7 65
During the clearance phase, local units were to use their superior knowledge of the local
area to focus the offensive operations of the theater reserve.766
After roughly one to three months of "treatment" by the theater reserve, the sector
would revert to the control of local forces. Local commanders would then employ some
mix of S.A.S. action, resettlement, and deliberate organization of the population to ensure
tight control. Though Challe shared his predecessor's focus on population control, his
pacification strategy emphasized targeting and control over purely psychological
operations.
g6n6rales et troupes de secteur," in ibid., Jauffret, Vafsse, Militaires et guerilla dans la guerre d'Algirie
(Paris: Editions Complexe, 2001), pp. 23).
764 Ibid., Challe, pp. 39.
765 Ibid., Challe, pp.
766 Franqois-Marie Gougeon, "The Challe Plan: Vain Yet Indispensable Victory," Small Wars and
Insurgencies, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 302.
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Challe's most significant operational innovation was the commandos de chasse
(hunting commandos). Building on Salan's earlier efforts,767 Challe used mixed
companies of Algerian and French troops to add a dynamic element to what had been a
largely static, pacification strategy. 768 In each local area, the French would form a
commando to shadow the opposing katiba (company). The commandos would then
employ range of tactics to hound their quarry; as Challe put it, they were not to break the
rebels but to mark them.7 69 In some cases the commandos would set up observation posts
of the high ground in a sector and then direct artillery, aviation, or reserve units to engage
the unsuspecting ALN bands. In other instances, the commandos would pose as ALN
guerillas. 770 These "carnival" operations, enabled the French to surprise the guerillas and
test the true sentiments of the population. As in the case of Leger's more elaborate
bleuite operations in wilaya III, the discovery of false guerilla bands bred suspicion and
sparked self-destructive purges. 77 1 The ultimate objective of the commandos de chasse
was to make the guerillas as insecure as possible, limiting their offensive capability,
breaking their hold on the population, and preventing their resurgence once the theater
reserve had moved on.
Challe decision reliance on the commandos de chasse was a product of judgment
and material constraint. Early French enthusiasm for such units, in some cases dating to
the Indochina period, rested on a belief that native troops were often better suited than
767 G6n6ral Maurice Faivre, "Le plan Challe," Revue historique des armies, No. 238 (March 2005), pp.
109; Claude d'Abzac-Epezy, Franqois Pernot, "Les op6rations en Alg6rie d6cembre 1958-avril 1960: Le
g6ndral Challe parle," Revue historique des armies, No. 200 (septembre 1995), pp. 67; Le Mire, pp. 275.
768 Ibid., Le Mire, pp. 257.
769 Ibid., Abzac, pp. 67.
770 Ibid., Faivre, Le Renseignement dans la guerre d'Algdrie, pp. 163.
771 Ibid., Villatoux, pp. 516-517.
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French troops to the task of pacification. 77 2 "Turned" ALN insurgents in the commandos
units were more adept at locating and eliminating their former associates. Equally
important, however, was the pressure to substitute local manpower for French troops.
While the French had managed to maintain roughly 400,000 troops in Algeria between
1957 and 1958, the French government had decided in late 1958 to revoke the extensions
in conscript service that had made this possible. In his initial directive to his commanders
on December 19, 1958, Challe emphasized that the resulting loss of between 40,000 and
50,000 troops773 made the use of far larger numbers of Muslim troops imperative:
In order to push these tasks forward, we find ourselves facing the problems resulting from the
reduction in [French military] forces. The extension of the length of service having been terminated
by the government, the maintenance of our potential must be found through the maximal utilization
of the F.S.N.A. [French of North African origin] and by through the improved efficiency in the use
of our available means. The use of the F.S.N.A. is first of all a moral imperative. We will not
pacify the Algerians without the Algerians. Secondly, this is a guarantee of [greater] effectiveness.
The best hunter offellaghas is an F.S.N.A. [a Frenchman of North African descent]. Finally, this is
a necessity in if we are to limit the fall in troop numbers. 774
Challe was true to his word. As the table below indicates, Challe's push for increased
Muslim participation drove the numbers of harkis, commandos de chasse, maghzen and
self-defense forces up dramatically. By the end of his tenure, the proportion of Muslim
combatants in the Algerian garrison had risen to one in three.
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I-Harkis -- Rural Police (GMS) --- Maghzens -- Self Defense Forces
Challe launched the first of his operations on February 6, 1959, just over a month after
his assumption of command. Operation Oranie targeted the weakest FLN region, wilaya
V. Within the space of one month, Challe's theater reserves, local units, and commandos
had cut F.L.N. manpower in the region by 50% (1,600 killed in action, 460 captured) and
captured between 40% and 50% of the rebels' weaponry.775 By March, the regional
commander, General Gambiez, ordered a shift from clearance operations to the conquest
of the population. 776
Confident that Oranie had proven the basic formula, Challe marched east into the
more strongly held FLN redoubts. Over the course of Operations Courroie (18 April-19
June 1959), Etincelle (8-20 July 1959), Operation Jumelles (22 July 1959-8 April 1960),
and Pierres Pr6cieuses (6 September 1959-August 1960), Challe pushed his ever larger
775 Ibid., Home, pp. 334.
776 Ibid., Faivre, "Le plan Challe," pp. 111.
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theater reserve through the remaining FLN sanctuaries. The impact of these offensives
on an ALN weakened by internal purges and cut off from its external bases was
devastating. Four of the six ALN regional commanders were killed, and in 1959 alone
the ALN suffered an estimated 26,339 dead.777 The number of regular ALN fighters
inside Algeria dropped from its 1958 level of roughly 20,000 to somewhere between
5,000 and 7,000 by the end of 1961.778 The drop in the number of katibas (ALN
companies) was even more striking; whereas the ALN fielded 121 katibas in August
1958, that number had fallen to 8 by July 1961. 779 Without access to new weapons and
ammunition, the katibas had broken into progressively smaller bands to survive the
French offensives.
Though most of the estimates of the ALN losses come from French military
sources, contemporary ALN accounts reinforce this impression of near military collapse.
As one F.L.N. leader in the Kabylia recalled, the Challe offensives reduced the insurgents
to desperation:
One could no longer move...One no longer ate. I was so weak that I could no longer even
manage to carry my own sub-machine gun. The establishment of military posts, the
multiplying of self-defense communities and intelligence agents was making life impossible,
and even survival itself....It was only by executing traitors one after the other that we did
780
manage to survive. But one was never able to regain the initiative.
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Challe's not only shattered the ALN units, but also put in place significant barriers to
rebel resurgence. The combination of border control, commandos de chasse, and S.A.S.
organization made it nearly impossible for the ALN to reassert control in the cleared
areas. As Challe pointed out, "The rebel was no longer the king of the djebel: he was
now the hunted." 78'
Split interpretation: Military and Civilian Perspectives on Challe Offensives
In strictly military terms, the Challe plan was a resounding success. Writing after
the war, Challe pointed to several tangible indicators of his success: increasing body
counts, decreasing ALN strength and unit size, and declining ALN willingness to
attack. 782 From a Model 1 perspective, the armed forces of the FLN inside Algeria were
nearly spent by the time of Challe's departure in March 1960.
To Challe's credit, he recognized that Algeria was a political war. Challe noted
that many general officers and politicians in France at the time saw the struggle in
entirely conventional terms:
"You, the military leaders, you win the war on the ground and we, the political leaders, we will make
the peace and we will set the political conditions." To which I replied: "This is not a war - I do not
consider myself Napoleon and neither are we at Austerlitz - we find ourselves in a political war and it
is a political war that we will win or we will lose." 783
Challe clearly rejected the sequential logic of the Model 1: the idea that wars were first
won in decisive battle and then delivered to the politicians. In sharp contrast, he argued
that, at least in revolutionary war, politics and war could not be disentangled. While
Challe had broken with Model 1 orthodoxy, his discussion reveals his commitment to
Model 2's coercive definition of politics. Control of the population was the central
781 Ibid., Challe, pp.
782 General Maurice Challe as cited in ibid., Abzac-Epezy, Franqois Pernot, pp. 70.
783 General Maurice Challe as cited in ibid., Abzac-Epezy, Franqois Pernot, pp. 64.
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objective of the war, and the only way to succeed was to separate the passive population
from the virulent rebel influence: "The rebel had, at that moment [when he refused to
engage the French forces], lost, not because we had bludgeoned him, but because we had
cut him off from the population." 784
Challe went on to cite the resettlement of the rural populations in 1,000 "new
villages" and the public works investments of the Constantine Plan as evidence of the
political transformation of Algeria:
Therefore, in this pacification, we had put in place a immense public works project and, as the
results of military operations and pacification went hand in hand, we had, I can say, won the
political war at the moment where the population rejected the rebels....I have told you what we did
to separate the rebels from the population and the population accepted it.785
Challe had perfectly summarized the Model 2 theory of victory. By his telling, the army
had won by beating the guerillas and bribing or beguiling a passive population. As such,
it was a vision of one-way politics in which the application of positive and negative
incentives was sufficient to restore the state's authority. As Paul and Catherine Villatoux
have noted that the theory of guerre revolutionnaire rested on this assumption of a
passive population and foreign agitation:
By asserting the principle that the rebellion was simply the poisoned fruit of disruptive elements, the
theoreticians of la guerre rdvolutionnaire logically conceived of the rallying of populations, not in
terms of a complete reversal, but as a simple return of these masses to the French bosom, previously
abused or terrorized by the agents of a foreign power. It is in this way that the Muslim population
was always described as a mass, amorphous, wavering, of a "primitive character" and "highly
emotional," within which only "a limited number of individuals" were "capable of reasoned
judgment." 786
Just as Salan and Trinquier had cited Muslim turnout in the September 1958
constitutional referendum as proof of the power of psychological operations, Challe and
other Model 2 leaders believed that an authoritarian order built on forced resettlement
784 General Maurice Challe as cited in ibid., Abzac-Epezy, Franqois Pernot, pp. 70.
785 General Maurice Challe as cited in ibid., Abzac-Epezy, Franqois Pernot, pp. 70.
786 Ibid., Villatoux, pp. 489.
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was proof of political success. Viewed through the Model 2 lens, political control was
synonymous with political success. So long as that population was inanimate and
reprogrammable, then its political preferences were largely irrelevant.
The Regroupements Crisis and the White Terror: Civilian Objections to the Challe Plan
While Challe was confident that he had all but won the war, other observers
expressed doubts about the Challe/Constantine package of sticks and carrots. Since the
objective of the campaign was to restore a free standing, civil order, everything rested on
the ability of the French to connect their military, economic and psychological operations
to this goal. Two major themes undermined Challe's claims: the political costs of
pacification and the incomplete or impermanent nature of French population control.
Challe's most important pacification tool was resettlement. Eager to clear the
countryside and establish positive control over rural populations, he endorsed a massive
expansion of the resettlement program. As the chart below indicates, the number of
Algerians in official and unofficial resettlements climbed from 360,000 (-4% of the total
Muslim population of 9 million) in November 1957 to over 1,660,514 in October 1960
(-20% of the Muslim population). 787 The military saw aggressive resettlement as
indispensable. As General Cr6pin, Challe's successor as French commander in Algeria,
put it in April 1960, "We will not be able to win the war unless we win the battle of the
regroupements."788
787 All data on regroupement figures is drawn from Charles-Robert Ageron, "Une dimension de la guerre
d'Alg6rie: Les regroupements de populations," in Jauffret, VaYsse, Militaires et guirilla dans la guerre
d'Algirie, pp. 327-362.






2,000,000 moratorium on new camps 2,000
S 
-**-Total Persons Interned
1,500,000 1,500 -Official Camps
_ o *Total Camps
en. Parlange





The results of regroupement were mixed. The isolation of the guerillas from their
support base clearly contributed to the collapse of resistance during the Challe offensives.
Similarly, the creation of "free fire" zones greatly simplified the pursuit of the remaining
guerillas. On the other hand, the French failed to persuade the resettled populations that
the new order was an improvement. From the outset, the military's eagerness to intern
Algerians outstripped its ability to provide housing, food, and sanitation. In 1960, a full
three years into the policy, Algerians interned in the Akbou sector were receiving an
average of 1 kg of rice flour per person per month whereas their nutritional needs
approached 7 kg/person/month. 789 Unemployment, malnutrition, disease, and infant
mortality were rampant in the camps, and these pressures drove Algerian into the arms of
the F.L.N. rather than the French authorities. Of the 600 nomads in one S.A.S. survey,
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68% refused to answer whether they would accept resettlement and another 20%
answered that they would not resettle. 790 Far from representing a coup for French
psychological operations, the regroupement camps had become breeding grounds for
future generations of Algerian insurgents. 79 1
French civilian authorities soon recognized the potential for strategic disaster. In
response to growing reports of deprivation in camps, Governor-General, Paul Delouvrier,
announced on March 31, 1959, the "suspension of all new regroupements"792 and a
renewed emphasis on addressing problems in existing settlements. To focus these efforts,
Delouvrier appointed the S.A.S. general, Georges Parlange, Inspector General for
Resettlement. 793 In one of his first reports, Parlange indicated that the displacement of
the rural populations approached "total ruin" for the affected parties and that the French
policy must help over one million "remake their lives and rediscover their former way of
life." 794
The French military resisted Delouvrier and Parlange's efforts to rein in
regroupement. Challe immediately protested Delouvrier's encroachment into the
military's war on the guerillas. While acknowledging the regrettable human
consequences of regroupement, military leaders emphasized military necessity and the
positive accomplishments of the program (expanded access to health care and education).
The indirect resistance to Delouvrier and Parlange's initiatives was more significant. As
the regroupement statistics show, Delouvrier's moratorium and his appointment of
Parlange did nothing to stem the growth of official and unofficial camps. Local
790 Ibid., Ageron, pp. 347.
791 Ibid., Ageron, pp. 346.
792 Ibid., Ageron, pp. 340.
793 Ibid., Ageron, pp. 340.
794 Ibid., Ageron, pp. 340.
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commanders, with the tacit support of the high command, simply ignored the directives
of the civil government or couched the new resettlements in different terms.795 In spite of
the best efforts of the civil administration and S.A.S. leadership to articulate the growing
short and long term costs of the regroupement programs, the French military pursued
expanded resettlement from 1957 through the end of offensive operations in 1961.
General Parlange, recognizing his inability to influence regroupement policy, resigned
his post in December 1960. In his final report, he underlined his conviction that the
policy would have disastrous consequences for French political-military strategy in
Algeria:
It is imperative that we unwind the resettlements at every opportunity. Otherwise, we will
face an irreparable failure that could wipe out all of the political, military, and economic
efforts undertaken in the past five years. 796
More than any other aspect of the French counterinsurgent strategy, the division
between the French military command and the civil authorities on regroupement revealed
the underlying philosophical gap between the two communities. Challe and the military
command were aware of the mixed effects of their strategy. Still, they considered the
tangible, military benefits to be more important than the intangible, political costs. 797
Given their belief in the intrinsic passivity and malleability of the population, the military
795 Ibid., Ageron, pp. 340
796 Ibid., Ageron, pp. 344.
797 To demonstrate that this subjective weighting of the effects of regroupement is a function of operational
code rather than nationality, it is worth citing the views of LTC John McCuen, an American military
authority on counterinsurgency: "An objective view of the French experience with regroupement in
Algeria, not to mention those in Malaya and Cambodia, would indicate that the concept is sound. Although
there are some disadvantages of great expense and of initial alienation of the population, the advantages
seem to far outweigh them. When well organized by civic action teams and combined with effective self-
defence, regroupement can create and environment in which guerillas find it very difficult to live. It can
facilitate civic and psychological action to counter-organize the population. It offers a medium to improve
the living conditions of the people and effect administrative reforms. Since these are all major factors in
counter-revolutionary warfare, regroupement can be a significant influence on its successful outcome."
(John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-insurgency (London:
Pitman Press, 1969), pp. 234)
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command believed that the separation of the rebels from the population was worth the
potential costs in human suffering. Delouvrier and the S.A.S. leadership saw a
consensual political arrangement as the fundamental goal of the war and protested
policies that undermined that goal. That regroupement played a large role in the success
of the Challe campaigns is indisputable. The important point is that the military's
regroupement methods, with their emphasis on coercive control, effectively ended the
hope for a long-term, consensual arrangement between the Muslim population and the
French authorities.
The commandos de chasse were equally double edged. While the commandos
increased the pressure on the guerillas, and did so at a lower manpower cost than earlier
forms of static quadrillage, they often did so by imposing a counter-terror on the
population. Former guerillas frequently resorted to methods they had used in the service
of the ALN. One French officer described the "Georges" commando, one of the first
units of its kind, as a "magnificent band of enraged dogs, desperados fighting ferociously,
such perfect mercenaries that no ideal motivated them anymore." Their behavior in one
"pacification" operation illustrates the potential for abuse:
Naturally the majority of the men of the commando worked within the population - it would be
more exact to say that they worked the population over - according to the techniques learned in the
enemy camp. Their remarkable tallies were often the product of terror and defiance of the rules.
Rather than trust the testimony of Djebbar [a local informant], the men of "Georges" swooped down
on the regroupement [camp] of Ain Mekter in order obtain intelligence for themselves through the
use of violence. Their method of investigation, however unjustifiable it might be, can be explained
in part by the deplorable fashion in which a good number of the regroupements had been set up -
poorly organized, poorly supplied and poorly protected. The former insurgents who mad up the
Georges commando remembered that it was in these regroupement camps that they had once gone
to sleep, eat and recover.... The thugs raped the women, pillaged the houses and tortured the men in
such a way that seven succumbed.798
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C. Hary, an S.A.S. officer serving in the Oranie (wilaya 5) made similar observations
about commando Yatagan:
When I was in the SAS detachment in Djeballa, the commando Yatagan left Nemours and came
down the valley toward the SAS, they were perfect killers, thieves and rapists. Entire douars
[villages] came to seek refuge beneath the walls of the SAS [compound] in order to place
themselves under our protection. 799
As in the case of regroupement, the commandos de chasse delivered military
results at the cost of the long term alienation of the population. Mixed Algerian and
French irregular units were more successful in locating, pursuing and eliminating the
smaller ALN bands that remained in the wake of the major combat operations. But they
could do so only by intensifying the Hobbesian war in the countryside. ALN guerillas
were increasingly insecure but this did not mean that the local populations reaped any
benefits. Asked to describe the mood in August 1960, another S.A.S. officer explained
that the Muslim population "was between the anvil and the hammer. They fear the Army
and the FLN."800
Even where extreme measures suppressed ALN violence, the shift in the fortunes
of the war did not necessarily lead to Muslims to rally to the French cause. In spite of
increased French efforts to protect, organize and indoctrinate the population, Muslims
tended to pursue various hedging strategies. As one observer noted, the same men who
fought in the village self-defense forces often sent their wives to deliver food to the
rebels. 8 1 Only by appeasing the Army and the FLN could the average inhabitant hope to
survive the escalating war in which the population was "a punching bag." 80 2
799 C. Hary as cited in ibid., Mathias, pp. 149.
800 Lieutenant H. as cited in Claude Dufresnoy, Des Officiers Parlent (Paris: Rene Juillard, 1961), pp. 123.
801 Ibid., Villatoux, pp. 490.
802 Ibid., Feraoun, pp. 201.
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Where Muslims departed from the hedging strategies, they did so in favor of
nationalist rebels. Colonel Bigeard, the noted para commander and zealous believer in
the guerre rivolutionnaire doctrine, nevertheless recounted the growing gap between the
fortunes of the ALN and the views of the population: "But in the monthly bulletin signed
by Colonel Bigeard, if he noted that 'the [ALN] morale has fallen very low,' he also
recognized: 'In contrast, if one observes d6tente with the Muslim population, it remains
nationalist in sentiment."' 803 Brigadier L. Jackson, the British military attache in Paris,
noted that when populations did rally to the French, they did so out of fear rather than
affection or genuine conversion:
Though no Frenchman will admit it, in my mind there is very little doubt that the [Muslim]
communities rally to the French, not because of any loyalty to the French, but purely because they
are fed up with the rebellion and with the extortion of the rebels. If they have no idealistic
attachment to France, they will obviously have no hesitation in changing sides if protection is
withdrawn from them. 804
General Ailleret, the commander of French forces in Northern Constantinois from
June 1960 on, made an even more pessimistic appraisal of the net effects of French
pacification:
... the policy of pacification by social and psychological action produced, by all appearances,
excellent results on the surface but, basically, the mohammeds of the bled were not with us but with
their brothers of the djebels [mountains], more or less actively, certainly, but with them all the
same.so5
Close observations of Muslim behavior belied the simple social constructs of the GR
theorists. Where those theorists and much of the high command saw the population as a
passive prize, the Muslim population, beset by violent agents of both camps, continued to
exhibit a consistent preference for their nationalist co-ethnics.
803 Ibid., Meynier, pp. 301.
804 Martin Thomas, "The British Government and the end of French Algeria, 1958-1962" in Martin S.
Alexander, J.F.V. Keiger (eds.) France and the Algerian War, 1954-1962: Strategy, Operations and
Diplomacy (Portland: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 178.
8sos5 Ibid., Villatoux, pp. 490.
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As the rolling offensives of the Challe Plan reached their terminus in the spring of
1960, the balance sheet was again mixed. Challe's operations had shattered the
weakened and isolated ALN forces inside Algeria. Those units that remained were
reduced to starvation. Yet this victory had been achieved only by placing one third of the
Muslim population in regroupement camps and imposing a reign of terror in the
countryside. Though some officers in the field disagreed, the French high command was
united in their belief that the final victory was near. The civilian authorities and the SAS
hierarchy, by contrast, feared that the Challe plans had left them at a new but
unsustainable equilibrium. A solution that rested on an open ended occupation by several
hundred thousand and the forced isolation of a third or more of the native population was
simply a more expensive form of the military stalemate that had prevailed on the eve of
Challe's appointment.
Phase 5: Self-determination, Negotiations and the Coup (March 1960-May 1961)
De Gaulle's enthusiasm for Model 2 strategies had begun to wane by the fall of
1959. After the failure of his conciliatory measures in 1958 and the crescendo of the
Challe offensives in 1959, de Gaulle had decided that the military victory and the
coercive "political" victory of the GR theorists were both hollow. While the military
oscillated between Model 1 and Model 2, it was de Gaulle who began to edge closer to a
Model 3 approach which acknowledged the active role of the Muslim population and
elites. Rather than confront the army or the settlers head on, de Gaulle reasserted civilian
control by adjusting his policy. It was the growing gap between a Model 2 military
strategy and a Model 3 policy that triggered the military coup of April 1961. With the
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suppression of the coup, de Gaulle engaged in a series of ultimately unsuccessful
negotiations that ended in French withdrawal on FLN terms.
Causes of Search: Two Lenses, Two Opinions
By the summer of 1959, civilian observers were less sanguine than military
leaders. Even with the substantial military gains of the Challe offensives, Delouvrier's
cabinet issued a decidedly downbeat appraisal of French fortunes:
They feared "we won't come out of it," according to a July 1959,"that the rebellion and the
terrorism are hydras with a hundred heads." The rebels were able to reconstitute their political and
military formations, and international opinion appeared more and more susceptible to their
arguments. The Muslim population had not gone over to them, the authors maintained, but "the
blood, plus the tears, plus the FLN (its existence, its dynamism, its organization, its conviction, its
exploits) create the consciousness of 'the Algerian nation' and the ideal of independence." Under
the circumstances, they concluded, political and economic reforms failed to resonate and military
victories were never more than partial. 80 6
The cabinet did not contest Challe's of episodic success - instead they questioned the
permanence of these gains and their impact on Muslim sentiment. Whatever their doubts,
Delouvrier and his advisors lacked the power to alter military strategy. The military's
settlement and re-organization of the rural population had made the Army the most
important single force in local administration. In spite of de Gaulle's first purge of the
most politically radical officers in the winter of 1958, and his efforts to extract the army
from Algerian politics, many officers were openly contemptuous of the Delegate-
General. Colonel Argoud, one of Massu's staff officers and a leading GR theoretician,
challenged Delouvrier in these terms:
You are giving us a lecture worthy of a political science professor and not that of a person
responsible for the government in Algeria. Your arguments referring to world opinion...are those of
a professor of history, of an intellectual. It's all very moving, but in no way does it correspond with
reality. You're not in contact with the population as we are.80 7
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For these reasons, the struggle for policy and strategy was reduced to a clash between de
Gaulle and a confident but frustrated army. As late as April 1959, de Gaulle appeared
hopeful about the prospects of military action: "I believe that we may have a military
solution to the Algerian affaire, because the barriers on the frontiers play their role and it
may be possible to get rid of the adversary fairly quickly."80 8 In an inspection tour of the
Kabylia, de Gaulle received more indications that the offensives had not altered the
nationalist position of the Muslim population:
Just as I was leaving, the Muslim town clerk stopped me and, bowing and trembling, and murmured:
Mon g6n6ral, don't be taken in! Everyone here wants independence." At Saida, where the heroic
Bigeard introduced me to a commando unit who had been won over, I caught sight of a young Arab
doctor attached to their group. "Well doctor, what do you think of it all?" "What we Arabs want,
and what we need," he replied, his eyes filled with tears, "is to be responsible for ourselves instead
of others being responsible for us." 809
With no end in sight, de Gaulle decided in the summer of 1959 to embark on a
radical change in French policy.810 While the French army continued to prosecute its
final offensives, de Gaulle announced on September 16, 1959 that French policy would
be based on "self-determination." Appealing to the Algerian masses and not to the FLN,
de Gaulle proposed a referendum with three choices: integration, association, or
secession. De Gaulle made clear that the first option, and the basis of French policy from
1955 to 1959, was moribund. The third option would be unthinkably self-destructive; a
precipitous move to independence would leave an Algerian republic without the aid
necessary to fuel modernization. Without stating it directly, de Gaulle signaled his
preference for an association which combined internal self-rule with close economic and
808 Charles de Gaulle as cited in Khaled Nezzar, Algirie, Journal de guerre (1954-1962) (Paris: Editions
Publisud, 2004), pp. 55.
809 Ibid., Horne, pp. 340.
8so10 Gil Merom, "A 'Grand Design?' Charles de Gaulle and the End of the Algerian War," Armed Forces
and Society, Winter 1999, Volume 25, No. 2, pp. 286, fn 38;
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defense cooperation. He also made clear that the referendum would be held only after
hostilities had ended.
De Gaulle's volte-face was the turning point of the war. In a single speech he had
repudiated integration or assimilation, the French policy of the past century. His abrupt
shift in policy left the Challe plan and the army's institutions of population control
suspended in mid air. A strategy that had as its aim the coercive control the population
had been unhinged by a policy that rested on free choice of the same subject populations.
Third, for the first time since the opening months of Soustelle's tenure, France had
articulated a policy that acknowledged and depended on the active participation and
cooperation of the Muslim population and elites.
A Moving Target: French Policy and Military Reactions
The French military reacted to self-determination with a mixture of shock and
disbelief. The move from a fixed policy goal of integration to a variable goal set by
Muslim opinion was deeply unsettling. The tools of warfare and population control
developed under Salan and Challe had no clear application in the context of procedural
democracy. The very ambiguity of the eventual policy made it difficult to develop
alternative military and political strategies. Challe expressed his profound displeasure in
a letter to Prime Minister Debr6:
One does not propose to soldiers to go and get killed for an imprecise final objective.....This is the
difference, moreover, between the mercenary army and the citizens' army. One can thus only ask of
soldiers of the army of Algeria today that they die in order for Algeria to remain French.8
These doubts were partially assuaged by messages from Debr6 that the policy was
intended for international consumption. Delouvrier encouraged the army to convince the
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population of the need for a French solution of integration or close association. Many
officers accepted this representation of self-determination as "an export item" designed to
relieve U.N. pressure. 812
In retrospect, de Gaulle's ambiguity was deliberate. Though it appears that he
sought to secure the most favorable exit outcome possible in Algeria, he had concluded
by 1959 that the end of the war was imperative and that the only exit lay in some form of
Muslim participation. As he admitted in his memoirs, he deliberately obfuscated his
plans in order to avoid an immediate backlash:
Were I to announce my intentions point-blank, there was no doubt that the sea of ignorant fear,
shocked surprise, of concerted malevolence through which I was navigating would cause such a
tidal wave of alarms and passions in every walk of life that the ship would capsize. I must,
therefore, maneuver without ever changing course until such a time as, unmistakably, common
sense broke through the mists.... 813
While de Gaulle's methods may have been justified in pragmatic terms, his
disingenuous approach gave his opponents ammunition. What de Gaulle saw as a
negotiator's challenge, soldiers and settlers alike came to see as dishonesty and betrayal.
Even after the shock of self-determination, the French military clung to a seemingly
successful Model 2 strategy. Here again the small victories dynamic was at play.
Writing in early 1960, a division commander explained the situation in these terms:
General Ailleret summarized the grounds for satisfaction: the small tallies registered fairly
frequently by the quadrillage forces, the constant diminution inside Algeria of the rebel potential in
weapons, ammunition and food, the corresponding slackening of rebel activity, reduced almost
everywhere to a struggle for survival. On the frontier defense, the substantial reinforcements gave
new confidence in the effectiveness of the obstacle belts in assuring the impermeability of the
frontiers. The numerous local successes, unspectacular but frequent, which the majority of units
registered, led to the virtual disappearance of rebel attacks and facilitated the creation of "new
villages" and the development of self-defense. Thus, in the Tenes sector," the continuing progress
of the regroupement policy leaves the rebels no more than a twentieth of the population of the
district, the advance of quadrillage into one time sanctuaries, led us to hope that the time is
812 Jean Nicot, "L'Armde franqaise en Algdrie au temps de l'autod6termination (septembre 1959-1960),"
Revue historique des armees, No. 197 (d6cembre 1994), pp. 56.
813 Charles de Gaulle as cited in Horne, pp. 308.
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approaching when the bands will be sufficiently diminished that effective control of the population
will be realized. " 814
To his credit, Ailleret noted the weak connection between these positive military trends
and the political situation. Noting that the settlers had never accepted liberalization in
any form, he observed that the Muslim populations had reacted to de Gaulle's policy shift
by adopting a wait and see approach.
The pieds noirs were far less charitable than the army in their interpretation of de
Gaulle's new policy. Increasing FLN violence in Algiers had encouraged extremists in
the settler community to agitate in favor of a coup similar to that of May 1958. De
Gaulle's recall of General Massu, the victor of the Battle of Algiers, was the spark for a
full blown insurrection in the capital. From January 24-30, 1960, Algerian settlers seized
the major government buildings in Algiers and solicited the support of the army. Though
many officers shared the settlers' distaste for self-determination, the high command under
Challe ultimately intervened to stop ethnic violence and prevent the spread of the pied
noir rebellion.
De Gaulle's public speech on the evening of January 29 underlined de Gaulle's
belief in the importance of Muslim consent in any durable political settlement:
The Algerians will tell us what they want to be. This will not be dictated to them. For if their
response were not really their response, then while for a time their might well be military victory,
basically nothing would be settled. On the contrary, everything can be settled and I believe I
France's favor, when the Algerians have had an opportunity to make known their will in all
freedom, dignity, and security. In short, self-determination is the policy that is worthy of France. It
is the only way out.
De Gaulle's speech provoked declarations of loyalty from over 40 units in Algeria and
effectively ended the week of the barricades. 815
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Having defused the immediate crisis his, de Gaulle embarked on his second major
purge of activist military elements. The pied noir militias were disbanded and their
leaders arrested. 816 Just as he had dismissed military activists in the wake of the May
1958 uprisings, he now sacked military officers suspected of complicity; Colonels
Godard, Argoud, Gardes, all leading lights in the GR campaign, were casualties of this
second and more extensive purge.817 De Gaulle then shuttered the military Fifth Bureau,
the heart of the GR school in Algeria, and reined in the intelligence organizations that had
grown into "a state within the state." 818 Challe's replacement three months later by his
deputy, General Crepin, was yet another attempt to tighten civilian control.
De Gaulle's reference to an "Algerian Algeria" on November 4, 1960 provoked
renewed unrest among settlers, administrators and the Army.819 Those who had hoped
that "self-determination" was simply a public relations slogan were forced to recognize
the profound shift in French policy. For de Gaulle's increasingly marginalized Resident-
General Delouvrier, the removal of "francisation" from the menu of self-determination
undercut all his technocratic and political efforts to build a united and French order.820
His resignation later in November marked the end of the Challe-Delouvrier formula of
Model 2 military and economic strategies.
A massive and unanticipated Muslim demonstration in Algiers on December 11,
1960 dealt another blow to the advocates of integration and even association. The sudden
appearance of thousands of Algerians waving FLN flags demonstrated both the depth of
support for the rebels in the capital. A violent French reaction which cost some 61 lives,
816 Ibid., Horne, pp. 373.
817 Ibid., Horne, pp. 373.
818 Ibid., Thdnault, pp. 207.
819 Ibid., Droz, Lever, pp. 296.
820 Ibid., Horne, pp. 423.
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55 Muslim, did nothing to buttress the legitimacy of French order. 821 The intricate,
authoritarian structures that had delivered "spontaneous" demonstrations of support for
the regime in May and September 1958 were powerless to resist Muslim opinion and
renewed FLN agitation. As a shrewd French observer noted, the demonstrations forced
all French parties to reassess the political landscape:
In Paris, it is considered that three myths died in Algeria over the weekend, these being the selfish
myth of the white ultras that Algeria is French; the mendacious myth of the French army that only a
fistful of fighting rebels in Algeria wanted independence in all those years of war; and the major,
miracle myth that de Gaulle could make peace - though no one here, or probably anywhere, thinks
anyone else could make it.822
Though the clashes of November 1960 may have validated de Gaulle's critique, they also
highlighted the mounting desperation of the losing parties in the emerging Algerian
order. For the pieds noirs, the events of November confirmed their fears of
marginalization and provided a rationale for violent resistance against the French state.
For the architects of the Model 2 strategies, de Gaulle's purges and his attempts to
disassemble the institutions of population control jeopardized the sum total of their
achievements.
It took the January 8, 1961 national referendum on self-determination to bring
events to a head. Though de Gaulle received overwhelming support in metropolitan
France, the abstention of 42% of Muslim voters in Algeria signaled the growing power of
the FLN. The clustering of the 39% of Muslim "yes" votes in urban areas revealed the
fragility of French control in rural areas, even in the wake of the Challe offensives. The
settlers were nearly unanimous in voting "no" to what they correctly perceived to be the
death knell of 1 'Algirie frangaise.823
821 Ibid., Th6nault, pp. 209.
822 Janet Flanner as cited in Horne, pp. 434.
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402
These results pushed the pied noir ultras and disgruntled army elements into open
revolt. In early January, the pied noir leaders of the "Barricades Week" joined a number
of cashiered military officers to form a new anti-Gaullist organization, the Organisation
Arme Secrete (O.A.S.). 824 With General Salan at its head, and activist GR colonels
ranging from Lacheroy to Argoud to Godard in its ranks, the OAS combined the doctrine
of revolutionary warfare with the passion and commitment of the settler ultras to launch a
subversive campaign against de Gaulle and his policies.
In a more serious development, the referendum accelerated coup plotting within
the French army. Convinced that the referendum spelled the end of French Algeria,
senior leaders, including Generals Jouhaud, Salan and Challe, began to consider a
restoration of military control in Algeria. Two developments forced the plotters' hand.
De Gaulle's replacement of the senior military commander in Algeria, General Crepin,
with the more politically reliable General Gambiez, encouraged the plotters to act
quickly. De Gaulle's subsequent announcement of open negotiations with the FLN
convinced the generals that they must move quickly or lose any chance of heading off
French capitulation. 825
On April 21, 1961 forces loyal to General Challe, Salan and Zeller seized control
of the government offices in Algiers and arrested the Resident-General, Jean Morin, and
General Gambiez. While some elite units rallied to the cause, de Gaulle repeated his feat
of the "Barricades Week," convincing the country and the army's rank and file that the
revolt was potentially ruinous. After less than a week, the revolt had collapsed and its
leaders surrendered or fled into exile.
824 R6mi Kauffer, "OAS: la guerre franco-franqaise d'Alg6rie" in Mohammed Harbi, Benjamin Stora (eds.)
La guerre d'Alge'rie, pp. 676
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Challe's testimony in his subsequent trial revealed the civil-military divergence of
opinion on the realm of political possibility in Algeria. According to Challe, the military
situation was highly favorable and the political situation entirely salvageable. 826 His plan
was to renew the military push and pacify Algeria within the space of several months.
With luck, such a result might pull France back from the path of unilateral concession.827
For Challe pacification remained a matter of security and expectations:
If the population were sure of the winner, they would refuse terrorism and terrorism would no
longer be possible. The theory, the famous theory of Mao Tse-tung frequently put forward, of the
water and the fishes, is still very simple and very true: if you remove the water, that is to say the
support of the populations, the fish can no longer survive. This is simple, I know, but in war only
simple things are realizable, and those who are here and those who have fought know this well. 828
De Gaulle, by contrast, saw no firm bridge connecting coercive military control of the
kind Challe had wrought and stable, low cost social order. As he would later write:
The war was all but over. Military success was achieved. Operations had been reduced to next to
nothing. Instead politics dominated the scene, and in this respect the communities were further
apart than they had ever been.829
The coup and its rapid collapse marked the final inflection point in French policy
in Algeria. De Gaulle purged the army a third time, removing those commanders and
units who had rallied to Challe's standard. While de Gaulle attempted unsuccessfully to
exploit his military position and the internal divisions of the rebels, the FLN ultimately
secured independence on its own terms. France was unable to safeguard any of its
subsidiary interests: the fate of colons and Muslim loyalists, control in the oil rich Sahara,
or long term military basing. The Algerian war had ended in defeat.
826 Ibid., Challe, Notre Rvolte, pp. 82.
827 Ibid., Kelly, pp. 316-317.
828 Ibid., Challe, pp. 82.
829 De Gaulle as cited in Horne, pp. 424-425.
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Algeria and the Theory
The Algerian case bears out many of the theory's central predictions. In its
second consecutive campaign, the French military faithfully repeated the dominant
patterns of interwar and intrawar learning dysfunction. As noted in Chapter 4, the French
military began a vibrant if bounded debate about the causes of defeat in Indochina and
their implications for future conflicts. This debate had almost no influence on the
allocation of resources and attention within the Defense Ministry. In spite of clear
warnings of unrest in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, the military was quick to turn its
attention from counterinsurgency to conventional rearmament and atomic warfare.
Consequently, France entered its second campaign in Algeria with the same Model 1
reflex.
French intrawar behavior followed the dominant pattern as well. The French
responded to the rebellion with Model 1 strategy. When attacks on the guerillas failed to
extinguish resistance, the civil government made a bid to impose a Model 3 alternative.
This Model 3 initiative under Soustelle was undone by a combination of enemy
escalation, military skepticism, and massive French reinforcement. Having returned to
the Model 1 path, the French military devoted the next year to material and normative
escalation. Trend failure and the shocks of the Ben Bella affaire and Suez prompted a
change to Model 2 strategy in 1957. Population control stabilized the situation but
produced a new stalemate. After a brief flirtation with Model 3 concessions, the French
returned to military escalation as the answer to Model 2 stalemate. The Challe offensives
broke the guerilla movement inside Algeria but only through massive resettlement, low
grade rural terror, and repeated conventional offensives.
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The military operational code played a visible role in French, wartime decision-
making. General Cherriere fell victim to the illusion of familiarity in the winter of 1954.
For Cherriere and his successor Lorillot, the problem appeared military in nature and
minor in scale. The lopsided results of tactical encounters with ALN guerillas baited the
Model 1 learning trap. Secure in their military prowess, French military leaders
continued to rely on manpower increases until the practical limits on reinforcement had
been reached. Once Salan had launched his Model 2 campaign in 1957, the French
military fell into the Model 2 learning trap. Coercive population control made it
impossible to measure true public sentiment and the French focused instead on measures
of performance to gauge political progress. Fixated on their own good acts rather than
the political effects of those acts, the French overstated the level of Algerian support for
French authority.
Civilian participation played an important role in all three episodes of Model 3
choice. Soustelle's appointment was the result of a bid by the Paris government to
reassert control over strategy. His parallel evaluation of Cherriere's campaign led to him
to adopt a radically different approach. Soustelle's political background led him to frame
the problem in terms of political exchange rather than compellance. Whether in his
negotiations with Muslim opposition groups, or in his offers of political equality and
inclusion to the rural masses, Soustelle sought to end resistance by offering power and
status to disenfranchised groups. De Gaulle's 1958 trial balloons - the Constantine Plan
and the paix des braves amnesty - were attempts to break the Model 2 stalemate with
Model 3 concessions. De Gaulle's later introduction of self-determination was the final
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expression of Model 3 reasoning. Here, rising civilian participation collided with high
military resources to provoke a civil-military crisis.
Resources played an important role in reinforcing the dominant pattern. The
absence of any constraint on military manpower encouraged military leaders to pursue
offensive operations against the guerillas. Until the limit of those resources had been
reached in 1957, the French military showed little interest in the search for alternative
strategies. By that time, massive reinforcement and the transfer of many administrative
duties to uniformed personnel had made the French military the true sovereign in Algeria.
Factor endowments also played a role in reinforcing Model 1 and Model 2 solutions. The
presence of overwhelming numbers of troops gave commanders the tools to pursue labor
intensive offensive and later defensive operations.
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Chapter 6
The Model and the French Cases: Theory, Prediction, Evidence and Fit
How well does the theory developed in Chapter 2 explain observed behavior in
the three French cases? How do well does this theory compare with the alternative
explanations presented in Chapter 1? The purpose of this chapter is to examine the
internal validity of the proposed theory within the confines of this three case sample. In
order to do this, we ask four questions. First, are the dominant patterns in fact present?
Second, can these patterns be traced to the influence of the military operational code and
bureaucratic interests? Third, do changes in the independent variables - task pressure,
civilian participation and resources - account for deviation from these dominant patterns?
Fourth, do the causal mechanisms outlined in Chapter 2 explain the connections between
the independent and dependent variables?
The chapter is broken into two sections. The first is an analytical summary of the
three cases. The object of this section is to compare the model's predictions with the
patterns and variations in strategic choice across and within the cases. Drawing on the
material of the case chapters, we will seek to explain each major change or potential
change in strategy. The second section will examine the role of the three independent
variables - task performance, civilian participation, and resources - in explaining
departures from the dominant pattern. The task is twofold: 1) to establish the correlation
between changes in the independent variables and the observed outcomes and 2) to
identify the specific casual mechanisms linking such changes with the outcomes. 830
830 For a comprehensive table of the independent variables, causal mechanisms and testable hypotheses, see
the table on pages 127-128 of Chapter 2.
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Analytical Summary of the French Cases
The French strategy in Indochina revolved around Model 1 or counterinsurgency
as small war. Though the conflict opened with a Model 3 strategy, this approach did not
survive early changes in military leadership and the arrival of French reinforcements.
Once open war with the Viet Minh had begun, the French devoted their resources and
attention to improving the efficiency of their Model 1 concept. From 1946 through 1952,
they sought to engage and destroy the Viet Minh army in decisive battle. During the
same period, they struggled unsuccessfully to eradicate guerilla resistance and pacify the
populated regions of Tonkin and Cochinchina. The largely positive military feedback
from battles with guerillas and main force units reinforced the military's attachment to
Model 1 and masked the underlying problems with campaign strategy. By 1952, the
failure of repeated pacification campaigns and the stalemate on the conventional front
encouraged the high command to experiment with elements of a Model 2 strategy
including population resettlement, population control, and the sponsorship of anti-Viet
Minh partisan movements. In the final year of the war, under pressure from French
political leaders and American military advisers, the high command began to retrace its
steps in the direction of Model 1. While the high command did not stamp out the Model
2 experiments, the weight of their efforts returned to the search for decisive battle. While
they continued to pursue offensive pacification in the North and South, this was seen
primarily as a prelude to the decisive battle with Viet Minh main force units in 1954 and
1955.
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French defeat in Indochina provoked a heated intellectual debate within the
military. While military leaders were genuinely committed to understanding the origins
of defeat and their prescriptive implications, the debate remained confined to solutions
compatible with the military operational code: Model 1 and Model 2. Very few
contemporary military observers were drawn to Leclerc's Model 3 formula of negotiating
while fighting. While this intellectual debate raged, and indications of serious unrest in
North Africa mounted, the French military shifted from preparations for
counterinsurgency to conventional defense in Europe.
When the rebellion in Algeria erupted in November 1954, the French appeared
poised to apply the insights of the Indochina experience and the postwar debates.
Instead, in spite of this experience, the French responded to the FLN uprising with Model
1. The dismal results of the first winter's campaign and mounting unease among civilian
leaders led to a brief flirtation with Model 3. As in the earlier conflict, the military
instinctively resisted Model 3 formulas predicated on the consent of local elites and
populations. Enemy escalation and the flood of French reinforcements undermined the
Model 3 strategy, and by September 1955 the focus returned to Model 1 and escalation.
Two years into the war, the unchecked expansion of the rebellion, failure at Suez,
and the limited impact of massive French reinforcements precipitated a shift from Model
1 to Model 2. For the next two years, the French army sought to apply the Model 2
insights of Indochina on a grand scale. While the combination of high force levels and
Model 2 strategy managed to stop the growth of the rebellion, it did not bring the
campaign victory. Mounting frustration among military and political leaders led to a
reassessment in the fall of 1958. When offers of amnesty and economic investment
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failed to produce the desired reaction in the enemy camp, de Gaulle endorsed a dramatic
intensification of Model 2 pacification and the return of large scale, Model 1 maneuver in
the Challe offensives. While the military saw the results of these offensives as proof of
impending success, the civilian leadership under de Gaulle saw them as proof of the
bankruptcy of French Model 2 strategy. De Gaulle's announcement of Model 3 policies
fatally undermined the military's Model 2 campaign and eventually prompted them to
launch the April 1961 coup. Though he survived the military challenge to his authority,
de Gaulle's late application of Model 3 strategies ended in failure as the FLN secured all
its major objectives at the expense of the French state.
Episode 1: French Indochina, Model 1 and the Learning Trap
Initial Response: Model 3
The French war in Indochina began under the least promising circumstances. By
the fall of 1945, French authority had collapsed, Viet Minh leaders had erupted onto the
scene, and the French lacked the resources to mount a conventional reconquest of
Indochina - a clear illustration of the budget constraint mechanism. Because he lacked
the power to reconquer the territory by force of arms, Leclerc pursued a Model 3 strategy
that restored French control of Indochina with a fraction of the troops available to his
successors. Within eight months of his return to Hanoi, Leclerc's political military
strategy had been undone and the French were embroiled in the "holy war" he had
strenuously sought to avoid.
The Model 3 response of the first year of the conflict was the product of Leclerc's
extreme resource scarcity, personal insight, and extensive civilian participation in
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strategy. Leclerc's unusual background made him more receptive to Model 3 strategies
than many other senior military officers. Leclerc was astoundingly young. He had
started the Second World War as a 38 year old captain; by 1945 he had risen to the rank
of four star general by 1945. Personal adherence to the MOC is in part a function of
professional socialization; selection and self-selection make long serving general officers
the least likely to hold unorthodox views on the logical underpinnings of the
profession. 831 Leclerc was in this sense an anomaly: his station and authority had come
without the traditional indoctrination and the repetitive selection that often eliminates
heterodox views. 832 The substance of Leclerc's prewar and wartime experience was just
as unusual. His formative experiences as a commander of native forces in Morocco gave
him an early appreciation of irregular warfare. 833 Similarly, his early campaigns in
Africa were essentially political projects; his success in that phase rested more on his
skills as a coup plotter and colonial administrator than on his military skills. Though he
would gain greater notoriety for his late war conventional exploits in North Africa and
Europe, it was the earlier tests that made him more receptive to integrated political
military strategy in Indochina.
While his unusual pedigree made Leclerc more open to Model 3 approaches, it
was extreme resource scarcity that made such a path nearly unavoidable. The mismatch
between the scale of the task and the resources available forced Leclerc to craft a plan
based as much on stagecraft as on battle. Leclerc lacked the forces necessary to destroy
831 James G. March, "Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning," Organization Science,
Volume 2, Number 1, February 1991, pp. 79, 85.832 Anthony Clayton, Three Marshals of France: Leadership after Trauma, (London: Brassey's, 1992), pp.
123.
833 Andr6 Martel, Leclerc: Le soldat et le politique (Paris: Albin Michel, 1998), pp. 60-75; ibid., Clayton,
Three Marshals of France: Leadership after Trauma, pp. 36-37.
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the Viet Minh or forcibly eject the 150,000 Chinese Nationalist troops occupying
Tonkin. 834 The impossibility of victory through force of arms made a combination of
battle, bluff, and negotiation the only feasible choice.
Early Reassessment: Model 3 to Model 1
Though Leclerc managed to reconquer Indochina in five months with very modest
forces, his Model 3 formula did not survive military skepticism and a positive resource
shock. Military leaders, including Admiral d'Argenlieu, the high commissioner, had
always been uneasy with Leclerc's modus vivendi with a known enemy of French control.
Leclerc's success, rising French troop levels, and Chinese withdrawal made a Model 1
military solution appear feasible. Given a choice between Leclerc's ambiguous
condominium and the opportunity for a decisive military encounter with the militarily
weak Viet Minh, the French military embraced the latter. The volte face of 1947
illustrated the allure of Model 1, the intense distaste for Model 3, and the remarkable
power of resources to seduce militaries into strategic backsliding. Once material
constraints had been lifted, the military applied its preferred solution to
counterinsurgency - Model 1.
In the eyes of the military, the results of the early battles in Hanoi and Haiphong
seemed to validate the switch from Model 3 to Model 1. Though Leclerc, Saintenay and
the architects of the modus vivendi lamented the start of a "holy war," Admiral
d'Argenlieu and General Valluy had driven the Viet Minh from the capital and forced
834 Ronald H. Spector, In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle for Postwar Asia
(New York: Random House, 2007), pp. 255; Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years of
the U.S. Army in Vietnam 1941-1960 (New York: The Free Press, 1985), pp. 52; Yves Gras, Histoire de la
Guerre d'lndochine (Paris: Librarie Plon, 1979), pp. 72.
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them to retreat to the base areas of Tonkin and Annam. Measured in terms of loss ratios
and control of the battlefield, the confrontation appeared a success. That said, the
victories did not bring the campaign victory the command had hoped to achieve. Instead,
the conflict had reached a new equilibrium with the French in control of the urban areas
and the major roads and the Viet Minh in control of the rural areas. Not surprisingly, the
military sought to break this stalemate by a Model 1 escalation: a large scale, decapitation
strike on the Viet Minh sanctuaries of northern Tonkin. Operations Lea and Ceinture
showcased a professional, highly mobile and effective French Expeditionary corps
capable of winning every tactical engagement with its guerilla opponents and clearing
large swathes of territory. When rapid maneuver failed to produce decisive results, the
architects railed against the constraints of limited manpower and insufficient duration; the
core logic of the Model 1 campaign remained unexamined. The French command was
convinced that local successes were cumulative and the underlying strategy was sound.
With the 1947 offensives, the French had entered a long and debilitating learning
trap. Uniformly positive tactical results appeared to validate Model 1 and begged
reinforcement of these successes. The resources and attention of the Expeditionary Corps
were focused on perfecting the Expeditionary Corps hammer and baiting the enemy into
decisive battle. On the other side of the ledger, French forces were unable to prevent the
"rot" or deterioration of population control in cleared areas. In classic Model 1 fashion,
military leaders attributed this to Viet Minh strategy and French material weakness rather
than local sentiment. Rather than reassess strategy or underlying assumptions, French
leaders in the opening three years of the war preferred to "treat" and retreat restive areas.
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The hard cap on French troop reinforcements left the preferred escalatory option untested
and therefore seductive.
Strategic Search Foregone: Model 1 to Model 1
The early Indochina stalemate was broken by catastrophic failure at Cao Bang in
1950. The new, Chinese trained, Viet Minh army inflicted a crushing, conventional
defeat on the exposed border outposts in Tonkin. The ensuing crisis of confidence
appeared to open the door to more extensive strategic search. Instead, the arrival of de
Lattre, the charismatic leader, set in motion a restoration and escalation of Model 1 rather
than an exploration of alternatives. The ill conceived Viet Minh exploitation of the Cao
Bang victory led to three French defensive victories in the space of three months. De
Lattre's restoration, and his success in securing expanded metropolitan and American aid,
set the stage for a repetition of the learning trap on a larger scale. Once again, tactical
success and escalatory opportunities trumped any interest in extensive strategic search.
De Lattre's tenure, cut short by his death in 1951, encouraged a belief in many quarters
that Model 1, in the hands of a properly resourced and charismatic military leader, held
the answer to the Indochina dilemma and revolutionary war in general. 835
835 The recent publication of a glowing account of de Lattre's tenure in the American military journal
Military Review (Lieutenant Colonel Michel Goya, Lieutenant Colonel Philippe Francois, "The Man who
Bent Events: 'King John" in Indochina," Military Review (September-October 2007), pp. 52-61)
demonstrates the enduring appeal of the "resurrection" parable. The authors, both serving French military
officers, paint de Lattre's policy and strategies in uniformly positive terms. The closing passage of the
article suggests that de Lattre's successes were only cut short by his untimely death: "In just one year, "the
French MacArthur" had restored fighting morale and esprit among French troops, won three major battles,
given enormous impetus to the creation of a free Vietnamese army, and shored up support for the war
among French and Allied politicians. No one can say for sure that the war would have ended differently
had de Lattre survived, but he was undoubtedly the right man in the right place at the right time. His single
major failing was that he joined his only son too soon."
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Experiments with Political War: Model 1 to Model 1.5
With the death of de Lattre and the appointment of General Salan, the French high
command began to confront the limits of Model 1. De Lattre's last act, made under
mounting pressure from French and American leaders, had been to launch a conventional
offensive outside the Red River delta to seize Hoa Binh. What de Lattre had intended as
a way to divide and weaken the Viet Minh soon evolved into a debilitating battle of
attrition. Salan, the architect of Operations Lea and Ceinture and de Lattre's primary
subordinate, had learned much about the limits of Model 1. His first act was to withdraw
from the perilous French position at Hoa Binh; his second was to launch a series of
Model 2 initiatives (civil-military pacification units, French sponsored Montagnard
insurgent groups, and resettlement operations in Cambodia). Salan's deliberate shift
from a strategy centered on main force battle to one focused on population control was
the second turning point in French strategy. 836 Though Viet Minh offensives would force
Salan to mount increasingly elaborate, conventional maneuvers to stave off collapse in
Tonkin, he had come to believe that control of the Vietnamese population held the key to
long term success in Indochina.
The growing strength of the Viet Minh army and the continued deterioration of
the military situation in 1952 and 1953 led French and American leaders to call for a
change in strategy and leadership. Both groups saw the solution in a return to more
aggressive Model 1 formulas. The contemporary reports of American military advisers
provide powerful supporting evidence of the professional origins of intrawar learning
dysfunction. Unencumbered by concerns about the future of the French army, American
836 The first inflection point was the move from Leclerc's Model 3 strategy to the d'Argenlieu/Valluy
Model 1 strategy in late 1946. The second was Salan's 1951 turn from Model I to experimentation with
Model 2.
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military advisers nevertheless saw the predicament much as the French high command
had in 1946 and 1947. The solution lay in decisive battle with the enemy army; Salan's
Model 2 initiatives and seemingly defensive orientation were distractions from this
central task. Under pressure from the Americans, and beholden to them for economic
and military aid, the French replaced Salan with a commander with no previous
experience in the theater. Though General Navarre did nothing to stamp out Salan's
Model 2 experiments, his arrival marked a shift back towards Model 1 priorities. In a
repetition of failed French strategies of 1947-1950, Navarre and his American advisers
hoped that offensive pacification in the south in 1954, and rapid expansion of the native
armies of the Associated States, would give him the tools to break the Viet Minh army in
1955. Leadership rotation and American professional opinion had led the French army
back to its conceptual starting point - the military operational code and Model 1
response.
Interwar Purge: Self-evaluation and Backsliding (Model 1 to Model 2 to Model 1)
Clear and catastrophic defeat at Dien Bien Phu, followed by French concession at
Geneva, provided another opportunity for reassessment of counterinsurgency strategy.
Though the military had employed all three models at various points in Indochina, the
postwar debate was strictly confined to arguments for and against Models 1 and 2.
Though these professional debates were intense and candid, the organizational response
was dominated by the problems of European defense. Far from incorporating or building
upon the lessons of Indochina, the removal of immediate task pressure led the French
defense establishment to turn from revolutionary war to conventional war in Europe.
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Even as warnings of revolutionary unrest in North Africa mounted, the organization
appeared bent on investing its resources and energy into conventional rearmament.
The implicit boundaries of the interwar search are themselves a testament to the
power of the military operational code and the organization's distaste for Model 3. While
advocates of Models 1 and 2 could agree on the shortcomings in political resolve and
manpower in Indochina, few military officers at the time were attracted to Leclerc's
Model 3 blend of negotiation and military force. The idea of combining negotiation,
national or local, civilian or military in origin, with the conduct of war was met with
ridicule and disdain in military circles. The constraints on French manpower in
Indochina made even this bounded debate between Models 1 and 2 inconclusive; behind
every Model 1 argument was the untested assertion that massive troop reinforcement
might have changed the outcome. Few Model 2 advocates openly disputed this
manpower critique as their alternatives were just as dependent on abundant manpower.
What both camps ignored was the paradox of Leclerc's shoestring successes of 1945-
1946; the French had restored partial control in Indochina when their strength vis-a-vis
the Viet Minh and Nationalist Chinese was near its nadir.
The gap between these professional debates and the defense establishment's
reaction is even more telling. While veterans of the conflicts and leading defense experts
debated the merits of Models 1 and 2, the organization welcomed the end of the war as an
opportunity to return to conventional rearmament. The intellectual efforts to explain
defeat and prescribe alternative approaches to counterinsurgency were almost entirely
detached from the ministerial and general staff arguments over resource allocation and
rearmament.
418
French organizational interwar behavior is entirely at odds with a number of the
leading alternative explanations of interwar learning. None of the experience
explanations appears to match the observed behavior. Fewer than six months separated
the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the All Saints' Day uprising in Algeria: far too short an
amount of time for the army, particularly the professional cadre of the Expeditionary
Corps, to forget the experiences of the past decade of counterinsurgency. That war had
clearly contributed to the stock of recent and relevant experience in counterinsurgency;
this additional raw experience did not, however, lead the military to revise their existing
doctrine or channel resources or attention into this area. Nor was this a problem of
insufficient processing of raw experience. Both the official studies and the lively
professional debate over defeat in Indochina demonstrated the military's willingness and
ability to consolidate, evaluate raw experience, and produce lessons. These debates make
the almost instantaneous turn from counterinsurgency to European rearmament even
more revealing. This reaction was neither a "last war" reflex nor an unbiased estimate of
the "most likely" war. Instead it resembled something closer to a "preferred" war reflex,
in which the removal of immediate task pressure set in motion a return to the
organization's core preferences as expressed in a standard mission set.
The period between the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the start of the Algerian
rebellion should have been an opportunity to consolidate and apply the lessons of the
Indochina war. It was not. As task pressure ebbed, the overwhelming temptation on the
part of the defense establishment was to turn from a complex, distasteful and
unrewarding problem of revolutionary war to the simpler, more appealing and
institutionally gratifying problem of European rearmament. This was true even in the
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face of immediate revolutionary war threats in North Africa. The French military did not
use the pause between Indochina and Algeria to perfect and then field a force designed
for counterinsurgency; instead they behaved as if the last war had been an unpleasant
anomaly. The military's rapid shift from counterinsurgency to conventional defense
meant that they would open the Algerian war almost as unprepared as they had in 1945.
Episode 2: Algeria, Model 2 and Defeat
Initial response: Model 1
For the French military, Algeria was an opportunity to apply the experience and
"lessons" of Indochina to a new revolutionary war. The value of the object in the new
contest was far higher and this translated into greater material and political resolve. A
French state that had balked at providing more than 150,000 troops in Indochina had by
the second year of the Algerian war dispatched over 400,000. The Algerian insurgents
lacked a powerful external sponsor to play the role of a Middle Eastern China.
Moreover, recent experience and reflection provided a foundation for improved strategic
choice. Having tested Models 1, 2 and 3 in Indochina and devoted considerable
intellectual effort to untangling the "lessons" of the conflict, the military should been
better prepared to respond to counterinsurgency.
In practice it was not and the French military did not pick up where it had left off.
Though they had pioneered Model 2 strategies in the later stages of Indochina, it took
over two years for the high command to implement a similar solution in Algeria.
Whatever advantages the French may have possessed in the operational realm were more
than offset by the political complexity of the emerging conflict. Though contemporary
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military leaders 837 tended to assume that operational advantages would make Algeria an
easier test than Indochina, these ignored the paralytic influence of the settler community
on political reform. Here again, the military's core assumptions about the significance
and agency of the local population created a critical blind spot. In a conventional military
problem, the military could safely ignore the role of the population and focus on the
opposing force or coalition. Though the later phases of the Indochina conflict had begun
to undermine those assumptions, the military's first response in Algeria was to focus on
their armed opponents and assume that the Muslim and pied noir populations were
insignificant and unable to influence the campaign.
The initial French response to the Algerian rebellion was to mount large scale,
offensive operations against the rebels - a classic Model 1 response to insurgency. The
local command treated the armed insurrection as a variety of conventional war. By
eliminating the guerillas and cowing the Muslim population, the French authorities hoped
to restore French authority and control much as they had in 1945 after Setif.
Almost from the start, French forces fell into the familiar, Model 1 learning trap.
French encounters with Algerian rebels were consistently one sided, but these small
victories did not produce the desired results on either the enemy or the population.
Tactical success seemed to suggest that the same Model 1 strategy applied on a larger
scale and for longer duration would translate into campaign success. Instead, in spite of
837 General Navarre, the last French commander in Indochina, devoted a significant portion of his 1956
account of Indochina to the comparison of the two wars. In Navarre's opinion, the circumstances in
Algeria were far more favorable than those he had faced in Indochina. Navarre's opinion reflects his
overwhelming focus on the military dimensions of the problem and his neglect of the powerful political
dynamics of Muslim and pied noir nationalism. (Source: Henri Navarre, Agonie de l'Indochine (1953-
1954) (Paris: Librarie Plon, 1956), pp. 316-335).
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sizable French reinforcement, and increasingly ruthless tactics, the rebellion expanded
rapidly in scale and geographical scope.
Civilian Reassessment: Model I vs. Model 3
The disappointing results of the first winter and civilian concerns over the military
bent of the campaign led the French government to appoint a liberal Governor-General,
Jacques Soustelle. Soustelle developed a new Model 3 policy of integration based on
compromise and embodied in a series of administrative, political and economic reforms.
Soustelle's goal was to draw Muslim elites and masses back into a discernably French
political order and reverse the tide of rebellion.
Soustelle's strategies fell into three categories. First, he sought to curtail the S6tif
style repression and large unit operations which he regarded as actively
counterproductive. Second, he proposed a set of administrative and economic reforms
that would begin to address the gross inequalities that existed between the settler and
Muslim populations. By restoring basic administration, public services and economic
development, Soustelle hoped to remove the resentment that fueled the FLN rebellion.
Third, he opened secret negotiations with Muslim leaders in the moderate nationalist and
more radical FLN camps in an effort to explore alternatives to a deepening civil war.
Soustelle's response clearly fell within the category of Model 3 response.
Whereas the military saw the population as insignificant and vulnerable to simple
intimidation, Soustelle recognized the active role of Muslim elites and masses would play
in any lasting resolution. Success in such an endeavor would require the consent of these
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Muslim actors, including large segments of the radical opposition and the enemy camp.
Soustelle saw the conflict as a war of consolidation in which appeals to the Muslim
masses and elites were more important than Model 1 pursuit or Model 2 authoritarian
control.
French military leaders disagreed with Soustelle's diagnosis and his prescription.
Soustelle's attempts to limit the exercise of military force were often ignored. The senior
military leadership saw the guerillas as the center of gravity; in this light, the solution was
a better resourced and more ruthless Model 1 campaign rather than new initiatives aimed
at Muslim elites or masses. In this context, Soustelle's plan rested on his ability to
impose logically foreign, Model 3 strategies on a skeptical and military. At the same
time, rising numbers of French reinforcements and a series of small victories encouraged
the military to exploit Model 1 and ignore Soustelle's alternative. Weakened by military
opposition and settler resistance, Soustelle's Model 3 strategy could not survive the FLN
provocation at Philippeville in August 1955. At a stroke, the FLN atrocities and French
reprisals discredited the cause of ethnic integration and political reconciliation, and
turned the liberal Governor-General into a hardened opponent of the FLN.
It is telling that the failure of Soustelle's Model 3 strategy presaged a return to
Model 1. While Model 2 alternatives were readily available, and Soustelle's and
Parlange's S.A.S. initiatives provided a springboard for just such a transition, the military
responded to Soustelle's fall and the expansion of the rebellion through escalation. Here
the flow of manpower appears to have played a dual role. Expanded resources made it
possible to play out the preferred Model 1 strategy. So long as the military command
lacked the troops and legal tools to implement a robust Model 1 campaign, the failures of
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the first six months of the rebellion could be rationalized in terms of inadequate resources
or civilian restrictions. Equally important, the rapid expansion in military troop strength
skewed the internal balance of French administrative power in Algeria. While the
Governor-General and the civil authorities might exert substantial influence in a
department with a garrison of 50,000 troops, the eightfold expansion in troop strength
made the military the leading voice in local administration. The creation of special,
militarily administered areas such as the Aurbs, the delegation of special powers, and the
rapid expansion in the S.A.S. all served to supplant existing structures of civil
government. 838 In short, the positive resource shock changed both the influence of the
military and the range of strategic options available. Both these mechanisms, resource
regression and bureaucratic influence, dragged the military towards Model 1 escalation
and away from meaningful strategic search.
The Model 1 escalatory cycle continued for just over a year. Steady increases in
manpower and repression resulted in increased numbers of enemy killed but failed to
produce the desired effects on the campaign level. While the French continued to
produce small victories, the major trends in the rebellion were overwhelmingly negative.
Rebel violence continued to rise and the size and scope of the FLN organization
exploded. While these negative trends eroded confidence in the strategy, it took episodic
failures in the fall of 1956 to force a change in leadership and strategy. The seizure of the
FLN leadership did not precipitate a collapse of the rebellion, and the strike on the
purported external sponsor of the rebellion at Suez was even more disastrous.
838 Michel Hardy, Herve Lemoine, Thierry Sarmant, Pouvoirpolitique et authoritg militarie en Algerie
frangaise: Hommes, Textes, Institutions 1945-1962 (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002), pp. 51-52.
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Political War: Model 1 to Model 2
The move to Model 2 strategy in December 1956 marked a shift from counter-
guerilla war to a political war based on population control. The timing of this change in
strategy is significant. On the one hand, the 25 month lag between the start of the
rebellion and the application of late Indochina Model 2 strategies belies the view of
organizational learning as cumulative and unbiased. Though the French military had had
some success with Model 2 pacification strategies in Indochina, and had highlighted their
significance in the official lessons learned studies, the military chose to apply Model 1
strategies and escalation until the shortcomings of that approach were inescapable. The
two year lag in response suggests some combination of professional misunderstanding
and bureaucratic antipathy towards Model 2 or 3 strategies. On the other hand, the shift
from Model 1 to Model 2 was considerably faster than in the Indochina war where major
reappraisal did not occur until the fifth year of the war.
There are at least two possible explanations for this acceleration. First, the scale
and intensity of French and rebel responses in Algeria may have accelerated the "testing"
of Model 1. Between 1946 and 1949, neither the Viet Minh nor the French
Expeditionary corps had possessed the resources to play out the Model 1 strategy to its
logical conclusion. In Algeria, the rapid expansion of the rebellion and the rapid influx
of troops made the inadequacy of Model 1 clear much earlier. Second, individual
learning by Indochina veterans, including Salan and many of his prot6g6s, served as a
hedge against the organization's interwar rejection of Model 2. As noted in Chapter 5,
many veterans expressed surprise and frustration at the failure to apply the "lessons" of
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Indochina in Algeria early on. When the Model 2 advocates gained influence under
Salan, they rushed to apply the "lessons" of Indochina with little regard for the
differences between the conflicts. In the first four years of the war the military oscillated
between two errors: what a statistician would refer to as "underfitting" and "overfitting"
of strategy to recent experience. In 1955 and 1956, French leaders had discounted recent
experience, preferring the Model 1 default strategy and invoking the unique
circumstances of the Algerian rebellion in their defense. In 1957 and 1958, Model 2
advocates treated the FLN rebellion as an extension or sequel to the revolutionary war in
Indochina. Not until 1959 did the military become comfortable with a Model 2 solution
modified for Algerian conditions.
From January 1957 through December 1958, General Salan, the proponent of
many of the Model 2 experiments in Indochina between 1952 and 1953, oversaw a
generalized application of such methods. Under Salan, the priorities shifted from
offensive action against the rebels to defensive population control. The ensuing shift in
the tools (psychological, economic, and administrative) and targets (the population and
the political leadership of the FLN) of the French campaign did not alter the underlying
coercive logic of the campaign. Instead of adopting the logic of politics as exchange, the
military redefined the political problem to fit the operational code's construct of war.
The Model 2 strategies of this period did arrest the deterioration of the French
position. The shift in emphasis from pursuit to pacification coincided with a decline and
later plateau in the number of FLN attacks. At the same time, the growth of the ALN
inside Algeria leveled off at a strength of roughly 20,000. Moreover, the construction of
extensive frontier barriers isolated the battlefield and made local successes cumulative.
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Salan also posted two major episodic successes: the Battle of Algiers and the "Battle of
the Frontiers." In the first, the French military extinguished FLN resistance in the capital
through a combination of raids, torture, authoritarian political organization, and
penetration of local guerilla cells. This apparent success, coming on the heels of civil
administrative failure, appeared to validate Model 2 strategy and military control over
strategy. The Battle of the Frontiers demonstrated the efficacy of the barrier systems and
the dominance of French elite forces in the war's only major, quasi-conventional battle.
While they had managed to stop the spread of the rebellion, the French had failed
to roll it back. The rebels continued to maintain their strength in the rural sanctuaries and
level of attacks remained stuck at the late 1957 levels. The ascent of de Gaulle, made
against a backdrop of campaign stalemate, led to changes in leadership and strategy.
Eager to restore civilian control and bring an end to the campaign, de Gaulle sacked
Salan and replaced him with General Challe.
The Military Crescendo: Model 2 and Escalation
While he was determined to conclude the war on his terms, de Gaulle's opening
moves were conciliatory. Eager to capitalize on the political goodwill of his return to
power, de Gaulle offered a broad amnesty to the FLN and a series of proposals for
economic modernization in Algeria. These Model 3 policy initiatives, reminiscent of
Soustelle's attempts to co-opt the Algerian population and elites in 1955, did not produce
the desired effects in the short term. The rebels rejected what they saw as a call for
unilateral surrender, and it would take months or years for the results of the economic
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initiatives to be clear. In the absence of force, de Gaulle's Model 3 initiatives did not
produce individual or group defection.
Faced with the failure of these opening moves, de Gaulle directed his new
military commander, General Challe, to apply decisive military pressure. The problems
of the late Salan period remained essentially unchanged. While the French had managed
to isolate the Algerian battlefield and establish an extensive pacification network, ALN
strength and attacks remained unacceptably high.839 While the military was able to
measure its performance of various constructive tasks (e.g. civic action, psychological
operations, population control), it was unable to measure the depth and permanence of its
pacification gains. Military frustration with the defensive stalemate, combined with
mounting political pressure from de Gaulle, made a change in strategy inevitable.
Challe's strategic choice was shaped by the military operational code and the
prevailing conditions: low civilian participation, mounting urgency and abundant
resources. While de Gaulle instructed Challe to intensify the military campaign, he left
the development of a new military strategy to Challe. The resulting Challe Plan,
developed in the absence of metropolitan or local civilian input, was a quintessentially
military answer to the stalemate. The specter of future French troop reductions
introduced a "window effect" reminiscent of the Indochina war. Though Challe had
400,000 French troops under his command, the government's decision to curtail the
length of conscript service meant that he would have to make due with less French
839 The FLN continued to mount over 1,500 attacks per month in late 1958; by contrast, de Gaulle had once
suggested that the maximum, acceptable level of violence in Algeria might be in the neighborhood of 200
attacks per month (Source: Irwin M. Wall, France, the United States and the Algerian War (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2001), pp. 200).
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manpower in the future. 840 The expectation of reduced resources amplified the pressure
for decisive action in the near term.
Challe's answer was analogous to Navarre's in 1954. He, like Navarre, continued
to support his predecessor's Model 2 political war in the countryside. In order to
consummate victory on the campaign level, he decided to reintroduce elements of Model
1 in the form of large scale, offensive maneuver. Challe saw Salan's emphasis on
defensive, local pacification and decentralized control as intrinsically flawed; the only
way to bring the campaign to a close was to renew pressure on the guerillas and FLN
political cadres in their mountainous sanctuaries. Salan's victories in the Battle of the
Frontiers made such a final blow appear feasible.
Challe believed that the answer was a rolling offensive that pitted the entire
French theater reserve against each of the FLN sanctuaries in succession. Challe's plan
reintroduced centralized control and a discernable spatial dimension to the war; progress
could now be measured in the Model 1 terms of rates of advance and enemy killed in
each targeted sector.
The rolling offensives were to be combined with an intensified Model 2 effort to
hold these gains. Challe redoubled Salan's efforts to build local self-defense forces and
mobile harki units in order to offset anticipated reductions in French manpower. Equally
important was a rapid expansion in resettlement of the Muslim population. Resettlement
not only made population control feasible, but also made the problem of offensive
pacification far easier. Challe added the commandos de chasse as yet another way to
local manpower to prevent FLN resurgence in cleared areas. Since the purpose of such
operations was to sever the links between active guerillas and a passive local population,
840 Maurice Challe, Notre Rdvolte (Paris: Presses de la Citd, 1968), pp. 99.
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Challe tended to discount the political and psychological costs of the white terror of the
commandos.
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Challe's offensives produced immediate, positive feedback on the military front.
The offensives killed an increasing number of ALN guerrillas and the barriers left the
FLN unable to replace these losses. Equally important, the military drove the number of
FLN attacks down to levels not seen since the opening months of 1956. The visible
deterioration of the FLN and ALN inside Algeria during 1959 and 1960 gave military
leaders the impression that decisive victory was within reach. Challe, like Salan and
most other military leaders, assumed that the population was essentially passive and that
the military collapse of the rebels would lead more or less automatically to the restoration
of durable, political authority. Since the population was assumed to be inert and
malleable, coercive measures such as resettlement that increased the level of physical
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control were assumed to be proof of restored authority. This was a classic illustration of
the Model 2 learning trap. Tight coercive control over the Muslim population made it
impossible to discern their real sentiments. To measure them, the French would have to
loosen their grip with no guarantee that the results would be favorable. In the absence of
valid, coincident measures of political progress, the French relied instead on measures of
their own performance of task - civic action, resettlement, and psychological operations.
All contributed to the illusion of political progress.
Political leaders including de Gaulle viewed these same operational results
through a different lens. Where military leaders saw cumulative military progress,
civilian leaders saw costly, temporary progress towards an untenable political end state.
The steps taken to secure "deep pacification" - offensive pacification, massive
resettlement, and the imposition of a white terror - made Algerian consent to French
control less and less likely. The only way to retain French control was to maintain
hundreds of thousands of troops in Algeria to police a Leninist political order. In de
Gaulle's opinion, the costs, financial and political, of maintaining such an order exceeded
the value of the object.841
These divergent interpretations of the results of the Challe offensives underscored
the profound differences between civilian and military understandings of politics. For
most French military leaders, the population was a prize to be won by the strongest side
in a political war. For civilians, even those with no compunctions about the use of force,
some minimal level of popular consent was a prerequisite for the low cost administration
of Algeria.
841 Ibid., Williams, The Last Great Frenchman, pp. 400.
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The Collision: Model 3 Policy and Model 2 Strategy
Though he saw the widening gap between military and civilian perceptions of
progress, de Gaulle opted not to change military strategy directly. Instead, he allowed the
military to continue its combination of Model 2 coercive pacification and Model 1
offensive maneuver while he embarked on a Model 3 policy of Algerian self-
determination. 842 He appears to have done so in order either to avoid a direct
confrontation or provoke one on his own terms. Challe and other military commanders
immediately realized the incompatibility of Model 2 strategy and Model 3 policy. As de
Gaulle sought to curtail military influence in Algeria through selective purges and
changes of command, the military leaders went into open revolt in response to what they
saw as a betrayal of their late war victory. The April 1961 coup attempt was the
military's last attempt to salvage what it saw as a Model 2 victory.
While the failed coup marked the end of the military's Model 2 strategy, the
suppression of the coup undermined de Gaulle's position. De Gaulle used the coup as an
opportunity to reassert civilian control and priorities. De Gaulle had hoped that his
military gains, in combination with open elections and engagement with non-FLN elites,
might allow France to retain some level of association and the control over key
interests. 843 All this depended upon developing some legitimate alternative to the FLN.
While the Si Salah affair had raised the possibility of a separate peace with dissident
rebels, the massive pro-FLN demonstrations in Algiers in December 1960 had underlined
842 As in the last phase of the Indochina War, the military command, frustrated by its inability to control the
population, sought to break the stalemate by reintroducing Model 1 offensive operations. Since Model 2
and Model I shared the same underlying coercive framework, the change from pure Model 2 to some
hybrid of Models 1 and 2 was less abrupt than a step from either towards Model 3.
843 These included French military bases, oil reserves, atomic testing ranges and the rights of European
citizens.
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the obstacles to a third force, political solution. Open negotiations with the FLN proved
disastrous; de Gaulle was unable to secure any of his major interests and was forced to
concede.
Variations on the Theme: The Role of Independent Variables and Causal
Mechanisms in the French Cases
While French behavior in the three cases is consistent with the dominant pattern
predicted in Chapter 2, the cases reveal considerable variation around this basic theme.
The French did exhibit a strong and durable preference for Model 1 solutions to
insurgency; consequently, wartime strategy tended to open with a prolonged "test" of
Model 1, followed by a belated shift in the direction of Model 2. Choices of Model 3
were far rarer and more fragile; they generally resulted from some combination of
extreme resource scarcity and heavy civilian participation. The interwar period saw the
reemergence of bureaucratic interests and the rejection of the heterodox Model 2 and 3
solutions. French behavior in the interwar period was at odds with common sense
notions of interwar progress and retention; rather than fixating on its recent experience,
the military tended to discard such experience and reset its strategies in accordance with
underlying cognitive beliefs and parochial interests.
That said, the French did not march from Model 1 to 2 to 3 in lockstep. Instead,
the order and timing of their strategic choice varied considerably within and across cases.
In this section we will examine two questions. First, to what extent did changes in the
specified independent variables (task pressure, task performance, resource abundance,
and civilian participation) explain changes in organizational behavior? Second, how did
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changes in independent variables influence strategic choice? Here the question is
whether the basic causal mechanisms developed in Chapter 2 explain the connection
between the independent variables and observed behavior.
The Military Operational Code, Bureaucratic Interests, and Task Pressure
The theory developed in Chapter 2 suggests that two constants 844 influence
strategic choice and retention: the military operational code (MOC) and bureaucratic
interests. The relative influence of each constant depends on the level of task pressure.
In total war, when task pressure is high and task performance is synonymous with
survival, the influence of the MOC is paramount - militaries are determined but biased
problem solvers. In limited war, when task pressure is more modest and task
performance is only loosely connected to survival, the MOC remains the leading
influence but parochial interests reinforce preference ordering and impede search for
alternative strategies. In peacetime, when task pressure is close to zero, bureaucratic
interests dominate organizational behavior. In practice, however, bureaucratic interests
and professional beliefs often reinforce each other; the bureaucratic motivation to reject
Model 3 strategies reinforces cognitive preferences for Model 1 formats.
The variation in task pressure is easiest to isolate in the transitions between the
cases. The French Indochina case is a classic case of expeditionary counterinsurgency
and modest task pressure. While the MOC appears to have played the leading role in
shaping strategic choice, contemporary French debates on strategy also revealed a strong
844 These are constant only within the context of military organizations. Different professions have
different operational codes and changes in the level of civilian participation reveal these systematic
differences in performance evaluation and strategic choice. The bureaucratic motivations cited here are
generic - they apply to almost any bureaucratic organization.
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distaste for Model 2 and particularly Model 3 strategies that impinged on military
autonomy, resources, and prestige. Model 2 strategies thrust the military into the political
realm but did so by applying a familiar coercive framework drawn from the operational
code. Model 3, by contrast, forced the military to discard the idea that politics was
simply war by other means. The move from war to one-way politics was far less jarring
than the transition from either to the ambiguous realm of politics as exchange.
Bureaucratic preferences were most evident at the highest levels of the metropolitan
defense establishment. Whether in senior officer visits or the deliberations of the
Ministry of Defense, senior French military leaders often saw heterodox solutions to
counterinsurgency as threats to preparations for Western defense. The depth of feeling
suggests that the French military's distaste for was more than an issue of theater priorities
or abstract debates about the expected values of various defense contingencies. For the
French military establishment, Indochina was more than the "wrong war in the wrong
place at the wrong time;" it was the wrong kind of war - one destined to distract and
damage the modernization and reputation of the military institution.
The drop in task pressure after Dien Bien Phu marked the beginning of an abrupt
institutional shift away from counterinsurgency. There is ample evidence that the
motives here were primarily bureaucratic. Pent up institutional distaste for
counterinsurgency was expressed in a swing in investment from operations to capital
modernization. Even as warnings of unrest in North Africa mounted, capital
modernization dominated the attention of senior civilian and military decision makers.
The postwar debates over the defeat in Indochina suggest a far greater degree of
flexibility on the conceptual level. While most officers ignored Leclerc's Model 3
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option, the military appeared committed to a candid exploration of the relative merits of
Models 1 and 2. The intellectual depth and practical insignificance of the postwar reports
on Indochina demonstrate the power of bureaucratic preferences in the absence of task
pressure.
The outbreak of the rebellion in Algeria led to an increase in task pressure and the
relative weight of the MOC. While senior military and civilian leaders initially resisted a
shift back to counterinsurgency and the organizational disruptions it might entail, the
rapid expansion in the rebellion soon overcame bureaucratic resistance. The primary
influence of task pressure on the Algerian episode was a lagged one; the post-Dien Bien
Phu failure to incorporate or generalize the "lessons" of Indochina meant that the French
entered Algeria at the conceptual ground floor. The official studies of Indochina clearly
identified the weaknesses of Model 1 and suggested that Model 2 formulas might be
more effective. Even so, the late Indochina Model 2 initiatives were conspicuously
ignored in the opening phases of Algeria; pride of place went instead to various Model 1
strategies that had been proven ineffective over a decade of experience in Indochina.
The Illusion of Familiarity and Learning Traps
The military operational code helps explain two subordinate puzzles of
counterinsurgency: the Model 1 default response and the slow recognition of its limits.
As noted in the Chapter 2, military reactions to insurgency often take the form of
patterned response rather than reasoned choice. Insurgencies exhibit many of the
symptoms of conventional war: the presence of antagonistic, armed groups and small
scale combat. Though these conflicts lack many of the familiar spatial features of the
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conventional battlefield (e.g. front lines, avenues of advance, strongpoints), their core
symptoms lead military decision makers to classify insurgencies as small wars. Once
insurgency has been labeled a subspecies of conventional war, military leaders are wont
to apply conventional strategies and measures of effectiveness. The problem, then, is not
the novelty of insurgency but the illusion of familiarity that is the product of common
symptoms and professional beliefs.
In Indochina, the illusion of familiarity was at work in the late 1946 transition
from Model 3 to Model 1. Most local military leaders saw the Viet Minh as a weak
military opponent. The sporadic clashes of the reconquest left no doubt that the conflict
was a variety of small war. Rather than allow the Viet Minh to grow in military strength,
the key was to seek a "trial of strength"845 while the balance clearly favored the French.
What these leaders missed and Leclerc understood was the significance and agency of the
local population. That silent partner would prove the decisive actor in a decade long trial
of strength between the French and the Viet Minh.
In Algeria, misclassification and inappropriate response were almost immediate.
General Cherriere saw the All Saints uprising as a small war; contemporary records and
his subsequent statements make clear that he considered the events of late 1954 a replay
of the S6tif insurrection of May 1945. His Model 1 solution to armed rebellion was
direct attack on the rebels. In his mind, these operations would destroy the agents of
rebellion and cow the local population into submission. While his strategy, unlike that of
Valluy and d'Argenlieu, made some accommodation for the reaction of the population,
he shared their basic assumptions about its low significance and essential passivity.
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845 Ibid., Clausewitz, pp. 127.
While the illusion of familiarity may explain inappropriate initial response, it does
not explain the tendency to retain Model 1 when that strategy has failed to produce
success on the campaign level. The problem here is another product of the operational
code - the learning trap. The balance of capabilities in most insurgencies favors the
counterinsurgent. For this reason, tactical encounters are structurally one sided; the
counterinsurgent typically inflicts losses on the insurgent band and suffers few of his
own. Since many of these engagements occur in populated areas, the battles often result
in damage to local property or the death of non-combatants. While military leaders are
not blind to the significance of these byproducts, the implicit weighting system of the
operational code leads them to score such mixed outcomes as net successes. Since most
engagements are likely to be scored as "small victories," and these gains are assumed to
be permanent and cumulative, then offensive operations will tend to produce positive
feedback and reinforce attachment to Model 1. When small victories fail to produce
campaign victory, militaries generally seek to escalate rather than search for alternatives.
In Indochina, the "small victories" dynamic proved a nearly insuperable hurdle.
From 1946 through 1954, every commander in chief of the French forces in Indochina
subscribed to the notion that battle, in its minor (pacification operations) or major (set
piece battles) forms, was the best way to set the conditions for political success. They
assumed that the destruction of Viet Minh guerillas and political cadres would lead a
basically passive population to accept the authority of France or the Associated States.
Intrawar French attempts to measure their own progress reflect the importance of battle
as the central organizing principle of all activities. Victory or defeat, whether in
pacification sweeps or more conventional battles, was measured in terms of loss ratios
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and physical control of territory. When French forces controlled the field of battle and
killed or captured more Vietnamese than they lost, the action was judged a success.846
Only when these familiar ratios were clearly reversed, as at Cao Bang or Dien Bien Phu,
did the military acknowledge even local defeat. While the more astute commanders
recognized the significance of the less tangible, political dimensions of the campaign,
contemporary records contain almost no mention of civilian deaths, loss of property, local
opinion, or the political byproducts of military operations.
The French struggled with the same issues in the first two years of the Algerian
war. The tactical successes of the French army in that period reinforced the military's
attachment to Model 1. As the figures below indicate, French losses remained low while
enemy losses climbed dramatically. Though Cherriere and his successor Lorillot were
not blind to countervailing, negative trends in the level of violence and the size and scope
of the FLN movement (see below), they sought to address these problems through
material and normative escalation. When vast increases in the number of French troops
and the relaxation of controls on military force failed to resolve the issue, Lorillot's
reaction was to endorse two classic Model 1 operations: a decapitation strike on Ben
Bella and the FLN leadership and the Suez expedition to destroy the rebellion's purported
external sponsor. French military behavior in the first two years of the war demonstrates
the overweighting of loss ratios (and particularly enemy body counts) and the
underweighting of costs of offensive operations. Similarly, it illustrates the military's
tendency to delay search until all Model 1 solutions have been exhausted.
846 The memoirs of General Salan demonstrate the tendency, even among experienced and astute
commanders, to gravitate towards simple and quantitative measures of operational success and failure. In
his accounting of major success and failures of the campaigns, Salan consistently reverted to loss ratios and
the control of terrain as the chief performance indicators (Source: Raoul Salan, Le Viet-minh mon
adversaire, pp.113, 191, 206, 289, 308, 355, 371).
439


















- FR Army FLN (KIA) - FR (KIA)



















--- FR Army -fFLN Attacks
440















--- FR Army -'-ALN Fighters
On the operational level, the French conduct of the war in Indochina included
many examples of brilliantly executed but largely inconsequential conventional
maneuvers against an unconventional opponent. Whether in the offensive operations
such as Lea (decapitation strike and exploitation against Viet Minh sanctuary in 1947),
Lotus (the attack at Hoa Binh in 1951 to cut the Viet Minh territory in two), and Lorraine
(raid to sever Viet Minh supply lines and derail Viet Minh offensive of 1952), or in
defensive operations such as the pre-Cao Bang border outposts along the Chinese border
and later in the "de Lattre Line" fortifications around the Red River delta, the French
applied strategies proven in conventional contexts and largely irrelevant to insurgency.
When doubts began to mount within the French command from 1952 on, American
military observers reinforced the Model 1 interpretation of the Indochina problem. By
assailing French passivity and excessive attention to static defense, American officers
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pushed the French command to pursue larger scale attacks on the Viet Minh regular
army. This return to Model 1 gained momentum as the Americans made continued
material aid in 1953 and 1954 contingent on more deliberate offensive operations against
what they considered the military center of gravity.
The operational campaigns in Algeria followed a similar if less spectacular
course. The first two years of the war were spent in the pursuit of the rebel bands. These
operations produced countless small victories and the occasional elimination of a
significant rebel leader. As in Indochina, the French command placed great weight on
the role of sanctuaries and external sponsors; the Suez expedition, Sakiet and the Battle
of the Frontiers were all predicated on the centrality of the external component of the
rebellion and the potential for war winning strikes on these targets. When Salan's Model
2 pacification plans failed to rollback the progress of the rebellion, the French military's
preferred solution was a return to large scale, offensive maneuver against enemy
sanctuaries and troop units. While Challe, like Navarre, elected to retain important pieces
of the Model 2 approach, it was the reintroduction of Model 1 style maneuver against
armed that was the hallmark of his offensives. It is noteworthy that in later stages of both
wars, military frustration with Model 2 pacification did not lead directly to an embrace of
Model 3; instead, the military tended to retrace its steps and revive elements of Model 1.
Model 2 and Model 3 strategies introduced new performance measurement
challenges. The struggle for the population was more difficult to measure and the
absence of clear performance feedback often led to a reliance on measures of activity
rather than effect. Unable to measure the true sentiments of the population, leaders often
cited their own actions - the number of economic projects completed, number of
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psychological operations conducted, etc. - as evidence of progress. In other cases,
coercive Model 2 strategies led to the fabrication of positive feedback. When Roger
Trinquier used his D.P.U. organization to stage pro-French demonstrations or influence
voting behavior, he was using population control measures to compel demonstrations of
support for the regime. Both problems - the fixation on the good acts of the
counterinsurgency forces or the use of coercion to produce favorable feedback - tended
to delay recognition of the limits of Model 2 strategies.
In Indochina, this measurement problem may also explain the military's unease
with Leclerc's the mixed strategy and their ambivalent reaction to early psychological
operations initiatives. Where it was relatively easy to score conventional military
operations, Model 2 and particularly Model 3 strategies tended to focus attention on
unfamiliar, intangible and lagged performance measures. While Leclerc argued that an
uncomfortable condominium was preferable to a "holy war" with the Viet Minh, he had
no way to prove this to skeptics. Just as a commercial negotiator cannot be sure of what
he has obtained until a contract has been signed, the Model 3 strategist cannot predict
with certainty the shape of the political endgame or its durability. With little idea of how
to measure either their own efforts in these areas, or the effects of these efforts on the
course of the campaign, it is hardly surprising that most officers clung to the simple and
concrete accounting system of battle and resisted the drift into the abstract and
ambiguous realm of Model 2 or Model 3 politics.
The earlier adoption and greater prominence of Model 2 and Model 3 strategies in
Algeria made the measurement of political performance more acute. Soustelle faced the
same set of issues that Leclerc had in the early phases of Indochina. His formula was
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rooted in the idea of political consent; he was convinced that military repression alone
could not secure the willing cooperation or even the abstention of the Algerian
population. His attempts to reach out to local notables and leading Muslim nationalists
were evidence of his belief that consent and cooptation were preferable to elimination.
Like Leclerc, however, he could not demonstrate immediate, tangible gains. Instead, his
formula proved vulnerable to FLN action and resource shocks; the Philippeville massacre
gave his opponents proof that Model 3 strategies were invalid and abundant resources
made a return to Model 1 escalation feasible.
With the rise of Model 2 political war in 1957, the military faced a different set of
measurement problems. Though Salan and other Model 2 advocates had identified the
population as the center of gravity, they found it difficult to track progress towards "deep
pacification" (pacification en profondeur).847 The clearest and most tangible measures
remained those of Model 1 - loss ratios and territorial control. Consequently they looked
to measures of their own activity as proxies for progress in pacification. The number of
schools and medical clinics built, jobs produced, and the like were cited as indirect
evidence of pacification. When pressed for direct evidence of popular sentiment, Salan
and others pointed to the "spontaneous" demonstrations by Muslims in Algiers on May
13, 1958 and the results of the September 1958 referendum. In both cases, however, the
evidence of political progress had been tainted by the military's own success in coercive
population control. When the DPU was used to turn out Muslim demonstrators, it was
proof of organization and control rather than genuine sentiment. The unintended price of
Model 2 population control was even deeper ignorance of local sentiment.
847 Jacques Massu, La Vraie Bataille d'Alger (Paris: Plon, 1971), pp. 127.
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In both Indochina and Algeria, the framing of counterinsurgency as battle comes
through in the French military's musings on the role of the local population. Few senior
commanders, with the exception of Leclerc and possibly Salan, believed that the
Vietnamese population might play a significant and active role in determining the
outcome of the conflict. While Saintenay, 848 Paul Mus, 849 at least one senior military
commander 850 had observed as early as 1945 that large portions of the Vietnamese
population fully supported the Viet Minh cause, the French high command tended to treat
the population as essentially inert, human terrain. 85' Early French strategies rested on a
belief that pacification was a straightforward problem of liberation; once freed from Viet
Minh coercion, the vast majority of the population would more or less automatically
accept a return to some variant of the old order. Even as some more junior leaders began
to recognize the significance of the population, they consistently overstated their ability
to shape local opinion. Whether in their conduct of psychological operations,
resettlement, or in their support for the highland maquis, even the most progressive
officers assumed that the right mixture of positive and negative incentives and ideas
could compel the population to accept French authority. The isolated successes of French
pacification among the southern religious sects and the hill tribes of Tonkin encouraged a
misplaced confidence in the French ability to generate lasting political support.
848 Jean Saintenay, Histoire d'une Paix Manquie (Paris: Fayard, 1967), pp. 63-70.
849 Ibid., Martel, Leclerc: Le soldat et le politique, pp. 357-362.
85o Henri Lorillot, "Objet: Prestige de Ho Chi Minh, 25 mars 1947" in Indochine 1947, pp. 187.
85! General Valluy's statements on strategy provide examples of the prevailing belief in an inert and
malleable local population (see General Valluy, "Fiche sur la situation en Cochinchine, 4 mai 1947," in
Indochine 1947: Rglement politique or solution militaire?, pp. 191; ibid., Valluy, Indochine 1947, pp.
303. In his postwar writings on Indochina, Colonel Nemo argued that effective counterinsurgency strategy
depended on an "attentive study of 'social terrain."' (Source: Paul et Marie-Catherine Villatoux, La
Ripublique et son armie face au "peril subversif " pp. 322)
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In Algeria, assumptions about the significance and agency of the population
followed a similar path. During the first winter of the rebellion, General Cherriere and
the leading civilian voices in the security apparatus saw the guerillas and their external
sponsors as far more important than the population as a whole; the key was to identify
and eliminate the rebel movement rather than protect or influence a population that was
considered neutral and passive. Soustelle challenged these assumptions in the early part
of his tenure, arguing that the population was centrally important, largely dissatisfied and
susceptible to French outreach. With Philippeville and Soustelle's departure, 852 the focus
returned to the attack on the guerillas.
The rise of Salan led to a change in the perceived importance of the population
but not its agency. Salan and his disciples identified the political wing of the FLN as the
principal target of the military effort and the passive population as a complementary
target of French influence. Advocates of guerre rdvolutionnaire assumed that some
combination of psychological operations, population control, and economic development
would cause the Muslim population to reject the rebels and rally to the French cause.853
Since coercive control was seen as the functional equivalent of consent, little energy was
put into measuring genuine political sentiment.
De Gaulle's move to self-determination in 1959 marked a return to Soustelle's
early emphasis on the active role of the local population. Like Soustelle, de Gaulle
argued that long term stability depended on the tacit agreement of the local population.
852 The hardening of Soustelle after Philippeville makes generalizations about his opinions perilous. After
his tenure as Governor General, Soustelle began to identify ever more closely with the pied noir cause. By
1959, de Gaulle and Soustelle had effectively switched places; de Gaulle was now the champion of Muslim
choice while Soustelle was the opponent of political concession.
853 As the French discovered in Algeria, Model 2 strategies could suppress violence but only temporarily
and at great and essentially perpetual cost. For a more detailed discussion of the efficacy of Model 2
strategies of population control, see Chapter 2, pp. 108-112.
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The French military leadership under Salan and Challe never accepted this assumption; to
the end they argued that physical control of the population and its forcible separation
from the rebel bands were proof of deep pacification.
While the French military in Indochina and Algeria tended to understate the
significance and agency of the population, there were notable exceptions. In Indochina,
prescient leaders including Leclerc, Salan, Lorillot and Morlibre, recognized the active
role played by the local population in the political struggle. From this recognition flowed
an interest in the local preferences and political actors in Vietnam - considerations that
would have been inconsequential in a world in which the population was neutral, passive
and malleable. Similarly, a handful of military actors in the Algerian war reached the
same conclusions: Monteil, Parlange, Ailleret. Such recognition was the key to using
violence to restore state authority. The acknowledgment of limited agency was a
prerequisite for effective negotiation with other actors in the political competition. So
long as the military saw the problem as one of defeating all political competitors
militarily, it could not contemplate the steps necessary to assemble the minimum winning
collation necessary to restore state authority.
Whether in Indochina or Algeria, these were minority opinions. Even when
senior commanders entertained doubts about the theories of influence embedded in
Model 1 or Model 2, they had difficulty convincing other members of the military
establishment of the logic of consent or exchange. For the vast majority of officers,
politics, seen through the lens of the operational code, was simply an extension of war by
other means. Individual insight, even at the highest level of command, proved
insufficient to overcome the collective skepticism of the military profession.
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Task Performance: Success and Failure in French Wartime Adaptation
As noted in Chapter 2, perceptions of success and failure are central to the
decision to explore alternative strategies. First, organizations will accept the costs and
risks of organizational search only when they believe that the current strategy has failed.
Second, either episodic failure or negative trends can stimulate search. Though the
counterinsurgent's military advantages make episodic failure rare in counterinsurgency, it
is a far more powerful spur to action than trends or stalemate. By contrast, negative
trends or stalemate (the prolonged absence of campaign success) are common in
insurgency but are far less powerful stimulants of search. Third, neither episodic failure
nor negative performance trends are valid predictors of the order or extent of search;
failure triggers search but does little to guide it.
The French experience in Indochina highlights the powerful but indeterminate
role of success and failure in explaining organizational change. Military success
undoubtedly delayed the search for alternative strategies on multiple occasions; military
failure accelerated search but did not dictate its course or extent. Leclerc's reconquest of
Indochina in 1945 and 1946, by his own admission a feat of military stagecraft, tended to
narrow rather than broaden the focus of those intent on restoring French sovereignty. If
French arms had delivered the initial prize, then military action could, on a greater scale
and in greater numbers, restore full political control. De Lattre's string of lopsided
victories in 1951 restored French confidence at the cost of strategic search. The outcome
of these battles made the idea of a counterinsurgency campaign rooted in large unit battle
believable once more.
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This same tendency to delay search in favor of exploitation and escalation was
present in pacification operations as well. As a number of observers noted, large scale
pacification operations were military riskless; large units could pummel any Viet Minh
units that were ensnared in cordon and search operations. So long as such operations
produced consistent, positive results on the military balance sheet, and the command
believed that such gains were cumulative, then the strategy appeared sound. That these
operations failed to produce lasting, positive gains encouraged French commanders to
turn to exploitation and escalation rather than first order search. Only very late in the
war, after the undoing of countless "successful" clearance operations, did the French
begin to experiment with approaches to pacification (G.A.M.O.s, maquis, resettlement)
that emphasized the "hold" phase of "clear and hold" operations. Even so, these
initiatives remained the supporting rather than the primary effort; when operational needs
forced the high command to choose, conventional operations were the first priority,
offensive clearance operations the second, and administrative or political consolidation a
distant third.854
Acute, episodic failure did spur organizational change, but the order and extent of
the ensuing organizational search varied considerably. In theory, the French collapse at
Cao Bang in October 1950 was an opportunity for a fundamental reassessment of French
strategy. The scale of the defeat, the realization of the impact of Chinese aid to the Viet
Minh, and the clear validation of many of the criticisms spelled out in the Revers report
of July 1949, made a major strategic reappraisal a logical next step. In practice,
conventional defeat at Cao Bang led to conventional military escalation rather than
854 Yves Gras' account of the failure of Salan's GAMO initiative reveals the implicit priority system.
(Sources: Yves Gras, Histoire de la guerre d'Indochine, pp. 461-462; Raoul Salan, Le ViOt-Minh Mon
Adversaire, pp. 309)
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extensive strategic search. De Lattre's policy focused French energies on improvements
in military organization and morale and major increases in manpower and materiel. De
Lattre's victories in the defensive battles of 1951 appeared to validate an approach rooted
in conventional response and fed by American capital and Vietnamese manpower.
The major shocks of Salan's tenure, notably the withdrawal from Hoa Binh and
the Viet Minh northern offensives of 1952-3, prompted conventional exploitation and
strategic experimentation. The operations at Na San and Operation Lorraine were
variations and extensions of military ideas developed earlier in the war. Though ably
executed, they reflected the French command's ongoing fixation with the problems of set
piece battle. To his credit, Salan, by far the most experienced Indochina hand to
command the Expeditionary Corps, showed greater interest in the politics than any of his
predecessors and sponsored several Model 2 experiments in population control.
Campaign stalemate and the steady deterioration in French military fortunes from 1952 to
1953 led to Salan's replacement and a decisive return to the familiar but unsuccessful
combination of conventional battle and military pacification. 855
Failure played a split role in the brief interwar period. While the defeat at Dien
Bien Phu and surrender at Geneva provoked serious professional debate, the impact of
that debate on the organization's behavior was minimal. In peacetime, failure was
capable of stimulating an intellectual inquiry but incapable of overriding the
organization's distaste for the proposed Model 2 solutions to revolutionary war. The
combination of intellectual debate and organizational backsliding demonstrates the power
of bureaucratic preferences in an environment where task pressure is largely absent.
855 For a more detailed discussion of the effects of Model 2 strategies, see Chapter 2, pp. 108-112.
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Episodic failure was much rarer in Algeria than in Indochina for structural
reasons. The FLN lacked the means to build a conventional army capable of inflicting
Cao Bang or Dien Bien Phu style battlefield defeats on the French army; the French army
for its part had introduced four to five times the number of troops they had in Indochina.
In the absence of such shocks, the French typically confronted some combination of
episodic success and stalemate. Major operational successes in the Battle of Algiers, the
Battle of the Frontiers, and the Challe offensives strongly reinforced the command's
attachment to prevailing strategies. These successes were typically followed by attempts
to replicate or generalize the winning formula; here again, the tendency was to
overweight military feedback and discount the political costs of such operations. The
French responded to the paradox of episodic success and campaign stalemate through
escalation. The leading examples of this were Lorillot's post-Soustelle escalation and
Challe's offensives. What the Algerian war did show was the outsized influence of
militarily trivial defeats on state policy. The massacre of roughly one hundred Europeans
at Philippeville buried Soustelle's Model 3 policy and opened the way for a return to
Model 1 strategy and escalation. Similarly, it was a single bombing incident at Sakiet,
and not the larger operational victory in the Battle of the Frontiers, that exerted the
greatest influence on French policy.8 56
The rarity of episodic failure made French strategic choice even more dependent
on the evaluation of performance trends. French reactions in the first two years of the
war suggest that loss ratios and enemy body counts were given greater weight than
856 The Sakiet incident set in motion a chain of events that led to the military seizure of power in Algiers in
May 1958. This bloodless coup, brought on by hints of civilian negotiations with the FLN, led to the
collapse of the 4 th Republic and the ascent of de Gaulle. For a more detailed account of this episode, see
page 366.
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measures of population security or social stability (numbers of attacks, etc.). During the
following two years, Salan and the Model 2 advocates were forced to reconcile
contradictory trends: highly favorable loss ratios (averaging more than 11:1 over the two
year span), stubbornly high levels of violence, and an undiminished ALN guerilla force.
In both cases, the response to ambiguous feedback was to pursue Model 1 escalation of
some form. In 1956, the answer was to increase manpower and ruthlessness; in 1959 the
answer was to return to large scale offensive action against enemy sanctuaries.
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Resources and Adaptation
The theory predicts that resource scarcity will accelerate search and increase the
probability that militaries will adopt Model 3 strategies. By contrast, resource abundance
will delay search and encourage a slow progression from Model 1 to escalation to Model
2. The influence of resources on strategic choice does not end with the initial response;
positive and negative resource shocks can trigger strategic change. Positive resource
shocks will tend to drive militaries into Model 1 or Model 2 strategies; negative resource
shocks will tend to drive militaries towards Model 3 alternatives.
Changes in resource levels influence strategic choice in three ways: budget
constraints, bureaucratic influence, and factor endowment effects. First, resource levels
dictate the range of choices available. When resources are abundant, choice is
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unconstrained and organizations will be guided by their beliefs and preferences. When
resources are very scarce, budget constraints render Model 1 and Model 2 strategies
difficult and militaries are often forced to explore Model 3 alternatives. Second, resource
levels affect the bureaucratic influence of the military vis-h-vis its civilian leadership.
When resources flow primarily into military hands, this has the effect of amplifying
military influence in the development and implementation of strategy. Resource
abundance tends to amplify military influence and by extension the influence of the
MOC. Third, the mix of resources provided, the factor endowment effects, can influence
strategic choice. The resources provided (capital equipment, manpower, and cash) can
make certain choices more attractive than others. All things being equal, the provision of
manpower will encourage Model 1 and Model 2 strategies; extreme manpower scarcity
will tend to force militaries to develop local forces, co-opt local actors and explore Model
3 solutions. The provision of large volumes of conventional military equipment will
reinforce the Model 1 instinct. When constraints on force levels and military equipment
increase the proportion of cash in the resource flow, militaries are more likely to pursue
Model 3 strategies focused on the cooptation of local actors.
The Indochina case also provides evidence of the three mechanisms that link
changes in resource levels to strategic choice. Leclerc's behavior and his contemporary
statements strongly suggest that resource scarcity played a powerful role in his
willingness to engage in negotiations with the Viet Minh and the Chinese Nationalists.
The removal of this binding constraint on strategy contributed to d'Argenlieu and
Valluy's reversal of course and subsequent pursuit of a policy of military confrontation.
Once the resources were available to play out the conventional solution to the Viet Minh
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problem, the French command dropped political-military strategy (Model 3) in favor of a
military test of strength (Model 1).857
The Indochina case also suggests is just how low the resource threshold for Model
1 response may be. With the 5,000 troops available in October 1945, there were few
obvious alternatives to Leclerc's Model 3 strategy of "negotiating while fighting"; by
October 1946, with just 90,000 troops available to pacify a country of 24,000,000 and
subdue a Viet Minh army of roughly equal strength (80,000-100,000), 858 a uniformed
High Commissioner and his senior commanders were willing to engage in a military
showdown. While advocates of confrontation acknowledged the need for additional
forces to complete a military pacification campaign, the possession of even a fraction of
the desired forces was enough to encourage moves towards confrontation. By
comparison, Leclerc estimated in January 1947 that it would take a minimum of 350,000
troops to reconquer Indochina by force. Just to restore the modus vivendi and seek a
negotiated solution, he estimated that 115,000 troops (100,000 European) would be
necessary.
If Indochina showcased the impact of resource scarcity on strategic choice,
Algeria demonstrated the impact of resource abundance. Even in the opening months of
the rebellion, the French military had at its disposal a force twelve times larger than the
one available to Leclerc in the reconquest of Indochina. 859 Abundant and rising
857 Here, as in many other areas, dissenting opinions were present. The flow of French forces into
Indochina in 1946 did not lead Leclerc to change his opinion on the importance of negotiation. General
Morlibre, one of Valluy's subordinate commanders in the 1946 uprisings, sought to restore the modus
vivendi before events and pressure from the Genesuper made confrontation unavoidable. What is clear is
that the advocates of confrontation won the argument, not only in the 1946 but on a number of occasions
thereafter.
858 Ibid., Bodinier, Le Retour de la France en Indochina, 1945-1946, pp. 96.
859 Depending upon accounting conventions, the French garrison in Algeria in October 1954 numbered
57,000; Leclerc had at his disposal 4,500 troops at the start of pacification in Cochinchina. The relative
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manpower made a Model 1 response feasible and almost automatic. While Soustelle did
explore a Model 3 alternative between February and August 1955, this change came early
in the escalatory cycle and was imposed over the objections of leading military
commanders. Rising manpower levels provided an attractive alternative to Soustelle's
formula. Though Philippeville was the proximate cause of the swing from Soustelle's
Model 3 experiments to Model 1, it was the ready availability of French manpower that
made Model 1 escalation so seductive.
In both Indochina and Algeria, resource flows influenced the weight of military
opinion in the policy process. The raw data on French spending in Indochina gives some
sense of the mismatch between military and civilian spending. Though the balance
fluctuated over the course of the war,860 military spending accounted for roughly 95% of
total French spending in Indochina.86 1 The military tended to exert monopoly power over
the actual disbursement of those funds. By manipulating various aspects of the funding
requests, the military tended to block civil oversight of military spending. 862 The military
skew of spending was even more pronounced in the case of the nominally independent of
the government of the Associated States; military spending consumed 70% of overall
numerical advantage in the opening months of the Algerian war was amplified by the scale and
concentration of the FLN movement. The FLN organization still numbered less than 1,000 and was
overwhelmingly concentrated in two small and isolated regions of Algeria. By contrast, Leclerc had to
confront scattered resistance by a much larger Viet Minh organization (80,000-100,000) across the entire
expanse of Indochina (Source: Bodinier, Le Retour de la France en Indochina, 1945-1946, pp. 96).
86o Two estimates of the civil-military split in spending, one for 1949 and the other in 1952, reveal roughly
similar results. In 1949, combined civil spending accounted for 2.01% of French spending; in 1952, total
civil spending reached 4.78% of total spending. A breakdown of the total cost of the Indochina war (1945-
1955) suggests a substantially larger percentage of civil spending - 22%. (Source: Hugues Tertrais, La
piastre et lefusil: Le coat de la guerre d'Indochine 1945-1954 (Paris: Comit6 pour l'histoire 6conomique et
financibre de la France, 2002), pp. 361-362, 542, 569)
861 Hugues Tertrais, La piastre et lefusil: Le coat de la guerre d'Indochine 1945-1954 (Paris: Comit6 pour
I'histoire 6conomique et financibre de la France, 2002), pp. 361.
862 Ibid., Tertrais, pp. 281.
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government spending by the Associated States by 1954.863 The skewed flow of resources
reinforced the military's de facto policy dominance in Indochina.
During the first four years of the war in Algeria, the flow of resources reinforced
military control and bureaucratic influence. In 1955, French military expenditures in
Algeria were over five times the level of civil expenditures in the territory. 864 The rapid
influx of military forces displaced civilian administration, particularly in the rural areas.
Civil administrators lacked the resources and the coercive tools to confront the problems
of administration and counterinsurgency; an increasingly muscular French garrison
simply assumed many of the administrative functions of the civil administration. In this
context, the passage of the special powers and the delegation of civil authority to
specified military commanders set only formalized the de facto militarization of French
rule in Algeria.
De Gaulle's attempts to restore civil control from 1958 on had a significant
resource component. The Constantine Plan marked the beginning of a shift from
predominantly military spending to a more balanced distribution of funds. The ratio of
civilian to military spending in Algeria rose from 1:5 in 1955 to roughly 1:2 in 1959 and
1960. 865 This shift in funding priorities, combined with active efforts to remove the
French army from politics, began to chip away at the military's near monopoly on
administrative power in Algeria.
863 Ibid., Tertrais, pp. 238.
864 Jean-Charles Asselain, "Boulet Colonial" et redressement 6conomique (1958-1962)" in Jean-Pierre
Rioux, La guerre d'Algrie et lesfrancais: Colloque de l'Institut d'histoire du temps present (Paris:
Fayard, 1990), pp. 296.865 Ibid., Asselain, pp. 296; Daniel Lefeuvre makes a similar cost estimate for 1959: 800 billion French
Francs in military spending (equivalent to $11.2 billion in 2006 USD) and 400 billion FF in non-military
spending (equivalent to $5.6 billion in 2006 USD). This total represented close to 20% of French
government spending in that year (Source: Daniel Lefeuvre, "Le cofit de la guerre d'Alg6rie" in La guerre
d'Algirie au miroir des decolonisationsfrangaises, melanges en honneur de Charles Robert Ageron (Paris:
Soci6t6 franqaise d'histoire d'Outre-Mer, 2000), pp. 501-514).
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The third causal mechanism - factor endowment effects - strongly influenced the
pattern of French strategy and the French operational innovation in Indochina.
Throughout the war, the French command lacked the manpower necessary to prosecute
its preferred strategy of conventional war and military pacification. Many of the policy
shifts from de Lattre on revolved around attempts to address the manpower shortfall.
Vietnamization, in its many forms, was the primary answer. The French hoped that the
development of a robust, Vietnamese national army would enable them to transfer the
unenviable pacification mission and concentrate the Expeditionary Corps for decisive
battle. The jaunissement of the Expeditionary Corps, and the expanded use of
Legionnaires and North African troops, were attempts to address chronic shortfalls in
French replacements. Even the GCMA/GMI resistance groups could be construed as an
attempt to develop solutions to the chronic manpower shortage. These operations offered
the possibility of French control or at least contestation of large area of northern and
western Tonkin at the cost of a very small French cadre investment. 866
The materiel provided shaped the French response in Indochina, particularly on
the level of operational routines. The equipment the French had on hand in 1945, and the
aid flows they received from the Americans from 1950 on, drove the French down
specific adaptive paths. The availability of large numbers of surplus American landing
craft and amphibious tractors made possible the Dinassaut and amphibious unit
innovations of the early Indochina war.867 The surge in American military aid from 1950
on transformed the Expeditionary Corps from a capital poor to a capital rich force. In his
866 Lieutenant-colonel Michel David, Guerre Secrte en Indochine: Les maquis autochtones face au Viet-
Minh, 1950-1954 (Paris: Lavauzelle, 2005), pp. 373.
867 Victor Croizat, The Brown Water Navy: The River and Coastal War in Indo-China and Vietnam, 1948-
1972 (Poole, UK: Blandford Press, 1984).
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memoirs, General Navarre highlighted the influence of American materiel on French
military practice:
American aid was also a fact that the command was obliged to accept no matter what. The
nature of the materiel that was bestowed upon us - and which had been developed for an
entirely different form of war - gave our forces certain ineluctable characteristics: if it gave
us power, it came at the cost of great weight. Once engaged in this way, it was practically
impossible to break free. 868
The growing availability of transport aircraft from 1950 on supported a rapid expansion
in airborne operations. The fortified camps at Na San and Dien Bien Phu were in some
sense the ultimate French response to capital abundance and labor scarcity. By building
fortified outposts in remote areas, and supplying them exclusively by air, the French
appeared to have found a way to force decisive battle on favorable terms. Generous
American transfers of aircraft, artillery made the fortified camps a logical answer to
dilemma of area control.
The French military labored under much the same constraints in the early phases
of the Algerian war. In 1954, army units in Algeria still resembled late Second World
War mechanized formations. In the mountainous terrain of the FLN base areas, however,
the firepower and road mobility advantages of this model became liabilities. Even before
the outbreak of the rebellion, however, senior military leaders were working to modify
local organizations to fit the needs of the theater. Most of these initiatives involved the
substitution of mules for wheeled transport and the decision to discard a good portion of
the heavy equipment of the standard formations. While these reforms had not taken
effect by November 1954, the French soon managed to reconfigure many of their units to
lighten these units and improve off road mobility. From 1956 on, the military equipment
stock had a far less significant effect on strategic choice than it had in Indochina. Absent
868 Henri Navarre, Agonie de I'Indochine (1953-1954) (Paris: Librarie Plon, 1956), pp. 318.
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the fire hose of American equipment transfers, French strategy was more a product of
choice than of material inputs.
The Indochina case also suggests the presence of powerful "window effects."
The expectation of reductions in manpower led military leaders to launch military
operations while the troops were still available. At a number of critical junctures in the
Indochina war, the temporary dispatch of French forces encouraged the French command
to do exactly this. General Valluy launched his northern offensive of 1947 in anticipation
of the loss of a large portion of his forces to rotation at the end of that year. Similarly,
Alessandri's drive to pacify the Red River delta in 1950 was in part a response to two sets
of window effects; the arrival of French reinforcements in the wake of the Revers report,
and the looming arrival of the Chinese Communists in northern Tonkin. The temporary
availability of additional forces and the prospect of Chinese intervention made rapid
pacification in the delta an imperative in 1949 and 1950. The French government's
grudging dispatch of an additional 20,000 reinforcements to General de Lattre in 1951
came with the proviso that the troops would need to leave Indochina by July 1952. 869
This temporary surge in manpower, combined with growing American pressure to
resume the strategic offensive, drove de Lattre to launch the risky offensive at Hoa Binh
in the fall of 1951. In all these cases, anticipated changes in the balance of forces, and
particularly the availability of friendly troops influenced not only the timing but the
substance of French military plans.
Similar window effects were present in the later phases of the Algerian war. In
anticipation of cuts in French force levels, Challe mounted a series of large scale
offensive operations in 1959 and 1960 designed to deliver a final blow to the FLN.
869 Ibid., Salan, pp. 222.
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While the plan relied heavily on the French forces, Challe launched a major expansion in
local force development. Though his resources were far greater and his opponent far
weaker, Challe faced a structurally similar problem to de Lattre's in 1950. If French
forces levels were set to drop, the key was to deliver the knock out blow while they were
still available. Once this had been done, and the countryside had been cleared, the task of
holding these areas could be transferred to local self-defense forces. In both cases, a
closing manpower window prompted the senior military leader to launch Model 1
offensive operations and raise ever larger numbers of native troops to secure those gains.
Civilian Participation
According to the theory, high civilian participation accelerates search and
increases the probability that militaries explore Model 3 solutions. Conversely, low
civilian participation delays search and encourages prolonged exploitation of Model 1
and Model 2.
Civilian participation operates through three causal mechanisms. First, civilian
contestation increases the likelihood that strategy will be the product of deliberate choice
rather than patterned response. By forcing military leaders to explain their reasoning,
civilians increase the probability that false analogies will be exposed and inappropriate
responses avoided. Second, civilian participation makes possible a parallel evaluation of
campaign performance and an independent exploration of alternative strategies. Civilians
weigh the same operational results differently, placing greater emphasis on the feedback
that the MOC discounts. This may lead to an accelerated recognition of the limits of
Models 1 and 2. Third, the particular expertise of civilian politicians makes them more
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likely to recognize the significance of exchange and two way politics in
counterinsurgency. While military leaders tend to see insurgencies as small wars,
politicians are more likely to see the same conflicts as violent political contests. The
politician's cognitive point of origin and his familiarity with norms of exchange place
him closer to Model 3 strategies than the professional soldier.
The French cases support these theoretical predictions. In Indochina and Algeria,
Model 3 strategies coincided with the high points in civilian participation in strategy.
Leclerc's early initiatives relied heavily on the input of his civilian advisers Saintenay
and Mus. Soustelle's appointment and subsequent policies were the expression of the
desire of civilian elites to reimpose civilian priorities and judgment on the conflict. Sharp
declines in civilian participation were associated with swings from Model 3 towards
Models 1 and Model 2. In Indochina, the departure of Leclerc and his group of civilian
advisers was followed by a move from Model 3 condominium to Model 1 confrontation.
The resignation of Soustelle's most liberal advisers, Tillion and Monteil, in the summer
of 1955 marked the beginning of the shift from Model 3 to Model 1.870
The Algerian resettlement crisis in 1959 and 1960 is the clearest evidence that the
link between civilian participation and Model 3 choice is causal rather than simply
correlative. Civilian leaders and the S.A.S. leadership sought to challenge the growth of
resettlements on the grounds that it would pauperize and alienate the Muslim population.
Challe and the French military command refused, arguing that resettlement was central to
their military operations and that population control as opposed to consent was the goal.
870 Pierre Miquel, La guerre d'Algirie (Paris: Fayard, 1993), pp. 186.
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This is a clear case of parallel evaluation by civilian administrators, albeit one negated by
military disobedience. 871
In Indochina, early civilian input temporarily dispelled the illusion of familiarity
and forestalled the adoption of Model 1. Though Leclerc ultimately adopted a Model 3
strategy, his earliest evaluations were much closer to Model 1 orthodoxy. Writing in late
August 1945, Leclerc, like de Gaulle, d'Argenlieu, and General MacArthur,87 2 expressed
confidence that the key to restoring control was a robust show of force. 873 It was only
after he received detailed feedback from French civilian advisers inside the country that
Leclerc began to revise his approach and develop a Model 3 strategy. The information
provided by Jean C6dile, Jean Saintenay, and Paul Mus lay outside the boundaries of
traditional military attention; all three pointed to the realities of resurgent Vietnamese
nationalism, the high levels of popular support for the Viet Minh, rising ethnic tensions
between Europeans and natives, and Vietnamese fears of Chinese occupation. 874 These
civilian reports, combined with severe resource constraints, convinced Leclerc to forgo a
Model 1 in favor of Model 3 entente.
No equivalent level of civilian participation was present in the brief window
between Indochina and Algeria. When task pressure disappeared, so too did civilian
attention. Civilian leaders were content to leave doctrinal decisions and the interpretation
of recent experience to military professionals. Consequently, military beliefs and
preferences dominated the interwar period with predictable results; the military
871 For a more detailed discussion of the resettlement crisis, see Chapter 5, pp. 380-384.
872 G6n6ral Leclerc, "Memorandum du G6n6ral Leclerc pour le Colonel de Guillebon, Kandy, le 7
septembre 1945," in Bodinier, pp. 163.
873 G6ndral Leclerc, "Rapport du G6ndral Leclerc A l'amiral d'Argenlieu," in Bodinier, Le Retour de la
France en Indochine, pp. 149-152.
874 Jean Cddile, "Rapport de Cdile au G6dnral Leclerc, Saigon, le 17 septembre 1945," in Bodinier, pp.
175-178, 180; Jean Sainteny, Historie d'une Paix Manquee, Indochine 1945-1947 (Paris: Fayard, 1967),
pp. 65, 90; Andre Martel, Leclerc: Le soldat et le politique (Paris: Albin Michel, 1998), pp. 358-362.
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immediately turned from colonial war and counterinsurgency to conventional war and
technological modernization. Civilian influence depends on a high level of civilian
attention or interest; neither was present once wartime pressures had abated.
In the early phases of Algeria, an alert and assertive metropolitan government
challenged the military's Model 1 reflex. Mendes-France and Mitterand sought to avert a
replay of the indiscriminate repression that had followed Setif. When their explicit
injunctions on collective responsibility were ignored by Cherriere and his subordinates,
they installed Soustelle to arrest the slide from "limited repression" to Model 1.
Soustelle's formal restrictions on the use of military force forced Cherriere and his
subordinates to articulate the reasoning behind their calls for normative and material
escalation. While Soustelle's initiatives were neither popular nor uncontested, the clash
of Model 3 reasoning and Model 1 military strategy forced military logic into the open.
In Indochina and Algeria, civilian elites viewed the evolution of insurgency and
counterinsurgent strategy through a fundamentally different lens. Civilian assumptions
and causal beliefs helped them identify underlying strategic flaws long before military
elites were willing to acknowledge them.
In Indochina, civilian advice highlighted the gap between civilian and military
theories of political influence. General Sabattier, writing in May 1945, expressed the
canonical military view that the collapse of French authority and its remedy were
intrinsically military problems:
It is quite evident that the Indochina problem is presently, above all, a military problem. Indochina
must be retaken by force of arms. The greater the part France plays in the effort necessary to drive
the Japanese out of Indochina, the stronger her rights, vis-a-vis the Indochinese and the Allies, to
sovereignty in the territory.
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Sabattier's answer was to reject political compromise and machination in favor of
decisive military action:
It would be easy to reestablish order by force, provided sufficient means are applied.... Being
reluctant to employ force we have thought first of political action, but we have gone from deception
to deception; each time the chiefs we have addressed have turned out to be no more than phantoms
whose silhouettes have faded more and more until they have completely disappeared into the mists.
Happy will be he who manages to comb through the tangled mess of interests, base and
dishonorable acts, the motives and influences that animate the revolutionary propagandists of the
second military territory [Indochina].875
Though civilian advisers shared the military's interest in restoring French
sovereignty, their diagnosis, prescriptions and proscriptions were fundamentally
different. Where the military was fixated on the balance of forces and logistical
constraints, civilians were more concerned with political intangibles that the military
discounted: the intrinsic preferences of the local population and their relation to French
authority. These observers understood that Vietnamese popular enthusiasm for self-rule,
combined with frustration with the famines and floods of the preceding two years, would
render a simple military restoration of control ineffective. The advisers were unanimous
in their desire to avoid the decisive showdown that the French military anticipated and
even welcomed. Instead, their intermediate objective was to secure entente 876 - a
negotiated deal which preserved core French interests without provoking nationalist
sentiment. They feared what direct military confrontation might bring. In the case of
decisive victory, the French might be left with no visible partners to administer the
territory and no way to dissipate the nationalist passions aroused by the abortive
revolution of 1945. In the case of incomplete victory, the French might be left with a
"holy war" that pitted the Viet Minh and large portions of the local populations against a
875 G6n6ral Sabattier, "Note pour le gouvernement du G6n6ral Sabattier, commandant les troupes franqaises
en Chine," in Bodinier, pp. 143, 146.
876 Ibid., Sainteny, pp. 65; ibid., C6dile, in Bodinier, pp. 176-177.
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thinly stretched French Expeditionary Corps. Civilian advice in the opening months of
the Indochina conflict had strong Hippocratic overtones; the essential task was to avoid
acts that would render impossible the restoration of French indirect rule.
These civilian skeptics also clearly understood that France was only one of
several active competitors for authority in Indochina. Far from being a simple military
struggle between the Viet Minh and the Expeditionary Corps, the competition involved
Chinese Nationalist forces, the Viet Minh, and the population. All these parties were
actors in a violent political drama, and the key, in the minds of most civilian advisers,
was the skillful manipulation of these actors to maximize French gains. On the advice of
his civilian advisers, Leclerc used the threat of Chinese occupation as a tool to compel
Viet Minh political concessions. What Sabattier and most of his military colleagues
dismissed as a distraction, Leclerc and his civilian advisers saw as the core of a political
contest whose outward military trappings were deceptive.
In Algeria, these same assumptions and causal beliefs led civilians to resist
Models 1 and 2 and advocate Model 3. In the earliest stages of the rebellion, the
metropolitan government was overwhelmingly concerned with avoiding overkill and
popular alienation. 77 Mitterand and Soustelle highlighted the risk that Model 1 strategies
might be counterproductive. These same leaders were more open to the idea that
longstanding popular grievances fueled the insurgency. Civilian calls for economic
development and political reform sprang from an implicit understanding of the full
spectrum of resistance. Much earlier than most of their military colleagues, civilians
recognized that even the most effective attrition strategy might fail to interrupt or reverse
the flow of locals from non-violent sympathy to armed resistance.
877 Ibid., Miquel, pp. 155.
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The late war resettlement crisis brought the clash of assumptions and beliefs into
the open yet again. Military leaders embraced resettlement as a way to improve military
pursuit and establish Model 2 political control. Civilian elites and S.A.S. leaders resisted
the expansion of the program on the grounds that it would pauperize and alienate the
Muslim population. While Challe and other military commanders acknowledged the
costs of the resettlement program, they refused to curtail it on the grounds that pursuit
and population control was the only path to the restoration of authority. Civilian
distinctions between coercive control and consensual authority lay behind de Gaulle's
subsequent break with Model 2 strategy and his embrace of self-determination as the
foundation of French policy.
The history of both conflicts highlights the gap between civilian insight and
influence. In Indochina, a series of skeptical metropolitan governments repeatedly
sought to prod the local command into a search for alternatives to Model 1. The dispatch
of senior military officers to perform informal audits proved largely ineffective in
changing the behavior of the local command; the command tended to ignore advice that
was at odds with their own judgment, and the chronic instability and weakness of the
metropolitan governments meant that they could do this with impunity. Emile Bollaert's
ill fated attempt to pursue accommodation with the Viet Minh in 1947 was yet another
example of civilian attempts to break with Model 1 prescriptions of the local command;
this initiative collapsed under pressure from a military command that was sure that
military victory was within its grasp.
In Algeria, senior civilians frequently questioned military strategy and
performance. As in Indochina, however, their efforts to influence decision making were
467
blocked on multiple fronts. The growing power and confidence of the military in civil
administration made it increasingly difficult for the metropolitan government to influence
events on the ground. After the Battle of Algiers in 1957, the military's success was used
to justify their assumption of sweeping police and administrative powers. The pied noirs'
fierce determination to avoid political compromise reinforced the military's attachment to
Model 1 and later Model 2. Together, the combination of rising military power and pied
noir intransigence represented a very significant brake on the power of the central
government. In spite of considerable misgivings about the logic of Model 2 strategy,
civilian elites were unable to influence the conduct of the campaign in Algeria from 1957
through the coming of de Gaulle in late 1958.
The coming of de Gaulle gave new weight to the Model 3 critique. His initial
gestures, the Constantine Plan and the paix des braves, were fundamental departures from
the prevailing Model 2 strategy of population control. Though he later endorsed a return
to Model 2 military action under Challe in 1959, de Gaulle's swift return to Model 3
policy reflected an understanding that any lasting solution would have to be minimally
acceptable to the local population.
De Gaulle's combination of military stature and political insight enabled him to
impose Model 3 priorities over the objections of a skeptical military. This underscores a
central point. Strategic insight, whatever its source, cannot be consequential without the
power to impose it. Civilians and a minority within the military frequently challenged
military strategy and that organization's self-evaluation. While civilians were more
likely to question military estimates of progress, they were far less likely to exert
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sufficient influence. Only when civilians participated in the development and evaluation






A French Disease? Tests of External Validity
As the Chapter Six demonstrates, the theory developed in this volume explains
the dysfunctional patterns of intrawar and interwar learning in the three French cases.
What remains untested is the explanatory range of the theory. A reasonable skeptic
might ask whether the learning patterns observed in the French cases are particular to the
French experience rather than generalizable to the broader set of counterinsurgency
campaigns.
As noted in the introduction to Part 2 of this study, the only solution to the
problem of sample bias is to expand the number of cases examined. The most robust test
is true, "out of sample" prediction or retrodiction. If the theory can explain patterns of
organizational learning beyond the original cases from which the theory was developed,
then the theory is strengthened. If the theory fails to explain patterns observed in the
additional cases, or if the patterns are at odds with the core predictions of the model, then
the theory is weakened or its explanatory range circumscribed.
In order to answer the charge of sample bias, we identify three additional shadow
cases. In each shadow case, we ask four questions. First, are the posited dominant
patterns of intrawar and interwar behavior present? Second, do the military operational
code and bureaucratic preferences explain these patterns? Third, do changes in the
independent variables - task pressure, civilian participation and resources - explain
deviation from the dominant pattern? Fourth, do the causal mechanisms identified in
Chapter 2 connect changes in the independent variables and dependent variables?
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Each shadow case has been selected to address important challenges to the
external validity of the insights drawn from the three French cases. The first two shadow
cases, those of Palestine and Malaya, are drawn from the British tradition. These British
experiences are significant in theoretical and historical terms. The British cases enable us
to isolate the effects of national and organizational culture while holding constant a host
of other factors: task pressure (expeditionary counterinsurgency), mixed conventional and
colonial military experience, great power, etc. In historical terms, they address the theory
of British exceptionalism: the notion that the British army is better than other armies at
developing solutions to counterinsurgency and retaining them over time. If the British
are indeed different, then we should see those differences in intrawar adaptation and
interwar retention. If on the other hand, British behavior closely resembles that of the
French, then the military operational code and bureaucratic interests may be the most
effective explanation.
The third shadow case is the Thai counterinsurgency campaign against the
Communists (1965-1983): a domestic counterinsurgency campaign waged by a small,
Asian power. Both the French and British cases involved efforts by European great
powers to suppress resistance in their colonial possessions; both France and the United
Kingdom faced choices between investments in European and colonial defense. Neither
of these issues was present in the Thai case. The Thai government was engaged in a
domestic counterinsurgency campaign; the survival of the state was at stake and the Thais
had every incentive to improve their strategy as quickly as possible. In addition, the Thai
state and military were intimately familiar with the cultural and historical setting in which
the struggle was waged.
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Summary of the Shadow Cases
The case of British Palestine provides at least three major insights into the role of
the military operational code and the independent variables: the illusion of familiarity, the
escalatory response, and the retrospective misinterpretation of experience. Faced with a
surge in violence, the British military assumed that the problem was essentially military;
attack on the armed perpetrators was the key and the population would be chastened by
the demonstration of force. When Model 1 failed to halt the violence, the military's first
recourse was escalation - material and normative. Even when massive escalation in
manpower and the imposition of martial law failed to reverse or even slow the growth in
violence, most British military observers ascribed the failure to civilian restraint and
resource shortfalls. The image that emerges from this case is not one of a genuinely
different and more enlightened approach to counterinsurgency; instead it appears a
faithful expression of the military operational code, nearly indistinguishable from the
early French responses in Indochina and Algeria.
Malaya offers still more evidence of professional dysfunction: inappropriate
response, learning traps, and the belated adoption of Model 2. In spite of the recent
failure of Model 1 in Palestine, the immediate reaction the new insurgency was to apply
the same solution. As in Palestine, the learning trap delayed recognition of the
bankruptcy of Model 1 strategy. If every tactical encounter ended in victory, and the
insurgents remained intact, then the logical answer was escalation. Two years of
stalemate led to a Model 2 epiphany under Briggs. With his arrival, the military shifted
its focus from the insurgents to their support base and applied a resettlement formula
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similar to the one that adopted by the French in Cambodia and later in Algeria. Eighteen
months after the introduction of the Model 2 Briggs Plan, the conflict had reached a new
stalemate. While resettlement and food control had increased the pressure on the
guerillas, the end of the insurrection was nowhere in sight; all political factions were
unsatisfied with the status quo and the level of violence and insurgent strength remained
very high.
A series of political and economic shocks in late 1951 precipitated the final major
strategy change, the change to Model 3. The inspection tour by Oliver Lyttelton of the
Colonial Office in November 1951 laid the foundations of a new Malaya policy and
paved the way for the appointment of a new civil-military commander, General Templer.
Both were committed to a markedly different, political formula that offered concessions
to the two major ethnic groups: accelerated independence for the Malays and citizenship
and land tenure for the Chinese. Templer and Lyttelton also pursued a conditional
relaxation of the restrictions placed on the Chinese community.
The "lessons" of Malaya, as interpreted by the British and other militaries, offer
still more evidence of the military operational code and bureaucratic interest. The British
faced two major insurgencies after Templer's turning point in Malaya. In both Cyprus
and Kenya, leaders applied Model 1 formulas proven bankrupt in the campaigns of
Palestine and Malaya. In both cases, the overwhelming tendency was to focus on the
tactical lessons rather than the strategies and circumstances that had contributed to
success in Malaya. The ultimate expression of this "tacticization of strategy" 878 was the
ATOM Manual, a collection of tactical, military routines largely divorced from strategic
problems of counterinsurgency. Even over the longer run, the standard historical
878 Michael Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (Milton Park: Routledge, 2005), pp. 355.
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narrative of the Emergency centered on Briggs' Model 2 plan and downplayed the role of
the civilian intervention and the political solutions fashioned by Lyttelton and the
Colonial Officer. By transforming Model 3 success into a Model 2 narrative, the British
military extracted lessons consistent with the military operational code and conveniently
free of the Model 3 political logic. They learned what they wanted to learn and
airbrushed out the inconvenient civil and political prerequisites to victory.
The Thai case shows that the military operational code is not a strictly Western
disease. The campaign opened with a Model 2 strategy championed by American
civilian agencies and the Thai police. As the resources provided to the Thai military
increased dramatically in 1966 and 1967, this Model 2 approach was abandoned in favor
of a military run, Model 1 suppression campaign. Though this approach stimulated
increased resistance and did nothing to reduce the scale of the insurgent base, it remained
the core of Thai counterinsurgency doctrine from 1967 through the early 1970s.
American withdrawal from Vietnam and the reduction in American military aid
precipitated a change in Thai strategy and the search for an alternative counterinsurgency
strategy. Only after the complete withdrawal of American forces from Thailand, the
surge in Communist strength in 1976, and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979,
did the final change in strategy occur. In General Prem, the Prime Minister and leading
counterinsurgency reformer announced a politically led Model 3 strategy based on
generous amnesty and local concessions. An insurgency that had reached its peak
strength in 1979 had virtually collapsed by 1983 under the weight of massive defections.
As in the Malayan case, Model 3 success did not lead to Model 3 retention. When
Thailand faced a new outbreak of separatist violence in the ethnically Malaya regions of
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the deep south in 2004, it applied a Model 1 strategy.879 While the architects of the
Model 3 victory of the early 1980s are still present and influential in the Thai political
sphere, the state and military applied first Model 1 and then Model 2 formulas in the
South.
The three shadow cases strongly suggest that learning dysfunction in
counterinsurgency is a professional rather than national or civilizational disease. French,
British and Thai officers adopt the same dysfunctional solutions when they confront
insurgency: 1) the illusion of familiarity, 2) Model 1 response, 3) learning traps and 4)
the belated embrace of Model 2 alternatives. When these militaries adopted Model 3
strategies, it was typically the result of either civilian participation, resource scarcity or
the exhaustion of alternatives. All three countries engaged in selective, interwar retention
of counterinsurgency "lessons." While all three militaries appeared eager to retain
tactical routines, they were less eager to retain Model 2 let alone Model 3 strategies.
879 Ukrist Pathmanand, "Thaksin's Achilles Heel: The Failure of Hawkish Approaches in the Thai South"
in Duncan McCargo (ed.), Rethinking Thailand's Southern Violence (Singapore: National University of
Singapore, 2007), pp. 71-73.
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Chapter 7
The British Exception? Palestine and Malaya
Palestine: From Failed Consolidation to Small War
The British campaign in Palestine (1945-1947) is a classic illustration of the clash
of civilian and military logic in counterinsurgency. With memories of the Arab Revolt
(1936-1939) fresh in mind, the British advocated a Model 1 response to rising Jewish
terrorism in Palestine. Convinced that victory in the Arab Revolt had been the result of
swift and ruthless action against the guerillas and their supporters, military leaders
believed that an attack on the armed forces of its opponents would stamp out resistance
and intimidate the Jewish population into submission. The British civil authorities
resisted such moves arguing that demonstrations of force and collective punishment
would alienate the population and fatally compromise British authority in the territory.
While civilians controlled policy from 1939 to February 1946, rising manpower
and insurgent violence eventually tilted the bureaucratic balance in favor of the military's
Model 1 formula. Although the military succeeded in imposing its preferred solution, the
results were dismal. In spite of overwhelming levels of force, the imposition of martial
law, and large scale offensive operations, the military was unable to stamp out terrorist
violence and the British decided to withdraw from the territory in the late summer of
1947. Even in defeat, British military leaders clung to the Model 1 critique. In spite of
the enormous military manpower applied, they continued to attribute their failure to
suppress Jewish resistance to a lack of manpower and excessive civilian restraint.
477
Prelude: Split Interpretations of the Arab Revolt (1936-1939)
After the First World War, Britain assumed responsibility for the League of
Nations Mandate in Palestine. The central political issue of the interwar period was
Jewish immigration and it effects on the political and economic division of spoils in
Palestine. The British faced two rebellions in the final decade of the Mandate. The Arab
Revolt (1936-1939) pitted the local Arab population against the British authorities over
issues of Jewish immigration and Arab rights. The Jewish Rebellion (1945-1947) over
Jewish immigration and the struggle for Jewish political independence.
The British responded to the Arab Revolt with Model 1 strategy. British military
leaders saw the government's "extreme moderation" as the cause of the revolt, and the
answer to resistance in the unimpeded exertion of military force against the perpetrators.
A tenfold expansion in the British garrison,880 the ruthless application of force, and the
mobilization of large numbers of Jewish combatants,88 1 forced the rebels to break into
smaller groups but did not break the rebellion. 882 In a postwar summary of the campaign,
the Palestine General Staff argued that martial law was essential to uproot resistance:
The essence of martial law is the power it gives to go to the root of the trouble - to strike at those
who instigate but will not come into the open...and to deal severely with those who use the
patriotism of others as a cloak under which to further their own ends. 883
88o Between 1936 and 1937, the number of British battalions in Palestine rose from 2 to 22 (Source: H.J.
Simson, British Rule, and Rebellion (London: William Blackwood & Sons Ltd., 1938), pp. 263).
881 This mobilization took two forms. The British raised between 12,000 and 19,000 Jewish police
auxiliaries to protect the Jewish settlements and relieve British troops of defensive functions. In addition,
the British permitted the development of the Haganah and other Jewish armed groups. In some cases this
crossed the line from toleration to active training and sponsorship as in the case of Orde Wingate and the
Special Night Squads. (John Newsinger, British Counter-insurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland
(New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 4.
882 Charles Townshend, "The Defence of Palestine: Insurrection and Public Security, 1936-1939," The
English Historical Review, Vol. 103, No. 409 (October 1988), pp. 939.
883 Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936, PRO, WO 19170, pp. 32 as cited in
Townshend, "The Defence of Palestine: Insurrection and Public Security, 1936-1939," pp. 930.
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Even with unrestricted offensive operations, abundant troops, extensive use of aerial
bombing against military and civil targets, the Arab rebellion did not end until Britain
published its 1939 White Paper that addressed the primary Arab complaints over
increased Jewish immigration. As a result, the British remained divided over the causes
of victory with the military seeing a validation of Model 1 and the civilians a
demonstration of the power of limited political concession.884
Failed Consolidation (1939-1945)
Between the end of the Arab revolt in 1939 and the beginning of the Jewish
insurrection in 1944 and 1945, the British government sought to consolidate its authority
through a Model 3 formula of negotiation and selective use of force. The outbreak of the
Second World War imposed strict limits on resources available in Palestine. While the
British were eager to demobilize the Jewish armed groups they had sponsored during the
Arab revolt, they were unable to take aggressive action for fear of destabilizing their
regime or draining resources from the war effort. While they used military troops to
assist in police searches for illegal weapons, violent clashes provoked by such searches in
1939 and again in 1943 led the British to pull back.885
The murder of Lord Moyne, the British Minister Resident of the Middle East, by
Jewish terrorists of the Lehi group in Cairo in November 1944 set off a debate between
advocates of Model 1 and Model 3. Local civil servants and military leaders favored a
very sharp crackdown on the Jewish population, including major search operations and
884 Ibid., Townshend, pp. 945-946.
885 Bruce Hoffman, The Failure of British Military Strategy in Palestine 1939-1947 (Jerusalem: Bar-Ilan
University Press, 1983), pp. 1 1-12.
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shows of force. 886 The War Cabinet in London took the opposite position, arguing that
demonstrations of force and large scale army operations were counterproductive:
Searches were rarely productive; secrecy as to the action contemplated was difficult to maintain;
mistakes were made by the troops; and bad feeling engendered. The slower, less spectacular, but
only sure method of dealing with the problem was the building up of the Police....the situation was
not necessarily best dealt with by increasing the military forces in the country and that, apart from
the great practical difficulties of finding troops, the problem was essentially one for armed Police.88 7
Though the War Cabinet won the argument in 1944, the basic tension between
Model 1 and Model 3 remained unresolved. Proponents of restraint pointed to the Jewish
Agency's decision to cooperate in the suppression of the Irgun; from November 1944 on,
they passed close to 1,000 names of Irgun terrorists to the British authorities, an act that
resulted in the arrest of 300 suspects and dealt a sharp blow to the terrorist group. 888
Model 1 advocates remained leery of a solution that relied on the cooperation of the
Jewish Agency and its armed wing, the Haganah.
886 Ibid., Hoffman, pp. 15.
887 "War Cabinet Minutes, 1944: W.M. (44) 15 5 th Conclusions. Confidential Annex (24 th November, 1944
- 11:00 A.M.)" in Bruce Hoffman, The Failure of British Military Strategy in Palestine, pp. 70, 72.
888 J. Bowyer Bell, Terror out of Zion: The Fight for Israeli Independence (London: Transaction Publishers,
1996), pp. 127-133; John Newsinger, British Counter-insurgency from Palestine to Northern Ireland
(London: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 9-10.
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Palestine Phase 1: Phase 2: Phase 3:
(1945-1947) Restraint and Decapitation and Martial Law and Collapse
Policing Aggressive Search
(9/45-6/46) (6/46-2/47) (3/47-9/47)
Military LTG J.C. D'Arcy LTG Evelyn Barker LTG H.A. MacMillan
Commanders FM Montgomery
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Resources Medium High High
(Manpower)
Resources Medium Medium High
(Equipment)
Civilian High Medium Low
Participation
Phase 1: Restraint and Policing (September 1945-May 1946)
With the end of the Second World War, Britain once more possessed the
resources and attention to confront the rising tide of terrorism directly. The nascent
Jewish revolt proved far more complex than the Arab Revolt. The British Labor
government's decision to abandon its pro-Jewish policy on immigration led to the
collapse of cooperation between the Jewish Agency and the British authorities. The
Jewish Agency, which had helped the British suppress the Irgun in 1944 and 1945, now
joined its onetime enemy in a United Resistance Movement designed to force a return to
pro-Jewish policy. 889 The two smaller and more radical factions, the Irgun and Lehi, 890
carried out the majority of the attacks on British security forces; the Jewish Agency and
889 David Charters, The British Army and the Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-1947 (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 53.
890 David Charters estimates that there were 1,500 members of the Irgun in 1945; the Lehi numbered 250-
300 in 1944 (Source: David Charters, The British Army and the Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, pp. 46, 48).
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the Haganah 891 avoided direct military confrontation, focusing their efforts on subverting
immigration controls.
The British garrison consisted of some 100,000 military troops supporting a
Palestine Police force of 20,000. 892 Though the High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir
Alan Cunningham, restricted the use of the army garrison to static defense, selective
search operations and support of the Palestine Police, this did not sit well with many
military commanders. As the level of forces available and the level of violence rose,
military commanders argued that the answer lay in offensive action against all Jewish
insurgent groups.
891 The Haganah numbered between 43,000 and 45,000 in 1945, with some 8,000 in the Hish (Field Force)
and 2,000-3,000 in the elite Palmach (Source: ibid., Charters, pp. 44).
892 These rough estimates may overstate the British security forces available. First, only 25,000 combat
troops were available at any one time for mobile operations, a situation that closely resembled that of the
French garrison in Algeria in 1954. Second, some 12,800 of the 20,000 man Palestine Police force were
members of the Jewish Settlement Police. This force had been developed to protect Jewish communities
against Arab attacks during the 1930s and its composition reduced its utility in a clash between Jewish
armed groups and the British authorities (Source: ibid., Charters, pp. 88-90).
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Phase 2: Decapitation and Aggressive Search (June 1946- February 1947)
Unable to find or eradicate the Irgun/Lehi insurgents, the military argued in favor
of a decapitation strike against the most visible elements of the Jewish resistance: the
Haganah and Palmach. Rising levels of violence and the lack of cooperation by the
Jewish Agency led the High Commissioner to sanction Operation Agatha in late June
1946. Over a four day period, some 17,000 British security forces arrested 2,718 persons
including leading members of the Jewish Agency, Haganah and Palmach; related search
operations uncovered 33 arms caches. 893 In military eyes, the operation had been a
success: it had produced positive operational results at very low cost, and it had landed a
public blow against Jewish organizations suspected of assisting or tolerating the more
radical insurgent organizations.
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893 Ibid., Charters, pp. 118.
What it did not do was land a decisive blow against the Irgun or Lehi. Instead,
less than a month later the Irgun launched the largest terrorist attack of the rebellion,
killing 91 people in an attack on the British military headquarters in the King David
Hotel. The King David bombing prompted the British to launch a second, large scale
offensive operation in Tel Aviv. Operation Shark (30 July-2 August 1946) involved a
room by room search of the town of Tel Aviv by 21,000 British troops. The British
interrogated some 102,000 persons, arresting 787. As Bruce Hoffman has pointed out,
the operations were judged a success because they produced tangible gains at very low
cost (four Jews killed, zero Army casualties). 894
Judged by Model 3 standards, however, both operations were failures. First, the
operations were misdirected, landing primarily on the more moderate and cooperative
Jewish Agency and Haganah rather than Irgun or Lehi. Second, Operations Agatha and
Shark had further alienated a Jewish population that considered them assaults on the
Jewish agency and the Jewish population. Third, the operations against the Haganah, far
from convincing the Agency to crackdown on the Irgun, led them instead to withdraw
from political negotiations. This boycott prevented the British from making any progress
towards the restoration of order in the territory. Fourth, to the extent that the operations
injured the Haganah, they made it easier for the rival Irgun faction to operate freely.
Fifth, these large scale operations had failed to produce more than a temporary, local
reduction in the level of insurgent activity; within a very short period of time, the
terrorists managed to rebound and increase the level of violence substantially. 895 While
the limited effect and political costs of the operation were clear to Cunningham and
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894 Ibid., Hoffman, pp. 23.
895 Ibid., Charters, pp. 99.
others from the start, a single-minded focus on tangible military results led the military to
misjudge the result of their operations.
Phase 3: Martial Law and Collapse (March 1947-September 1947)
After a brief lull in terrorist activity, the violence began to increase again and the
civil-military clash intensified. Field Marshal Montgomery, the Chief of the Imperial
General Staff and a veteran of the counterinsurgency campaigns in Ireland and Palestine,
argued that the civil authorities under Cunningham had hamstrung the military command;
the only way to rectify this was to take the offensive and impose collective responsibility
in the form of fines and martial law.896 Cunningham rejected this logic arguing that
collective responsibility would be actively counterproductive:
I should say with the examples of Ireland and even the Arab rebellion before me, I am dead against
reprisals as such. The question of the morale of the troops is constantly in my mind and is a factor
which I am constantly emphasizing to HM government, but I am sure that you will agree that it
would not be right to take action which would imperil imminent political solution to this thorny
problem, which alone can bring peace to this country, for the sake of the morale factor alone.897
This debate pitted Model 3 advocates led by Cunningham, General Barker [the senior
commander in Palestine] and the Colonial Office against the Model 1 faction led by the
War Office, Montgomery and General Dempsey [Commander in Chief, Middle East
Land Forces]. Incidents in December 1946 increased the pressure on the government and
enabled the Model 1 faction to carry the day. As David Charters points out, Montgomery
saw material escalation and offensive operations as the obvious solution:
The Field-Marshal wanted to flood the countryside with mobile troops to restore confidence in
authority and make things difficult for the insurgents....he [Montgomery] advocated 'turning the
place upside down' to disrupt the population and to persuade them to cooperate with the authorities
against the insurgents. Montgomery welcomed the opportunity to draw the Haganah out for a battle,
claiming that he had succeeded with such measures against the Arabs before the war.
Enthusiastically he offered the entire strength of the British army, bringing in reinforcements from
896 Ibid., Charters, pp. 102.
897 Cunningham as quoted in Charters, pp. 102.
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Egypt or Germany. Cunningham feared that this would destroy any hope of a political settlement
and Creech-Jones [the Colonial Secretary] observed that war with the Haganah meant war with the
whole Jewish nation. Montgomery replied that he thought the British government would have to
enforce partition against the wishes of the Jews and the Arabs.898
Montgomery and Dempsey succeeded in forcing the imposition of martial law in
March 1947. Though the edicts covered only Tel Aviv and the Jewish sections of
Jerusalem, they were an expression of a more general and unmistakably Model 1 theory
of victory. Army planners hoped to apprehend or disrupt the terrorist bands and
intimidate the population into submission. As one planning document made clear, the
deprivation of liberty and the disruption of commerce would compel submission and help
the British crush resistance: "Such measures by striking at the liberty and and pockets of
the private citizens may induce them to cooperate by laying information against and
refusing to shelter the terrorists." 899
Though the Model 1 advocates had succeeded in imposing martial law, the results
of this new escalation in force brought similar results. The British failed to capture more
than 60 terrorists in the first month of operations, and the restrictions on the population
had the opposite of their intended effect. Instead of delivering information to the security
forces, the Jewish population protested their collective punishment and refused to furnish
support. After the initial shock, the crackdown did very little to suppress resistance:
The Sixth Airborne's intelligence officer noted how, "In spite of all the restrictions, acts of sabotage
and murder continue on an increasing scale...The Illegal Forces are going all out to thumb their
noses at the authorities and their fellow countrymen.
The paltry results of martial law led the Army and Cunningham to suspend it on
March 17, 1947. Having taken the Model 1 path with Operations Agatha, Shark and
martial law, however, it was essentially impossible to return to a Model 3 formula based
898 Ibid., Charters, pp. 105.
899 Joint Planning Staff document cited in ibid.., Hoffman, pp. 29.
900 Ibid., Hoffman, pp. 30.
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on the cooperation with the Jewish Agency and the population. In the face of rising
violence by the Irgun and ethnic violence between Jews and Arabs, Cunningham now
argued that there could be no turning back: with negotiation forfeited, martial law and
reinforcement were the only options remaining. At this point, the military, chastened by
the reverses of March, argued that even with one British soldier for every six Jewish
inhabitants of Palestine, they could not impose martial law in Tel Aviv let alone in the
country as a whole. Faced with the Army's new insistence on massive reinforcement, the
Cabinet in London balked and by August had resigned itself to abandoning the Mandate.
The scale of the British garrison relative to the local population provides a natural
experiment in the limits of material escalation. The ratio of all British security forces
(police and military) at the peak was 61.77 for every 1,000 inhabitants or nearly three
times the level James Quinlivan identifies as the threshold for effective stabilization
operations (20 security forces for every 1,000 inhabitants).901 Even when the police are
subtracted to account for the large number of Jewish Settlement Police, the ratio remains
51.47. When the ratio is calculated using the Jewish population alone (i.e. excluding the
Arab inhabitants who were uninvolved in the uprising), the result is even more striking;
the ratio of British security forces rises to 197/1,000 Jewish inhabitants, nearly ten times
the Quinlivan threshold. These ratios lend virtually no credence to the Model 1
explanation for defeat. Instead, they make the military's postwar explanation of defeat
all the more revealing. The military's insistence on the significance of resource scarcity
and civil restraint displays in the baldest terms the ability of the military operational code
to distort perception - even in retrospect.
901 James T. Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," Parameters, Winter 1995.
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Palestine and the Theory
The collision of civil and military opinion in Palestine demonstrates the power of
professional beliefs in shaping strategic choice. The military was deeply suspicious of
the Model 3 formula applied by civil authorities from the end of the Arab Revolt to May
1946. While reliance on the Jewish Agency and the Haganah to suppress Jewish terror
groups might have been acceptable under the extreme circumstances of the Second World
War, the availability of abundant military manpower made a muscular Model 1 response
feasible. Rising manpower proved a powerful solvent, capable of dissolving the tenuous
civil-military accord to employ a mix of force and negotiation.
The strong military preference for a direct military solution to resistance rested on
simplistic assumptions about the nature of the threat and the role of the population. The
small scale of the Jewish armed groups made them appear vulnerable, and it was assumed
that attack on the guerillas would cow the inhabitants into submission. These
assumptions were functionally indistinguishable from those espoused by d'Argenlieu,
Valluy and Cherribre in the opening phases of the Indochina and Algerian wars.
Operations Agatha and Shark stand as examples of the Model 1 learning trap.
Each delivered short term, tangible results (the suppression of violence, the apprehension
of suspects) at minimal cost. When each operation was followed by an upsurge in
attacks, the ready answer was escalation in manpower and ruthlessness. Once the path of
Model 1 military confrontation had been chosen, a return to Model 3 formula was
virtually impossible.
The post hoc interpretation of the outcome is equally revealing. As the theory
predicts, military leaders traced the failure to excessive civilian restraint and insufficient
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resources. The stubborn Model 1 critique is particularly striking in view of the scale of
resources committed to the suppression of the revolt. With one British soldier for every
five Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, military leaders argued that they lacked the
manpower to impose effective martial law in the major urban areas. As Field Marshal
Montgomery's comments on Malaya would make clear, two years of ineffective
escalation in Palestine did little to diminish the military's preference for Model 1
solutions to insurgency.
The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960)
In the Malayan case we seek to answer four questions. First, are the dominant
intrawar and interwar patterns predicted in Chapter 2 present? Second, to what extent are
these patterns traceable to the military operational code, bureaucratic interests, and the
associated causal mechanisms? Third, to what extent do changes in the independent
variables account for deviation from those dominant patterns? Specifically, did changes
in civilian participation, resource levels, and task performance account for the adoption of
Model 3 strategies? Fourth, do the specified causal mechanisms explain the connections
between changes in the independent and dependent variables?
The Malayan case offers strong evidence of the military operational code at work.
Just one month after the withdrawal from Palestine, British authorities responded to the
outbreak of resistance in Malaya with a Model 1 strategy nearly indistinguishable from
the one that had failed spectacularly in the last episode. While civilian leaders retained
greater control over policy and strategy than their French counterparts, the British
military approached the problem of counterinsurgency in much the same way the French
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had in the early phases of Indochina and Algeria. After two years of largely ineffective
Model 1 strategy, reinforcement and escalation, the British introduced a new Model 2
strategy in May 1950 - the Briggs Plan. The two principal elements of the plan were a
unification of civil-military administration under the War Executive Committee System
and the large scale resettlement of the Chinese population. 902 The unexpected, Korean
War boom in tin and rubber prices provided a surge in Malayan government revenues;
this windfall offset both the direct cost of resettlement and softened the political
resentment engendered among the Chinese population. 903
After a year and a half of Briggs' Model 2 strategy, the struggle appeared to have
reached a new and costly stalemate. With the resettlement of over 500,000 Chinese
squatters largely complete, the MCP insurgency remained largely intact: levels of
violence were high, and the Chinese population appeared unwilling or unable to
cooperate with the British authorities. Then in short order, the authorities suffered three
shocks: the first two political, the third fiscal. The death of the High Commissioner
Gurney in an ambush and the ascent of a Conservative government in London three
weeks later opened the way for a wholesale change in local leadership and government
policy. The new Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, developed a new Model 3 policy
predicated on engagement with the Chinese population and rapid movement towards
independence. General Templer, the civil and military governor selected by Churchill
and Lyttelton, was sent to execute this new policy, restore order and engineer a post-
colonial united Malaya. This choice of strategy was strongly influenced by a rapid
contraction in British and Malayan state resources. The end of the tin and rubber boom
902 Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960
(Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004), pp. 101.
903 Ibid., Stubbs, pp. 109.
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in 1952 had led to a contraction in the economy and Malayan government revenues; the
British government was undergoing the most severe balance of payments crisis since
1947.904 Resource scarcity and the prospect of further belt tightening influenced the
London government's decision to embrace a Model 3 strategy.
This shift from Model 2 to Model 3 strategy brought decisive results. Templer's
announcement of a policy of ethnic compromise set the stage for the emergence of a
Malay-Chinese coalition. While Templer continued to increase pressure on the MCP, his
new strategy included major political and social concessions towards the Chinese
population. These changes directly contributed to the shift in British fortunes and the
stability of the emerging Malayan state.
Prelude: Incomplete Restoration and Failed Compromise (August 1945-May 1948)
British authority in colonial Malaya collapsed under the Japanese onslaught of
1941-1942. From the fall of Singapore in February 1942 through the Japanese surrender
in August 1945, Britain's only significant role in Malaya was as the sponsor of a largely
Chinese insurgency against the Japanese. While the British played a pivotal role in
training, arming and advising the Chinese guerillas, these same resistance groups would
constitute the backbone of the insurgent movement in 1948.905
In 1945, the British returned to a Malaya crippled by Japanese occupation and
divided by a wave of ethnic violence and score settling that had followed the collapse of
904 Frank Heinlein, British Government Policy and Decolonisation: Scrutinising the Official Mind (London:
Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 88-89.
905 The standard account of the British advisory role in occupied Malaya is F. Spencer Chapman's, The
Jungle is Neutral (Times Books: Singapore, 1998).
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the wartime protectorate.906 Though the British managed to demobilize a portion of the
Communist guerilla army, the Malayan Peoples' Anti Japanese Army (M.P.A.J.A.), the
Malaysian Communist Party (MCP) maintained a secret army and weapons as an option
for future resistance. 9 07
The British spent the period between 1945 and 1948 in an unsuccessful attempt to
rebuild their imperial authority and address the fundamental problem of Malay politics:
the division of power and status between native Malays and ethnic Chinese residents.
According to the 1947 census, some 44% of the population of five million was Malay,
38.5% Chinese, 10.5% Indian, 5.5% aborigine, and 1.5% other groups including the
estimated 20,000 Europeans (0.3% of the total population).90 8 Scattered violence
perpetrated by Chinese "bandits" continued from the war's end through the outbreak of
the Emergency. As Anthony Short has noted, the lack of government security and high
ethnic tensions benefited the MCP - the only significant, extra-governmental armed
group with a substantial political following. 909 The first British model for a unified
Malayan state, the so-called Malayan Union, collapsed when the Malay leaders of the
federal states refused to sign treaties that centralized state control and gave equal rights
906 For a detailed account of ethnic violence during and after the Second World War, see Cheah Boon
Kheng, Red Star over Malaya: Resistance & Social Conflict during and after the Japanese Occupation,
1941-1946 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003)
907 Chin Peng, the leader of the MCP during the Malayan Emergency, argues that the M.P.A.J.A. had
shifted its strategy as early as 1944 to compete with the British for territorial control in the event of
Japanese surrender. These plans involved extensive wartime negotiations with the Japanese. Though the
MCP ultimately chose legal struggle over armed resistance, their late war and early postwar behavior
suggests that armed action against the British was closely considered throughout the period. Chin Peng
estimates that somewhere between 500 and 1,000 guerillas of the secret army were retained in each state,
for a likely total of 5,000 - 8,000 guerillas (Source: C.C.Chin, Karl Hack (eds.), Dialogues with Chin Peng:
New Light on the Malayan Communist Party (Singapore: National University of Singapore, 2005), pp. 92-
101; 105-106).
908 This summary of the 1947 census is drawn from Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare, pp. 12.
909 Anthony Short, In Pursuit of Mountain Rats: The Communist Insurrection in Malaya (Singapore:
Cultured Lotus, 2003), pp. 26-27.
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and citizenship to the Chinese.910 The organized resistance to the idea of the Malayan
Union led to the formation of the United Malaya Nationalist Organization (UMNO)
which became the predominant political party in 1947 and remains so to this day.911 The
Chinese were the losers in this outcome, and the MCP channeled this resentment into an
increasingly militant labor movement.
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Phase 1: "Coercion and Enforcement"912 (Model 1) (June 1948 - May 1950)
The decision by the MCP to take up armed struggle provoked a Model 1 response
The British authorities responded to the launch of the MCP insurgency with a classic
Model 1 response. In what Richard Stubbs has described as a "reflex action," 913 the High
Commissioner Edward Gent and his military and police subordinates agreed on a
sweeping military and police crackdown aimed at the "bandits" responsible for violence
against civilians and security forces. The government immediately announced
Emergency regulations restricting a number of basic freedoms and offering much wider
latitude for police and military action.
The military response in particular showed all the signs of Model 1 reasoning.
Just as General Cherriere had dismissed the early FLN attacks in Algeria as a relatively
modest, traditional uprising, General Boucher, the senior military leader in Malaya saw
the MCP uprising as an outbreak of banditry that could be resolved by prompt, offensive
military action. Gauging the seriousness of the insurrection by the scale of the violence
and the military potential of the guerilla force, Boucher was optimistic about the chances
of a speedy resolution to the crisis:
I can tell you this is by far the easiest problem I have ever tackled. In spite of the appalling country
and the ease with which he can hide, the enemy is far weaker in technique and courage than either
the Greek or Indian Reds. 91 4
Boucher and his military colleagues insisted that the appropriate response was
offensive rather than defensive. With roughly 6,000 infantrymen and 9,000 police
available, the military argued that there were insufficient forces to defend the rubber
plantation, tin mines, or local populations. Given the choice between defensive
912 This is Richard Stubbs' description of the initial British response to the insurrection (Source: Stubbs,
Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare, pp. 70).
913 Ibid., Stubbs, pp. 92.
914 General Boucher as cited in Stubbs, pp. 71.
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dispersion and prompt offensive action, the military chose the latter."'9 When M.J.
MacDonald, the British High Commissioner for Southeast Asia, highlighted the
importance of defending Britain's economic interests, the local government and military
grudgingly acceded to the creation of a special constabulary, police force. This civilian
intervention resulted in what would later be seen as the pivotal innovation of the early
counterinsurgency campaign - the fielding of some 30,000 Malay special constables to
assume the defensive responsibility for major economic interests and the population. 916
MacDonald's attempts to redirect the thrust of the response did not diminish the
military's enthusiasm for conventional campaigning. On July 27, 1948, Boucher
explained his theory of victory to the local government in these terms:
My object is to break up the insurgent concentrations to bring them to battle before they are ready,
and to drive them underground or into the jungle, and then to follow them there, by troops in the
jungles, and by police backed by troops and by the RAF [Royal Air Force] outside of them. I intend
to keep them constantly moving and deprive them of food and of recruits, because if they are
constantly moving they cannot terrorize an area properly so that they can get these commodities
from it; and then to ferret them out of their holes, whatever these holes may be. 9 17
His preferred instrument for these operations was the large unit sweep.918 As Boucher
indicated, offensive sweeps would disrupt the enemy and likely force him into a decisive
engagement. 919 Boucher and other military leaders during this period downplayed the
significance of the local Chinese and Malay populations. When they did relate their
operations to the population, military leaders generally assumed that aggressive action
would deter cooperation with the guerillas.
915 Ibid., Short, pp. 116-117.
916 Ibid., Short, pp. 115, 124-125.
917 Ibid., Short, pp. 137.
918 Riley Sunderland, Army Operations in Malaya, 1947-1960 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation,
September 1964), RM-4170-ISA, pp. 132.
919 These battalion and larger operations usually employed one of two operational concepts: cordon and
search or hammer and anvil (Source: Sunderland, Army Operations in Malaya, pp. 126-127).
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The coercive formula drew support from two hard line constituencies inside
Malaya: the European planters and the Malay political leadership. The planters and other
businessmen saw no point in conciliation with criminal elements who threatened their
lives and livelihoods. In the words of one Straits Times editorial, the authorities should
"Govern or get out." 920 Though this constituency consistently argued for tougher,
offensive measures against the guerillas and their sympathizers, they constituted less than
half a percent of the population and wielded nothing approaching the French pied noir
veto power in local politics. 921 The Malay population and political leaders shared many
of the Europeans' views of the need to crack down on Chinese sponsored violence. Even
before the declaration of the Emergency, the leading Malaya political figure of the time,
the state minister of Johore, Dato Onn, argued in favor of the suppression of the MCP and
its Chinese backers:
The time has now come when the Federation Government should firmly show by its action that it
will have no truck with Communism in this country, that every step possible, every power that this
Council can give, should be given to the police and others to maintain that law and order, to see that
law and order is maintained in this country and that Communism is eradicated, and those
responsible for bringing that ideology into this country should be banished for ever. I would further
request that such action should be taken not only against the people who advocate Communism, but
also against every foreigner, against every alien who comes to this land to agitate, to create trouble
and to instigate the people. The fullest use of the law should be made to seek these people out and
to send them back to their own country to ferment trouble there. 922
Credit for curbing the "reflex actions" of the military and the ethnic Malaya
leadership must go to the new High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, who arrived in
November 1948. While Gurney did not overturn the military's actions or soften the law
and order agenda of the police, he sought to check military control and limit the scope of
what might easily become an ethnic war between Malays and Chinese. Gurney made
clear that General Boucher's early bids to bring the police under military control would
920 Ibid., Short, pp. 68.
921 Ibid., Short, pp. 332.
922 Dato Onn as cited in Short, pp. 69.
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not stand. 923 Instead, he appointed a new Police Commissioner, Colonel W.N. Gray, and
gave him responsibility for the coordination of the counterinsurgency campaign. On the
political front, Gurney encouraged the development of a non-Communist counterweight
to the MCP, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA).924
The results of the early Model 1 campaign were predictably mixed. On the
positive side of the ledger, large unit offensive operations produced lopsided tactical
results; encounters between guerillas and British security forces categorically ended in
small victories for the counterinsurgents. In the process, the British generally pushed the
guerillas out of a given geographical area, preventing the establishment of Maoist base
areas. 925 While the tactical feedback was uniformly positive, the results did not meet
early expectations of decisive victory. Large unit operations conducted in the absence of
intelligence produce very few significant engagements. 926 Instead, British forces had to
spend weeks of effort to kill or capture a relatively small number of guerillas. The two
leading measures of effectiveness employed by British forces - the number of kills per
contact and the number of "eliminations" per battalion - demonstrate the single-minded
focus on the guerillas and neglect of the population and the Communist support
network. 927
Unable to eradicate the guerillas through direct action, many military leaders
resorted to collective responsibility. Particularly in the first year of the war, British rules
of engagement in Chinese areas were very loose and it was not uncommon for villages to
be burned in retaliation for guerilla attacks. During this period, conditions often
923 Ibid., Short, pp. 140-141; ibid., Stubbs, pp. 72.
924 Ibid., Short, pp. 265.
925 Ibid., Sunderland, pp. 126.
926 Ibid., Short, pp. 138; ibid., Sunderland, pp. 131-132, 138.
927 Ibid., Sunderland, pp. 37, 50-51.
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approached what Anthony Short has described as a "counter-terror" in which military
frustration was taken out on the Chinese population: 928
In Perak a Police report said of Colonel X that he "has been seven days in Malaya and is fully
prepared to deal with the situation which he considers can only be met with fire and slaughter. He
has been in India and assumes that Chinese react in a similar way to the Indian." 929
Nor was the problem restricted to the British military alone. Malay constables were
hardly neutral parties in the charged ethnic environment, and the newly arrived Palestine
Police veterans were notorious for their reliance on brute force against the population. 930
The behavior of the security forces in the opening twelve months of the Malayan
Emergency showed little recognition of the limits of collective responsibility and show of
force coercion.
As in the French cases, the string of small, tactical victories against the guerillas
reinforced the military command's attachment to Model 1 strategy.931 The British
military reacted to the paradox of tactical success and campaign stalemate with a two part
rationalization. First, they vigorously defended the basic paradigm of offensive action.
General Ritchie, reflecting on the first three months of the insurgency, argued that the
British had succeeded in arresting the development of the insurgency. He saw this
success as a product of concentrated offensive action and he argued against any
dispersion or defensive deployment. 932 Though the military was frustrated by the lack of
intelligence on the guerillas, this was typically blamed on the police. Though he was not
blind to the relatively inconclusive nature of the large operations, and the tendency of
928 Ibid., Short, pp. 160-165; ibid, Stubbs, pp. 73-74.
929 Ibid., Short, pp. 153.
930 Ibid., Newsinger, pp. 47-48.
931 It is worth noting that the British defense establishment expressed a different concern at this time.
Echoing a familiar bureaucratic theme, the British Defence Coordination Committee worried that
counterinsurgency operations would diminish the preparedness of troops for future conventional in Asia or
Europe: "Units and formations employed in anti-bandit operations in Malaya are seriously handicapped in
carrying out their main peace-time task, namely preparation for war." (Source: Short, pp. 229, fn 18).
932 Ibid., Sunderland, pp. 30-31.
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resistance to reappear in recently cleared areas, General Boucher argued as late as
February 1950 that the answer was reinforcement under the existing strategy. Boucher
emphasized that a shortage of troops had left him unable to exploit the opportunities
brought by offensive action against the guerillas. 933
Second, they blamed the absence of cumulative pacification on the weakness of
the civilian and police apparatus. As General Harding, Boucher's immediate superior,
argued, the failure to make cumulative progress against the insurrection could be traced
to a failure of administration. Under these conditions, military reinforcement would not
only expand the opportunities for decisive battle but also provide "the breathing space
required by the civil and police authorities required by the civil and police authorities to
put in hand the decisive measures that they alone can take." 934 Harding, like Boucher,
strongly implied that military efforts had been successful; progress had been held back by
the failure of civil authorities to provide intelligence and administration. As Anthony
Short has noted, the military strongly believed that this failure could only be overcome by
a unification of the counterinsurgency under military leadership. 935
Phase 2: The Briggs Plan (Model 2) (May 1950-February 1952)
Nearly two years of Model 1 strategy had failed to bring MCP resistance to an
end. While the local military command contended that the underlying strategy was
sound, extensive police powers, a near doubling in the number of British troops, a
doubling of the regular police force, and the addition of 47,000 special constables had
failed to roll back the ostensibly weak MCP insurgency.
933 Ibid., Short, pp. 225-227.
934 General Sir John Harding, Commander in Chief of Far East Land Forces, as cited in Short, pp. 233.
935 Ibid., Short, pp. 234.
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If the local command remained firmly in the jaws of a learning trap, civilian
observers and outside military leaders began to express doubts about the basic course. In
January 1950, Gurney acknowledged that the combined efforts of the military and the
administration had yet to deliver decisive results: "The political brains behind the
Communist efforts remain for practical purposes untouched and unlocated."936 A month
earlier, Field Marshal William Slim, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, emerged
from a visit to Malaya convinced that the challenge was largely civil rather than military
in nature. Slim seized on the intrinsic limits of the prevailing model of offensive
operations:
The Army has for a long period kept the Communist bandits on the move and has inflicted minor
losses on them.... The sequence of action seems to be that a band having been located in an area, a
military force proceeds to beat through a wide expanse of jungle and locate the band. Contact is
usually made with one or two individual bandits acting as outposts but the main body is able to
evacuate its camp and disperse to rally again.... The Army then laboriously repeats the process. I
had the trace of some of these operations plotted on the map and only too often the result was a
circle; the Army drove the bandits from one place to another until after a few months the circle was
complete and the bandits were back again in more or less the area from which they started. It seems
to me the Army can go on doing this indefinitely, and so can the bandits. The only answer is that as
the bandits are driven from an area a real effective civil administration steps in and with its Police
and other forces takes complete administrative control of the area.937
Having grasped the inconclusive nature of offensive operations, Slim advocated a
renewed focus on the civil component of the campaign: "...until it is recognized that the
problem is by no means a military one, and that any military effort can only be subsidiary
to and in support of a civil effort, we shall make no progress." 938
The answer to stalemate was Model 2 strategy. As a compromise between the
military desire to exert greater control over civil and police operations and the civilian
936 Sir Henry Gurney as cited in Anthony Short, "The Malayan Emergency" in Ronald Haycock (ed.),
Regular Armies and Insurgency (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1979), pp. 60.
937 Field Marshal Sir William Slim, "'Note on tour of South-East Asia October 1949': report by Field
Marshal Sir W Slim on the importance of civil action in counter-insurgency, Minutes by O H Morris and W
C Johnson, November 1949, CO 537/4374, no. 5," in A.J. Stockwell (ed.), Malaya: Part II: The
Communist Insurrection, 1948-1953 (London: HMSO, 1995), British Documents on the End of Empire,
Series B, Vol. 3, pp. 173-175.
938 Ibid., Slim, pp. 175.
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unease at militarized government, Gurney requested the appointment of a retired general
officer to the civilian post of Director of Operations. The new Director, General (ret.)
Harold Briggs, developed a new plan. Whereas earlier operations had focused almost
exclusively on the pursuit of the guerillas, Briggs' Plan identified the guerillas' support
base in the population as the center of gravity. This base organization, known as the Min
Yuen, provided food, intelligence and general support to the MCP guerillas, the MRLA.
By breaking the links between the Min Yuen and the guerillas, Briggs hoped to weaken
the MCP and make possible cumulative progress towards the restoration of law and
order.939
Briggs' plan was unmistakably Model 2 in its assumptions and chosen
instruments. At its core was the recognition of the significance of the population and the
MCP's supporters, the Min Yuen, in particular. As Briggs expressed to Gurney a week
after his arrival, the real focus of operations should be the MCP cells rather than the
guerillas:
Successes against the bandit gangs, though essential to security and morale, were in effect only a
"rap on the knuckles." It is at this "heart" we must aim, to eliminate the Communist cells among the
Chinese population to whom we must give security and whom we must win over. By doing so and
removing the bandits' source of supply and information the task of the Security Forces would be
simplified and the enemy forced to fight for these in areas under our control. Thus only can the
initiative be wrested from the bandits. 940
Equally important, Briggs' answer to this problem was fundamentally coercive and
predicated on the passivity of that population. Skeptical of the potential for active
Chinese cooperation, Briggs instead assumed that compulsory resettlement would deliver
greater benefits:
939 Sir Harold Briggs, "'Federation plan for the elimination of the communist organization and armed forces
in Malaya' (the Briggs plan): report by COS for Cabinet Malaya Committee, CAB 21/1681, MAL C(50)23,
Appendix, 24 May 1950," in Stockwell, Malaya: Part II: The Communist Insurrection, 1948-1953, pp.
216-221.
940 Harold Briggs as quoted in Short, In Pursuit of Mountain Rats, pp. 235.
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The Chinese population is generally content to get on with its business even if it entails subsidizing
the Communists; nor is it willing generally to give any information to the Police for fear of reprisals
until it is given full and continuous security by our Forces. The Chinese have always had
repugnance for joining Army or Police Forces; nor will they volunteer now at rates of pay lower
than they can get in civil life, which are far greater than those earned by Malays. They are vocal and
promise a lot, yet do nothing. Strangely enough compulsion is more acceptable than
volunteering. 941
Briggs' plan was to resettle a sizable portion of the rural Chinese population in fortified
camps. Once they had been resettled, the Chinese squatters could be more effectively
protected, administered, and controlled. These camps, in combination with police
outposts and later use of food denial operations, were to form the basis of a campaign of
strangulation against the guerillas. The economic and social impact of uprooting the
Chinese population, and the potential alienation of the resettled populations, were
secondary considerations; the interruption of the connections between the population and
the guerillas was considered far more important than the sentiment of the affected groups.
Colonel Gray, a retired military officer and the Commissioner of Police, offered a
defense of resettlement which was nearly indistinguishable from those offered by General
Challe had in Algeria in 1959:
17D [deportation and resettlement] operations, Gray said, were the only single measure devised and
used against armed Communism in Malaya which had achieved marked and indeed spectacular
results in the task of restoring law and order. They had produced badly needed information of great
value and had severely damaged the bandit effort, morale and support. Of this there could be no
doubt. He conceded that there were objections. There was some political difficulty "in that
politicians and so-called leaders may have some ground for complaint." Hardship and suffering was
caused and sometimes presumably to innocent or helpless people.942
As in most Model 2 strategies, this reflected an implicit sequential theory of state control
and political exchange; according to this line of reasoning, strict administrative order had
to precede the reintroduction of active political debate. 94 3 The Briggs Plan was a classic
941 Harold Briggs as quoted in Short, In Pursuit of Mountain Rats, pp. 240.
942 Colonel Gray as cited in Short, In Pursuit of Mountain Rats, pp. 193.
943 Ibid., Stubbs, pp. 206.
503
expression of one-way politics - a formula in which the underlying political dynamics
and preferences of the parties were subordinated to the imperative or restoring state
control in its most direct form.
The second major piece of the Briggs plan was its creation of unified
administrative control in the form of the War Executive Committees. At every level,
from national to district, representatives of each of the primary colonial agencies - civil
administration, police, and military - met to coordinate government operations. This
system was not without its costs; the effective integration of policy was purchased at the
cost of decreased speed of decision and decreased latitude for the subordinate
organizations. This change also meant a shift away from the independent employment of
military forces towards one that nested such operations in the context of police activities
and civil administration.
Though Briggs' first bid to "dominate" southern Malaya ended in a disappointing
set of large unit operations, he quickly embraced a new set of tactics that combined police
intelligence and small unit patrolling. As some units had independently discovered,
troops were most likely to locate the enemy when their own unit was small in scale and
they possessed detailed information on his probable location. In the absence of detailed
information on the target, the probability of making contact in an ambush was 3.03% and
in a patrol was 1.14%. When units acted on specific intelligence, the probability of
contact rose to 10% and 5.88% respectively. 944
944 These data refer to operations in 1952 and is drawn from the British Operational Research group's
official reports (Source: Sunderland, Army Operations in Malaya, pp. 145).
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Although the Briggs plan increased the efficiency of British security operations
and increased the pressure on the MCP guerillas,945 it was neither costless nor decisive.
Resettlement had embittered the affected populations and alienated many non-
Communist Chinese leaders. Though the government attempted to buffer the impact of
resettlement by extending small grants and allowances to the resettled groups, the process
was unavoidably coercive and disruptive; 94 6 settlers lost their dwellings, agricultural plots
and were forced to resettle in fortified camps in which their movements were strictly
controlled. The British encountered much the same tradeoff as the French in Algeria;
resettlement brought undeniable military benefits at the cost of potential long term
pauperization and alienation. Faced with this tradeoff, and relying on Model 2
assumptions about popular agency and motivation, Briggs opted to capture the military
benefits and accept the political costs.
What saved resettlement in Malaya from the fate of the Algerian experiment was
a fortuitous boom in rubber and tin prices. The Malayan economy was overwhelmingly
dependent on commodity earnings and the Chinese furnished most of the labor in both
industries. The outbreak of the Korean War brought an explosion in demand for both
commodities. As the chart below indicates, the price of rubber quadrupled between 1949
and 1950, while tin prices nearly doubled. 947 The positive shock of the commodity boom
had three effects, all of which softened the blow of resettlement. First, the revenues of
the Malayan Federal government expanded dramatically, enabling them to absorb the
945 Chin Peng later admitted that resettlement and food denial had imposed enormous pressure on the MCP
(Source: C.C. Chin, Hack, Dialogues with Chin Peng, pp. 160).
946 Ibid., Short, pp. 292.
947 Ibid., Stubbs, pp. 110.
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enormous cost of the Emergency and resettlement; 948 the Malayan government fiscal
balance swung from a deficit of $13.4 million Malay dollars in 1950 to a surplus of
$289.9 million in 1951. 94 9 Second, the expansion in profits enabled private firms to pay
for the resettlement of their own Chinese workers. 950 Third, and perhaps most
significant, the commodity boom expanded Chinese employment and wages just as the
shock of resettlement hit. Daily wage rates for unskilled labor rose from $1.43 to $2.90,
while the more skilled rubber tappers earned between $3.65 and $4.35.951 That this
economic boom exactly coincided with the peak of Chinese resettlement was an
extraordinary piece of good fortune. Without the boom, the political costs of the Briggs'
Plan might have been prohibitive. 952
948 Shortly before the invasion of Korea, the Colonial Office and the Exchequer were embroiled in a very
bitter debate over the scale of British financial assistance to the government of Malaya. While the
Exchequer was sympathetic to the needs of the Malayan Federation, it was unwilling to commit to
unlimited support of the Emergency at a time when defense spending was already very high and the debt
burden stifling. For detailed discussions, see the correspondence between Mr. Gaitskell (Exchequer) and
Mr. Griffiths (Colonial Office) (A.J. Stockwell, Malaya, Part II: The Communist Insurrection, pp. 252-257,
270-272).
949 Ibid., Stubbs, pp. 111.
950 Ibid., Stubbs, pp. 113-115.
951 Ibid., Stubbs, pp. 113.
952 The injection of wealth into the Chinese working classes also diminished the appeal of joining or
remaining with the MCP insurgents.
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While the boom helped cushion the shock of resettlement, Briggs' formula of War
Executive Committees, resettlement and "dominating" tactics did not bring the desired
results in the short term. Though Briggs and others had hoped to see major
improvements within the first six to twelve months, 953 most civil and military observers
were deeply frustrated with the inability to make significant progress against the rebels.
Though the number of rebels killed had increased in the latter half of 1950, the Minister
of Defence observed in late February 1951, with the agreement of Field Marshal Slim
and the Colonial Office, that "...no substantial progress has been made in Malaya. The
953 "'Federation plan for the elimination of the communist organization and armed forces in Malaya' (The
Briggs plan): report by the COS for Cabinet Malaya Committee, 24 May 1950," in A.J. Stockwell, Malaya,
Part II: The Communist Insurrection, pp. 221.
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number of incidents fluctuated from month to month, but there was no sustained
downward tendency." 954
The political atmosphere among the British administration, the Malay and
Chinese leaders had grown increasingly poisonous. The High Commissioner Gurney was
increasingly frustrated with the unwillingness or inability of the Chinese to contribute
substantially to the suppression of the revolt.955 Malay leaders continued to lobby for
increasingly harsh measures against the MCP and the Chinese population as a whole, 956
while Chinese leaders called for greater political representation in the form of
citizenship. 957
Phase 3: State Consolidation (February 1952-1960)
Explanations of British success in the latter part of the Malayan Emergency
typically focus on two elements: the Briggs Plan and General Templer, the charismatic
civil-military supremo who implemented it in full. The underlying assumption is that
Briggs Model 2 strategy was essentially sound, and that subsequent British success
depended on energetic execution of this formula and the inspirational leadership of
Templer.
954 Minister of Defence Shinwell, " Cabinet Office summary of a meeting at 10 Downing Street on 26 Feb
called by Mr. Attlee to consider the [Briggs] plan's slow progress, 27 February 1951," in A.J. Stockwell,
Malaya, Part II: The Communist Insurrection, pp. 277-278. For a similarly downbeat appraisal by a
General Harding, see "Cabinet Office summary of a meeting resumed on 12 Mar to consider the progress
of the [Briggs] plan, 13 Mar 1951," in Stockwell, pp. 283-285.
955 Gurney's most famous expression of these concerns was penned two days before his death. For the full
document, see " [Gurney's 'political will']: a note by Sir H Gurney expressing his frustration with the
Chinese community, October 1951" in A.J. Stockwell, Malaya: Part II: The Communist Insurrection, pp.
300-301.
956 Their proposals included mass deportation of Chinese populations, confiscation of property, and the
like. For details, see "Savingram no 83 from M V del Tufo to Mr. Lyttelton on meetings with rulers,
mentris besar and Chinese leaders, 25-28 October 1951 ," in A.J. Stockwell, Malaya: Part II: The
Communist Insurrection, pp. 302-303).
957 Ibid., Short, pp. 269.
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This narrative obscures the very significant shift in the content of British strategy
and policy in early 1952. The Conservative victory in British parliamentary elections in
October 1951, followed swiftly by the removal of all major local leaders of the British
campaign, set the stage for a shift from the one-way politics of Briggs Plan to the two
way politics of Oliver Lyttelton and Gerald Templer. While this new team built on
Briggs' administrative foundation and reaped the benefits of resettlement, it was their
recognition of the centrality of active Chinese cooperation that marked the decisive shift
of the campaign as a whole. Where the Briggs' Plan alone was a recipe for perpetual,
high cost, direct rule and rising ethnic tension, Lyttelton's new Model 3 policy and
Templer's deft implementation of it swung the Chinese population into the government's
camp and paved the way for the end of the Emergency.
The strategic search of late 1951 and early 1952 was the result of operational
stalemate and a series of political shocks. As noted above, the consensus view by late
1951 was that the Briggs Plan, for all its tactical successes, had reached a new and costly
plateau. While MRLA losses continued to mount in 1951, so too did the number of
MRLA attacks. What is more, the growing number of kills did not appear to have made a
significant impact on the guerillas' end strength. The first political shock came with the
death of the High Commissioner in an MCP ambush on October 6, 1951. Though
Gurney does not appear to have been the target of the ambush, 958 his death dealt a severe
blow to morale and leadership. With Briggs' retirement looming in December 1951, the
civil-military leadership of the campaign would soon be gone. The Conservative party's
victory in British elections in late October brought a major shift in Colonial policy and
personnel and a reassessment of the Malaya policy. James Griffith, the outgoing
958 Ibid., C.C.Chin, Hack, Dialogues with Chin Peng, pp. 156.
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Secretary of States for the Colonies, informed his successor, Oliver Lyttelton, that the
Attlee government had reached an impasse: "At this stage it has become a military
problem to which we have not been able to find an answer." 959 With Lyttelton's
replacement of the Commissioner of Police Gray in January 1952, there had been a clean
sweep of the local and metropolitan leadership.
Though most observers expressed frustration with the stalemate, their
prescriptions varied. Recently retired Field Marshal Montgomery expressed his opinion
that the outgoing civilian administration, including Gurney, had been excessively focused
on the political dimension:
It was commonly supposed that Gurney was good. It is natural that after his murder he should have
had a build-up; but this was not really justified. He was certainly a very good Chief Secretary in
Palestine 1946/47. But in Malaya he concentrated on the political problem; he was never able to
handle the bandit problem; he did not understand how to keep law and order in the Federation, and
he was unable to give clear guidance and direction. 96
Oliver Lyttelton, who spent the month of December 1950 assessing the situation on the
ground, came away with roughly the opposite conclusion. Emphasizing that the
Emergency was "in essence a Police rather than a military problem," he argued that
Chinese cooperation and a more effective and ethnically balanced Police force were the
keys to unlocking the problem:
If the present situation had to be summed up in one sentence it would run: "You cannot win the war
without the help of the population, and the Chinese population in particular, and you cannot get the
support of the population without at least beginning to win the war."... It is axiomatic that we must
gain the support and help of the Chinese population and involve them much more deeply in the
struggle. One of the greatest weaknesses today, which is unfortunately bound to persist for a long
time, is that the Police - both the Regular Force and the Special Constabulary - are overwhelmingly
Malay, while those whom they are terrorizing are overwhelmingly Chinese. In the face of this
959 James Griffiths as cited in John Cloake, Templer: Tiger of Malaya, The Life of Field Marshal Sir Gerald
Templer (London: Harrap, 1985), pp. 199-200.960 Field Marshal Lord Montgomery, "[Appointment of Templer]: letter from Field Marshal Lord
Montgomery to Mr. Churchill. Enclosure: "Success in Malaya', note by Montgomery (M/222, 2 Jan 52),"
in A.J. Stockwell's, Malaya: Part II: The Communist Insurrection, pp. 358-359.
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handicap it is hard to gain the confidence of the population, to increase the flow of intelligence and
to concert the proper counter-measures. 96'
In his official report on the trip, he laid out what would later become the core of the new
Malaya policy. 962 Some of these reforms were administrative: greater centralization of
the counterinsurgency effort under a new civil-military supremo, the appointment of two
deputies, one political and the other military, and the revitalization and retraining of the
police force. The weightiest elements, however, were explicitly political. Since at least
the 1920s, the central issue in Malayan politics had been the political status of Chinese
residents. Lyttelton realized that the resolution of the Emergency and the fate of an
independent Malaya depended on a mutually acceptable agreement on Chinese
citizenship and land tenure.
Templer, for his part, showed a keen understanding of the politics of exchange
and willingness to subordinate military strategy to political imperatives. Whereas
General Boucher had resisted civilian participation in strategy, seeking to subordinate the
police to military control and resist the imposition of restrictions on Army action, one of
Templer's first moves was to ask for clear political guidance from Churchill and the
Cabinet. Emerging from his personal interview with Churchill in January 1951, Templer
stated his appreciation of the problem to Lord Moran in these terms:
The military problem is nothing. The police question can be set right. The civil service difficulty
can be solved. What we have to do is to get the Malay and the Chinaman, with their different
languages and religions, the followers of Confucius and Islam, to say "This is our country. 963
961 Oliver Lyttelton, "'Malaya': Cabinet Memorandum by Mr Lyttelton. Appendices I-XV, 21 Dec 1951" in
A.J. Stockwell's, Malaya: Part II: The Communist Insurrection, pp. 322.
962 Lyttelton's December 1951 trip report is reproduced in full in A.J. Stockwell's, Malaya: Part II: The
Communist Insurrection, pp. 318-353.
963 Lord Moran, Churchill: Taken from the Diaries of Lord Moran (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), pp.
387.
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His openness to close cooperation with the civilian leaders inside and outside Malaya,
British, Malaya, and Chinese, made possible the development of the social coalition that
broke the back of the MCP from 1955 on.
What explains the choice of a Model 3 strategy in late 1951? First, civilian
leaders were actively engaged in the development of the new strategy. The record
strongly suggests that the Lyttelton/Templer plan was a conscious departure from the
Model 2 Briggs Plan, and that Lyttelton and the Colonial Office were its primary authors.
This civilian input was expressed in the selection of Templer 964 and reinforced by his
willingness to work with the civil authorities in Malaya and London. Second, the choice
was driven by increasing financial austerity. The British government remained
overextended, and Lyttelton realized that this made indirect rule and eventual
independence unavoidable: 965 "The influence of the British has now in fact to be
exercised by persuasion rather than direction." 966Equally important, the end of the tin and
rubber boom in 1952 meant that the windfalls of 1950 and 1951 would not be available in
perpetuity. A strategy based on the perpetual, direct rule of 25% of the Chinese
population was impractical; material escalation, either by London or Kuala Lumpur was
impossible. Third, Templer broke with the Model 1 and Model 2 frameworks of his
predecessors, correctly identifying political compromise as the heart of the problem.
964 Had others been chosen for Templer's position, the outcome might have been quite different. The
shortlist included General Sir John Harding, Marshal of the RAF, Sir Arthur Harris, General Sir B.
Robertson, Field Marshal Slim, Marshal of the RAF, Lord Portal, Lieutenant-General G C Bourne, and
Lieutenant-General Sir R Scobie (Source: Oliver Lyttelton,"[Appointment of Templer]: telegram no T6/52
from Mr Lyttelton to Mr. Churchill, 4 Jan 1952," in A.J. Stockwell, Malaya: Part II: The Communist
Insurrection, pp. 356).
965 Oliver Lyttelton, " "'Malaya': Cabinet memorandum by Mr. Lyttelton, 21 Dec 1951," in A.J. Stockwell,
Malaya: Part II: The Communist Insurrection, pp. 330.
966 Ibid., Lyttelton, pp. 321.
512
Many outsiders assumed that the appointment of General Templer as High
Commissioner and senior military commander, a British de Lattre, 967 would signal an
intensification of the military campaign. Instead, as Robert Thompson and Anthony
Short have noted, Templer's first moves in country were political.968 His first act as High
Commissioner was to read a directive, prepared by the Cabinet, the Colonial Office and
Templer himself, that laid out the new policy of the government. The directive stated
that the British government was committed to self-rule, a united Malaya, and common
citizenship. 96 9
Templer's subsequent actions demonstrated his commitment to a Model 3
approach. Whereas the early resettlement push had been dominated by the drive for
population control and the interruption of the links between the Min Yuen and the
guerillas, Templer began to address the political costs of resettlement. Early in his tenure
he began to address issues of land purchase and land tenure - items that would provide
the resettled communities with a greater degree of social and economic stake in the new
system.970 Similarly, Templer enacted a Village Charter that established local councils in
many of the "New Villages." These councils, elected by the Chinese residents, were
made responsible for local tax collection, and local administration. 971 This, combined
with the development of Chinese local self-defense forces, signaled a fundamental shift
in government policy towards the Chinese population. Whereas Gurney and Briggs
967 A number of observers inside and outside the government made explicit comparisons to de Lattre as
they considered the option of appointing a military leader to a unified civil-military post.968 Sir Robert Thompson, Make for the Hills: Memories of Far Eastern Wars (London: Leo Cooper, 1989),
pp. 98; Ibid. Short, "The Malayan Emergency" in ibid., Regular Armies and Insurgency, pp. 62.
969 "[Templer's instructions]: directive issued by Mr. Lyttelton on behalf of HMG, 1 Feb 1952," in A.J.
Stockwell's, Malaya: Part II: The Communist Insurrection, pp. 372-373.
970 Ibid., Short, pp. 340; ibid., Stubbs, pp. 339.
971 Ibid., Short, pp. 342, 402; ibid., Stubbs, pp. 189-190, 218-219.
513
tenure had been marked by rising tensions between the authorities and the Chinese,
Templer sought to relieve restrictions and promote cooperation. 972
Similarly, Templer increased the attention paid and funds devoted to amnesty
programs. Amnesty proposals had been discussed early in the Emergency but vetoed or
watered down by several powerful constituencies: Malay politicians, police and military,
and European settlers. All argued that amnesty enabled those responsible for the violence
to escape punishment for crimes against individuals and the society; the distribution of
monetary rewards for surrender was even more objectionable: "As one Australian soldier
remarked, the terrorists who were caught were treated like murderers, while those who
surrendered were 'treated like kings."' 9 73 Nevertheless, Templer endorsed Greene's "fair
treatment" pledge and the Surrendered Enemy Prisoner (SEP) classification which
enabled captured insurgents to escape punishment by cooperating with their captors.
Templer also supported large increases in the scale of the rewards offered for surrender or
capture of senior MCP leaders. 974 Though these amnesty programs did not have their
greatest effect until 1957 and 1958, Templer's enthusiasm demonstrated his belief that
military threats and credible guarantees of fair treatment were complementary; the former
provided the positive pressure and the latter the reassurance that defectors would be
shielded from retaliation.
Templer's decision to increase rewards and amnesty was a part of a larger effort
to provide positive incentives for Chinese cooperation. Across a range of issues, from
972 Simon C. Smith, "General Templer and Counter-Insurgency in Malaya: Hearts and Minds, Intelligence,
and Propaganda," Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 65-66.
973 Robert W. Komer, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful
Counterinsurgency Effort (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, February 1972), R-957-ARPA, pp. 74.
974 Kumar Ramakrishna, "'Bribing the Reds to Give Up': Rewards Policy in the Malayan Emergency," War
in History, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2002), pp. 341-342.
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deportation to collective punishment, Templer reduced the weight of coercive measures
in order to convince the Chinese community that they were not collectively the target of
state suppression. Templer's decision to declare "white areas" in which the most
restrictive Emergency measures were lifted once violence had fallen to an acceptable
level was the final expression of this partial relaxation of coercion. As Templer pointed
out, the conditional relaxation of food control and other measures gave the local
population a tangible stake in the maintenance of law and order:
There is no doubt that by strictest possible control of food supplies and restrictions on movement of
food, vehicles and individuals in certain areas and at certain times, we have imposed a great strain
on the CTs [Communist Terrorists]....It has however long been my feeling that it would give a great
fillip to morale if I could raise some of these irksome restrictions on the liberty of the individuals in
areas where...it could be safely done....A scheme of this sort might have considerable results.
Apart from its repercussions on public opinion outside Malaya, it might well have a great effect for
good on the local population here, encouraging those people in areas where restrictions are still, of
necessity imposed, to co-operate more freely with Government to remove the CTs so that they could
also reap the benefits of greater freedom. Quite apart from these aspects it is, I consider, essential
we should in any case keep ERs [Emergency Regulations] constantly under review.97 5
By selectively relaxing controls, Templer acknowledged that coercive direct rule
was necessarily temporary and that long run stability depended on the willing cooperation
or consent of a large portion of the Chinese population. Beating the MCP was as much a
question of reintegrating MCP members and supporters as it was one of finding and
eliminating them through direct military action.
Though subsequent observers have labeled Templer's agenda a "hearts and
minds" campaign, this has led to the impression that his appeal was based largely on
propaganda. In reality, the Lyttelton/Templer plan was had more to do with bargaining
than advertising; it established a set of quid pro quos at the local and national level
designed to reward Chinese cooperation. Chinese communities were given greater
975 Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, "[White area in Malacca]: inward savingram no 1480/53 from Sir G
Templer to Mr Lyttelton on a proposed relaxation of emergency regulations in part of the Settlement, 28
Aug 1953" in A.J. Stockwell, Malaya: Part II: The Communist Insurrection, pp. 469.
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political power and exposed to fewer acts of state coercion in return for political
participation and assistance in the fight against the MCP. Neither the Chinese/Malay
electoral alliance of 1955, nor the participation of Chinese citizens in the
counterinsurgency campaign, was a demonstration of new affective bonds between the
Chinese and the British or Malays. Instead, they represented a political compromise in
which the Malays received greater security and self-rule and the Chinese received
citizenship, land tenure, and conditional release from the harshest of the Emergency
regulations. [Persuasion through exchange, not persuasion through clever advertising]
Postwar interpretation: The "Lessons of Malaya"
The immediate impact of Malaya on British conduct in other insurgencies was
more limited than its prominence in our contemporary literature might suggest. As Hew
Strachan has noted, Malaya did not become a model for British counterinsurgency until
the late 1960s; 976 it was American observers who were more interested in lessons that
might be applied to the emerging conflict in Vietnam.97 7 While the British appeared to
replicate important successes in their campaigns in Borneo, 978 their conduct in Kenya
and Cyprus more closely resembled the disaster in Palestine.
To the extent that the British attempted to generalize the lessons of Malaya, their
reaction was to discount the significance of circumstance, late war Model 3 strategy, and
976 Hew Strachan, "British Counter-insurgency from Malaya to Iraq," RUSI Journal, December 2007, Vol.
152, No. 6, pp. 10.
977 John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-insurgency (London:
Faber and Faber, 1966).
978 The less frequently cited case of the British war in Borneo (1960-1964) is another example of the
successful integration of civilian leaders into the conduct of low-intensity, military operations. In Borneo,
as in Malaya, it was active civilian restraint that delivered political success; civilian insistence on limits on
cross-border operations against Indonesian forces left open the possibility of a face-saving end to the war.
For a detailed discussion of the Borneo campaign, see Christopher Tuck, "Borneo 1963-1966: Counter-
Insurgency Operations and War Termination," Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 2004).
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luck and overstate the importance of tactical or administrative routines. Three major
circumstances strongly favored the British in the campaign. First, the MCP insurgency
was limited to the Chinese population. Second, the MCP never obtained substantial
external support from Russia or China. Third, favorable geography meant that there were
no easy sanctuaries where the MCP could refit. Fourth, the Malayan economy's
dependence on cash crops made food denial operations unusually effective against the
rebels. Chance, in the form of the Korean War tin and rubber boom, played an equally
important part in cushioning the financial and political impact of Briggs' resettlement
push. Without the boom, the effect of resettlement might have been much closer to that
seen in Algeria.
Most accounts of the Malayan Emergency identify the Templer era as the turning
point without providing a compelling explanation of his contribution. The tendency has
been to treat the Briggs Plan as the blueprint for victory and Templer as a particularly
effective and energetic executor of that Plan. As noted above, this ignores the deep flaws
of Briggs formula with its singular emphasis on direct rule, population control, and food
denial. Lost in these accounts is any recognition of the political compromise drawn up by
Lyttelton and implemented by Templer. The British offer of independence in return for
recognition of Chinese citizenship and land tenure was the key to wining Chinese elite
cooperation in the Emergency and acceptance of the new order. The relaxation of
Emergency controls in "white areas" and the provision of land grants to rural Chinese
squatters brought major changes in Chinese status and political orientation. Without such
compromises on the local and national level, the Briggs Plan would have been a recipe
for open ended, authoritarian administration of resettlement camps by British and Malay
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leaders. The roles of Templer and Lyttelton are central to understanding the origins of
search and its result. Most accounts overemphasize the personal role of Templer while
neglecting that of Lyttelton. While Templer played an central role in the execution of the
policy, it was Lyttelton who selected Templer and Lyttelton and who altered the course
of the Briggs strategy. A civilian politician was responsible for changing the military's
course and bringing the Model 2 experiment to an end. It was not a case of the military
arriving at a second political epiphany on its own.
What the British military did retain was overwhelmingly tactical in nature. A
1952 primer sponsored by Templer and written by Walter Walker, The Conduct of Anti-
Terrorist Operations in Malaya (ATOM),979 was the most prominent example of the
obsession with tactical innovations. Like its close cousin, the United States Marine
Corps Small Wars Manual, the ATOM was a summary of standard solutions to the
challenges of small war in a jungle theater. While the manual included brief references to
the Briggs Plan and other strategic issues, it was essentially a collection of routines: how
to conduct jungle patrols, how to locate MCP bases, how to employ firepower, etc..
Though some of the routines were specific to the Malayan context or counterinsurgency,
the vast majority fell into the "dual use" category: routines or skills that were applicable
to both conventional warfare and counterinsurgency.
The retention of lessons of Malaya was, as the theory would predict, highly
selective. Favorable circumstances and random shocks were discounted, 980 while the
Model 3 elements of late war strategy were ignored or repackaged as ancillary elements
979 The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, Third Edition (1958) (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailey
Publishing, 2006).
980 Writing in 1966, Robert Tilman highlighted the fundamental differences between the British problem in
Malaya and the American one in Vietnam (Robert O. Tilman, "The Non-Lessons of the Malayan
Emergency
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of Briggs' Model 2 formula. By contrast, tactical routines were treated as decisive and
generalizable; their distribution in the form of the ATOM manual was the most
significant direct inheritance of the Malayan experience.
The British Cases and the Theory
Palestine and Malaya offer an important test of the external validity of the theory.
The British cases are distinct in a number of ways. They involved different national and
organizational cultures, different settings and different outcomes. Britain had not
suffered the same national trauma as France in the Second World War, and it might be
reasonable to assume that their more stable governmental situation would have produced
a different pattern of organizational learning. What is more, the British have generally
been considered the leading Western authorities on counterinsurgency, and many have
traced this to their ability to accumulate best practices and avoid the missteps of other
great powers.
What is striking is the degree of similarity between British and French responses
to insurgency. In spite of significant differences in national and organizational culture,
the British military faced the same cognitive and bureaucratic obstacles to functional
adaptation in the intrawar and interwar period. In Palestine and Malaya, the illusion of
familiarity led to a reflexive application of Model 1. The stimuli of insurgency triggered
an application of coercive force against the armed guerillas and crude attempts to cow the
population into submission or cooperation. In both cases, the small victories against the
insurgents led the British military into a learning trap; leaders assumed that strings of
tactical victories were proof of the effectiveness of Model 1 strategy. When confronted
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with stalemate or deterioration, the first response was exploitation: the refinement of
operational concepts and normative or material escalation. In Palestine, the campaign
collapsed at that stage as Britain withdrew and transferred responsibility to the UN.
In Malaya, after two years of small victories and a steady deterioration of
security, the military adopted a Model 2 strategy centered on population control. Even
this militarized form of politics was an uncomfortable fit for many in the British military:
As one observer noted,
The Army never felt comfortable in their role of supporting civil power; they were soldiers,
many of them said, fighting with one hand tied behind their backs. They were irritated by
the slow, methodical tactics of the police. For their own part, the police were becoming
irritated with the Army's superior attitude.
Operations were carried out on a basis of compromise between the police and military
methods. There was always divided authority on any large scale operation involving troops
and police. There was the inevitable clash between the soldier trained to deal with the enemy
by all means within his power in the quickest possible time, and the policeman trained to act
only after the fullest investigation and after convincing himself that he had got the right
person.981
The trigger for late war search were the high cost stalemate of the Model 2 Briggs Plan
and the wholesale leadership change that followed Gurney's assassination and
Conservative victory in London. The choice of a Model 3 strategy under Lyttelton and
Templer was shaped by the two factors predicted in the model: high levels of active
civilian participation in the formulation of strategy and policy, and mounting resource
pressures.
The interwar behavior of the British military was equally dysfunctional. In the
wake of each campaign, the interpretation of recent experience was distorted by
bureaucratic interests and the military operational code. Through the period, the British
defense establishment was concerned with maintaining the conventional readiness of the
981 Harry Miller, Menace in Malaya (London: Harrap, 1954), pp. 137 as cited in Komer, pp. 49.
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force and resisted counterinsurgent duties that might undermine it.982 While the
immediate pressure of other colonial uprisings in Cyprus and Kenya prevented a violent
swing from counterinsurgency to conventional war, the British military sought to
economize on hot counterinsurgencies in favor of conventional rearmament in cold
theaters.
Most important, the military operational code distorted the interpretation of
experience. Even after the British force ratios in Palestine reached the level of one
soldier for every five Jewish inhabitants, the most popular military explanations for the
failure of martial law were manpower scarcity and excessive civilian restraint. After
Malaya, the most popular explanation for the success was some combination of the
Briggs Plan and tactical innovation; local and national political concessions to the
Chinese and Malay communities in 1952 were generally ignored.
These professional beliefs proved remarkably durable. Field Marshal
Montgomery, a veteran of the Irish rebellion and the Arab Revolt, and the leading
proponent of escalation and martial law in 1947, reacted to midwar stalemate in Malaya
by casting blame on civilian restraint and the politicization of small war. Though there
were important exceptions to this professional misinterpretation, 983 the median response
of senior military leaders was remarkably consistent and dysfunctional. For every
Templer or Leclerc, there were four to five senior commanders wedded to Model 1 or
Model 2. Though lower level leaders may have been less rigid in this respect, these
beliefs were broadly shared and deeply held. The military operational code explains both
the rarity and instability of Model 3 strategies.
982 Ibid., Short, pp. 229.983 General Barker in Palestine and Field Marshals Slim and Templer are the clearest examples of Model 3
advocates among senior British military officers.
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Chapter 8
The Domestic Challenge: The Thai Insurgencies (1965-1983)
For almost two decades, the Thai state waged a campaign against Communist
insurgents on the northern and southern borders of the Kingdom. The Thai case offers
compelling evidence of the dominant patterns of learning dysfunction, their causal origins
and the leading sources of variation. In spite of substantial prewar investments in Model
2 population security and development projects, the Thai state responded to the outbreak
of resistance in 1965 with the Model 1 reflex. After a year of ineffective, large unit
operations against the guerillas, the Thais reassessed their strategy and moved to a Model
2 strategy loosely based on the Briggs Plan.
Continued deterioration of security and mounting military impatience led the
army to seize control of strategy in 1968 and embark on a Model 1 campaign. The army
pursued this strategy in all four of the major regional strongholds with the familiar tools
and predictable results. Large scale offensive sweeps and lavish use of firepower
produced positive tactical feedback but inflamed local tensions. For almost six years, the
army adhered to a Model 1 strategy as guerilla strength and the level of violence
continued to rise.
In 1973, a series of political and material shocks triggered a third reassessment
and a return to Model 2 strategy. The second period of Model 2 strategy failed to bring
about a collapse of the Communist insurgents; instead, the fall of Saigon in 1975 and the
return of military government in 1976 led to a rapid expansion in the scale and capability
of the insurgent forces. In 1979 and 1980, a new series of internal and external shocks
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set the stage for a final search. The resulting Model 3 strategy brought about the rapid
collapse of all three regional insurgencies.
The history of the Thai insurgency makes plain the role played by rival causal
beliefs about the relationship between violence and resistance. From 1965 through 1980,
most Thai military officers treated the insurgency as insignificant in scale and military in
nature. The solution to this military problem was the direct application of force. A
much smaller military faction drew inspiration from the British campaign in Malaya and
the advice of American civilian advisers; they saw the problem as one of administrative
coordination and population control. The third faction only emerged only after eight
years of steady deterioration in security; this third group reframed the challenge in terms
of political exchange - the provision of status and wealth to notables in exchange for
submission to state authority.
The Political Backdrop
Between 1965 and 1983, the Thai state rested on three pillars: the monarchy, the
bureaucracy and the military. Strong popular reverence for the monarch was the source
of authority in the political system, while the actual business of governance fell to a
highly centralized bureaucracy in Bangkok. The military was the strongest voice in the
bureaucratic system and its animosity towards the police was longstanding and politically
rooted.984 Military government was the norm during most of the period, with the only
period of civilian rule coming between October 1973 and October 1976.
984 Police and army competition for power in Thailand dates to the 1940s and 1950s.
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Thailand was composed of two large ethnic groups and a series of much smaller
ones. Some 53% of the population was ethnic Thai, while 27% belonged to the Laotian
group. The remaining ethnic minorities were the Chinese (12%), the Malays (4%), the
Khmer (3%), and various hill tribes (<1%). While ethnic Thais made up the majority of
the population, the regional concentration of these minorities along the borders of the
Kingdom set the stage for the outbreak of resistance in the mid 1960s. With the
exception of the Chinese, the ethnic minority groups were concentrated in specific areas
along the frontiers. Three of these ethnic groups, the Thai-Lao in the Northeast, the hill
tribes in the North, and the Malays in the South, would become the focal points of
insurgent activity between 1965 and 1983.
Single Sponsor, Single Agent, Multiple Insurgencies
The agent of Communist insurgency in Thailand during this period was the
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), a Sino-Thai movement with ideological and
financial ties to the Communist Party of China.985 While nearly all insurgents in this
period depended on CPT support and leadership, the rebellions were local in origin and
motivation. In the Northeast, the rebellion has an ethnic Laotian base and CPT cadre; the
primary motivation for rebellion appears to have been economic underdevelopment and
resentment of central government intrusion. In the North, the insurgency was again led
by CPT cadre but composed primarily of the ethnically and culturally distinct, Meo hill
tribes. In the deep south, the Communists mobilized a mix of ethnic Malaya separatists
and Chinese Communist fighters expelled from Malaysia at the end of the British
985 R. Sean Randolph, W. Scott Thompson, Thai Insurgency: Contemporary Developments (Beverley Hills:
Sage Publications, 1981), The Washington Papers, Vol. 9, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Georgetown University, pp. 10-13.
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Emergency. All three major rebellions shared common features. 986 Each developed in a
border region where Thai state authority was at its minimum and the terrain was at its
most forbidding. Each capitalized on specific local grievances and a general distrust and
resentment of Bangkok's authority.
The CPT appears to have launched its armed struggle in August 1965 in response
to orders from the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC).987 Whether the Chinese sought to
destabilize the Thai state or simply punish the Thais for offering air bases to the
Americans, there is strong evidence that the CPT's decision to launch armed struggle was
external in origin. 988 As prisoner reports would later reveal, the first wave of CPT cadre
were drawn from local communities, trained in North Vietnam at a training base near
Hoa Binh, and then reinserted to start the rebellion.989
986 There was a third and much smaller insurgency in the mid-South comprised mainly of Thai bandits.
The scale of the insurgency and its political dimension are small enough to exclude it from this account.987 George K. Tanham, Trial in Thailand (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1974), pp. 48-49;
Thomas A. Marks, Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam (New York: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 23.
988 R. Sean Randolph, The United States and Thailand: Alliance Dynamics, 1950-1985 (Berkeley: Institute
of East Asian Studies, 1986), pp. 84-86.
989 Jeffrey Race, "The War in Northern Thailand," Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1974), pp. 94.
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Thailand Phase 1: Phase 2: Phase 3: Phase 4: Phase 5:
(1965- Patterned Response Civil-Police-Military Army control and Instability and the Political Concession
and Small War (CPM): Population the Counter- Search for Solutions and State
Security and guerilla War Consolidation
Development
(8/65-12/66) (1/67-12/67) (1/68-10/73) (11/73-3/1980) (4/80-10/83)
Military Prapass Saiyud Kerdphol Tongcherm Prem Tinsulanonda Prem Tinsulanonda
Commanders Charusathiara Sangkhavanich (2 nd Army) (Prime Minister)
(2 nd Army) Chavalit
Aung Potigant (3 rd Yongchaiyud
Army) Saiyud Kerdphol
Strategy Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Operational * Search and * Communist * Search and * Self Defence * Prime Minister's
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Phase 1: Patterned Response and Small War (8/1965-12/1966)
Between 1960 and 1965, the Thai government sought to prevent the emergence of
resistance in the underdeveloped border areas of the North and Northeast. During this
period, several American agencies, including USAID, CIA, and the Army Special Forces,
funded and sponsored efforts to immunize the border regions using a mix of police
programs and economic development. 990 The theory behind these measures was to
extend the state's span of control and address perceived economic grievances. By
pushing government agents into previous ungoverned spaces, and spending government
monies on infrastructure development, the planners hoped to eliminate the breeding
grounds for violent resistance. 9 91 Thus, when the CPT attacks launched its first attacks
against police and village leaders in the summer of 1965, the primary state agents in those
areas were the Border Patrol Police (BPP) and the civic action teams - the Mobile
Development Units (MDUs).
In spite of this multi-year program of Model 2 immunization, the Thai state's
initial response to the outbreak of insurgent violence was to apply Model 1. In late 1965
and 1966, the army ordered battalion sized, cordon and search operations to flush the
guerillas out of their sanctuaries along the border. These operations involved the lavish
application of air support and artillery fire against suspected targets. 992 The Thai army's
diagnosis and prescription had clear roots in the military operational code. The stimulus
990 Ibid., Randolph, pp. 88-89.
991 Kusuma Snitwongse, "Thai government responses to armed communist and separatist movements" in
Chandran Jeshurun, Governments and Rebellions in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 1985), pp. 253-253.
992 Ibid., Tanham, pp. 86; ibid., Kusuma, pp. 256; Thomas A. Marks, "Thailand: Anatomy of a
Counterinsurgency Victory," Military Review (January-February 2007), pp. 38.
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of organized, armed resistance produced an illusion of familiarity. This in turn
influenced the military's judgments about the scale of the problem and the appropriate
treatment. If the rebellion was military in nature, then the scale of the challenge was a
function of the number and military capabilities of the guerillas. In comments to one of
his subordinates, the Army Commander in Chief and Deputy Prime Minister General
Prapass expressed a quintessential Model 1 perspective in December 1965:
If we divert enough resources to this effort we'll crush the communists in six months.993
Given the modest number of guerillas present, it was only natural to assume military
action and material escalation would enable the Thai state to prosecute an effective, low
cost campaign against these guerillas.
The results of these early operations were disappointing. Even though the army
managed to kill a number of guerillas, the majority escaped the unwieldy operations. The
indiscriminate application of force inflamed tensions among the local population. The
number of guerillas in the Northeast nearly tripled in the first year of the operations and
violent and non-violent resistance activity rose dramatically. As in the early phases of
the Algerian and Malayan campaigns, the army expressed its mounting frustration by
imposing collective responsibility on population. As one military observer noted,
military attitudes towards the population moved from simple indifference to active
intimidation:
Some people were impatient....Our programmes depended on winning people over to our point of
view and this often meant maintaining patience, sometimes with great difficulty. Especially when
the communists were using extreme terrorist methods, there were military people who wondered
why we should take so long. "Why not go in there, simply and quickly," they asked, "and use
military force to crush the insurgents?" In those days, area commands were in the hands of older
soldiers who did not understand what we wanted to do. I respect this older generation; they are my
brothers. But the military alone could not do the job, and occasionally punitive action only made
993 General Saiyud Kerdpol, The Struggle for Thailand: Counter-insurgency 1965-1985 (Bangkok: S.
Research Co., Ltd., 1986), pp. 13.
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matters worse. In one well-documented action at Ban Phon Ngam in the Northeast in 1966, for
example, women were raped, two men (one later found not to be a communist) were tortured, and an
unknown number of villagers summarily executed. 994
The early Thai response was a classic demonstration of the military operational code in
counterinsurgency. The stimulus of armed resistance was enough to undo several years
of Model 2 preparations. The resulting Model 1 strategy produced positive tactical
results and rapid deterioration on the campaign level. Army frustration with the elusive
guerilla opponents often spilled over into crude attempts to punish or intimidate local
populations into cooperation.
Phase 2: The Civil-Police-Military (CPM) Model: Population Security and
Development (Model 2)
The failure to contain the insurgency in 1965 and 1966 led to a year long trial of
Model 2 strategy. Thai strategy shifted from a direct attack on the guerillas to the control
of local populations. The choice of Model 2 was a function of at least four factors:
individual insight on the part of Saiyud Kerdpol, the precedent of the pre-1965 Model 2
programs, U.S. civilian advisory input, and the perceived lessons of Malaya. These made
Model 2 a ready alternative to the early and unproductive military campaigns of the first
year.
From the start, a small group of Thai military officers had seen the answer to
insurgency in Malayan style, population security - an approach they referred to as Civil-
Police-Military (CPM). The leading proponent of this new doctrine, Saiyud Kerdpol,
drew his inspiration from Briggs' Model 2 initiatives in Malaya and his two major
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994 Ibid., Saiyud, pp. 16.
innovations were the intellectual descendants of the British campaign. 99 5 The first was
the establishment of the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) in
December 1965 under Saiyud's control. Like the War Executive Committees in Malaya,
the CSOC was designed to coordinate the joint efforts of police, civilian administrators
and military. During this period, the CSOC functioned as an executive headquarters,
directing the employment of all forces, civilian, police and military, in a target area.
Saiyud's second step was to develop and implement a comprehensive plan to
defeat the insurgency. If the War Executive Committees were the model for the CSOC,
the Briggs Plan was the model for the 09/10 Plan. Using the existing infrastructure of
BPP teams and MDU civic action teams, Saiyud sought to secure a series of areas in the
Northeast (see figure below). As Saiyud would recount in a speech in 1969, the target of
government efforts was the local population rather than the guerillas:
CSOC came to understand very quickly the dangers inherent in attempting to rely on force alone in
suppressing the communist terrorists. We also realized that our goal should be not only to eliminate
the insurgents but also to win over the people to the government. Winning the people, in fact, is the
key to success....In this indirect approach, it is the people themselves who become the focus of
operations or the "target." 996
The key, in Saiyud's opinion, was to break the link between the population and the
guerillas through a mix of population control measures and small unit pursuit. Each
threatened village was to develop a Village Security Team (VSTs), and the state was to
provide additional security, economic assistance and psychological indoctrination. 997
While Saiyud's initial focus was squarely on the Northeast, the outbreak of resistance in
the North in late 1967 led him to develop a similar scheme known as Plan 09/10A.
995 George Tanham as cited in foreword to Saiyud Kerdpol, The Struggle for Thailand, pp. 5.
996 Ibid., Saiyud, pp. 42-43.
997 Ibid., Saiyud, pp. 27-28, 43-44; ibid., Kusuma, pp. 257.
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While Saiyud's 09/10 Plan produced important gains in the areas of village
security and development, these gains were not as rapid, decisive or permanent as his
sponsors had hoped. Many of the CPT guerillas were pushed out of the target areas, but
they were able to regroup and return at a later date. When villages were forced to
confront the return of the guerillas, they proved unequal to the task.999 The economic
elements of Saiyud's plans were based on a tenuous theory of influence. U.S. civilian
9 98 This map is drawn from Saiyud Kerdpol, The Struggle for Thailand, pp. 45.
999 Ibid., Kusuma, pp. 257.
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advisors and their Thai prot6ges had assumed that economic development would reduce
resistance and bolster state authority. In practice, the pre and post 1965 development
programs often failed to produce the anticipated political benefits. The state's centralized
provision of economic assistance produced new inequalities within and between regions;
in some instances local populations moved to threatened areas in order to capture the
perceived gains of these preferential aid programs. In still other instances, the guerillas
themselves claimed credit for attracting additional government investments. 1000 For all
these reasons, the simple theory of influence based on the technocratic distribution of
economic development aid seldom produced the anticipated increases in state authority.
Equally important, the introduction of the CSOC proved deeply unpopular with
the major regional commanders in the Thai army. As in the British War Executive
Committee system, the centralization of authority in the hands of an interagency
headquarters diluted the power and influence of the army commanders.
Phase 3: Army Control and the Return to Counter-guerilla War (1/1968-10/1973)
In October 1967, the Royal Thai Army reasserted direct control over the
counterinsurgency campaign. Although the CSOC nominally survived this transition,
control over the employment of military assets returned to the regional army
commanders.'l00 From 1968 through 1980, the CSOC served more as a coordinating
body than an operational headquarters. This change in organizational structure was
accompanied by a return to Model 1 strategy. Once in place, the Model 1 strategy would
persist for nearly six years.
1000 Ibid., Kusuma, pp. 253-254.
'00' Douglas S. Blaufarb, Organizing Counterinsurgency in Thailand, 1962-1970 (Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, August 1972), R-1048-ARPA, pp. 31.
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The decision to move from Saiyud's 09/10 Plan to a more direct, military
campaign was shaped by several factors. First, Saiyud's plan had not stopped the
expansion of the rebellion or produced visibly decisive results in the targeted areas.
While Saiyud had argued that the patient application of these methods would yield
results, the short term results did not support this position. Second, the majority of the
Thai army had never abandoned the Model 1 framing of the insurgency. In the military's
eyes, the solution to a small armed uprising was the more energetic application of
conventional force.
Third, the high command was uncomfortable with an arrangement that
subordinated senior military commanders to the interagency, CSOC headquarters. In a
state run by the army, an idea that upset the military hierarchy and advanced the interest
of other agencies including the police was highly suspect. Fourth, the move from Model
2 to Model 1 coincided with exponential increases in American military assistance and
troop presence. Though American servicemen did not participate in combat against the
Thai Communists, escalation in Vietnam brought a surge in U.S. military personnel and
investment at the major Thai airbases. Fifth, the decision to change strategy came while
task pressure remained low. Few in the Thai military or state considered the rebellions in
the Northeast and then the North immediate threats to state survival. 1002 The arrival of
American aid and American troops further dampened fear of the insurgents and the
incentives to act against them.
The expansion in U.S. troop presence and military aid influenced Thai strategic
choice in three ways. First, it lifted the material constraints on strategic choice. By 1967,
1002 Donald Nuechterlein, "Thailand: Another Vietnam?" Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No. 2 (February 1967), pp.
128.
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American military assistance had nearly doubled from a 1965 figure of $30.8 million to $
59 million. As one scholar has pointed out, this surge in aid may have reinforced
underlying preferences for a Model 1 approach: "military aid without proper
implementation based on an appropriate doctrine made little significant contribution [to
Thai counterinsurgency] and may have encouraged the stress on active/suppressive
measures by the Thai military."' 1003
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Second, the rapid expansion in military aid changed the balance of power within the Thai
state and the U.S. advisory effort. While American aid had been more balanced in the
years between 1960 and 1965, the new injection was overwhelmingly military in nature.
Earlier programs had funneled resources to the police and civic action programs; the
post-1965 funds flowed primarily to the Thai military and were administered directly
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through the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG). These changes reinforced
the influence of the Thai military in the counterinsurgency campaign at the expense of
police and civilian perspectives. Third, the surge in aid came in the form of military
hardware rather than manpower. 1004 As such, it gave the Thai military new tools to apply
American, firepower intensive doctrine.
The army's new strategy was unquestionably Model 1 in content. As noted
above, the CSOC was reduced to a coordinating body while real authority was transferred
to the Communist Suppression Operations Regions (CSORs) - commands that
corresponded to the existing Army level commands for the North, Northeast, Center and
South. Instead of a single, interagency plan to defeat the insurgency, the Thai army
pursued first two and later four separate regional campaigns whose content depended on
the views of the Thai high command and the regional commanders themselves. 100 5
One of the first major operations under the new order was a joint Thai/Laotian
army sweep from east to west designed to drive CPT guerillas into a screen line of Thai
border police (BPP) teams along the northern border. The large scale operations
increased the number of contacts with guerillas but cost the border police 10% of their
strength in the space of two months. With the loss of these highly trained, police cadre,
fluent in local languages and adept at small unit patrolling, the Thais had to rely on large
unit, conventional operations. Thai army operations involved a mix of aerial
bombardment, artillery fire and enforced evacuation of hill tribe settlements. This pattern
of operations made it nearly impossible for the BPP teams to remain in close contact with
local populations. In further recognition of the new prominence of the army in
1004 Ibid., Tanham, Trial in Thailand, pp. 152.
'005 Ibid., Tanham, Trial in Thailand, pp. 87.
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counterinsurgent campaign, all police operations had to be approved through the regional
army commander. 006
The army's assumption of control in the Northeast undermined the limited
successes of the 09/10 Plan. 1007 In the North, where the outbreak of violence coincided
with the army's assumption of control, Model 1 strategy set off an ethnic war between
Meo tribesmen and the Thai military. The army was no more effective in slowing the
growth in the guerilla forces than the CSOC had been; even as the army brought its
greater numbers and firepower to bear, the numbers of Thai government casualties rose
more quickly than the CPT losses. The estimated strength of the Communist guerillas in
1968 was 3,340; in that same year the Thai government killed 169 guerillas. By 1972,
guerilla strength had risen to 8,775 while the number of guerillas killed that year reached
309. In spite of these disappointing results, the Thai military persisted on this same basic
course for nearly six years. So long as the revolt remained on the periphery, and
Thailand was the recipient of lavish military assistance and a large, American troop
presence, there was little positive incentive to change strategy.
Conventional, large scale operations reached their apex in February 1972 with a
division level attack on a communist base camp near Phu Kwang in the North. The
month long operation, which involved 10,000 army troops, copious amounts of aerial
firepower and artillery, and a significant American advisory presence, ended in more or
1006 Jeffrey Race, "The War in Northern Thailand," Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1974), pp. 102-
104.
1007 Ibid., Saiyud, pp. 117.
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less total failure. The Thai army suffered between 300 and 600 casualties and reached
the core of the base area to find it deserted. 100 8
Phase 4: Instability and Search for New Solutions (10/1973-3/1980)
Several developments explain the Thai strategic search in late 1973. The first was
the trend failures of the Model 1 strategy of the preceding period. The Communist
rebellion continued to grow in the North and Northeast, while a new resistance movement
had begun to spring up in the south. Episodic failures such as the attack on Phu Kwang
reinforced the sense that material escalation was unlikely to arrest the deterioration in
security. Second, the American moves towards Vietnamization signaled the end of the de
facto American security guarantee. With North Vietnamese expansion and American
withdrawal, the Thais needed to confront the possibility of insurgent threats from the
Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese as well as the existing Chinese sponsored CPT.
The only immediate alternative to the Model 1 strategy was a return to some
variant of Saiyud's Model 2 formula. As Saiyud himself noted in 1977, the
ineffectiveness of Model 1 had become unavoidably clear by 1973:
... from 1971 to the uprising of 14 th October 1973, the army finally learned...the negative lessons of
a purely military approach to the problem. Throughout the second period, military sweep operations
contributed only to the statistics of clashes, killed and wounded. After this, the army had little
choice but to fall back on CSOC's CPM approach. 1009
While Saiyud's Model 2 formula was the only ready alternative, the CSOC
remained unable to influence the conduct of the regional campaigns directly. Instead,
1008 David Morell, "Thailand: 1972," Asian Survey, February 1974, pp. 170-171; ibid., Tanham, pp. 98;
ibid., Kusuma, pp. 256.
1009 Ibid., Saiyud, pp. 117.
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initiative in the counterinsurgency campaigns fell to the army leadership and the regional
commanders.1010
In the absence of a clear national plan, the most significant development in Thai
strategy was the appointment of the new, Third Army commander: General Prem
Tinsulanonda. Though Prem had had very little exposure to the insurgency problem prior
to assignment his assignment to the Northeast in 1973, he began to develop a Model 3
formula that would serve as the basis for the final war winning strategy of the 1980s.
Prem immediately recognized the seriousness of the situation and the bankruptcy of the
Model 1 strategies of his predecessors. 10 11 While his answer incorporated elements of
Saiyud's CPM model, he laid much greater emphasis on retail political engagement with
the traditional leaders of the region. Rather than simply extending the direct rule of
Bangkok, Prem sought to attract local leaders and incorporate them into a system of
indirect rule. The primary tools in this Model 3 strategy were de facto amnesty, financial
patronage and retail politics.
While Prem began to make significant progress in the Northeast, the chronic
instability of the civilian governments in Bangkok sapped much of the motive force from
the counterinsurgency campaign between 1973 and 1976. Civilian sought to rein in some
of the military's excesses, but did little to develop or implement a national alternative to
Model 1 or Saiyud's Model 2 solutions. In spite of this strategic drift, the growth in the
scale and intensity of the insurgency leveled off in the first three years of this
interregnum. Though the insurgents held far larger base areas than at the start of the
1010 Ibid., Tanham, pp. 157.
1011 William Warren, Prem Tinsulanonda: Soldier & Statesman (Bangkok: Eastern Printing Co., 1997), pp.
70-71.
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rebellion in 1965, they had yet to mount a significant challenge to state authority in the
Thai heartland.
Phase 5: Political Concession and State Consolidation (4/1980-10/1983)
Between 1975 and 1979, the Thai state was buffeted by three political shocks.
Vast increases in task pressure and resource scarcity combined to drive the Thai military
towards a Model 3 campaign of state consolidation. The first came in April 1975 with
the fall of Saigon and Phnom Penh and the collapse of the American defense relationship.
1012 This map is drawn from Saiyud Kerdpol, The Struggle for Thailand, pp. 228.
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The rise in North Vietnamese power raised the specter of increased insurgent activity and
even conventional threats to the state. The failure to renegotiate a bilateral agreement on
American assistance and troop presence in Thailand in early 1976 left the Thai state with
no ally to counter rising internal and external threats.1013 Though the Thais sought to
hedge their risks by normalizing relations with Beijing in 1975, this partial thaw did not
bring an immediate end to the Chinese relationship with the CPT.
The second shock was the Thai military coup of October 1976. Mounting
concerns about the internal external security of the Kingdom led the Thai military to
overthrow the civilian government. Unlike many Thai coups, the 1976 coup turned
violent and 42 students were killed and some 200 wounded in clashes at Thammasat
University. 10 14 The immediate impact of the crackdown was to drive an estimated 2,000
students and an additional 2,000 rural Thais into the arms of the CPT. 01 5 The rapid
expansion in the scale of the insurgency added still more pressure to develop some
effective solution to the internal threat.
The final shock came in December 1978 with the Vietnamese invasion of
Kampuchea. The prospect of 150,000 and 200,000 North Vietnamese troops on the
borders of Thailand forced the Thais, Chinese and Americans to re-evaluate their
response.1016 Vietnamese expansion led the Chinese to cut ties with the CPT and focus
their energies on funding the Khmer Rouge remnants seeking refuge in Thailand. The
Americans began to consider a resumption of military aid to the Thais. From the CPT's
1013 R. Sean Randolph, pp. 194-199.
1014 Frank C. Darling, "Thailand in 1976: Another Defeat for Constitutional Democracy," Asian Survey,
Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 12 7 .
1015 Ibid., R. Sean Randolph, W. Scott Thompson, pp. 30.
1016 William Turley, Jeffrey Race, "The Third Indochina War," Foreign Policy, Vol. 38 (Spring 1980), pp.
92.
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point of view, the North Vietnamese invasion was a disaster. The war brought CPT's
longtime sponsor, the PRC, into conflict with the North Vietnamese and their Path Lao
allies, the powers controlling the insurgents' major sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos.
Rising frustration among the young Thais who had joined the movement after 1976 only
amplified these strains and led many of these urban recruits to surrender to the
government.
The choice of Model 3 strategy in 1980 was a product of Prem's insight and an
increasingly precarious internal and external environment. In the Northeast, Prem had
witnessed first hand the limits of Model 1; in his five years as Third Army commander,
he had found consensual political engagement with existing local leaders to be more
profitable than brute force or direct rule. Prem was supported by a two reformist factions
in the Thai army, the Young Turks and the Democratic Soldiers, both of whom advocated
a renewed focus on the political dimension of the counterinsurgency campaign.' 0 17 The
rising threat of direct or indirect Vietnamese aggression made internal consolidation
imperative. This step change in task pressure made it easier for Prem and other
proponents of Model 3 to overcome cognitive and bureaucratic resistance to their new
formula. Though the Americans had begun to take an interest in Thai defense after a five
year hiatus, the Thais lacked the resources to pursue a Model 1 escalation. The final
element was the opportunity provided by the CPT's rising difficulties.
Prem announced his new strategy on April 23, 1980 in Prime Minister's Order
66/2523. The plan had two major elements. The first was the explicit subordination of
1017 Leading members of the Young Turks and the Democratic Soldiers had witnessed firsthand the failure
of American Model 1 strategies during their tours in Vietnam. The Young Turks saw the answer in a
Model 2 solution while the Democratic Soldiers emphasized the consensual accumulation of political
support.
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military operations to what he called a "continuous political offensive." ' 1 8 As he had as
regional commander in the Northeast, Prem's answer lay in expanded political
participation and indirect rule. His object was "to transform the armed struggle into a
peaceful means."' 0 19 The tangible expression of this political offensive was a generous
amnesty offer - the so-called "Open Arms" policy in which former insurgents were
pardoned and often rewarded with positions of authority. The second prong of the
offensive was military. Eager to take advantage of the CPT's weakness and division,
Prem ordered a series of offensives against the exposed CPT bases in the North and
Northeast. As military pressure mounted, the release valve was the amnesty program.1020
While the hallmark of Prem's political offensive was the "Open Arms" amnesty
policy, it was simply the most visible element a larger attempt to forge a "social
contract" 1' ' 021 between the state and the inhabitants of the border regions. The government
curtailed abuses by troops, police and soldiers. At the same time, the state offered
existing political leaders, including former insurgents, status and funds. Previously
marginal groups were offered posts in the civil service and local administration. State
funded, patronage networks gave local leaders a stake in the suppression and prevention
of violence. Stripped of its support among the population and particularly the traditional
local elites, the CPT was unable to maintain its power in the base areas. Prem's social
contract was a means of binding the border regions to the center through "structural
1018 Prem Tinsulanonda as cited in Sarochna Robbamrung, "Internal Security, Kingdom of Thailand,"
USAWC Military Studies Program Paper, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1987), pp. 1.
1019 Prem as cited in
1020 Ibid., Kusuma, pp. 261, 266.
1021 Duncan McCargo, "Behind the Slogans: Unpacking Patani Merdeka," in Duncan McCargo (ed.),
Rethinking Thailand's Southern Violence (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2007), pp. 3;
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corruption" and expanded participation in local governance. 1022 General Chavolit,
Prem's deputy in the strategy, embarked on a campaign of retail politics in the Northeast
and the North to secure the cooperation of the populations which had supported the CPT
rebellions.
In the space of just over three years, the CPT rebellions collapsed under pressure
from Prem's primarily political strategy. As the graphs of insurgent strength and activity
show, mass surrenders drove the number of insurgents from a 1979 peak of 12,000 to
1,800 by 1984; during the same period, violent and non-violent insurgent activity
plummeted to twenty year lows. The progress was so sweeping that the state announced
in October 1983 that they had scored a "complete victory" over the Communist
insurgents.1023
The Thai Case and the Model
The theory predicts that militaries from different national and organizational
cultures will behave in essentially the same manner when exposed to the stimulus of
insurgency. Militaries will respond to insurgency by applying Model 1 solutions. When
Model 1 produces mixed feedback, the first recourse will be exploitation not exploration.
When exploration occurs, Model 2 is the most likely result - militaries will tackle the
problem of mass politics by forcing it into the logical framework of battle. Model 3
strategies will be the last to be embraced by military leaders; they are likely to emerge
only after Models 1 and 2 have been repeatedly demonstrated to be bankrupt. During
interwar periods, the disappearance of task pressure will lead to a selective purge; tactical
1022 Duncan McCargo, "Thaksin and the Resurgence of Violence in the Thai South" in McCargo,
Rethinking Thailand's Southern Violence, pp. 39-41.
1023 Ibid., Saiyud, pp. 184.
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routines, particularly "dual use" routines will be retained while Model 2 and particularly
Model 3 strategies will be jettisoned.
When militaries depart from these dominant patterns, it will be the result of
changes in the specified variables. Some combination of high task pressure, high civilian
participation and resource scarcity will be necessary to push militaries towards Model 3
solutions. Model 3 equilibria are inherently unstable; even small increases in resources
or dips in task pressure or civilian participation, will encourage militaries to revert to
more congenial Model 1 or Model 2 strategies. Finally, we should expect to see the
influence of the causal constants and independent variables expressed through the
specified causal mechanisms.
The Thai case strongly supports the core predictions of the theory and suggests
that the explanatory range of the theory may be relatively high. If learning behavior
varied by national or organizational culture, or based on the distinctions between
domestic and expeditionary counterinsurgency, then we would expect the Thais to
respond differently. Instead, the Thai case reveals striking similarities between the
organizational responses of a small, Asian state and two European, imperial great powers.
The same cognitive and bureaucratic obstacles that impeded learning and retention in the
expeditionary counterinsurgencies of France and Great Britain are clearly present in the
Thai case.1024
In spite of tremendous differences in context and organizational culture, the
adaptive path followed by the Thai military mirrors that of the French and British. The
initial Thai response was reflexive. In spite of five years of Model 2 investments in the
1024 Further examination of other Asian insurgencies such as those in Burma and the Philippines would be
required to establish this finding with greater certainty.
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North and Northeast, the Thai military reacted to organized resistance by applying Model
1 strategies: large unit attack on the guerillas to break the enemy and intimidate the
population. When a year of this treatment failed to slow let alone roll back the progress
of the rebellion, the Thais flirted with a Model 2 alternative that drew on U.S. funded,
prewar programs. This liberal experiment collapsed under the pressure of rising guerilla
action and massive infusions of American military aid. The reversion to Model 1 lasted
from 1968 to 1973. Falling resources and rising task pressure explain the subsequent
march from Model 2 (1973-1979) to Model 3 (1980).
Even after Prem's Model 3 strategy delivered a decisive victory over the
insurgents, the Thai state appeared unable or unwilling to retain the most important
strategic insights of the campaign. General Saiyud, the leading Thai proponent of Model
2, remained deeply suspicious of Prem's reliance on amnesty. When violence again
erupted in the Thai south in 2004, the Thai state responded in much the same way they
had in 1965. The progress of Thai strategy in this new rebellion had an amnesiac
quality; a military that had learned to resolve rebellion in the same area in the 1980s
applied the strategies of the 1960s with depressingly familiar results.102 5
The two causal mechanisms most closely associated with the military operational
code were clearly present in the Thai case: the illusion of familiarity and learning traps.
The illusion of familiarity explains both the Model 1 reflex of 1965 and the 1968
reversion to this solution. The opinions expressed by Thai military leaders in 2004 betray
the same underlying logical difficulties. When confronted with armed resistance, most
officers saw the familiar outlines of interstate war; having framed resistance in military or
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criminal terms, they measured the scale of the challenge by counting the number of
armed opponents.
Learning traps were equally prominent in the Thai case. When Model 1 solutions
were applied, the results were typically mixed; guerillas seldom won engagements
initiated by government forces and these "small victories" typically inflicted damage on
the inhabitants and their property. The overweighting of positive military feedback and
the underweighting of political intangibles reinforced the military's attachment to Model
1 strategy. Micro-success and macro-stalemate made escalation in scale, firepower and
ruthlessness the logical next step. When the Thais pursued Model 2 strategies, they fell
into a slightly different learning trap. Having accepted the importance of politics, the
Thais, like the French in Algeria and the British in Malaya, struggled to measure their
progress in this new domain. Compared with battlefield results, the allegiance of the
population was intrinsically more difficult to measure. This difficulty was compounded
by the coercive nature of Model 2 strategy; local populations were unlikely to express
their genuine preferences to the government wardens who controlled their security and
material survival. For these reasons, leaders tended to focus on measures of performance
rather than measures of effectiveness. Rather than measure political opinion, they used
their own benevolent acts as proxies for political progress. The number of roads, schools
and dispensaries built, the number of indoctrination sessions held, and the like were held
up as proof of government authority. Like the French in rural Algeria between 1957 and
1962, the Thais fell prey to what David Hackett Fischer has called the "quantitative
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fallacy." Unable to measure opinion, they fell back on "the idea that the facts which
count best count most:"'10
26
Often the ultimate objective of changing people's attitude to one that was favorable to the
government was forgotten in favor of the more tangible yardstick of quantitative accomplishment,
such as so many kilometers of roads built, so many wells dug and so many visits by the health
team. 1027
By focusing on their own performance of tasks rather than their intangible effects on
local opinion, Thai leaders systematically overstated the effectiveness of Model 2
strategy. Until 1980, they tended to equate control and authority, only to be repeatedly
surprised by the reemergence of resistance in previously "pacified" areas.
The Thai case also demonstrates the power of resource swings to influence the
timing and result of strategic choice. The massive surge in American material assistance
between 1967 and 1973 strongly influenced the decision to break with Saiyud's Model 2
strategy in favor of Model 1. When the flow of resources was reversed in the mid 1970s,
the Thai military was forced to explore less profligate alternatives. All three resource
mechanisms were present: budget constraints, resource weighting of influence, and factor
input effects. Budget constraints were absent in the early stages of the insurgency but
were increasingly significant from 1973 on. So long as the scale of the threat was small
relative to the resources available to combat it, the Thai military preferred to apply Model
1. In the late 1970s, however, the rising threat of direct or indirect Vietnamese
aggression meant that the Thais lacked the resources to prosecute a Model 1 or even
Model 2 campaign against the CPT. Resource scarcity narrowed the set of feasible
strategies and made Model 3 the only untested option. Similarly, American military aid
amplified the voice of the military in counterinsurgent strategy - a classic example of the
1026 David Hackett Fischer, Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York:
Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 90.
1027 Ibid., Kusuma, pp. 253.
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resource weighting of influence. Before 1965, when resource flows were modest, and a
significant portion of those flows went to the police as opposed to the military, the
military was first among equals in the counterinsurgency realm. Once JUSMAG's
military assistance budgets dwarfed the aid flows from the CIA and USAID, the Thai
military and its U.S. military advisers dominated strategic choice. Under these
circumstances it is hardly surprising that the rising tide of military aid swept away the
foundations of Saiyud's Model 2 strategy and replaced it with a classic Model 1 formula.
The composition of American military aid was also very significant. During the
aid surges of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the vast majority of the American aid came
in the form of capital equipment: helicopters, artillery pieces, armored vehicles, etc.. The
provision of tools whose only utility lay in the realm of conventional combat accelerated
the swing from Model 2 to Model 1. Presented with shipment after shipment of
hammers, the Thai military spent a decade looking for nails.
The Thai case is also useful for what it shows about swings in task pressure.
Unlike the French and British cases, the Thai case involved a domestic threat to the
regime. In theory, task pressure can be thought of in crude, categorical terms. If task
pressure is a function of the threat to state survival or interests, then it is at its maximum
in domestic insurgency, its midpoint in expeditionary insurgency, and its minimum in
peacetime. In practice, however, task pressure is more continuous. Rebellions are most
likely to erupt in areas where state control and state interests are at their minima. While
the Thai state was more intimately concerned with affairs inside its borders in 1965 than
France was with events in Indochina in the late 1940s, unrest on the periphery did not
elicit a strong response until it posed a clear threat to state survival. As task pressure
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ratcheted up with a series of political shocks - American withdrawal, North Vietnamese
victory, and the invasion of Cambodia - the Thai military began to take greater interest in
solving the insurgency. It was this dramatic escalation in task pressure, combined with
relative resource scarcity and Prem's individual insight, which explains the dramatic shift
to Model 3 strategy in 1980.
The Thai case also illustrates the soporific effect of military control over
counterinsurgent strategy. With the exception of the period between 1973 and 1975, the
Thai army controlled the both the state and the military. Consequently, the search for
counterinsurgent strategy took place within the army cloister. This professional
monopoly explains the very long delays in exploration between 1968 and 1973 and 1973
and 1980. As in the French and British cases, Model 2 and Model 3 advocates were rare
in the overall military population. Under these conditions, the process of promotion and
leadership selection tended to drive the military back towards the institutional presets
and, by extension, Model 1 strategy. Over a fifteen year period, the only senior
commanders who showed strong, a priori Model 2 or Model 3 leanings were Saiyud,
Prem, and Chaovalit. Consequently, there was a strong tendency for Thai strategy to
oscillate between Model 1 and Model 2 with Model 1 emerging as the preferred strategy
of the median senior commander.
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General Saiyud's reaction to the collapse of the CPT insurgency in the 19080s
provides additional evidence of the power of the military operational code and its
incompatibility with Model 3. As the graph above shows, the CPT collapsed as a result
of mass surrender rather than battlefield attrition; the ratio of CPT surrendering to CPT
killed in action rose from 3:1 in 1979 to 40:1 by 1983. The historical record strongly
suggests that this was the product of internal tensions within the CPT, increased military
pressure, and a generous and credible amnesty. Writing two years after the collapse of
the CPT, however, General Saiyud argued that the mass surrenders were a Communist
plot to survive the campaign and subvert the Thai state:
From the military standpoint, the new [Communist] strategy thus implies a major adjustment in the
CPT's approach to warfare that requires a movement of its armed cadres from the jungles and hills
to the plains, towns, and cities as quickly an inexpensively as possible. This shift has been
considerably facilitated by the government's "open arms" policy towards communists. In fact, it is
reasonable to assume that the major so-called 'surrenders' have taken place largely at the initiative
of the CPT as a means of implementing its changed strategy. At the same time, government policy
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has served to inflict damage on the party and limit its operations to a degree which the party
leadership had probably not foreseen. But the CPT is attempting to remedy the situation.,028
Whereas Model 3 advocates such as Generals Prem and Chavalit were comfortable with a
solution in which former insurgents were granted amnesty and political status in return
for submission, General Saiyud was deeply suspicious of any outcome that involved the
transformation of onetime enemies into citizens. This split interpretation highlights the
philosophical gulf separating Models 2 and 3. For Model 2 the key is direct control and
individual roles, particularly among the insurgents, are regarded as fixed; tools designed
to move individuals from one end of the resistance spectrum to the together, such as
amnesty or positive rewards, are viewed with some mix of skepticism and revulsion. For
Model 3 advocates, by contrast, the object of the struggle is to convince individuals and
groups to rejoin the state's coalition through some mix of force and targeted concession.
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1028 Ibid., Saiyud Kerdpol, pp. 168.
Chapter 9
Conclusion: The Theory and its Rivals
Two puzzles motivate this study. Why do militaries struggle to develop effective
counterinsurgency strategies? Why doesn't their performance improve across successive
counterinsurgency campaigns? The first chapter lays out the most common existing
explanations for military learning dysfunction in counterinsurgency. The second chapter
develops a new theory, one that seeks to explain the origins and persistence of particular
patterns of intrawar and interwar learning failure. The theory contends that the problem
is not one of insensitivity or sloth; the historical record shows that militaries are active
but dysfunctional learners. Instead, a specific set of professional beliefs and bureaucratic
preferences distort military response and adaptation, producing dysfunctional patterns of
intrawar adaptation and interwar retention. These two causal constants explain the
existence of dominant patterns; a small number of independent variables, notably
resource scarcity and civilian participation, explain deviation from these patterns.
Ironically, militaries choose the most effective counterinsurgent strategies when their
choice is severely constrained.
The second part of the study examines the validity of this new theory using a
series of historical cases. Chapters Three, Four and Five trace the development of French
counterinsurgent strategies from the start of the Indochina War through the withdrawal
from Algeria in 1962. In each of these chapters, we examine the French strategic choice
at a series of decision nodes in an effort to explain strategic change and strategic stasis.
Chapter Six evaluates the fir between the theoretical predictions of the model and the
observed behavior.
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In Part III of the dissertation, we examine the external validity and explanatory
range of the theory using three shadow cases. While the French cases demonstrate the
role of the military operational code, bureaucratic preferences and independent variables
in explaining strategic choice, they do so within the confines of a single national and
historical tradition. The three shadow cases, two British and one Thai, suggest that the
theory and its predictions travel across national boundaries across the divide separating
domestic and expeditionary counterinsurgency. Confronted with the common problem of
insurgency, French, British and Thai military leaders responded in remarkably similar
and dysfunctional ways.
Rival Theories and the Cases
In Chapter One, we divided the leading explanations of learning dysfunction in
counterinsurgency into three categories: experience, culture, and constraints. As noted in
Chapter One, many of these "folk theories" of learning dysfunction are plausible but
thinly supported. The range of cases examined in this study further undermines these
alternative explanations. We find no compelling evidence in the five cases that these
alternative theories explain the observed patterns of behavior. Where they predict
variation on the basis of culture or experience, we see similarity. Where they predict
negative relationships between constraints and strategic choice, we see the opposite: the
blessings of scarcity and compromise and the curses of abundance and ruthlessness. In
short, the six cases in this study weaken the empirical validity of the most common
explanations for intrawar and interwar learning dysfunction.
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Experience? Serial Amnesia
Many studies of counterinsurgency suggest that learning dysfunction in
counterinsurgency is a function of experience. Learning failure is chalked up to a lack of
experience, the overwhelming influence of the "last war," rational expectations of
conventional war, an inability to process raw experience into usable lessons, or simple
insensitivity to experience. Successful learning, defined in terms of improved initial
response, wartime adaptation and interwar retention, is seen as a product of a given
military's stock of counterinsurgency experience, similar challenges in the "last war,"
expectations of counterinsurgency, robust learning processes and high receptivity to
change.
Neither the French nor the British cases support the hypothesis that task
performance increases with experience. Both militaries had faced a series of insurgent
challenges dating back to the 18 th century with mixed results. Both national traditions
had produced major and widely distributed works on the problems of colonial
rebellion. 1029 In all four cases (Indochina, Algeria, Palestine and Malaya), the militaries
had extensive experience in the specific areas where the rebellions broke out; in each case
the counterinsurgent power had previously waged either an insurgency (Malaya) or a
counterinsurgency (Indochina, Algeria, Palestine) in the same geographical area. This
experience base did nothing to improve the initial response, subsequent adaptation or
interwar retention. In all four cases, the militaries responded to the outbreak of violence
1029Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey, Du r6le colonial de l'armie (Paris: Armand Colin, 1900); Joseph-
Simon Gallieni, Gallieni au Tonkin (1892-1896) par lui-meme (Paris: ); Henry d'Ideville, Marichal
Bueaud, d'apres sa correspondence intime et des documents inidits, 1784-1849, Tome Premier (Paris:
Librarie de Firmin-Didot, 1881); Colonel C.E. Calwell , Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, Third
Edition (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996); Major General Sir Charles Gwynn, Imperial
Policing (Edinburgh: MacMillan & Co., Ltd, 1936); H.J. Simson, British Rule, and Rebellion (London:
William Blackwood & Sons, Ltd., 1938).
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with Model 1. The French and the British both responded to Model 1 stalemate with
exploitation - some mix of process improvement and escalation. Although the
experience in Indochina and Palestine underline the limits of small war, they emerged
from these Model 1 defeats only to apply the same formula in the opening rounds of
Algeria and Malaya.
The military with the least direct experience in counterinsurgency, the Thai
military, responded in much the same way. Fighting a counterinsurgent campaign in
their own territory meant that the state and military were very familiar with the insurgent
groups they confronted. Their close observation of the insurgency in Malaya and their
intense interest in the First and Second Indochina wars did nothing to help them
overcome the obstacles to initial response, subsequent adaptation or retention. While the
Thais eventually won their two decade campaign against the CPT, this did nothing to
shield them from the Model 1 reflex in 2004.
The popular "last war" hypothesis proves equally suspect. While the French
response in Indochina could be linked to the World War II experience, it is telling that
Leclerc's 1945 reconquest was the high water mark of French strategy in Indochina. If
the "last war" syndrome were the cause of the Model 1 fixation in Indochina, we would
expect to see it in the initial response. Similarly, the ostensible case for a "last war"
response in Palestine must be qualified. The British army had fought a
counterinsurgency campaign between 1936 and 1939 in the same territory and was very
familiar with the leaders and armed groups of the later Jewish insurgency. In spite of this
very recent experience in the theater, they responded to violence with a Model 1 strategy.
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But it is the second campaigns of the French, British, and Thais that demolish the
"last war" hypothesis. With less than a year separating the end of their first and second
counterinsurgency campaigns, the French and British applied the unsuccessful Model 1
strategies of the previous episodes. In the Algerian case in particular, we have ample
evidence that the military had identified the weaknesses of the Model 1 approach and still
failed to apply their Model 2 recommendations for over two years. Though the first and
second Thai episodes were separated by two decades, the result was essentially the same.
An experienced military applied a Model 1 solution rather than the winning Model 3
strategies of the "last war."
Rational expectations of conventional war do little to explain this pattern of
behavior. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the French and British
leadership were squarely focused on the problem of colonial consolidation. It was not
until the late 1940s and early 1950s that the Cold War challenge introduced a clear
tradeoff between major conventional war and colonial campaigns. In Palestine and
Indochina, both powers expected colonial unrest and responded in ways they deemed
appropriate. In 1948, on the eve of the Malayan Emergency, there was nothing to
indicate an immediate conventional threat on the European central front. In Algeria, the
French disregarded clear warnings of imminent rebellion in North Africa, preferring
instead to reorient their military efforts towards the more distant but conventional and
atomic challenge of great power war in Europe.
Learning dysfunction appears to have little to do with information flows or the
processing of lessons. There is almost no support for the argument that the French,
British or Thai armies were organizationally inert. All three dedicated significant energy
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and resources to improving the mobility, firepower and precision of their forces. The
French and British both excelled at extracting the tactical lessons of Model 1
campaigning; the lessons learned studies and doctrinal publications of the 1950s show an
intense interest in change at the level of routines. This ferment at the routine level stands
in sharp contrast to stagnation and mean reversion at the strategic level. All three
militaries improved their ability to apply violence. All three failed to improve their
understanding of the relationship between the application of violence and mass politics.
The experiences of all three powers strongly suggest that the problem was not one
of information processing in the mechanical sense; the real issue was what was learned,
what was ignored, and what was expunged. Guessing the shape of the next war is
inherently difficult; it requires that the observer not only understand causation in one
episode but identify the relevance to a separate episode.030 If this is true, then we
should expect interwar adaptation to be fraught with error and that those errors should be
widely distributed. What we see in French, British and Thai cases is fundamentally
different. Instead of being widely or randomly distributed, the interwar errors of all three
militaries were essentially identical. The similarity of the strategic responses, adaptive
problems and selective retention indicate that some underlying, shared trait or traits are
producing similar outcome across a range of ostensibly dissimilar militaries and
circumstances.
1030 William Fuller, "What is a Military Lesson?" in Bradley Lee (ed.), Strategic Logic and Political
Rationality: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 38-59.
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Culture? Variation Predicted and Absent
One of the most popular explanations for variation in learning performance is
national or organizational culture. According to this line of argument, variation in beliefs
and preferences will lead nations and organizations to respond differently to the same
stimulus. If this is true, we should expect to see wide variation in initial response,
intrawar adaptation and interwar retention on this basis. Some militaries should
outperform others within a given domain and these performance advantages should be
traceable to specific beliefs, preferences, or historical experiences. In the conventional
historiography, sharp contrasts are typically drawn between British military proficiency
in counterinsurgency and French ineptitude.
The cases examined here do not support these propositions. Where national and
organizational culture arguments predict variation in organizational response we find
instead nearly universal conformity. French, British and Thai militaries produce the same
initial responses and encounter the same problems with intrawar adaptation and interwar
retention. Median military leaders from all three traditions behaved in strikingly similar
fashion.
Constraints? The Blessings of Scarcity and Costs of Brutality
Another familiar explanation of learning failure focuses on the role of external
constraints. The argument is that militaries could improve their performance in
counterinsurgency if only they were given sufficient resources and full freedom of action.
Armed with additional manpower, materiel, and freed from the constraints of civilized
warfare, militaries would be able to crush resistance in short order.
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Resources? Manpower Surplus and High Cost Failure
As noted in Chapter One, there is very little empirical support for widely held
belief in the positive relationship between manpower levels and success in
counterinsurgency. The cases examined here further undermine the Quinlivan
hypothesis: the notion that successful stabilization demands a minimum of 20 security
forces for every 1,000 inhabitants. While there is abundant evidence in the Indochina,
Algeria, Malaya and Thai cases that low force ratios are associated with the outbreak of
insurgency, there is almost no evidence that massive reinforcement is an effective
treatment once fighting has erupted. French Algeria and British Palestine are near perfect
illustrations of the limits of manpower escalation. In French Algeria, French force levels
peaked at around 612,000 in a country whose Muslim population was nine and a half
million. If the force ratio is calculated using the total Muslim and pied noir population,
the Quinlivan ratio is 58.22. If the ratio is calculated using only the Muslim population
as a base, the ratio rises to 64.55. If we exclude the two million Algerian Muslims
confined in resettlement camps at this time, the ratio reaches 82.69. All these figures are
three to four times the Quinlivan threshold of 20.
In Palestine, the British sought to extinguish Jewish resistance by weight of
numbers. In the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939, Whereas British force ratios in the Arab
Revolt of 1936-1939 had peaked at 22.7, they reached 61.8 during the Jewish Revolt of
1945-1947. Here again, this is a conservative estimate of the forces employed against the
subject population. If the ratio is calculated using the Jewish population alone as a base,
the force ratio rises to 197 security forces per 1,000 inhabitants - almost ten times the
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Quinlivan threshold. Incredibly, the British military's faith in numbers was undiminished
in the aftermath of this experiment. With one British soldier for every five Jewish
inhabitants of Palestine, a number of British officers argued that they had lacked the force
levels necessary to enforce martial law.
Even in the less extreme cases of British Malaya and Thailand, the positive
contributions of manpower appear to have been overstated. In both cases, the increase in
the number of security forces did not translate into major gains until Model 3 strategies
were adopted. The Briggs stalemate (1950-1951) and the Thai stalemate (1965-1979)
suggest that simple reinforcement is seldom the path to the suppression of violence let
alone the restoration of political authority. What is more, misplaced faith in the power of
numbers delayed the search for Model 3 strategies in both cases. Search was an
afterthought so long as additional reinforcements remained available.
Scruples?
Other authors have argued that constraints on the use of violence are the
fundamental obstacle to success in counterinsurgency. If states are free to use violence,
then they can eradicate their opponents and cow the population into submission. When
these choices are removed in order to preserve public support for the campaign, militaries
are unable to resolve the problem of resistance. If these arguments are valid, then we
should expect to see three things. First, restrictions on the use of violence should impede
learning and task performance. Second, the absence of restrictions on the use of violence
should be associated with improved learning and task performance. Third, the same
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generalizations should hold within cases; sharp increases in the use of violence should
translate into counterinsurgent gains.
The cases examined here suggest that these ideas are false. In practice, nominal
restrictions on the use of violence against insurgents and civilians were routinely
circumvented, particularly in the early phases of each campaign. In Indochina, Algeria,
Palestine, Malaya, and Thailand, militaries often relaxed restrictions on the use of
violence without guidance from civilian authorities. The presence of early state terror in
every case undermines the notion that military choice is heavily constrained.
Nor were the most permissive periods associated with durable gains in security.
The case of French Algeria is an illustration of the limits of coercion. The escalation of
state terror, including the use of resettlement, torture, summary executions, and free fire
zones, increased pressure on the insurgents at the cost of alienating the target population.
The combination of staggering force levels and extensive use of violence by security
forces did not translate into an improved outcome. Instead, such strategies appeared to
solidify opposition to the state, forcing the counterinsurgent to maintain high levels of
force in perpetuity simply to maintain the stalemate.
Within each case, increases in state coercion tended to inflame the situation rather
than resolve it. Informal terror tended to be at its maximum in the early stages of each
case. Such strategies were generally unsuccessful in the extreme; insurgent force levels
and violence tended to rise in response to counterinsurgent excesses. Official efforts to
increase coercion, as in the middle phases of Algeria and Malaya, did not produce the
desired results. While resettlement, food control, and other instruments of population
control could break the physical links between the population and the insurgents, the
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collateral political damage made it difficult to capitalize on the military gains. While
guerillas tended to suffer, opposition among affected populations rose in parallel. Instead
of breaking the guerilla movements, such Model 2 strategies tended to produce new, high
cost stalemates.
By contrast, moves to curb collective responsibility were strongly associated with
improvements in security. When the authorities curtailed the use of coercion, or relaxed
it in return for submission, the results were often beneficial. Effective restraint was
associated with rapid improvement in a number of the cases. Under the
Lyttelton/Templer policy in Malaya, the relaxation of collective responsibility led to
increased Chinese support for the government, major decreases in insurgent violence and
a surge in surrenders. In the Thai case, the mass surrenders of the early 1980s followed a
conscious effort to curtail the use of violence against civilian populations. This appears
to be the common theme connecting the collapse of the Communist insurgencies in
Malaya and Thailand. The turning point in each case was the announcement of
individual and collective amnesty provisions and a conditional relaxation of state
coercion on the subject populations.
The Theory and the Cases
Part One of this study presents a new explanation for the puzzles of learning
dysfunction in counterinsurgency. The military operational code, a set of deeply held
professional beliefs, leads militaries to misunderstand insurgency. Confronted with mass
violence, militaries classify insurgency as a subspecies of war and apply their repertoire
of proven strategies and measures. This illusion of familiarity leads to inappropriate
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response, delayed strategic search and distorted late war interpretations of politics. When
militaries do come to understand what effective counterinsurgency demands, they dislike
the solution. A category of conflict that undermines the organization's core interests in
resources, autonomy and prestige proves deeply unpopular on a bureaucratic level.
Organizational revulsion explains the slow adoption of winning strategies in times of war
and their rapid elimination in times of peace.
The relative weight of these two causal influences, one cognitive and the other
bureaucratic, depends on the level of task pressure. Task pressure is defined as the threat
the insurgency poses to state survival or vital state interests. When task pressure is high,
as in many cases of domestic insurgency, militaries subordinate bureaucratic preferences
to problem solving and the influence of the military operational code is dominant. When
task pressure disappears in the interwar period, long term bureaucratic preferences
emerge as the leading influence on organizational retention with the operational code
playing a supporting role. When the state is engaged in expeditionary counterinsurgency,
and task pressure is at an intermediate level, the military operational code is the leading
influence and bureaucratic preferences play a supporting role.
The Dominant Patterns
In wartime, the military operational code produces a dominant pattern of learning.
Seeing in mass violence the familiar outlines of interstate war, militaries believe are
confident they understand the task. This illusion of familiarity leads them to apply Model
1: the small war solution to internal resistance. Under these strategies, the military seeks
to kill or capture the guerillas and cow the population into submission. Model 1
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strategies typically produce a combination of tactical success and campaign stalemate.
The military typically wins most tactical engagements but fails to make cumulative
progress in reducing violence or enemy end strength. This sets up a learning trap in
which small victories and skewed performance weighting reinforce the attachment to an
ineffective strategy. The military responds to stalemate with exploitation: a mixture of
process improvement and material and normative escalation.
When the exploitation response fails to produce results, militaries often shift from
small war (Model 1) to political war (Model 2). The focus of the campaign shifts from an
attack on the guerillas to population control. The military targets the population and
employs a new range of tools including economic development and psychological
operations. While the shift from Model 1 to Model 2 involves significant changes at the
strategic and operational level, it retains the underlying coercive framework of the
operational code. The military addresses the political dimension of insurgency by
militarizing politics. As in Model 1, the object in Model 2 is to apply positive and
negative sanctions to compel unilateral submission.
While Model 2 strategies increase pressure on the guerillas and the population,
they seldom produce stable, low cost state control. Effective prosecution of political war
is even more manpower intensive than small war against the guerillas and success in
suppressing violence can lead to a new, higher cost stalemate. Frustration with the
incomplete resolution of the insurgency or the cost of maintaining that order, typically
leads militaries to return to some form of military escalation. Unable to master the
political domain, militaries return to the battlefield in the hopes that some combination of
population control and renewed attack on the guerillas will deliver victory.
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Militaries seldom adopt Model 3 strategies voluntarily. Generally it takes some
combination of prolonged failure, resource scarcity and high civilian participation to
force such a choice. The greatest conceptual leap is from Model 2 to Model 3 and the
results of that leap are the least stable. Militaries must unlearn the militarized politics of
Model 2 and learn the entirely novel paradigm of political exchange. This new strategy is
incompatible with the military operational code and the underlying bureaucratic
preferences of the military. When the constraints on choice are lifted, either by the
provision of additional resources or the disappearance of task pressure, militaries are
quick to purge Model 3 strategies.
The Theory and the Evidence
The theory provides an explanation with far greater validity and explanatory
range than its rivals. Examination of the five episodes in this study reveals far more
similarity than dissimilarity in military responses to counterinsurgency. The military
operational code and its associated mechanisms are evident in every case. The French,
British and Thai militaries all succumbed to the illusion of familiarity in the early phases
of their campaigns. All saw the answer to rebellion in some form of small war on the
guerillas; all initially discounted the significance of the population. In Indochina,
Algeria, Palestine, Malaya and Thailand, early Model 1 response produced the same
paradox of small tactical victories and campaign stalemate. A narrow focus on military
measures of effectiveness, combined with implicit assumptions about the permanence
and cumulative nature of the "small victories," led to an exploitation response. Rather
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than search for alternatives, militaries refined existing strategies and increased the level
of resources and decreased restrictions on the use of force.
In every case save the abbreviated British campaign in Palestine, Model 1
exploitation was followed by the adoption of some Model 2 strategy based on population
control.1031 Under Model 2, the military occupational code produced a different learning
trap. Unable to measure the political effects of their strategies, militaries measured the
performance of their own specified tasks: civic action, psychological operations,
resettlement, etc. The shift from measures of effectiveness to measures of performance
reinforced militaries' attachment to Model 2 solutions.
In the three cases where militaries adopted full blown Model 2 strategies, the
result was a different kind of high cost stalemate. In Algeria, Malaya and Thailand,
militaries found that population control could suppress or at least contain violence. The
problems were cost and open ended commitment. Such measures required large
commitments of troops and once these measures were put in place it proved difficult to
remove them without reigniting resistance. In Algeria, de Gaulle's recognition of this
dilemma led to a late Model 3 gamble and failure. In Malaya, Lyttelton and Templer
forged a Model 3 solution based on concessions to Chinese and Malaya leaders and local
Chinese communities.
Task performance played in decisions to explore alternative strategies. Militaries
seldom searched for alternatives so long as they believed that they were succeeding or
that exploitation could translate tactical success into campaign victory. Prolonged
stalemate occasionally prompted strategic change. In Algeria, Salan's inability to roll
1031 I include Indochina here because Salan started significant experiments in population control under his
in 1952 and 1953.
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back FLN progress in 1958 that precipitated de Gaulle's Model 3 concessions and the
later Challe offensives. In the Thai case, however, we see how long stalemate and even
trend failure can persist before search is undertaken. Between the outbreak of the
insurgency in 1965 and the change of government in 1973, the Thai military pursued a
course of Model 1 exploitation broken only by a one year, Model 2 experiment. Trend
failure was somewhat more effective in stimulating search. Serial relapses in the pacified
areas of Tonkin between 1950 and 1953 prompted Salan's Model 2 experiments and
Navarre later return to Model 1 campaigning. Sustained deterioration in security in
Algeria between 1956 and 1957 did prompt a shift from Model 1 strategy to Model 2.
Episodic failure was the rarest but most powerful spur to action. The shock of
Suez in 1956 paved the way for the Model 2 transition of Salan. The death of Gurney in
Malaya in October 1951 set in motion the chain of events that would lead to Model 3
strategy by early 1952. The fall of Cao Bang in 1950 in Indochina case offers a twist on
this effect. This catastrophic defeat opened the door for search, but de Lattre chose to
forgo a change in strategy in favor of renewed exploitation of Model 1.
While failure often prompted exploration, it did little to influence the result. Here
civilian participation and resources played the most important roles. High levels of
civilian participation increased the chances that initial response would be conscious
rather than patterned. In the early phases of Indochina and Algeria, high levels of civilian
involvement led to important Model 3 initiatives. Civilians forced military leaders to
explain their choice of Model 1 and for a time managed to impose Model 3 alternatives.
Parallel evaluation of performance was clear in four of the five cases. In Indochina,
Algeria, Palestine and Malaya, civilian leaders produced very different evaluations of
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performance than their military peers. Civilian administrators were more attuned to the
political costs of successful military operations and more willing to entertain notions
concession on the national and local levels. Civilian familiarity with norms of political
exchange made them more likely to advocate Model 3 solutions. Politicians accustomed
to logrolling were more likely to arrive at quid pro quo solutions to political violence
than military leaders accustomed to simple compellance. It is not accidental that the
major amnesty initiatives and proposals for political engagement in Indochina, Algeria,
Palestine, and Malaya had their origin in civilian circles.
Resource levels played a powerful role in shaping strategic choice. Whereas the
conventional wisdom holds that resource abundance is the key to success in
counterinsurgency, the cases suggest the opposite. Militaires chose Model 3 solutions
only under the pressure of resource scarcity. When manpower and military equipment
were abundant, the overwhelming temptation was to resolve the problem of rebellion
through the application of force. This curse of abundance was evident in all five cases.
In Indochina the surge of reinforcements in 1946 helped unravel Leclerc's Model 3
condominium. In Algeria, the surge of reinforcements and a spike in rebel violence in
the summer of 1955 undermined Soustelle's Model 3 strategy and paved the way for a
disastrous Model 1 escalatory cycle. In Malaya, the expansion of the military forces and
police between 1948 and 1951 served as a substitute for strategic thought. In Thailand,
the geyser of American military assistance between 1967 and 1973 explains the
regression of Thai strategy and the resulting attachment to Model 1 theories of victory.
When resources were too scarce to support Model 1 or Model 2 strategies,
militaries were often forced to explore Model 3 solutions. Extreme scarcity helps explain
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Leclerc's embrace of Model 3 strategy in 1945. Similarly, Soustelle appears to have
gained a Model 3 toehold because the French military did not yet possess the resources to
pursue a comprehensive Model 1 campaign across Algeria. The Thai case offers the
clearest evidence that sharp downturns in resources, particularly when they are
accompanied by rising threats, can force militaries towards political solutions to
rebellion. As the figures on American assistance show, the Thai military clung to Model
1 strategy as long as military aid and American troop presence were high. Once both had
been removed, and North Vietnamese advances had increased task pressure, the Thais
chose a Model 3 strategy based on amnesty and a new social contract between the center
and the border regions.
On rare occasions, changes in resources and civilian participation worked at cross
purposes. When resources and civilian participation rose together, it tended to increase
civil-military friction. In 1955, Soustelle sought to impose Model 3 strategies as the pace
of French reinforcement accelerated. In that case, rising resources translated into rising
military influence and Model 1 escalation was the result. Five years later, de Gaulle's
Model 3 advocacy collided with high resource levels and Model 2 strategy of General
Challe. Here again the result was civil-military crisis. In cases where civilian
participation and resources fell in tandem, resources emerged as the dominant influence.
In Thailand in the late 1970s, steep declines in resources and rising external threats meant
that the Thai military had to find some lower cost solution to the CPT problem.
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Contributions of the Study
Good social science explains the existence of important behavioral patterns and
the origins of change. This study addresses the problems states face in ending rebellions.
This problem is ancient and the patterns enduring. If rebellion is as old as authority, then
the problems of restoring authority are just as old. Although the challenge is very old,
state and particularly military responses appear curiously static and dysfunctional.
Militaries consistently struggle to develop effective responses to insurgency. Stranger
still, they seem unable to apply insights gained in one campaign to similar problems in
the future.
While there has been steady progress in the study of rebellion, the study of the
restoration of authority has lagged considerably. After a surge of serious academic
inquiry in the 1960s and 1970s, the systematic study of counterinsurgency entered a dark
age populated almost exclusively by memoirs, single case studies, national histories and
practitoners' cookbooks. While the raw material for serious inquiry into
counterinsurgency accumulated, the field remains a theoretical wasteland. Consequently,
the gap between our understanding of why men rebel and why men obey again has only
widened over the past two decades.
This study seeks to close this gap by explaining the choices states make and their
effects. In so doing, it seeks to correct the historicist bent of the field that has sought
explanations for broadly shared, professional dysfunction in the particular features of
single cases or single national traditions.
The explanation that I develop here has significance outside the narrow
boundaries of insurgency. It resides at the perilous intersection of the study of ideas and
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material interests. One of the central insights of this study is that military choice cannot
be explained in purely ideational or purely material terms. Instead, it is the interaction of
beliefs and material preferences that explains the dominant patterns of organizational
learning and important deviations from those patterns.
This study supports the recent arguments about the limits of objective control in
civil-military relations. '032 The restoration of state authority demands active civilian
participation and military cooperation with civil government. While this level of
cooperation forces the military to surrender a significant amount of autonomy, this
compromise is essential if states are to fashion durable, low cost solutions to the problem
of authority. In the absence of civilian input, militaries are likely to pursue self-defeating
strategies based on counter-guerilla war or the militarization of politics.
The study also validates important insights of the existing literature on military
innovation. Task pressure and civilian intervention appear to be central to explaining
strategic choice. ' 033 Similarly, the absence of appropriate measures of effectiveness does
impede wartime learning.'034
While this study supports these findings, it departs from the orthodox
explanations in others areas. While most studies of military innovation have focused on
major changes in doctrine or strategy and excluded tactical innovation, this study argues
that the two categories of change compete for the finite attention and resources of the
organization and the state. The exploitation of existing strategies and the exploration of
new ones are competitive goods, and exploitation generally holds an important advantage
1032 Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime (New York: The
Free Press, 2002).
1033 Ibid., Posen, pp. 233.
1034 Ibid., Rosen, pp. 114, 121.
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in this competition. Second, this study suggests that innovation in counterinsurgency is
more difficult than innovation in other military domains. Innovation often forces
entrepreneurs to confront existing stakeholders. But even in the most heated internal
disputes over mission priorities and community interests, the military operational code
remains largely undisturbed. Factions can argue about the most efficient and effective
ways to apply violence to an opponent. But very seldom do they question the utility of
force or the relationship between its exercise and mass political behavior. Effective
adaptation in counterinsurgency requires militaries to overthrow or at least suspend the
most basic causal beliefs and frames of their profession. They must abandon the simple
causal beliefs and measures of battle in favor of the ambiguity of politics. In the realm of
counterinsurgency, then, it is the specific content of the innovation and its incompatibility
with deeply held beliefs and preferences that explains the failure to adopt optimal
strategies.
Third, optimism about military led, peacetime innovation appears misplaced.
Absent the immediate pressure of war, militaries will not develop the strategies and
measures of effectiveness necessary to tackle similar problems in the future. Instead,
they will devote considerable effort to expunging the most important lessons of
counterinsurgent strategy. They will do so because they the solutions are incompatible
with their causal beliefs and deeply threatening to their most basic organizational
interests in autonomy, resources, and prestige.
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